a* $m mm *ts THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THREE VOLUMES VOLUME THREE ./2> THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1783-1919 EDITED BY SIR A. W. WARD, Litt.D., F.B.A. AND G. P. GOOCH, M.A., Litt.D. VOLUME III NEW YORK THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 1923 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN PREFACE THE concluding Volume of this History may seem to some of our readers to make its appearance too soon, seeing that on many of the transactions narrated or questions discussed in it the time has not yet arrived for expressing a definitive judgment. Public archives are thrown open, and private memoirs made known in rapid succession, to a breathless world; and at the very moment when this Preface is being written, the Foreign Policy of our country, seemingly at a standstill of unprecedented perplexity, may be on the eve of changes not less momentous than any discussed in the ensuing pages. But there can be no reason for abandoning the conviction with which this work was first taken in hand, that a study of British Foreign Policy, based on authentic documents, is indispensable for an insight, however incomplete, into the problems engaging that Policy at the present day, and that the existing responsibilities of its conductors to the welfare of our nation and empire, and to the Peace of the World, cannot be dissociated from the lessons taught by history as to the endeavours and the failures of the past. Moreover, since the period of European and World politics falling under the particular range of our Third Volume may fairly be described as a period of Congresses and Conferences, designed to adapt the international relations between the Powers Great and Small to changes brought about by conflicts between Alliances formed in the interests of particular States, so the future may have in store an age in which those interests will be reconciled under the control of other interests common to the whole body of States and peoples, and in subjection to the predominant interest of them all — the Peace of the World. The establishment and development of such a system, only partially and tentatively antici- pated in the efforts and experiments of previous periods, will in that event inevitably become the cardinal task of British Foreign Policy. For Great Britain and her empire cannot stand aside or play a merely acquiescent part. They have been called by their history to the position of the foremost among European World Powers, and are consequently authorised to take a leading part in working out what promises to be the next chapter in the destinies of the World. The present Volume has, like its predecessors, benefited by the VI PREFACE interest taken in the progress of this History as a whole by friends and well-wishers, among whom we should specially like to repeat our acknowledgments to Lord Fitzmaurice, to the Right Hon. Sir Ernest Satow, G.C.M.G. and to Dr H. Hall, late Assistant Keeper of the Public Records. The private papers of the late Sir Andrew Buchanan, G.C.B., with the loan of which we were favoured by his relatives, and more especially Mr Henry Mellish, of Hadsock Priory, Worksop, have continued to be serviceable. They include a Corre- spondence extending from November 9th to December 15th, 1870, concerning the repudiation by Russia of the obligations imposed upon her by the Convention of March 30th, 1856, together with certain Letters of the previous October, showing Sir Andrew to have been fully aware already at that time, and even earlier, of Prince Gorcha- kofFs intention to press the wishes of Russia upon the European Powers at the earliest opportunity. The Wallace Papers, the generous loan of which to us for the purposes of this work, has already been gratefully recorded, contain a number of Letters belonging to the period from June, 1894, to March, 1896, to Sir D. M. Wallace, from Sir Valentine Chirol, when correspondent of The Times at Berlin, which are of singular interest and have of course been referred by us to their writer, the distinguished contributor of Chapter IV to the present Volume. As Mr Algernon Cecil's summary analysis in the Table of Con- tents will show, the Chapter (VIII) on The Foreign Office in this Volume, from its own point of view, covers the whole ground of our work. Its proper place seemed, therefore, to be at the end of the narrative chapters (including the Epilogue, which deals, for many reasons in summary fashion, with the course of the World War and the circumstances and conditions of the Peace which brought it to a close). The complex task of critically surveying a field at once so wide and in several respects so contentious called for independence of judgment as well as fulness of knowledge. In acknowledging the advantages derived by our contributor from distinguished expert information and counsel, we desire, on his behalf as well as on our own, to state explicitly that no responsibility of any sort rests with those to whose assistance he is indebted. With this proviso, we are requested by Mr Algernon Cecil to acknowledge the kind assistance of the Earl of Balfour, K.G., late Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Chancellor of our University, the late Lord Sanderson, G.C.B., Lord Carnock of Carnock, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Sir Algernon PREFACE vii Law, K.C.M.G., C.B., Sir W. E. Davidson, K.C.M.G., C.B., the Marquis of Lansdowne,K. G., the Right Hon. Lord Robert Cecil, M.P., Lord Eustace Percy, M.P., Lady Gwendolen Cecil, and others. Our thanks are again due to Miss A. D. Greenwood, a I historian in her own right, for supplying the Index to this Volume as she has to its predecessors ; to Mr A. T. Bartholomew, Assistant Librarian of the University, for varied help, and to Miss Pate, for her indefatigable aid in preparing this Volume for the Press. Finally, in once more recording our gratitude to the Syndics of the University Press, and to the whole body of its workers, for entering upon and carrying through the publication of this History, we cannot but call to mind at least one side of the very serious difficulties with which of late they have had to meet in all their under- takings. In the Preface to our Second Volume we referred to the lamented death of the late Secretary of the Syndicate, Mr A. R. Waller, whose work has since been taken up by a trusted successor. More recently, the death of the University Printer, Mr J. B. Peace, Fellow of Emmanuel College, has inflicted another grievous loss upon our Press and the University whose best interests it serves. May we add that the sorrow which these events have caused through- out the Press, and the sympathy with which has been shared by the University at large, attest the intimacy of cooperation long notable in the history of an institution indissolubly bound up with the past, present and future of Cambridge ? A. W. W. G. P. G. March, 1923 CORRIGENDA Vol. II. p. 16, 1. ii from bottom. For Chapter III read Chapter VI. p. 430 note. For C. IX read C. VIII. p. 525, note 1, line 2. For ceded in return read retained possession of. Vol. III. p. 203, line 27. For as read a*. p. 505, line 4. For of Belgium read io Belgium. p. 538, line 9. For Kamel read Kemal. p. 556, line 9. For between read zwZ/z. CONTENTS BOOK IV FROM THE THIRD MINISTRY OF LORD DERBY TO THE FIRST MINISTRY OF LORD SALISBURY, 1866-1886 CHAPTER I NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 A. Neutrality in Continental Affairs 1866-1874 By C. R. M. F. CRUTTWELL, M.A. Fellow and Tutor of Hertford College, Oxford I. The Austro-Prussian War and the Conference of London, 1 866-1 867 Attempts of Liberal Cabinet to prevent War. Abortive French Proposal for European Congress. Derby's Government maintains Neutrality. The Luxemburg Incident. Franco-Prussian War averted by Conference of Lon- don. Value of Collective Guarantee page 3 II. The Abyssinian Expedition, 1868 Attitude of Theodore towards British Demand for Release of Captives. The Rassam Mission. Organisation and Results of the Expedition . 16 III. The Franco-German War, 1870 Liberal Foreign Policy outlined by Gladstone, 1869. Increasing Friction between France and Prussia. Clarendon's Attempt to negotiate a Limitation of Armaments. Reasons for its Failure. Death of Clarendon. Granville at the Foreign Office. The Hohenzollern Candidature. Abortive Negotiations. Allegation that Great Britain could have prevented War examined. British Policy towards Belgium, 1 866-1 870 20 IV. The Franco-German War and the Conference of London, 1871 The Treaties to secure Belgian Neutrality. The League of Neutrals. The Thiers Mission. Alsace-Lorraine. The GortchakorT Circular. Odo Russell and Bismarck. The Conference of London. Its Results considered. The New Orientation of Europe 40 x CONTENTS B. Sea-Policy and the Alabama Claims By Professor J. E. G. de MONTMORENCY, M.A., LL.D., Peterhouse Quain Professor of Comparative Law in the University of London Outbreak of the North American Civil War, April, 1861. The Political and Social Repercussion in Great Britain of the War. The War at Sea. The Position in Liverpool. The s.s. Alabama [No. 290]. Inaction of Lord John Russell. Action of Mr C. F. Adams (United States Minister in London). History of the Anglo-American Doctrines of Contraband, Blockade and Neutrality. Tension in 1870 between Great Britain and the United States. The High Joint Commission of 1871. The Treaty of Washington, 1871. The Three Rules of Neutrality. The Indirect Claims. The Geneva Arbitra- tion, 1872 54 CHAPTER II FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION 1 874-1 885 By WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON I. The "Forward" Policy in Central Asia, 1874-1880 The Indian North- West Frontier Problem. Relations with Afghanistan. The Russian Advance. Acceptance of the Oxus as the Northern Frontier of Afghanistan, 1873. "Forward" Policy proposed by Lord Salisbury and resisted by Lord Northbrook (Viceroy), 1875. Appointment of Lord Lytton. The Peshawur Conference. Growing Distrust of the Ameer, Shere Ali. Russia concludes a Treaty with Afghanistan. Repulse of a British Mission to Kabul. Ultimatum and Invasion of Afghanistan and Treaty of Gandamak, May, 1879. Massacre of the British Mission at Kabul, July, 1879. Settlement of the Country under Abdur Rahman . . . . . . 72 II. The Reopening of the Eastern Question, 1 875-1 877 Revolt in Herzegovina and Bosnia, July, 1875. The Andrassy Note, December 30th, 1875 '■> Joint Acceptance by the Powers. Inaction of the Porte. The Berlin Memorandum, May 13th, 1876; its Rejection by the British Government. Deposition of Abdul Aziz and Succession of Abdul Hamid II. The Bulgarian Atrocities, May, 1876, and Gladstone's Crusade. The abortive Constantinople Conference ........... 91 III. The Russo-Turkish War and the Treaty of San Stefano, 1877-1878 Russian Declaration of War against Turkey, April, 1877. GorchakofFs Circular Letter and the British Government's Attitude. Conclusion of Anglo- Austrian " Moral Understanding," July 26th, 1877. Outbreak of "Jingoism " in England, and Menace of War. Treaty of San Stefano. The Salisbury Note of April 1st, 1878 115 IV. The Berlin Congress and its Issues, 1 878-1 880 Proposals for a Conference of the Treaty Powers. The Salisbury- Schouvaloff, Vienna and Cyprus Conventions. The Congress and Treaty of Berlin. First Overtures for an Anglo-German Alliance, September, 1879. Execution"" of the Treaty of Berlin 132 CONTENTS xi V. The Reorganisation of Egypt: the Dual Control, 1 875-1 880 Egyptian Indebtedness under Ismail. Purchase of the Suez Canal Shares. Institution of the Caisse de la Dette publique and the Financial Commission of Control, 1877-1878. Formation of a Constitutional Cabinet. Ismail rejects the Financial Reform Scheme, and is superseded by Tewfik, June 26th, 1879. The Law of Liquidation 154 VI. The British Occupation of Egypt, 1 879-1 883 Extent of the Foreign Population and Bureaucracy. Abuse of the Capitula- tions. Military Riot in Cairo, and Emergence of Arabi Pasha. French Influ- ence in Egypt, and Gambetta's Policy. Revolution and Massacre of Europeans at Alexandria, June 1 ith, 1882. Conference of the Powers at Constantinople. Bombardment of Alexandria. The Wolseley Expedition and the Battle of Tel- el-Kebir, September I2th-i3th. Lord DufTerin's Mission to Cairo and his Scheme of National Reorganisation 163 VII. The Rebellion in the Soudan and the Gordon Mission, 1 883-1 885 Rise of the Mahdi, and Insurrection in the Soudan. Massacre of the Hicks Pasha Expedition, November 5th, 1883. Proposals for the Withdrawal of the Egyptian Garrisons. The Gordon Mission. Lord Wolseley's Relief Ex- pedition. Fall of Khartoum and Death of Gordon, January 25th, 1885 176 BOOK V THE SECOND AND THIRD SALISBURY ADMINISTRATIONS AND AFTER 1 886-1 907 CHAPTER III IMPERIAL POLICY IN THE OLD AND THE NEW WORLD 1 885-1 899 By WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON I. Frontier Disputes in Central Asia A. The Afghan Boundary Delimitation, 1 884-1 895 Russian Advance to Merv and Sarakhs. Appointment of an Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission, August, 1884. Collision between Russian and Afghan Forces at Penjdeh. Definitive Delimitation of the Afghan Frontier, July, 1887 187 B. Annexation of Upper Burma, 1 878-1 886 French "Pacific Penetration" of Upper Burma, and British Annexation, January 1st, 1886 .193 C. Disputes with France concerning Siam, 1 889-1904 French Designs against Siam ; the Franco-Siamese War, and British Media- tion. Disputes with France regarding the Mekong Region . . 196 < VI J \J xii CONTENTS II. The European Partition of Africa; Heligoland and Madagascar, 1850-1904 Attitude of British Governments towards Imperial Expansion in the Middle of the Century. The Shepstone Mission and the Annexation of the Transvaal, \ April 1 2th, 1877. Despatch of Sir Bartle Frere to the Cape, and the Zulu \ War, 1879. Proclamation of the South African Republic; the Boer War; \ I the Disaster of Majuba Hill (February, 1881), and the Pretoria Convention (August 3rd). Belgian and French Acquisitions in Central Africa, and German Activity in South- West and West Africa and the Pacific. The Congo Conference and Treaty. British Dispute with Portugal. German and British Rivalry in East Africa. The Zanzibar-Heligoland Convention, July 1 st, 1890. Aggressive Action of France in Madagascar, leading to the Annexation of the Island, and the Repudiation of British Treaty Rights, 1882-1896 200 III. Territorial Settlements with the United States, 1 887-1 901 A. The Venezuela Boundary Dispute, 1887-1899 Revival of the Venezuela Boundary Dispute, and Intervention of the American Government. The Olney- Salisbury Correspondence, 1895. Ap- pointment of a Court of Arbitration, and its Award, 1 897-1 899 . 222 B. The Behring Sea Fishery and Alaska Disputes, 1 893-1 899 . 226 C. The Panama Canal Treaties, 1 899-1 901 American Panama Canal Scheme and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. The Pauncefote-Hay Treaty, November 18th, 1901 .... 227 IV. Foreign Encroachments in China, 1885-1898 Proclamation of a French Protectorate over Annam and its Dependencies, leading to War with China, 1885. Great Britain occupies Port Hamilton (April, 1885), but withdraws two years later (February, 1887). The Corean War between Japan and China and the Treaty of Shimonoseki, April 15th, 1895. Anti-foreigner Riots in China, and Murder of German Missionaries, August, 1897. Germany seizes Kiaochow; Russia occupies Port Arthur and Talienwan, and Great Britain obtains a Lease of Wei-Hai-Wei . 228 ( V. ill! ^fulfilled Provisions of the Treaty of Berlin A. The Armenian Question, 1 894-1 904 Turkey's Refusal of Reforms to Armenia; Massacres in July, 1894. The Governments of Lords Rosebery and Salisbury fail to secure Effectual Action by the Powers. Further Massacres in 1896 233 B. Crete and the Graeco- Turkish War, 1878-1898 Mussulman Attacks on Christians in Crete, followed by Greek Invasion of the Island and the Graeco-Turkish War (1897). Evacuation of Crete by the Turks and Appointment of Prince George of Greece as High Commissioner by the Powers 237 CONTENTS Xlll VI. Reconquest of the Soudan and the Fashoda Dispute, 1885- 1899 Negotiations with Turkey for the Conditional Withdrawal of British Troops from Egypt, and Sir H. D. Wolff's Missions, 1885 and 1887. French Attempts to oust Great Britain from Egypt; Bismarck refuses to assist, November, 1886. Further Alliance Overtures by Bismarck to Lord Salisbury. The Re-conquest of the Soudan, 1 896-1 897. France attempts to establish herself on the Upper Nile; the Marchand Mission to Fashoda, and French Withdrawal under Pressure, 1898. Establishment of an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in the Soudan . . . . . . . 242 VII. The First Hague Peace Conference, 1899 Growth of the Idea of International Arbitration. Peace Conference con- vened by the Tsar Nicholas II ; Creation of a Permanent Arbitration Tribunal at The Hague. Appreciation of Lord Salisbury as Foreign Secretary; his Moderating Influence in International Relations; Secret of his Reputation abroad 258 CHAPTER IV THE BOER WAR AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION 1 899-1 902 By Sir VALENTINE CHIROL zP \l. The Jameson Raid and the South African War, 1 895-1902 Difficulties in the Transvaal. The Jameson Raid. William H's Telegram to Kruger. Increasing Tension. Kruger's Declaration of War. South African Campaign. Peace of Vereeniging 263 I II. The International Situation at the Outbreak of War, 1899 ^Europe and the South African War. The T^eutral Powers.t'German ColoniaD Expansion. Continental Public Opinion. JVnti^Brjtish Feeling in German^ .r, William II and Lord Salisbury*. Chamberlain's Views on Anglo-German * Relatioi)? . 266 III. Anglo-German Negotiations, 1898-1901 William II at Windsor in 1899. Chamberlain and Bulow. Seizure of German Mail Steamers. The German Navy Bill. Anglo-German Agreement concerning China. The Eckardstein Conversations in London on an Anglo- German Alliance. Billow's "biting on granite" Speech. Fresh Outburst of Anglophobia. The Emperor's Ill-humour. The Failure of the London Con- versations 276 IV. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1898-1902 The Origins of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. British Relations with Japan. The Boxer Rising. The Open Door in China. Russian Pressure at Peking. The Manchurian Issue. The Anglo-Japanese Agreement. The Effect upon European Relations 286 xiv CONTENTS CHAPTER V CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS i 902-1 907 By G. P. GOOCH, M.A., Trinity College; Litt.D. /TN3reat Britain and Germany, 1 902-1 905 Anglo-German Co-operation in .Venezuela. Great Britain declines toco- operate in the Bagdad Railway. The Results of Canadian Preference. The Construction of a German Navy 294 (fl^\ Great Britain and France, 1902-1904 King Edward visits Paris, 1903. The Anglo-French Arbitration Convention. The Treaties of April 8th, 1904. Egypt and Morocco. French Concessions in regard to the Newfoundland Fisheries. British Concessions in West Africa. Madagascar, Siam, the New Hebrides .... 305 |fft.) Great Britain and Russia, 1 900-1 905 Lord Curzon's Visit to the Persian Gulf. The Younghusband Expedition to Lhasa. The Dane Mission to Cabul. The Russo-Japanese War. The Russian Volunteer Fleet interferes with British Shipping. The Renewal of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance. The Treaty of Bjorko 319 IV. The Conference of Algeciras, 1904-1906 The Kaiser's Visit to Tangier. The Secret Treaties of 1904. The Fall of Delcasse and the alleged British Offer of an Alliance with France. Anglo- French Military Conversations begin. The Conference of Algeciras 338 V. The Second Hague Conference, 1 906-1 908 Campbell-Bannerman's Appeal in the Nation for a Reduction of Armaments. Sir Edward Fry's Speech at the Hague. The Plan of an International Prize Court 349 VI. The Entente with Russia, 1905-1907 Great Britain contributes to Witte's Loan, 1906. The Anglo-Russian Con- vention of August 31st, 1907. Persia, Afghanistan, Tibet. Lord Curzon's Criticisms ........... 356 VII. The Congo, 1 891-1907 The first Debate in Parliament, May 20th, 1903. Consul Casement's Report. The Belgian Commission of Enquiry . . . . . . 366 VIII. Macedonia, 1901-1907 The Austro-Russian February and Miirzsteg Programmes of 1903. The Gendarmerie under European Officers. Lord Lansdowne secures a Financial Commission 373 CONTENTS xv BOOK VI BEFORE AND IN THE WORLD WAR i 907-191 9 CHAPTER VI TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE 1907-1914 By G. P. GOOCH, Litt.D. I. The German Danger, 1907- 1908 The Kaiser's Visit to Windsor. Negotiations relating to the Bagdad Railway. The Kaiser's Letter to Lord Tweedmouth. The Daily Telegraph Incident. Lord Roberts urges Compulsory Service 385 II. Macedonian Reform, 1 907-1908 The Novibazar Railway Concession to Austria. Sir Edward Grey proposes a European Governor. King Edward's Visit to Reval. The Young Turk Revolution 394 III. The Bosnian Crisis, 1908-1909 "The^ Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina." Great Britain vetoes Izvolsky's Scheme for opening the Straits to Russian Warships. The surrender of Russia and Servia 402 UV. Persia, 1906-1911 The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Great Britain encourages the Persian Reformers. The Expulsion of the Shah. The coming of Mr Shuster, and his Eviction by Great Britain and Russia . . . . 412 V. The Congo Again, 1 907-1913 The transfer of the Congo State from King Leopold to Belgium in 1908. Great Britain refuses Recognition till the worst Abuses are removed, and only grants it in 1913 424 VI. The German Fleet, 1909-1911 King Edward's Visit to Berlin. The Navy Scare of March, 1909. Bethmann- Hollweg succeeds Bulow, and Discussions as to Naval Armaments begin 429 VII. The Agadir Crisis, 1907-1911 The French march to Fez, and the Panther is sent to Agadir. Mr Lloyd George's Speech at the Mansion House. British Anxiety during the long Franco-German Negotiations in Berlin. Sir Edward Grey's Speech of November 27th, 191 1. The Tripoli War 438 VIII. Lord Haldane's Mission, 19 12 Lord Haldane in Berlin, February, 1912. Neutrality Negotiations after his Return break down. Anglo-French Arrangements for the Mediterranean. The Grey-Cambon Letters of October 22nd, 19 12 . . . 456 xvi CONTENTS (l£. The Last Years of Peace, 1912-1914 The Balkan Wars and the Standing Conference of the Ambassadors in London. Austro-Russian Disagreement in regard to Servia. The Liman von Sanders Crisis. Successful Anglo- German Negotiations relating to the Portuguese Colonies and the Bagdad Railway. King George and Sir Edward Grey visit Paris, April, 19 14. Anglo-Russian Negotiations for a Naval Con- vention . . . 470 X. The Outbreak of the War, 19 14 The German Government gives Austria a free hand to punish Servia. Sir Edward Grey's Plans of Mediation. Cabinet Differences. Conditional Promise of Naval Support to France, August 2nd. Declaration of War against Germany, August 4th . . . . . . . 486 CHAPTER VII EPILOGUE. THE WAR AND THE PEACE 1914-1919 By G. P. GOOCH, Litt.D. I. The War, 1914-1918 Japan enters the War. Unsuccessful Attempts to keep Turkey neutral. The Treaty of London. Friction with the United States. The Peace Offer of December 12th, 191 6, and the Allied Reply. The Emperor Charles and Prince Sixte. The Pope's Offer of Mediation, August 1st, 1917. Mr Lloyd George defines British Aims, January 5th, 1918. Towards an Armistice 509 II. The Peace, 1918-1919 The British Empire Delegation. The League of Nations. The Left Bank of the Rhine. The Saar. Reparations. Modifications of the Draft Treaty after its Presentation to the German Delegates. The Settlement with Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Turkey . 525 CHAPTER VIII THE FOREIGN OFFICE By ALGERNON CECIL, M.A., New College, Oxford Introductory. The Foreign Office and the Nation. Foreign Office Internal History up to the present time a progress from Privilege to open Competition. The early Administration of Foreign Affairs. The Northern and Southern Departments in the time of the elder Pitt. The Birth of the Foreign Office in 1782 539 I. Charles James Fox (March 27th, 1782). The first Foreign Secretary. His Ability as a Diplomatist. The Dispute with Shelburne. Lord Grantham (July 17th, 1782). Fox's Second Administration of the Foreign Office (April 2nd, CONTENTS xvii 1783). Lord Caermarthen (5th Duke of Leeds) (December 23rd, 1783). Lord Grenville (June 8th, 1791). George Canning Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Downing Street. The Old Foreign Office. Grenville's staff and their salaries. The use of English in Diplomatic Correspondence. Lord Hawkesbury (2nd Earl of Liverpool) (February 20th, 1801). Lord Harrowby (May 14th, 1804). His Dependence upon Malmesbury. Lord Mulgrave (January nth, 1805). Fox's last Term of Office (February 7th, 1806). LordHowick (2nd Earl Grey) (September 24th, 1806) . 542 II. George Canning (March 25th, 1807). Importance of his administrations in regard both to the internal economy and to the external relations of the Foreign Office. The FitzHarris incident. Stratford Canning. His early life an illustration of the Opening of a successful Diplomatic career in those days. The Duel with Castlereagh. Its Departmental Significance. Lord Bathurst (October nth, 1809). Lord Wellesley (December 6th, 1809). His Neglect of Business as shown by his Treatment of Stratford Canning. Lord Castlereagh (2nd Marquis of Londonderry) (March 4th, 181 2). Castlereagh's Habits as Foreign Secretary. The Cooke Incident at Vienna, and the Appointment of Planta. Continuity in the conduct of Foreign Affairs. The Policies of Castle- reagh and Canning compared. Canning's second term as Foreign Secretary (September 16th, 1822). The Struggle with the Crown as to the Recognition of the South American Republics. Canning's Methods with the King. Canning's Habits as Foreign Secretary. Canning's Foreign Office — the Officials and their Salaries. The Librarian. The Foreign-Service Messenger Corps. Sketch of its history 550 III. Lord Dudley (April 30th, 1827). His Character as Foreign Secretary. Lord Aberdeen (June 2nd, 1828). His Character as Foreign Secretary. Ellen- borough's criticism. The Diplomatic Establishment placed on the Con- solidated Fund. Lord Palmer ston. His First and Second Terms at the Foreign Office (November 22nd, 1830)1, (April 18th, 1835). His Character and Im- portance as Foreign Secretary. Foreign Office Characters in his time. The Palmerston touch in Diplomacy. Palmerston's Use of the Press. Aberdeen's Second Term at the Foreign Office (September 2nd, 1841). The Oregon Treaty and Delane. Aberdeen and Guizot. Palmerston's third term at the Foreign Office (July 6th, 1846). The Spanish Marriage affair as an illustration of his Methods in regard to Private Diplomatic Correspondence and Diplo- matic Intrigue. The Conflict with the Crown. Palmerston's Influence in consolidating the Policies of Friendship with France and the Protection of Turkey. Lord Granville (December 26th, 1851). His Character and Accom- plishments. Stratford Canning's two Disappointments. Lord Malmesbury (February 28th, 1852). His Conversations with Palmerston and Wellington. The Buol Incident 562 IV. Lord John Russell (December 28th, 1852). Lord Clarendon (February 21st, 1853-58), (November 3rd, 1865-66), (December 9th, 1868-70). His relations with Stratford de Redcliffe. Malmesbury's Second Term of Office (February 26th, 1858). Russell's Second Term at the Foreign Office (June 1 8th, 1859). Influence of the Prince Consort at this period. Lord Stanley (15th Earl of Derby) (July 6, 1866). The Clarendon Era. Clarendon's 1 The Duke of Wellington acted as Foreign Secretary for a few months from Nov. 15, 1834 to April 1835. xviii CONTENTS characteristics. Relations as Foreign Secretary with the Cabinet, Parliament, the Press, and his Staff. The New Foreign Office. The Permanent Under- Secretaries of the Foreign Office at this date: Addington; Hammond. The Organisation of the Foreign Office in the Mid-Victorian Era: (i) The Progress of Business, (ii) The Library and the Hertslets; The Foreign Office List, (iii) The Treaty Department and the Bergnes ; Charles Marvin and the Secret Treaty of 1878. (iv) The Supplementary Clerks, (v) The Foreign Office Agencies, (vi) The Diplomatic Service. Leading features of its Organisation in the Early Nineteenth Century. Salaries. Clarendon introduces "the Qualifying Test" and makes the service a recognised Profession. The system of Nominations. Changes and Improvements since the Beginning of the Century. Recommendations of the Select Committee of 1 861. The End of a Period. Features of the New Era. Granville's Second Term at the Foreign Office (July 6th, 1870). The Prime-Minister and Foreign Affairs 580 V. Derby's Second Term at the Foreign Office (February 21st, 1874). Ascen- dancy of the Crown and the Prime-Minister during the Crisis of 1876-78. Lord Salisbury (April 2nd, 1878). His Characteristics. His Diplomatic Ap- pointments. His Confidential Diplomatic Correspondence; the "Clarendon canon." His Innovations. Granville's Third Administration (April 28th, 1880). Dilke and the Commercial Department of the Foreign Office. Pauncefote and the Legal Department. The Growth in Importance of the Permanent Under- Secretaryship. Pauncefote. Currie. Lord Sanderson. Lord Hard- inge. Lord Carnock. The Reorganisation of the Office in 1 88 1. Subsequent changes. The Introduction of the Second-division Clerks. The Introduction of Limited Competition for Foreign Office Clerkships. Salisbury's Second Term at the Foreign Office (June 24th, 1885). Lord Rosebery (February 6th, 1886). Lord Iddesleigh (August 3rd, 1886). Salisbury's Third Administration of the Foreign Office (January 14th, 1887). Its importance in Departmental history. The Ridley Commission. Lord Rosebery' s Second Administration of the Foreign Office (August 18th, 1892). Lord Kimberley (March nth, 1894). Increasing claim of the Parliamentary Under-Secretaries to become Foreign Secretaries. Salisbury's Fourth Administration (June 29th, 1895). LordLans- downe (November 12th, 1900). The Anglo-French Entente and the Influence of the Crown 601 VI. Sir Edward Grey (afterwards Viscount Grey of Fallodon), (December 1 ith, 1905). The last blow at " Patronage." The Private Income Qualification for the Diplomatic Service. Features of Lord Grey's Foreign Policy. Secret Service Money. Relations between the League of Nations and the Foreign Office • 616 VII. Mr Balfour (now 1st Earl of Balfour) (December nth, 1916, to October 29th, 1919). Lord Robert Cecil (Co- Secretary, July 19th, 1918). The Report of the Civil Service Commission in 1914. Lord Robert Cecil's Speech of July 31st, 191 8. Its Main Points and Transitional Character. The Foreign Office and British Commercial Interests. The Consular Service, sketch of its history. The General, Levant, and Far Eastern Services. Leading Personalities. Method of appointing Consuls. Lord Lansdowne's Introduc- tion of the Competitive Principle recommended by the Walrond Committee (1903). Failure of the attempt to attract Business Men into the Consular CONTENTS xix Service. Recommendations of the Law Committee (1912) as regards Salaries and Early Retirement. Imperfect Adjustment of the work of the Foreign Office in regard to Overseas Commerce and the Board of Trade. The Faringdon Committee and the subsequent creation of the Department of Overseas Trade under Mr Balfour. The Commercial Attache" and the Commercial Secretary. Recommendations of the Civil Service Commission of 1 9 14 with regard to the Consular Service. Cost of democratising the Foreign Services. Estimates compared with those of Other Countries. The Foreign Office Departments created by the War : the Ministry of Blockade ; the War-Trade Intelligence Department; the Political Intelligence Division. Relations of the Foreign Office and the Press during the War ; Lord Robert Cecil's interviews. The Foreign Office and the Public. Foundations and Prospects of a new Democratic Diplomacy 618 BIBLIOGRAPHIES 631 INDEX . • • . 639 BOOK IV FROM THE THIRD MINISTRY OF LORD DERBY TO THE FIRST MINISTRY OF LORD SALISBURY, 1866-1886 W.&G.I1I SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS July, 1866 : Lord Stanley (Earl of Derby). December, 1868 : Earl of Clarendon. July, 1870: Earl Granville. February, 1874: Earl of Derby. April, 1878 : Marquis of Salisbury. April, 1880: Earl Granville. June, 1885 : Marquis of Salisbury. UNDER-SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS Right Hon. Edmund Hammond (afterwards Lord Hammond) {Permanent). *July, 1866: Edward Christopher Egerton. *December, 1868 : Arthur John Otway (afterwards Right Hon. Sir Arthur). July, 1869: Hon. Thomas Charles William Spring Rice (Assistant). August, 1870: Odo W. L. Russell (afterwards Lord Ampthill) (Assistant). * January, 1871 : George H. C. Byng, Viscount Enfield (afterwards Earl of Strafford). October, — : Charles Stuart Aubrey Abbott, Lord Tenterden (Assistant). October, 1873: The same (Permanent). October, 1873 : Thomas Villiers Lister (afterwards Sir Villiers Lister) (Assistant) . *February, 1874: Hon. Robert Bourke (afterwards Lord Connemara). July, 1876: Sir Julian (afterwards Lord) Pauncefote (Assistant). ♦April, 1880 : Sir Charles (afterwards Right Hon. Sir C.) Dilke, Bart. (Parlia- mentary). September, 1882: Sir Julian (afterwards Lord) Pauncefote (Permanent). October, — : Philip W. (afterwards Lord) Currie (Assistant). ♦January, 1883 : Lord Edmond George Petty Fitzmaurice (afterwards Lord Fitzmaurice) (Parliamentary). ♦June, 1885 : Right Hon. Robert Bourke (afterwards Lord Connemara) (Parliamentary) . * Parliamentary. CHAPTER I NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 A. Neutrality in Continental Affairs, 1 866-1 874 I. The Austro-Prussian War and the Conference of London , 1 866-1 867 THE year 1866 opened ominously for European diplomacy. It became increasingly clear that the relations between Austria and Prussia had grown worse instead of better after the Convention of Gastein (August 14th, 1865). This Convention had, it is true, appeared most objectionable to the British Government, based, as it was, on the mere principle of force ; but it had not even the virtue of providing for an agreement between the two countries. In Bismarck's words, it had merely "papered over the cracks"; and the paper was already wearing very thin. The arrangement by which Austria administered Holstein and Prussia Schleswig must speedily come to an end, and only two solutions were possible. Either the Duchies must enter into the Germanic Confederation, which Prussia would not permit, or they must be annexed to Prussia, to which Austria could not be expected to grant a peaceable consent. Lord Russell's Government had, there- fore, to face the probability of an Austro-Prussian war, for which the pretext was ready at hand; and the results of which, even if Europe as a whole was not involved, would certainly not be restricted to a final settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein question. Neither Lord Clarendon nor Lord Augustus Loftus, the British Ambassador at Berlin, had any doubts as to the intentions of Bismarck to force a war, with the object of destroying the existing Germanic Confederation for the benefit of Prussia. The difficulty lay, however, in discovering any effectual method of preventing war. British diplomacy, acting in conjunction with France, had been signally un- successful on the occasions of the Polish rising (1863) and the Schleswig- Holstein War (1864). The main results had been to make Bismarck serenely contemptuous, and to render both Great Britain and France unwilling to risk any further failures in common. Moreover, the Foreign Office had an acute distrust of the character and methods of Drouyn de Lhuys, on whose retirement Lord Cowley wrote, in September, 1866, that "it will certainly not cause regret. . .as I have 1 — 2 4 NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 never been able to place complete reliance on the accuracy of his statements1." Finally, it was certain that, in any question affecting the reconstruction of Germany, it would be quite impossible for the Emperor Napoleon to act with the measure of disinterestedness which alone could give any concerted action the possibility of success. It does not indeed appear that Lord Clarendon had any idea of the extent to which the Emperor Napoleon had fettered his freedom of action by his interviews with Bismarck at Biarritz (October, 1865); but he believed that, although the Emperor would shrink from war in deference to the wishes of the Chamber and the commercial classes in France, he would not be averse from fishing in troubled waters. The task, therefore, of endeavouring to avert war rested on the British Government alone. On February 28th, 1866, the Ministerial Council held at Berlin determined not to modify the Prussian demands on Austria, and virtually adopted Bismarck's view that the Schleswig- Holstein question was only a part of the larger problem of German Reconstruction which logically required, as a preliminary, a war with Austria. Direct negotiations with Italy were immediately commenced, which were concluded by the offensive and defensive Alliance of April 8th. These actions naturally succeeded, as they were intended to do, in alarming Austria, who, early in March, proceeded to reinforce her troops on the Bohemian and Galician frontiers. The work of mediation was thus seriously compromised, before it had actually begun. Lord Clarendon lost no time; on March 18th he suggested that "Prussia, before going to war, should bear in mind the agreement entered into by the Congress of Paris, to refer disputed questions to a friendly Power"; and indicated that, if the King of Prussia should ask for the good offices of the British Government, they would be given, in con- junction if possible with other Powers. Bismarck replied in the tone which he consistently adopted throughout the negotiations ; and cast the whole responsibility on Austria. The conduct of the Prussians had been throughout scrupulously correct : they had always closely observed the Convention of Gastein, which Austria had "shamefully violated"; any military precautions which they had taken were only an inadequate defensive reply to those already set on foot by Austria, who by making them proved her intention of evading her treaty obligations by force. He made, however, the admission that, in view of Austria's conduct, 1 the whole Prussian nation was now unanimous in regarding annexa- 1 From Lord Cowley, No. 235, September 2nd, 1866. CLARENDON AND MEDIATION 5 tion (of the Duchies) as a vital question, whether regarded in its military or political aspect1 " ; and that the proposal of convoking the Estates of the Duchies in order to decide on their future destiny was, in consequence, inadmissible as they would probably adhere to the Duke of Augustenburg. Clarendon replied by directly traversing these statements, and declaring that Austria neither wanted war nor was preparing for it. In a conversation with Count Bernstorff on April 4th2, he showed how completely he understood Bismarck's position. " Count Bismarck," he told the Prussian Ambassador, " was not an ordinary Minister ; he exercised supreme power, he dictated the policy of Prussia which was territorial aggrandisement, he was a man of purpose and that which he announced he was likely to execute. War with Austria had become necessary for his position and his designs, and Austria was right in preparing to repel the blow that might at any moment be aimed at her by Prussia. " He told Bernstorff with passion that Bismarck was engaging his country in the greatest of all wrongs, unjustifiable war, which he was certain would not have been contem- plated by the King, a sincere Christian and a man of the highest honour, if the whole truth had been made known to him. Such an appeal was not, however, likely to influence Bismarck, who was then presented with a suggestion that both Prussia and Austria should disarm. Bismarck, at first, promised that disarmament should proceed pari passu in both countries ; but, finally (on April 26th), he declared that Prussian action must be contingent on the complete disarmament of Austria against Italy also : with the result that within a week general mobilisation was in progress in all three countries. Since General de La Marmora had, with singular frankness, repeatedly told the British Minister at Florence that " as soon as war was declared between Austria and Prussia he would declare it against Austria3," this condition, which Bismarck had sought to impose, offered the clearest proof both of the identity of interest between Prussia and Italy and of the determination of the former to push the dispute to extremes without further loss of time. The chance that war might be avoided by any agreement or compromise was now exceedingly slight ; for, as the history of the nineteenth century has shown, the almost inevitable sequel of mobilisation is war. The Emperor Napoleon, however, whose efforts had hitherto been mainly confined to clearing the way to war 1 Clarendon to Loftus, No. 33, March 24th, 1866. 2 Clarendon to Loftus, No. 42, April 4th, 1866. 3 Clarendon to Loftus, No. 81, April 29th, 1866. 6 NEUTRALITY, 1 866-1 874 for two of the prospective combatants, pressed forward a proposal for a European congress. It is doubtful whether the Emperor ex- pected, either that a congress would be held, or that, if held, it would be successful in averting war; but it could not do France any harm, and would give the French Representative an opportunity of ex- plaining more precisely what the Emperor had meant by his pointed reference at Auxerre, on May 6th, to the detestation with which he and the majority of French people regarded the Treaties of 18 15, "dont on voudrait faire aujourd'hui l' unique base de notre politique exterieure." Clarendon doubted, from the outset, whether a congress offered a reasonable prospect of effecting the purpose for which it would be convoked. He objected that it would be powerless to enforce its decisions, and again suggested the employment of the means recom- mended by the Paris Protocol of 1856. Great Britain, France and Russia should appeal jointly to the prospective combatants to resume the status quo. The French thought that better results would be achieved by presenting a programme which had been settled in advance by the three Powers, and was accompanied by a joint declaration of their "firm intention" to solve the international difficulties in the direction of peace. Clarendon considered that the words "firm in- tention " might suggest a course of action which his Government did not intend to pursue, while the French argued, with some force, that to make it clear from the outset that no armed intervention was con- templated under any circumstances would ensure the futility of any offer of mediation. The proposal for a congress was finally accepted by Great Britain and Russia, and invitations were sent out on May 24th. They were addressed to the Germanic Confederation as well as to the three principal parties to the dispute, and the object to be attained was thus defined. "It is proposed in the interests of peace to settle by means of diplomacy the question of the Elbe Duchies, that of the Italian dispute and, thirdly, that of the reforms to be introduced into the Federal Pact, as far as they may affect the balance of power in Europe." The vague phrase, "the Italian dispute," was understood to include the Venetian question, but expressly to exclude all discussion re- specting the guarantee of the Temporal Power of the Pope. No preliminary condition of demobilisation was insisted upon, but a hope was expressed that military preparations would be suspended while the congress was sitting. Prussia and Italy accepted without con- ditions. Bismarck, as always, was careful to act with formal correctness THE AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN WAR 7 towards Europe ; and the event proved that he was right in taking the apparent risk of seeing his plans overthrown. For Austria accepted only with a proviso which was regarded by the inviting Powers as a refusal. She demanded that the congress should exclude from its deliberations any arrangement which would give to any one of the States invited any accession of territory or any increase of power. This condition excluded any arrangement such as the proposal — privately favoured by Clarendon — by which Austria would cede Venetia to Italy, and would renounce any claims to the Elbe Duchies in favour of Prussia, while receiving Silesia in exchange from the latter Power. Austria had definitely determined not to cede Venetia without war; though the Secret Treaty concluded with the Emperor Napoleon on June 1 2th showed that, at the moment, she considered her interests in Germany more vital than those in Italy, as she undertook to cede Venetia, if successful in conquering Silesia. Clarendon had strongly warned Austria against refusal; since, in contrast with the acceptance of the two other Powers, it would throw upon her the technical respon- sibility for the ensuing rupture, and divert public opinion abroad from the Prussian designs. British opinion had, in fact, been deeply ex- asperated against Prussia, and BernstorfT had constantly, during the spring, warned his Sovereign of the general hostility which he en- countered in London. The last steps to war were now speedily taken. On June 7th Prussian troops entered Holstein in answer to the proclamation by which Gablenz, the Austrian Commander, had convoked the Estates of the Duchy. On June 10th, Bismarck proclaimed his far-reaching aims by publishing the draft of a new Federal Constitution for Germany, from which Austria was to be excluded. The neutrality of Great Britain in the ensuing struggle had been generally accepted as a matter of course both at home and abroad. It is true that the Queen had expressed her opinion, in a Memorandum written at her desire on March 30th, that Austria should be given armed support ; while Lord Russell had also inclined to the same view, if Austria had been prepared to sacrifice Venetia. But no Cabinet, of whatever party complexion, would have advised participation in a war in which no British interests were directly affected — and least of all the discredited and moribund Liberal Administration, which, on June 19th, actually resigned office, in consequence of a defeat in the House of Commons in Committee on the Reform Bill. This resig- nation aroused the indignation of the Queen, whose intense interest 8 NEUTRALITY, 1 866-1 874 in the struggle, due to both political and personal reasons, made her consider the crisis at home as inconsiderable, especially when viewed in the light of the general apathy in the country towards Reform. Lord Russell, however, declined to accept her view that he was acting in- consistently with the duty which he owed herself and the country, and refused to reconsider his resignation. She then endeavoured, but without success, to induce Clarendon to remain at the Foreign Office as a member of the Conservative Government which Lord Derby finally succeeded in forming on July 6th. It was, indeed, unfortunate that a change of Government should have taken place at this moment. The new Ministry, faced by a minority of 70 in the House of Commons, could not expect to speak with authority abroad. But the accession of Lord Stanley to the Foreign Office brought no change to British policy. He was, it is true, comparatively inexperienced, exceedingly cautious and un- willing to commit himself or the country ; and the Queen had suggested the fear, on his appointment, that he might be inclined to go too far in the line of non-intervention. Nor can his temperament, as sketched by Disraeli a year later, be said to suggest the qualities requisite in a successful diplomatist. He wrote to the Queen (August 16th, 1867) that "although Lord Stanley is of a reserved and rather morose temper, and will not go out of his way to confess that he has been in error, he is really au fond truthful and impartial, and, if convinced that he has erred or miscalculated, is never blind to the result, and often unavowedly, to a certain degree perhaps unconsciously, will assuredly modify his conduct/' Yet it is impossible to see how Clarendon could have enabled the country to play a more active and influential part in the settlement which followed. For the rapidity and completeness of the Prussian triumph made any attempt at mediation between the victor and the vanquished completely futile, unless backed by a determination to employ force, as the Emperor Napoleon found to his cost. Moreover, no British statesman of either party seems to have had any clear idea as to what resettlement of Germany would be compatible or incompatible with British or European interests. It was generally assumed that Prussia was simply following her traditional method of territorial aggrandise- ment and that, if successful, she would swallow up some more pieces of Germany; but, until the terms of peace were presented to Austria, no one, with the exception of Sir Robert Morier1, seems to have 1 See Memoirs and Letters of Sir R. Morier, vol. n. ch. xix. DISRAELI ON FOREIGN POLICY 9 perceived clearly that the aim of Bismarck was to create a united Germany, or to have considered how the new creation would affect the Balance of Power in Europe. It was indeed recognised that the Germanic Confederation, as part of the Vienna Settlement, was legally under the guarantee of the Signatory Powers, and that any alteration might be held to require their preliminary assent. Curiously enough, Russia, without whose consent, given or implied, Bismarck could never have embarked on the War, proposed a joint declaration by Great Britain, France and Russia, to the effect that Prussia could neither dissolve the Germanic Confederation nor form another with- out the consent of all the Great Powers1. Russia cannot have wished to preserve the existing Germanic Confederation, and was probably anxious to discover what would be the attitude of the British Govern- ment. Lord Stanley, while declining the Russian proposal, stated that armed intervention would be in any case impossible. The policy of the Government, in short, was to wait on events — and, indeed, no other policy was at the moment possible — but no attempt was made to think out what changes would be desirable for British interests in Central Europe, and what would be the position, in the new European system of an Austria deprived of influence both in Italy and Germany, and of a united Germany controlled by Prussia. Disraeli was, indeed, beginning to point out to his countrymen that British Foreign Policy was growing to be imperial rather than European. In his speech on reelection he said : " The abstention of England from any unnecessary interference in the affairs of Europe is the consequence, not of her decline of power but of her increased strength. England is no longer a mere European Power; she is the metropolis of a great maritime empire, extending to the boundaries of the furthest ocean. It is not because England has taken refuge in a state of apathy that she now almost systematically declines to interfere in the affairs of the Continent of Europe. England is as ready and as willing to interfere as in old days when the necessity of her position requires it. There is no Power, indeed, that interferes more than England. She inter- feres in Asia, because she is really more an Asiatic Power than a European. She interferes in Australia, in Africa, and New Zealand, where she carries on war often on a great scale. Therefore, it is not because England does not recognise her duty to interfere in the affairs of the Continent of Europe that persons are justified in declaring that she has relinquished her imperial position, and has taken refuge in the otium cum dignitate which agrees with the decline of life, of power, and of prosperity. On the contrary, she has a greater sphere of action than any European Power, and she has duties 1 From Buchanan, unnumbered, July 7th, 1866. io NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 devolving upon her on a much larger scale. Not that we can ever look with indifference upon what takes place on the Continent. We are interested in the peace and prosperity of Europe, and I do not say that there may not be occasions on which it may be the duty of England to interfere in European wars." The emphasis in this passage is obviously laid rather on the point that the interests of the empire are not primarily European, than on the prior truth that its security rests on the existence of a favourable Balance of Power in Europe. The Government found no difficulty in meeting the terms of the Treaty of Prague with a ready acquiescence. The Queen had, indeed, shown much concern at the plight of the fugitive King of Hanover, but was persuaded by Disraeli and the King of Prussia that it would be unwise to permit him to find a refuge in England. When Russia proposed to Prussia that a European congress should be held to discuss the post- War settlement, Lord Stanley declined to support the Russian demand, and it was not seriously pressed. He had already stated in the House of Commons (July 20th) that he could not see how the establishment of, a strong compact Power in northern Germany would be either a detriment or a menace to Great Britain, whatever it might be deemed to be by other Powers. From these last words it is clear that British anxieties were beginning to be diverted from Prussia towards the probable attitude of France. When Thiers exclaimed in the French Chamber, "It is France that has been defeated at Sadowa," he was emphasising two points whose overwhelming importance appealed instinctively to French public opinion. That duality in Germany, whose existence the French had always regarded as a pledge of their security or an opportunity for their advantage, was gravely threatened. It is true that the Treaty of Prague permitted to any future Confederation of the southern States "an international independent existence"; but how were they to be prevented from falling under the exclusive influence if not the direct control of Prussia ? Moreover, Prussia herself, the triumphant head of the new centralised North-German Confederation, had added to her dominions 4,000,000 inhabitants. The Emperor Napoleon, after the failure of the Benedetti negotiations, made it clear by parting with Drouyn de Lhuys (September 1st, 1866), that he intended, at least for the present, to accept the Treaty of Prague, and that, if territorial compensation was to be sought for France, it would not be looked for in German territory. The alarm which Disraeli expressed in a letter FRANCE AND LUXEMBURG n to Lord Stanley (December 30th, 1866) as to the existence of secret French designs against the independence of Belgium was, indeed, well justified, as was proved by the subsequent publication by Bismarck of the draft Treaty, in Benedetti's handwriting, which provided for the French annexation of that country. (The vigilant anxiety of British Ministers for the integrity of Belgium during the next four critical years will be considered later, in connexion with the steps taken to secure it during the Franco-Prussian War.) The Emperor Napoleon, however, in order to satisfy public opinion, and in particular the indignation of the Army, which was intense, required some immediate and tangible territorial advantage. In February, 1867, he entered into negotiations with Bismarck and the King of the Netherlands for the transfer to France of the grand-duchy of Luxemburg. This territory, although quite small in both extent and population, offered considerable advantages. Its strategic value was high: in French hands it would render extremely difficult any hostile advance through Belgium, while facilitating a French advance down the valley of the Moselle towards Coblenz. The Emperor declared to Lord Cowley that he required it solely for the security of France, and not from any prompting of amour propre. Further, the position of the grand-duchy after the War was extremely anomalous. Previously a member of the then dissolved Germanic Confederation, it formed no part of that Confederation's North-German successor; but its fortress was still garrisoned by Prussian troops under Treaties concluded between Prussia and Holland in i8i6and 1856. Its Sovereign was the King of the Netherlands; but the grand-duchy enjoyed a separate existence; its inhabitants were believed to have French sympathies, and the King, who needed money, was supposed to be ready to part with it1. Bismarck appeared to entertain no objection to the transfer, provided that the bargain was kept secret until its completion. Lord Stanley, when consulted on the subject by the French Ambassador, replied that the French acquisition seemed to him a cheap price for ensuring the Peace of Europe ; and there seemed no reason to suppose that any objections would be made by Austria or Russia, the other guarantors of the Treaties of 1839, by which the grand-duchy was assigned to the King of the Netherlands. To the dismay of the British Government, the proposed transfer, which had 1 The French Ambassador told Lord Stanley that it was only at the request of the King of the Netherlands that France had entered into the negotiations. (To Cowley, No. 109, April ioth, 1867.) 12 NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 seemed a promising means for preserving peace between France and Germany, suddenly developed into an imminent threat of war. The question was raised in the Reichstag on April 1st, probably without the connivance of Bismarck, who had consistently warned Benedetti of the dangers of premature publicity. Bismarck immediately gave expression to the outburst of national feeling in Germany, and declared that the Emperor Napoleon's attitude had caused "the question to become one of German national honour; the position of Prussia in Germany is involved, and that is well worth fighting for1." In point of fact, neither Bismarck nor the Emperor desired a war at this moment, and the acquisition of the grand-duchy was no longer left open to France, since the King of the Netherlands refused his consent so soon as he became aware of the state of German feeling on the subject. But, considering the relations between the two Governments and the feelings of the two nations, it was exceedingly difficult to avoid war without calling in the offices of a third party. Thus, Bismarck, when writing to Bernstorff and using the words quoted above, threw out a hint that he would not object to see the question discussed by a European congress; and the French Ambassador, on April 12th, appealed to the good offices of Great Britain, while giving Lord Stanley to understand that the danger to France lay in the occupation of the fortress by the Prussian garrison, whose withdrawal might make a friendly arrangement possible2. The question was thus reduced to the narrow limit as to whether Prussia should or should not maintain in the fortress a garrison, whose presence, as Bismarck afterwards admitted, was not, in his opinion, legally justified, though it suited him at the moment to maintain that the Treaty of 1816 between Prussia and Holland was a complete justification of it. On April 19th, Lord Stanley telegraphed to Lord A. Loftus : 14 If the question is really reduced to these limits, it is deserving the consideration of Prussia whether she should not make so small a sacrifice • since her hesitation to do so would seem to countenance the notion that she wishes to keep Luxemburg for aggressive purposes against France and so to justify the urgency of the French Government to obtain security in that quarter. France is understood only to seek such security without insisting on any other point in regard to Luxemburg than that it should not be used for hostile purposes against herself. Speak in this sense to Count Bismarck and ascertain his views. Her Majesty's Government would 1 To Cowley, No. 92, April 5th, 1867, giving the substance communicated to Stanley by Bernstorff of a despatch from Bismarck. 2 To Cowley, No. in, April 12th, 1867. "Most confidential." THE LUXEMBURG GUARANTEE 13 see with deep regret the breaking out of a war for an occasion apparently so trifling, which could not but retard the consolidation of Germany." After another week of negotiation, during which Austria actively used her influence to preserve the peace, the hesitations of Bismarck were overcome. He declared that Prussia accepted a conference, at which she could make concessions to Europe and Holland on behalf of peace, which she could not make to France, and on this account could not accept any preconcerted basis for the conference. Lord A. Loftus, however, confidently stated that Prussia would accept the neutralisation of the grand-duchy and withdraw her garrison, if the fortress were placed under a European guarantee1. On the same day, he confirmed and expanded this acceptance in a telegram to Bernstorff in which he stated that Prussia was "prepared to concede the evacua- tion and rasing of the fortress, if the Conference expresses the wish that she should do so, and at the same time gives a European guarantee for the neutrality of Luxemburg, such as now exists in the case of Belgium." Such a declaration removed all serious obstacles to the meeting of a conference. But Lord Stanley was extremely uneasy at the thought of " giving any fresh guarantee in the actual state of public opinion which prevails in this country2." The existing responsibilities of Great Britain with regard to Belgium had already aroused his apprehension, and he had written to Disraeli : "I am ready to go as far as may be necessary in support of Belgium, short of giving an absolute pledge to fight for its independence. Suppose we gave such a pledge, that France and Prussia came to an understanding, Russia and Austria standing aloof, where should we be?3 " He, accordingly, suggested as a basis for the proposed treaty that, as Luxemburg was already guaranteed to the King of the Netherlands by the Treaties of 1839, ne should engage not to alienate it without the consent of all the Powers4. When this proposal proved generally unacceptable, he suggested that Luxemburg might be declared neutral, without being the subject of a special guarantee. It was, however, evident that Bismarck would not consent to a conference, unless the neutrality of Luxemburg wrere guaranteed by all the Powers. Lord Stanley was therefore compelled to abandon his objections. The Conference met on May 7th in London, and was attended by Pleni- potentiaries from all the Powers who had signed the Treaties of 1839, 1 From Loftus, No. 181, April 27th, 1867. 2 To Cowley, No. 189, April 27th, 1867. 3 Buckle, Life of B. Disraeli, Earl of Beacons field, iv. 471. 4 To Cowley, No. 227, May 3rd, 1867. i4 NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 and from Italy, who thus received that formal recognition of her status as one of the Great Powers to which Cavour had looked forward as the logical sequel to the appearance of the Piedmontese Representa- tives in Paris in 1856. It was agreed that the Prussian garrison should be withdrawn from the fortress of Luxemburg, which was to be demolished. The grand-duchy itself was declared to be a perpetually neutral State, and its neutrality was placed "under the sanction of the collective guarantee of the Powers signing the present Treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a neutral State" (Article II, Treaty of London). Moreover, Luxemburg, unlike Belgium, was placed under no obligation to defend her neutrality, and was indeed prevented from doing so, since by Article III the King of the Nether- lands as Grand- duke undertook to maintain no fortresses within the territory, and only so many troops as were necessary for the preserva- tion of order. In view of the demand made by Bismarck that the conference should give "a European guarantee for the neutrality of Luxemburg such as now exists in the case of Belgium," it is important to ascertain what obligations British statesmen, then and subsequently, considered themselves to be assuming. Lord Stanley told the House of Commons that he had assented to this provision with more doubt and anxiety than he had ever felt on any public question, but asserted that the guarantee involved only a " limited liability"; while Lord Derby amplified his son's language in the House of Lords (July 4th, 1867) by emphasising the difference between a collective and a separate and several guarantee : UA several guarantee binds each of the parties to do its utmost in- dividually to enforce the observance of the guarantee. A collective guarantee is one which is binding on all the parties collectively; but which, if any difference of opinion should arise, no one of them can be called upon to take upon itself the task of vindicating by force of arms." A collective guarantee, thus interpreted, implies no more than an engagement by each of the Signatory Powers to respect the neutrality of a State so guaranteed, with the liberty, but not the obligation, to regard any violation as a casus belli; the British Government had therefore, in reality, pledged itself no further than it would have done by Lord Stanley's first suggestion, which not only Prussia but the other Powers represented at the Conference had declared insufficient. Lord Derby proceeded to point out that the Treaties of 1839, on the other hand, provided Belgium with a separate guarantee from each of the five Signatory Powers, and that Prussia must have been well BRITISH OBLIGATIONS 15 aware of the difference between the two engagements when she signed the Treaty of London. This interpretation of the practical difference between the two Treaties seems to have been accepted as a matter of course by British statesmen. Viscount Grey, at the outbreak of War in 1 9 14, treated it as a matter of common knowledge that Great Britain was bound to engage in a single-handed defence of Belgium, but was not so bound in the case of Luxemburg. A comparison, however, of the text of the two Treaties, of 1839 ana* I^°7> by no means bears out this clear distinction, from which such vitally important results have flowed. Article II of the Treaty of London of 1839 speaks simply of "the guarantee" of the Signatory Powers — omitting the word " collective " but not inserting the word "joint and several." But this latter is a technical diplomatic term, which was actually inserted in the Treaty signed by Great Britain, Austria and France on April 14th, 1856, by which "the high contracting parties guarantee, jointly and severally, the independence and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire." Such an omission, therefore, makes it appear that legally the value of the guarantee of 1867 was precisely that of the guarantee of 1839; that Prussia was justified in supposing that she had actually obtained the result that had been implied in her demands; and finally that, if the guarantee to Luxemburg meant only what Lord Derby asserted, then that to Belgium had no higher legal value. The practical difference between the two may be considered to amount to this : Great Britain would always regard the violation of Belgium neutrality as a casus belli, because she would always view the integrity and independence of Belgium as a vital interest1, and could always render that country direct assistance by sea ; whereas neither of these considerations applied to Luxemburg. The Queen pointed out with truth to Disraeli that, while the British action in preventing war had restored to the country much of its lost prestige, yet the most likely method of provoking the violation of a neutral State was to use language which suggested that Great Britain regarded her guarantees as a dead letter. In point of fact, a vigorous British protest was lodged when, in December, 1870, Bismarck declared that Prussia no longer felt bound to respect the neutrality of Luxemburg, in view of the use which the French had been permitted to make of the grand-duchy for military purposes. 1 Compare the language used by Gladstone in the House of Commons, August, 1870: "We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee." 16 NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 As Bismarck in reply stated that he had no intention of denouncing the Treaty of London, nor entertained any design of annexing Luxem- burg, the matter was allowed to drop. II. The Abyssinian Expedition, 1868 Although the Conservative Government during the remainder of its tenure of office were not faced with any further complications in Europe, it won, deservedly, great credit for its successful handling of the Abyssinian Expedition, of which the object was to release the British captives whom Theodore, the Negus, or supreme King, of the country, had detained in his hands since November, 1863. Theodore, who maintained with difficulty and great cruelty the position which he had usurped in 1855, had been in the habit of seeking the society of British Consuls at Massowah, who had been appointed since 1848 for the protection of British trade with Abyssinia and the countries adjacent thereto. They had no official status in the country, since Theo- dore had always refused to ratify a Treaty which Consul Plowden had negotiated with his predecessor, providing for mutual representation. But Consul Plowden, who had become one of the King's most in- timate friends, was killed while assisting him against a rebellion in Abyssinia; and his successor, Cameron, in spite of warnings from Lord John Russell as to his not holding the position of a diplomatic Representative, also spent much of his time at Theodore's Court. In the spring of 1863, Cameron forwarded to the Foreign Office a letter from the King to Queen Victoria proposing an Embassy and an alliance against the Turks, although he had been expressly warned that no Embassy would be received from him until he had given up his hostile designs against Turkey and Egypt. This letter remained un- answered, and Theodore retaliated by throwing Cameron into prison. Apart from the slight to his vanity, the King seems to have feared that Great Britain would join Egypt in an attack on his independence, and discovered a further grievance in the fact that Abyssinian pilgrims to Jerusalem were being treated by the Turkish authorities as Turkish subjects, whereas he considered that Lord Malmesbury had promised them in 1852 the protection of the British Consul1. He was confirmed 1 Lord Malmesbury's actual Instructions had been that, while the British Government could not undertake officially to protect Abyssinians residing in Turkish territory, yet the British Consul was, in case of need, to use his good offices on their behalf "as members of a Christian Church in spiritual communion with the Established Church in this Country." THE RASSAM MISSION 17 in his suspicions by an intercepted despatch to Cameron, which ordered the latter to return at once to Massowah and to cease from interfering in Abyssinian affairs. Ten European missionaries, of whom two were women, were joined with Cameron in captivity, and were treated intermittently with extreme cruelty : they believed themselves to have excited the King's displeasure by commenting unfavourably on his wholesale massacre of rebels. In 1865, the captives still re- mained in Theodore's hands, and public opinion began to demand that effectual steps should be taken to secure their release. An abortive attempt had been made in February to use the Abouna, or Christian Bishop, of the country as an intermediary for the purpose. Lord Russell rejected the notion of force, writing on June 8th: "I cannot think that it would be wise to send a military expedition to attack the King of Abyssinia. I know not how we could reach him in that way " ; and decided to send an official British Mission. Accordingly, Rassam, an Armenian by birth who had received an English education, and held the post of First Assistant to the Resident at Aden, was sent to Massowah, with a letter from Queen Victoria to Theodore, affecting not to know of Cameron's imprisonment and promising that the King should be permitted to send an Embassy when the Consul had re- turned to England. In September, 1865, Rassam received an invitation from Theodore to proceed to Abyssinia, and after many delays was received, on February 7th, 1868, by the King, who immediately released Cameron and all the other prisoners. Rassam was delighted ; "Nothing " he wrote, "could exceed King Theodore's courteous and polite behaviour"; and the whole matter seemed to be successfully concluded. On April 13th, however, the King suddenly ordered the rearrest of the liberated prisoners, and placed Rassam and the re- mainder of his Mission under confinement. Theodore, whose diseased mind was influenced by an intense suspiciousness bordering on in- sanity, apparently believed that, if he allowed his captives to leave the country, the British Government would on their safe return send an expedition to attack him. He, therefore, determined to retain them as hostages until he had a satisfactory reply to his original offer of an alliance with the Queen, and to take advantage of the opportunity for procuring from England a number of skilled artisans, desired by him for the development of his country. The Government, with extra- ordinary forbearance, acting on the advice of the Resident at Aden, Colonel Merewether, who was then in London, advised the Queen to give an audience to the German missionary who brought Theodore's W.&G.III 2 18 NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 demand to England, and sent presents of machinery for Theodore to Aden, together with a number of artisans, who had been induced to go to Abyssinia by a guarantee against financial loss given by the Government. Theodore, however, returned no answer to the intima- tion that they would be placed at his disposal when the captives reached Aden; but merely removed these to the inaccessible and rockbound fortress of Magdala. In October, 1866, Lord Stanley asked the War Office to consider the possibilities of a military expedition; though expressing his real feelings in a letter to Disraeli: "I sincerely hope the W.O. will find the country inaccessible. I think they will." No further action was taken until April, 1867, in the belief that Theodore, who was surrounded with rebels, might be overthrown and the captives in consequence released. On April 16th, Lord Stanley for- warded through Aden an ultimatum to Theodore, warning him that, if the prisoners were not restored within three months from the despatch of the letter, all friendship between him and the Queen must cease. No answer was returned by him to this communication. On August 19th, it was decided that an Expedition should be immediately despatched from Bombay, the Governor of that province having already drawn up plans under the Instructions of Sir Stafford North- cote, Secretary of State for India. The Instructions given to Sir Robert Napier, who was placed in command of this force, show ex- tremely clearly the objects which the Government had in view. His ■primary object was to be to secure the release of Cameron, Rassam and all the other official persons detained by Theodore, and he was, also, to use his best endeavours to secure the release of all other Europeans in captivity, whether British citizens or not, though he was not to prolong the Expedition for that purpose. Theodore was not to be deprived of any portion of his territory, nor to be forced to make any concession, pecuniary or other. While Napier might take advan- tage of the existence of any hostility to the King in Abyssinia, he was not to wage war in order to set up a pretender in a country where there were really no British interests to promote. If Theodore fell into the hands of the Expeditionary Force, he was to be sent to Bombay. Lord Stanley concluded by remarking that, " Her Majesty's Govern- ment have no concern with what might befall Abyssinia by the removal of Theodore from the country. The lesson to be taught to rulers of his character and their peoples is that wanton outrages to British Subjects will sooner or later bring down upon the perpetrators of them signal retribution." It is not within the scope of the present EFFECT OF ABYSSINIAN EXPEDITION 19 work to describe the Expedition, which was handled throughout with the greatest ability and met with a complete and almost bloodless success. Theodore, who had taken no notice of a last warning letter sent him by the Khedive of Egypt after the Expedition had actually started, recognising the impossibility of resistance, killed himself in Magdala, on the day before the British troops entered and found the prisoners all unharmed (April 13th, 1868). Within a week they were beginning their withdrawal from Abyssinian territory. Great Britain had acted in this protracted affair with a combination of extreme patience and rapid energy. Four years had elapsed between the imprisonment of Cameron and the entrance of British soldiers on Abyssinian soil; but within five months they had overcome all the geographical and climatic difficulties, and were masters of a fortress, which all who were acquainted with it had described as impregnable. It is certain that the impression of irresistible power produced in India, where the Expedition had been organised, powerfully enhanced British prestige, which Sir Henry Rawlinson so aptly described as "the power which enables us to achieve very great results with very small means at our immediate disposal." Disraeli was fully justified in calling the attention of Parliament to the disinterestedness which had throughout characterised our action. When the Expedition was starting, he had stated that its object was "not to obtain territory, not to secure commercial advantages, but for high moral causes and for high moral causes alone." On its completion, he repeated that, " when it was first announced that England was about to embark on a most costly and perilous expedition, merely to vindicate the honour of our Sovereign, and to rescue from an unjust but remote captivity a few of our fellow-subjects, the announcement was received in more than one country with something like mocking incredulity. But we have asserted the purity of our purpose. In an age accused, and perhaps not unjustly, of selfishness, and a too great regard for material interests, it is something, in so striking and significant a manner, for a great nation to have vindicated the higher principles of humanity. It is a privilege to belong to a country which has done such deeds." The mass of papers preserved among the records of the Expedition, which emphasise the importance of developing British trade in Abyssinia and describe the richness of the mineral deposits, prove that Ministers did not adhere to their disinterested policy from lack of inducements to depart from it. 20 NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 III. The Franco-German War, 1870 The Abyssinian success, however, did not prevent the Liberals from obtaining a large majority in the new electorate at the General Election held in the autumn of that year (1868). Gladstone became head of a powerful and active Government, and Lord Clarendon returned once more to his old post. But the latter appointment was not made until objections from a most unexpected quarter had been overcome. In 1866, the Queen had been so unwilling to part with Clarendon as Foreign Secretary as to write that she "cannot express too strongly her hope and earnest wish that Lord Clarendon may find himself enabled to accede to the proposal, which the Queen knows Lord Derby will make to him, of remaining in his present office " (June 28th, 1866). But, two years later, we find from Lord Halifax's Journal1 that she desired to place an absolute veto on his name for that post. An entry there, for November 26th, states that "The essential part of the Queen's message was her objection to Clarendon as Foreign Secretary. She told Charles2 that he was the only one of her Ministers who had ever been impertinent to her, and that she could not submit to him in the position of Foreign Secretary which brought him into such constant communication with herself; that he was too intimate with the Queen of Holland and was influenced by her, and that his opinions against the German unity and views of Russia, which she considered so right and necessary, rendered him unfit for that post on public grounds. She said that both Clarendon and Lowe were very sarcastic, and she did not like such people in intimate communication with her." It was fortunate that the Queen's opposition, which appears at bottom to have rested on some personal pique, was overcome. Lord Clarendon was the only British diplomatist who possessed a European reputation ; and so far was he from desiring to break the continuity of our Foreign Policy that he tells us himself that on taking office he had "a long official talk with Stanley, who was most friendly and communicative. I did not detect a shade of difference of opinion between us3." In fact, the Memorandum which was presented by Gladstone to General Grey for the information of the Queen (April 17th, 1869) furnishes an exposition of the principles which should govern the relations of Great 1 Quoted in Sir H. Maxwell's Life of Lord Clarendon, 11. 353. 2 General the Hon. Charles Grey, her Private Secretary. 3 Sir H. Maxwell's Life of Lord Clarendon, 11. 355. GLADSTONE'S MEMORANDUM 21 Britain to Europe very similar to that laid down by Disraeli in his speech quoted above1. He writes : " I do not believe that England ever will or can be unfaithful to her great tradition, or can forswear her interest in the common transactions and the general interests of Europe. But her credit and her power form a fund which, in order that they may be made the most of, should be thriftily used...." And he adds: " As I understand Lord Clarendon's ideas, they are fairly represented by his very important diplomatic communications since he has taken office. They proceed upon such grounds as these: That England should keep entire in her own hands the means of estimating her own obligations upon the various states of facts as they arise ; that she should not foreclose and narrow her own liberty of choice by declarations made to the Powers, in their real or supposed interests, of which they would claim to be at least joint interpreters; that it is dangerous for her to assume alone an advanced, and therefore an isolated position, in regard to European controversies; that, come what may, it is better for her to promise too little than too much; that she should not encourage the weak by giving expectations of aid to resist the strong, but should rather seek to deter the strong by firm but moderate language from aggression on the weak; that she should seek to develop and mature the action of a common, or public or European opinion, as the best standing bulwark against wrong, but should beware of seeming to lay down the law of that opinion by her own authority, anJLlms running the risk of setting against her, and against right and justice, tlkt general sentiment which ought to be, and generally would be, arrayed in their favour. I am persuaded that at this juncture opinions of this colour being true and sound, are also the only opinions which the country is disposed to approve. But I do not believe that on that account it io one whit less disposed than it has been at any time, to cast in its lot upon any fitting occasion with the cause it believes to be right." Meanwhile, the relations between France and Prussia remained inevitably the central problem of European diplomacy. The publica- tion by Bismarck (March, 1867) of the Treaties of Alliance with the southern States, and the wave of national excitement which swept all over Germany at the time of the Luxemburg incident, proved how shadowy were the guarantees of the Treaty of Prague for the inde- pendent existence of the south, and suggested that the surest method of cementing a German Unity, which to all impartial observers now seemed inevitable, would be a war against France for an object common 1 See for this letter or memorandum Lord Morley's Life of Gladstone, 11. 316- 318, where it is described as "in truth a sort of charter of the leading principles of Mr Gladstone's foreign policy at the moment when he first incurred supreme responsibility for our foreign affairs." 22 NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 to all Germans. Many reasons combined to draw closer the relations between Great Britain and France. Lord Clarendon was a personal friend of the Emperor Napoleon, who regarded him with complete confidence1; while Lord Lyons proved an extremely able successor to Lord Cowley, who had shown himself during his fifteen years of office (1852-67) to be the most effective of contemporary British Ambassadors. The Emperor, throughout all the windings of his policy, attached the highest importance to preserving British friendship. Clarendon regarded the continuance of the Napoleonic empire as the only guarantee against the evil of high tariff walls between the two countries, and was suspicious of the transformation into a Parlia- mentary system which was gradually taking place in the government of France2. Further, he hoped to prevent the Emperor from either tampering with the independence of Belgium, or making war on Prussia to secure popular opinion for the support of his tottering dynasty. In its continuance he had little confidence, and he expressed his opinion, in August, 1869, that the French " will drift into a Republic before another year is over." As to the unification of Germany, he did not believe it to be imminent, but expected that it would prove a gradual and inevitable process. 'U agree with you (he wrote to Lyons, March 3rd, 1870) that Prussia w?H never declare that she will not complete the unity of Germany, because she looks on it as inevitable. Nothing, as the King himself said to me, can prevent the gravitation of the weak towards the strong, but that it would not take place in his life, possibly not in that of his son. France if not grov;, wiser by that time will probably consider it as a casus belli. . .and she ! /ould weld all Germany together as one man if she attempted by force to prevent Bavaria, Wurttemberg and Baden from joining the North, when they had determined that it was for their own interest to do so." There was little interchange of real confidence between Berlin and London ; although Clarendon did not believe that Prussia meant war, he felt the deepest distrust of Bismarck, whom he had described in 1864 as "a man without faith or law." He saw clearly that, while 1 Cf. Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley, October 20th, 1868. The Emperor told Clarendon in strict confidence of a proposal which he had not, he said, mentioned even to his Ministers. Men of weight (des hommes serieux) had proposed a Con- federation between the south-German States and Switzerland. (See Ix>rd Newton, Lord Lyons, 1. 204.) 2 See Lyons's letter to Clarendon, December 3rd, 1869: "I am afraid we shall never again, either in political or commercial affairs, have as good times as we had under the personal power of the Emperor — by we of course I mean the English"; to which Lord Clarendon replied : " I quite agree with you that we shall never have uch good times again under a Parliamentary instead of a personal regime." (Lord Newton, Lord Lyons, I. 240-1.) LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS 23 France and Prussia persisted in their competition of armaments, peace must remain at the mercy of an incident, so soon as one or other party believed itself to be momentarily possessed of a clear superiority. The King of Prussia had always, in spite of his real desire for peace, shown himself no less unapproachable than Bismarck on this subject; but the Emperor Napoleon, with whom the Foreign Secretary had a con- versation in September, 1869, proved more sympathetic. The rural population, the solid prop of the French empire, was growing more and more restive under the burden of taxation and conscription; and, so early as April, 1868, the Emperor's Government had informally suggested to Lord Stanley that Great Britain might "give advice" to Prussia on the subject of disarmament, which he had refused to do. The newly formed Ministry, which under Ollivier was to reconcile responsible government with the empire, made another essay in the same direction through La Valette, the French Ambassador at London (January 26th, 1870). Clarendon agreed to enter into the design, though it was clear that its handling required the most delicate tact. For, as Ollivier told Lord Lyons (January 30th) it was essential that the French Government should not be in any way compromised; since, "under present circumstances a public rebuff from Prussia would be fatal." " Un echec" he said, " c'est la guerre." He hoped, therefore, that Prussia might be led to agree with France on a simultaneous disarmament, or at least to receive a proposal from her in a friendly spirit. After obtaining the approval of the Queen and the Prime- Minister, but without communicating the matter to the Cabine Clarendon sent a Memorandum (February 2nd) which Lord A. Loftus was instructed to lay before Bismarck in strict confidence. This document, after pointing out the destructive and anachronistic burden which the enormous standing armies of Europe imposed on civilisation, suggested that Prussia, better than any other Power, might undertake to modify this system. Clarendon, therefore, hoped that, in spite of the King's "parental feeling and affection for his army," Bismarck would recommend to him a partial disarmament. The moment seemed highly propitious, as France had " never been more peacefully inclined than at the present time, under a responsible government which cannot make war for an idea, because it represents a nation that is determined to maintain peace so long as there is no just cause for war, and because the Emperor entirely shares the feelings of his people." He concluded by expressing his conviction that the French Government would raise no opposition to a reduction of the Army pari passu with Prussia. 24 NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 In point of fact, the moment was very unpropitious for opening this question with Bismarck, who was becoming increasingly anxious as to whether the Treaties with the south- German States, his principal pledge of security, would be renewed when they expired in 1871. The fall of the Hohenlohe Cabinet in Bavaria (February 14th) and the unconcealed hostility of the King of Wurtemberg, showed how sub- stantial were his reasons for uneasiness. Moreover, as he pointed out with force in a conversation with Lord A. Loftus (February 5th) Prussia's geographical position made the taking of any initiative in the reduction of armaments far less feasible for her than for Great Britain. "Our position," he said, "is an exceptional one. We are surrounded by three great empires with Armies as large as our own, any two of whom might combine against us." He further remarked that Prussia's military strength was an advantage to Great Britain, as the events of 1869 had shown, when an occupation of Belgium would have taken place, had it not been known at Paris that Prussia would join in the defence of that country. He declared that he did not dare even to name the subject of Clarendon's letter to the King, " much less show it to His Majesty. He would get into a fury and immediately think that England was trying to weaken Prussia in the interests of France." Daru, the French Foreign Minister, on hearing the substance of Bismarck's objections, expressed his determination to disarm, whether Prussia did so or not, and to propose to the Emperor a reduction of the yearly contingent from 100,000 to 90,000 men, which reduction he would have suggested to be even larger, if the accounts of Prussian intentions were more satisfactory (February 10th). This step would, he thought, furnish Clarendon with a powerful argument for per- severing in his endeavours to work on Prussia. Clarendon was not discouraged, and renewed his attempt in a letter to Lord A. Loftus on March 9th. He tried to convince Bismarck that Prussia had nothing to fear from any of the three empires which surrounded her. Austria " could not, even on the most pressing emergency, bring 200,000 men into the field. Her finances are dilapidated and her internal dis- organisation affords just cause for alarm." Bismarck had dwelt on the "hostility of the Muscovite party towards Germany and on the dislike of the Tsarevitch to everything German " which must cause a great change in the relations between Prussia and Russia after the death of Alexander. Clarendon replied that " Count Bismarck must know better than myself that Russia has long since, and wisely, ceased to aim at influence in Germany or intervention BISMARCK'S OBJECTIONS 25 in German affairs, and that all her energies are now directed eastwards, with a view of extending her territory and her commerce in Asia. Whatever sentiments may be suggested in other quarters by a rapid development of the present feeling of Russia, which has the entire support of public opinion in that country, it appears certain that Germany can have no danger to guard against from Russia, whatever may be the personal feelings or opinions of the reigning Sovereign." In this assumption, Clarendon was hardly expressing his real feelings, since he had already told Lord Lyons that he believed it to be true that the Tsarevitch and the Slav races were very hostile to Germany. TIe proceeded to emphasise the importance of the reduction in the French Army to which the Emperor had assented, and added: "I venture to think that the present state of opinion in France, founded as it is upon a true estimate of French interests, is a more solid guarantee than any that the respective Governments of France and Germany could effect for their own security." His practical proposal, derived from a suggestion by Daru, was in favour of a general disarmament. "The military forces of the great Continental Powers have a certain proportion to each other ; in order to maintain that proportion, very heavy burdens are imposed upon each country; but if, by common agreement, each reduces its army by a certain number of men, the same proportions will be maintained, while the burdens, which are fast becoming intolerable, will be alleviated." In reply, Bismarck naturally controverted the extravagant expecta- tions which Clarendon based on the present disposition of the French people. In conversation with Lord A. Loftus (March 12th) he said that, " although the nation was now pacific, you know as well as I do that a war cry can be raised in France, on any emergency, and at the shortest notice. If. . .the present Constitutional government had been three years instead of three months in existence, then there would be some chance for its duration and for the maintenance of peace.' ' At the present moment, he observed, there was a party anxious to restore the previous state of things, a personal government. That party in- cluded the Empress Eugenie, and they would not be sorry to divert the public attention from home affairs by raising some questions of foreign policy. Bismarck, however, on this occasion did not refuse to bring the matter to the notice of the King, and appeared to be less decidedly opposed to any disarmament. But any hope that King William might view the project with a favourable eye was quickly dashed. He stated his objections with a conclusive simplicity which 26 NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 made it impossible to continue the negotiations. The German Army could only be reduced in two ways : either by changing its legislative basis, and thereby its whole character, or by reducing the period of military service to two and a half years. The former method was impossible ; the latter had been the subject of a five years' struggle between the King and his Parliament, and he would rather give up his Throne than yield on it. Moreover, as Bismarck had foretold, the King regarded the proposal as put forward in the interests of France, and as showing no regard for the safety of Prussia. It is not surprising that this attempt should have failed. The whole interchange of views rested on a basis of unreality. The one supreme difficulty which barred the way to mutual confidence between France and Germany was never mentioned. Yet it was perfectly clear — to French and German as well as to disinterested observers — that the tension between the two countries must continue, until either France was satisfied that Prussia had no design of uniting Germany, or until Prussia was satisfied that France would not oppose such a Union by force. The character of an intrigue was thus inevitably thrust upon the negotiations themselves. The French Government was desperately anxious that Bismarck should not know that they had anything to do with the proposal, since such knowledge might lead to immediate war; while Bismarck, in return, professed great eagerness that the French Government should not be acquainted with it. The preparations for a plebiscite which was to ratify the recent Constitutional changes in France provoked the uneasiness of Lyons, who feared that a failure or a small majority might turn the minds of the Ministers to war. Writing to Clarendon on May 6th, he said: "With reference to Loftus's despatch, I sincerely hope that his most confidential informant is not so well informed as he represents himself to be, and that no change is really contemplated in the status quo of Hesse and Baden. It would be quite a mistake to suppose that this is a moment at which it would be safe to defy France. On the contrary, a war unmis- takably provoked by Prussia would be hailed by many as a welcome diversion from internal difficulties. So far as I can judge, Ollivier is not the man to shrink from one." The overwhelming majority, however, which Ollivier's "devouring activity " secured two days later seemed a pledge of renewed confidence, and the last month of Clarendon's life offered no premonitions of the coming storn. He died suddenly on June 27th, only ten days before the Hohenzollern candidature became publicly known. Lord Clarendon owed his great reputation at home and abroad less LORD CLARENDON 27 to his achievements than to his character. Passionately attached to peace — the French called him "le commis voyageur de la paix" — he was constantly to see wars gathering before his eyes, which his best efforts failed to prevent ; of all his public utterances none is so firmly enshrined in the popular mind as his statement in 1854: "We are drifting into war." His personal reputation reached its height at the conclusion of the Congress of Paris, in which he had become the most prominent and popular figure. The Queen expressed a general feeling when she wrote: "We congratulate him on the success of his efforts in obtaining the peace, for to him alone it is due ; and also to him alone is due the dignified position which the Queen's beloved country holds, and which she owes to a straightforward, steady and unselfish policy throughout." His European position was established, and was never afterwards shaken. Lord Augustus Loftus has described him as possessing all those qualities which mark the ideal diplomatist: " Courteous and dignified, with charming manners, he won the regard and confidence of all with whom he came in contact. Firm and courageous, with consummate judgment, he was neither open to flattery nor to the influence of fear." Gladstone dwelt on "his un- swerving loyalty, his genial temper, his kindness ever overflowing in acts yet more than in words, his liberal and indulgent appreciation of others"; and estimated him to have been the "very easiest and most attractive " of all his colleagues in the Cabinet. His broad sympathies, and his effortless power of being happily at home in any society invested him with that personal attractiveness which helps in so important a measure to smooth the path of diplomacy. It is perhaps true that he was a better judge of men than of events, and that while he " understood how to dash off in a few daring if slightly contemptuous phrases the main features of a political situation and the leading traits of the European statesmen whom he had known," he was less successful and possibly less interested in forecasting the future developments of Europe. His influence was increased by his rare personal detachment : he was so far from desiring office that he accepted its burdens only with increasing reluctance, and has been well described as having been a member of successive Cabinets simply because he had proved himself indispensable. One of the highest compliments ever paid him was that posthumously bestowed by Bismarck, who told Lord Clarendon's daughter in 1871 that he was never in his life more glad to hear of anything than of her father's death, because if he had lived he would have prevented the War. Lord Granville, whose very first duty in taking office was to 28 NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 attempt this task, had many of the personal qualities of his predecessor. He, too, was noted for his tactful, courteous and conciliatory address, which made him for more than thirty years so successful a leader of the Liberal minority in the House of Lords. He even surpassed Clarendon in the unusual command which both possessed of the French language. His previous direct experience of the Foreign Office amounted to less than three months; succeeding Palmerston, after the dismissal of the latter in December, 185 1 , he won the complete approval of Lord John Russell, who, on his retirement, expressed the somewhat extravagant belief that "the country will lose one of the best Foreign Secretaries it ever had." During the eighteen years which elapsed before his resumption of the office, Lord Granville had, however, exerted at intervals a remarkable influence over the course of British Foreign Policy. In 1856, he had been sent to Russia immediately after the conclusion of the Crimean War, as head of a Special Mission to attend the Coronation of the Tsar. The Queen, who placed entire confidence in his sagacity and moderation, twice employed him, when President of the Council, as her mouthpiece in the Cabinet to combat the views of Palmerston and Russell. In 1859, she urged upon him, in a private communication, the duty of controlling the Italian sympathies of his colleagues ; and in 1864, in a still more urgent appeal, she begged him to prevent the country's becoming involved in the Schleswig-Holstein War. In September, 1862, he had, on his own initiative, taken the leading part in defeating the proposal made by Palmerston for a joint intervention with France in the American Civil War. He was, therefore, regarded in 1870 as the natural and inevitable successor to Clarendon. But his achievements were not equal to the expectations of his friends. Faced as he was throughout his two sub- sequent periods of office (1870-74, 1880-85) by a constant series of difficult problems directly affecting British interests, the responsibilities of office bore very heavily upon him. He was constantly (though often unjustly) accused of indifference or of imperfect sympathies; and, in the long run, his lack of decision contributed to involve the country in misunderstandings with several of the Great Continental Powers. On the afternoon of July 5th, Granville, who was to receive the Seals next day, had a conversation at the Foreign Office with Ham- mond, the Permanent Under-Secretary. The latter assured him that he had never during his long experience known so great a lull in foreign affairs. This unforgotten false prophecy cannot be held to convict British diplomacy of any peculiar ignorance ; for it was only on the 3rd that Paris knew definitely of the acceptance by Prince Leopold of THE HOHENZOLLERN CANDIDATURE 29 Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen of the offer of the Spanish Crown. It rather proves the extraordinary success with which Bismarck had matured his plan in secret. It is not necessary or indeed relevant to enter into a full discussion of the methods by which the Prince's reluctance to grant his consent was overcome. The full extent of Bismarck's responsibility for the decision, which could only be sus- pected in 1870, has gradually become known through a series of subsequent revelations. The British Government could only base its policy on such information as was obtainable at the time. The deposi- tion of Queen Isabella on September 30th, 1868, had created a de facto republic in Spain, from which Marshal Prim, who had induced the Cortes to pass a monarchical Constitution, wished to rescue his distracted country as soon as possible. He had not been actuated by hostility towards France in the invitation to Prince Leopold, who was related to the Emperor Napoleon both by birth and marriage, and whose elder brother, Charles, had ascended the Roumanian throne in 1866 with the Emperor's goodwill. But Leopold proved very cautious. Although Lord A. Loftus reported that the Prince was being mentioned in diplomatic circles as a possible candidate so early as October, 1868, he was not finally persuaded to accept until June 21st, 1870, when the King of Prussia gave his reluctant assent. The Spanish Cortes had been kept sitting in order to proceed with the election ; but, owing to a telegraphic error in the date announced for the return to Madrid of the Envoy, Salazar, who was bringing the acceptance with him, they were adjourned without proceeding to a vote. This small mistake of a clerk had very important consequences. Bismarck had hoped to keep the entire question secret until France could be confronted with a fait accompli. In that case, only two practical alternatives would have been open to her: either to accept Prince Leopold of Hohen- zollern as King of Spain — a humiliation and a prospective menace which the condition of French feeling at the moment would hardly have endured — or to make war on both Germany and Spain together, it being exceedingly improbable that a people proverbially proud like the Spanish would have consented to drop their elected King at the bidding of a foreign Power. But, as a matter of fact, the secret began to leak out in Madrid. The Emperor Napoleon had expressed his suspicions to the Due de Gramont, the French Foreign Minister, so early as June 17th; but had been reassured by Mercier, the French Ambassador at Madrid, on June 25th, who wrote that if the candidature was really a subject for negotiation, it was kept very secret and suspected by no one, and, 30 NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 on July 1 st, that he had still not heard a word of it. Next day, Prim somewhat shamefacedly informed him of Leopold's acceptance; it would not, he knew, be agreeable to the Emperor, but then he had no other alternative. Spain could not be left a prey to revolution, and Leopold would make an ideal King. Mercier warned him with great vigour and gravity that the news would produce an "extraordinary effect " in France, and that public opinion would view it as a "real provocation." Ollivier and Gramont, acquainted with the news of the 3rd, were stiffened in their resolution next day by the almost unanimous voice of the Press, and by the affectation of complete ignorance, which they disbelieved, at Berlin. When Lyons saw Gramont and Ollivier on the 5th, their language was perfectly definite and firm. Gramont exclaimed: "To this France will not resign herself, and when I say that we shall not resign ourselves to it, I mean that we shall not permit it; and we shall use our whole strength to prevent it." The proposal was not only an insult, but a positive danger to France. It would paralyse 200,000 French troops in case of a war with Prussia. Leopold was a member of a family which had shown peculiar devotion to the head of the House of Hohenzollern. His brother Charles had acted under the direction of Bismarck when he accepted the Throne of Roumania ; he had begun to build up a military State there, and would use his army for any purpose which Prussia might require1. Such were the arguments which were presented as the French justification. Prim, when conversing with Mercier (July 2nd) had ridiculed the importance of the dynastic danger; a King of Spain, he said, will always be a Spaniard; but subsequent events have shown that Gramont was justified in believing that family relationships between rulers may still play a considerable part in determining the policy of European States in both peace and war. On the 6th, Gramont read in the Chamber a Declaration, the terms of which had been concerted by the Council of Ministers. It stated that respect for the sovereignty of Spain did not oblige France to allow a foreign Power, by placing one of its princes on the throne of Charles V, to shift the existing Balance of Power in Europe to the detriment of France and to endanger her interest and honour. The Government hoped that the wisdom of the German and the friendship of the Spanish people would prevent this project from being carried into execution ; but, if this should be the case, they would do their duty without hesitation or weakness. 1 From Lord Lyons, No. 685, July 5th, 1870; Nos. 697-8, July 7th, 1870. VIEWS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT 31 The Emperor and Ollivier, at least, seem to have used this strong language with the object not of precipitating, but of preventing, war ; for, on the same evening, the French Ambassador asked Lord Granville if the British Government would advise the abandonment of the candidature at Berlin and Madrid. When Gladstone had first heard the news, he had, while expressing his disapproval, said that he was not disposed to interfere with the liberty of the Spanish people to choose their own Sovereign. But both he and Granville readily assented to the request made for their good offices. They deprecated the language which Gramont had used; they did not admit that Leopold's nomination to the Spanish Throne was "a matter of such importance to a great and powerful nation like France as to warrant carrying to extremes a natural feeling of resentment1"; but they perceived that the strict secrecy in which the affair had been matured made the issue exceedingly dangerous. A telegram was at once despatched to Layard at Madrid, ordering him to "use every pressure which will not offend the Spanish Government, but will in your judgement promote the abandonment of the project." But no repre- sentations appear to have been sent to Berlin until the 9th, as Lord Granville's despatch, though written on the 6th, was delayed for the approval of a Cabinet meeting held on the former date. Lord A. Loftus was instructed to avoid any appearance of dictating either to Spain or to Prussia ; to assume that the King of Prussia had not sanctioned the project, the secrecy of which was, so far as it went, a just cause of offence to France ; and to point out the dangers which it would involve to Spain, Prussia and Prince Leopold himself. Meanwhile, in spite of the commencement of French military preparations, there seemed good reasons for believing that war would be averted. On July 8th, Gramont told Lyons that "a voluntary renunciation on the part of the Prince would be a most fortunate solution of a difficult and intricate question, and he begged Her Majesty's Government to use all their influence in bringing it about2." The Emperor Napoleon, on the same day, sent a secret message to the King of the Belgians urging him to put pressure upon Prince Leopold to withdraw ; and in equal secrecy gave his personal approval to Strat, the Roumanian Agent, who had been induced by the Spanish Ambassador at Paris to go to Sigmaringen on the same errand. Thus, 1 To Lord Lyons, No. 13, July 6th, 1870; No. 19, July 9th, 1870; and to Lord A. Loftus, July 6th, 1870. 2 From Lord Lyons, No. 708, July 8th, 1870. 32 NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 from all quarters, both official and unofficial, a converging pressure was being employed to obtain the result suggested by Gramont. Nor was it ineffectual, for on July 12th, Prince Anthony telegraphed to Madrid withdrawing the candidature of his son. But by this time the French Government had changed its position, or rather had reverted to that which it had adopted in instructing (July 7th) Bene- detti to negotiate at Ems directly with the King of Prussia. Gramont had, in a confidential letter, instructed Benedetti to obtain a declaration from the King that his Government disapproved of Prince Leopold's acceptance and ordered him to revoke his unauthorised decision; by this means alone could France be satisfied and war avoided. But on the 8th, in conversation with Lyons, this was put forward as only the one of two alternatives : the other being pressed upon the attention of the British Government as a "most fortunate solution." On July 9th, however, Benedetti extracted from King William the information that he had known of Leopold's candidature, and had not withheld his assent, though he maintained that he had acted simply in his capacity as head of the Hohenzollern family. The news seemed to Ollivier most ominous1; after a Council of Ministers Gramont told Lyons, on July 10th, that " the affair is now, beyond all controversy, one between France and the King"; that, therefore, it was necessary for its satis- factory conclusion for Prince Leopold to withdraw "on the advice of the King of Prussia." Granville does not appear to have perceived the importance of this enlarged demand, and to have confidently expected that the news of Leopold's renunciation on the 12th would satisfy France. But Gramont was far from being satisfied. He acknowledged, indeed, to Lyons (July 12th) that Spain was now out of the dispute; but said that the answer of the King was neither courteous nor satis- factory. The Government was placed in a very embarrassing position ; for public opinion was so much excited that the Ministry would probably be overthrown, if they announced next day in the Chamber that the affair was settled, without having obtained some more complete satisfaction from Prussia. Gramont was peculiarly irritated by his knowledge that King William had privately advised Leopold to retire2, though he had refused when conversing with Benedetti to give such advice. Such an attitude really shows, as Lyons pointed out, that the King's intentions were pacific, and he warned Gramont that if war 1 See his note to Gramont on the night July 9-1 oth: "La depiche Benedetti est fort claire; elle confvrme tous mes pres sentiments et des maintenant la guerre me parait imposee; il n'y a plus qu'd s'y resoudre intrepidement et virilement." 2 In a letter sent to Prince Anthony by Colonel Strantz on July nth. THE EMS INTERVIEW 33 broke out now "all Europe would say that it was the fault of France; that France rushed into it without any substantial cause — merely from pride and resentment, " and that Prussia might well expect to rally all Germany in defence against such an attack1. So soon as Lord Granville learnt this, he telegraphed at midnight, July I2th-i3th, to instruct Lyons to renew his representations before the Council of Ministers was held, and to remind Gramont that the British Govern- ment had intervened at the request of France, and that their efforts could not have been more promptly and energetically employed, and to impress upon him the immense responsibility which would rest on France, if she should seek to enlarge the grounds of the quarrel. As the Ministers were in session when Lyons received the telegram, he embodied the substance in a letter which was handed to Gramont at the Council table (July 13th). But France was already committed. Ollivier, on hearing of the renunciation, considered that peace was now assured, and the Emperor at first agreed with him; but the Empress and various Deputies of the Right so worked upon his vacillating mind, during the afternoon of the 12th, that Gramont was authorised at 7 p.m. to send to Benedetti a telegram containing the words : " In order that this renunciation by Prince Anthony may pro- duce its full effect, it seems necessary that the King of Prussia should be associated with it, and should give us the assurance that he will not authorise this candidature in future." Ollivier had, in fact, been simply ignored by the Emperor; and his attempt, in a second despatch to Benedetti, to narrow the scope of the guarantees demanded arrived too late. Benedetti had acted with great promptitude, and had seen the King early in the morning of the 13th. The latter categorically refused to give the required promise, and declined the request of the Ambassador for a second audience, at which he intended to act on his modified instructions ; but sent word later by his aide-de-camp, Prince Radziwill, that he gave his full and unreserved approval to the re- nunciation made by Leopold. Meanwhile, Lyons still hoped during the 13th that peace might be preserved. The Council of Ministers had neither called out the reserves nor issued an ultimatum to Prussia, and Gramont had merely announced to the Chamber that the negotia- tions with Prussia were not yet concluded. Gramont, it is true, maintained a very stiff attitude. He told Lord Lyons that from Prussia France had obtained nothing, absolutely nothing Surely, it is but reasonable that France should take some precautions against 1 From Lord Lyons, No. 738, July 12th, 1870. w.&g. in 3 34 NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 a repetition of what had occurred when Prince Leopold's brother went off to Bucharest. It was not to be supposed that France would run the risk of Prince Leopold suddenly presenting himself in Spain and appealing to the chivalry of the Spanish people. Still, France did not call upon Prussia to prevent the Prince's going to Spain: all she desired was that the King should forbid him to change his present resolution to withdraw his candidature. If His Majesty would do this, the whole affair would be absolutely and entirely at an end. He then asked whether France could count on the good offices of the British Government in obtaining this prohibition from the King. Thus Gramont made his third volte-face to the Ambassador within five days ; each time he had added something to his original demand, and each time he had protested that he had nothing else to ask. Lyons, without committing himself, forwarded this new suggestion to the Foreign Office; and it was considered next day at a Cabinet Meeting. It was decided that Gramont's new demand was inadmissible ; but another attempt was made to preserve peace by a communication handed to Bernstorff which ran as follows : " We recommend to Prussia that as the King consented to the acceptance and thereby in a certain sense became a party to the arrangements, so he might with perfect dignity communicate to the French Government his consent in like manner to the withdrawal of the acceptance, if France should waive her demand for an engagement covering the future. Such a communication at the suggestion of a friendly Power would be a further and the strongest proof of the King's desire for the maintenance of the peace of Europe." The proposal was at the same time sent to Paris. But it arrived too late to have a chance of acceptance in either country. For, on the previous evening, Bismarck, who strongly disapproved of the King's negotiation with Benedetti, and had threatened to resign if he received the Ambassador again, took advantage of the discretionary power allowed him by the King and published the Ems telegram. He so rearranged the wording as to make it appear that, in consequence of Benedetti's offensive importunity, the King had been compelled to repel him by a public slight. This version of the telegram was not only published in the newspapers, but sent officially to the Prussian Diplo- matic Agents abroad. The French Council of Ministers met on the afternoon of the 14th and called out the reserves. But, momentarily shrinking from a war which now stared them in the face, they assented to the proposal of the Government, that France should appeal to a European Congress to give a formal recognition to the principle of international law, which, it was stated, forbade princes connected with THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 35 any of the reigning Houses of the Great Powers from accepting a foreign Throne, without the preliminary assent of all. The two further Councils held on the evening of the 14th and morning of the 15th, influenced partly by the furious excitement shown in the Press and in the streets, partly by a despatch from Vienna, which suggested that Bavaria would remain neutral, hesitated no longer, but decided to demand from the Chamber a vote of credit for 50,000,000 francs, which was justified by a statement amounting — as Ollivier admits — to a declaration of war. After recounting the course of Benedetti's negotiations, it asserted that the King's refusal to give the required guarantees, although regrettable, had not led to a rupture of negotia- tions; but that his refusal to see the Ambassador, which had been officially communicated to foreign Governments, rendered further attempts at conciliation undignified and imprudent. Granville made a last desperate appeal to the two Governments, in accordance with the Paris Protocol of 1856, to have recourse to the good offices of some friendly Power acceptable to both before proceeding to extremities; but it met with no more success than Lord Clarendon's similar effort in 1866. War was formally declared by the French on July 19th. Great Britain entered into a difficult and much resented neutrality. It has been maintained by both Bismarck and Ollivier that Great Britain might have prevented the War. The former said to Lord A. Loftus : " Great Britain should have forbidden France to enter on war. She was in a position to do so, and her interests and those of Europe demanded it." No importance can be attached to this charge, when it is remembered that Bismarck has himself admitted in his Recollec- tions his intense desire for the War ; besides indicating in a moment of frankness that Clarendon was the only man whose influence over the Emperor Napoleon could have averted it. Ollivier based his belief on different grounds. He wrote that The English Cabinet did not realise the decisive influence which it could exert; in short, it could, if it had so desired, have prevented the War. It had only to say: 'An international rule which we created in the case of Belgium and bowed to in the case of Greece, forbids every Great Power to place one of its members on a foreign throne, without the consent of Europe. We consider that under the present circumstances which threaten the peace of the world, a Conference should assemble to examine the validity of this rule and to decide in what way it is to be applied to the case of the candidature to the Spanish Crown1.' Such a proposal, he believed, which, coming from France, would have 1 U Empire Liberal, xv. 156. 3—2 36 NEUTRALITY, 1 866-1 874 met with the refusal of Prussia, would have met with success if made by Great Britain. Ollivier, however, assumes the very point at issue. If the British Government had recognised the existence of such a rule, the procedure which he recommended might have been appropriate ; but both Gladstone and Lord Granville made it perfectly clear through- out the negotiations that they did not claim to interfere in any way with the free exercise of the right of national self-determination by either Spain or Prussia ; if they recommended the withdrawal of Prince Leopold's candidature, it was simply because such a candidature was at the moment injudicious, not because it offended against international law. The cases of Belgium and Greece, which Ollivier cites as pre- cedents, are hardly even analogies. Each of these countries had been erected into an independent State by the Great Powers; each was subjected to a special regime, Belgium being neutralised under the guarantee of the five Great Powers, and Greece being guaranteed as a Constitutional monarchy by Great Britain, France and Russia. It is no doubt true that every Power has always held itself absolutely free to object to any dynastic change in the case of another, and if necessary to push this objection to the point of war ; but such an action would be taken in the interests of the Power concerned, or, if in the interests of Europe, in order to secure the Balance of Power, not in order to preserve international law from violation. Further, the candidature was not itself the cause of war, for the candidature had been with- drawn. If, at the suggested congress, France had put forward the further demand for guarantees, it would certainly have been refused by Prussia, and the negotiations would have been left at precisely the same stage as they had actually reached on July 12th. Nor, finally, is there any justification for the allegation afterwards made by Disraeli that the British remonstrances had been lacking in energy. If Ollivier had been in real instead of nominal control, war would not have broken out; but the Emperor and Gramont changed their policy without Ollivier 's knowledge, and they obstinately persisted in their provocative action in spite of Granville's most urgent warning, delivered at the Council Table in the middle of their deliberations. It is useless to speculate whether Clarendon would have been more successful, for his personal influence over the Emperor had died with him. The Cabinet could not have exerted stronger pressure on France except by uniting with the other Powers in a collective protest; but such a united action was as impossible in the existing diplomatic grouping of Europe as was any collective mediation to enforce peace during BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 37 the course of the War itself. The only other alternative — that of declaring that, if France engaged in an unjustifiable war, Great Britain would range herself as a belligerent on the side of Prussia —would not have met with the support of any section of public opinion. The first and most important problem which confronted the British Cabinet was that of the neutrality of Belgium. The independence and integrity of that country had been an almost uninterrupted source of anxiety during the four preceding years. At the time of the Austro- Prussian War the Belgian Minister had expressed his anxiety to Lord Stanley1. He said that the country was prosperous and contented under a popular King, and that no French party existed ; but that his Government had been urged more than once to obtain some confirma- tion or fresh sanction for the guarantees of 1839. This was not his own opinion, since he thought that no fresh Treaty could strengthen the obligation under which the Powers already lay ; but he admitted that Belgium had been alarmed by a statement made by a personage of importance — not connected with the British Government — that Great Britain would stand aloof, if Belgium was attacked. Lord Stanley agreed that the existing guarantees could not be strengthened by a new Treaty, and said that the greatest danger to Belgium would be the existence of a strong party hostile to its independent nationality within the country itself; inasmuch as there would always be in England a strong feeling against a rupture with France, any such division of opinion in Belgium might plausibly be adduced as an argument that the existing guarantees should not be held applicable. The Belgian Minister asked if the British Government would let Napoleon know that an attack on Belgium would eventually bring about a rupture with France ; to which Lord Stanley replied that he believed that Lord Clarendon had already given such an assurance and that " the views of the present and late Government were on that point the same." Lord Cowley took the opportunity on August 10th of emphasising these views to Drouyn de Lhuys, who, in a conversation about French "compensations" had cynically remarked that "as far as he was aware no sacrifice would be asked from Belgium." On the 14th, Drouyn de Lhuys enclosed a letter, written by the Emperor's order, in which he disavowed all intention of demanding from Belgium the frontiers of 18142. Only two days later, Rouher sent Instructions 1 To Lord Cowley, p. 57, July 20th, 1866. 2 From Lord Cowley, No. 166, August 14th, 1866: " Mon cher Ambassadeur, L'Empereur me charge de vous icrire que, si vous venez a Paris il vous verra avec plaisir, que cependant il croit inutile que vous vous derangiez si voire visite n'a pour but que 38 NEUTRALITY, 1 866-1 874 to Benedetti to obtain Bismarck's consent to the annexation of Belgium ; and he fulfilled these Instructions by drawing up and leaving with Bismarck the draft of a Treaty by which France was to assent to a federal union between north- and south- Germany in return for Prussian military assistance "in case His Majesty the Emperor of the French should be obliged by circumstances to cause his troops to enter Belgium and to conquer it." This transaction remained unknown to the British Government, though Disraeli suspected its existence. In April, 1867, Beust had proposed as a solution of the Luxemburg Question that Belgium should receive the grand-duchy and cede to France the frontiers of 18 14 — a proposal which Belgium had, with British support, resisted. These continual suggestions among the Great Powers for trafficking in Belgian territory caused keen alarm to Queen Victoria; especially as Lord Stanley was inclined to minimise the extent of British respon- sibilities. She impressed upon Disraeli that : " Prussia isn't likely to violate either the neutrality of Luxemburg or the independence of Belgium — indeed, she has no interest to do so — unless she sees reason to believe that England means her guarantee of both these objects to remain a dead letter; in which case she might think it to her interest to come to an agreement with France, fatal to the independence of the rest of Europe." It was hardly possible even for the Emperor Napoleon to renew negotiations with Bismarck for compensations after the humiliating failure to obtain Luxemburg1. Lord Stanley had shrewdly penetrated the intentions of the Emperor, when he spoke of the danger of the formation of a French party within the country itself; for the imperial policy was now one of peaceful penetration, politically and above all economically. The inspired French Press had, in 1868, again raised the often discussed problem of a Franco-Belgian customs union, but at the end of the year a serious practical question arose between the two countries. The French Eastern Railway Company had already made an arrangement which gave it the right of exploiting the de lui demander s'il compte revendiquer la partie des frontier es de 1814 qui appartient aujourd'hui a la Belgique; que je puis vous rassurer completement a cet egard que les forteresses de Philippeville et de Marienbourg, appartenant a un etat neutre, ne menacent plus nos frontieres, et que, quant aux autres parties de territoire qui ne sont pas a la Belgique, ce n'est ni par intimidation ni par violence qu'il desire une ratification (sic) de frontieres, mais par une entente amicale avec les parties interessees. Voild textuelement ce que fai pour instructions de vous dire.. . .Drouyn de Lhuys." 1 There is no doubt that Bismarck was intentionally inaccurate in giving the summer of 1867 as the date of the Draft Treaty in his telegram to Bernstorff of July 28th, 1870. THE BELGIAN RAILWAYS QUESTION 39 Guillaume-Luxemburg line, which served the grand-duchy. The Eastern Company further entered into secret negotiations for acquiring the two adjacent Belgian railways. Such an amalgamation was highly objectionable to Belgium, as the Eastern Company had behind it a French State guarantee, and would be able to control the most im- portant industrial region in Belgium round Liege. The Belgian Government therefore passed (February 23rd, 1869) a law forbidding the transfer of any Belgian railway without the authorisation of the Government. The Emperor chose to regard this action as a proof of hostility towards France, concerted with Prussia, and entertained serious thoughts of war1. He had hoped that this project of railway amalgamation would lead to a close union between the two countries ; hinting through his agent, La Guerroniere, who had been appointed French Minister at Brussels, that since 1866 former Treaties had no more than an "ideal value," and that Belgium must henceforward "lean towards France." Gladstone and Bright were believed to be firm partisans of non-intervention, while the Alabama question seemed likely to embroil Great Britain with the United States. The use of such language naturally confirmed the Belgian Government in the conviction that, under the guise of a commercial transaction, an attack was being made on the neutrality of the country. Queen Victoria, always in- tensely preoccupied with Belgium, had urged Clarendon (January 14th) to make it known that any proceedings which seemed to threaten Belgian independence or neutrality "would bring England at once into the field." Gladstone agreed that " the independence of Belgium was an object of the first interest to the mind of the British people," and hoped that it would be made clear to France that " the suspicion even of an intention on the part of France to pay less respect to the inde- pendence of Belgium than to the independence of England would at once produce a temper in the country which would put an end to the good understanding and useful and harmonious cooperation of the two governments." But Clarendon was able by friendly pressure to induce the parties to agree (March 21st) on examining the whole economic relations between the two countries by a Franco- Belgian Commission. Frere-Orban, the Belgian Prime-Minister, repaired to Paris to carry through these negotiations, which proved very thorny, as the Emperor seemed determined to press his original demands. Clarendon, throughout, urged Belgium to come to an agreement with 1 See his letter to Marshal Niel, February 19th, 1869, quoted in Ollivier, V Empire Liberal, xi. 375. 4o NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 France, provided that this did not involve the transfer of the railways, which would prevent Belgium from remaining its own master1. He deprecated the Belgian proposal to call upon the guarantors of 1839 to decide the question, except as a last extremity, in the event of a definite rupture of negotiations. On the other hand, he warned the French Ambassador in unmistakable terms (April 22nd) that, if Frere- Orban quitted Paris without an arrangement having been reached, the results might prove more serious to the Emperor than to Belgium. The incident finally terminated in a Protocol signed on April 27th, which provided for the appointment of the Commission agreed upon, and definitely rejected the projects of the Eastern Company. Bismarck afterwards claimed to Lord A. Loftus that, " although there had been no direct understanding with England, it was felt and known at Paris that Prussia would have supported England, if action had been taken. It was this knowledge that warded off action, and Belgium was saved." This statement was misleading, since Napoleon was prepared to face Prussian hostility in the matter, under the impression that such a casus belli would not unite German sentiment. It is true that Bismarck had made it clear that Prussia would join with Great Britain ; but it was British, not Prussian, action which exercised the decisive influence over the Emperor. IV, The Franco-German War and the Conference of London, 1871 At the outbreak of war in 1870, both France and Germany ex- pressed their intention of respecting Belgian neutrality. But the publication by Bismarck, on July 25th, of the Benedetti Treaty considerably diminished the value of their assurances, and produced a strong feeling that Great Britain should take immediate steps to secure the enforcement of the guarantee. Since each of the belligerents hastened to lay on the other the blame for a document which, as each declared, embodied the policy of his adversary, it was easy to obtain from both a further pledge for Belgium's security. Gladstone differed from the view expressed by Lord Stanley in 1867, that no new Treaty could strengthen the existing guarantees. " The sole or single-handed defence of Belgium," he wrote on August 4th to Bright, " would be 1 The result of the Eastern Company's control of the Luxemburg lines was clearly shown in 1870, when the Luxemburg Government excused unneutral pro- ceedings which had taken place on their territory by disclaiming all responsibility for a railway directed solely by a foreign Company, whose employes were also foreigners. (Despatch of Servais, Ministre d'fitat of the grand-duchy, to Bismarck, December 14th, 1870.) THE "LEAGUE OF NEUTRALS" 41 an enterprise which we incline to think Quixotic ; if these two great military Powers combined against it — that combination is the only serious danger ; and this it is which by our proposed engagements we should I hope render improbable to the very last degree." Accordingly, Treaties were signed (August 9th) with both belligerents, each of whom undertook to join Great Britain in defence of Belgian neutrality against the other; Great Britain not engaging to take part in any general operations of the War beyond the limits of Belgium. These Treaties were to remain in force for one year after the conclusion of peace. During August, the British Government took the leading part in forming what the French incorrectly called the League of Neutrals. Its genesis and scope can be best described in the language used by Granville to Lyons1 : " M. de Lavalette informed me to-day that the French Government had reason to suppose that Prince GortchakofF had informed the Russian Charge d'affaires in Paris that England had agreed with Italy that neither party should abandon its neutrality without announcing its determination to the other, and that the British Government proposed similar arrange- ments should be made between the Great neutral Powers and those of the second order." The Emperor of Russia, the telegram went on to say, had given his complete adhesion to the proposal. " M. de Lavalette asked me whether the fact stated by Prince GortchakofT was true — what was the nature of the engagement referred to, whether it was made and whether it was proposed afterwards to make it general. I replied that the statement was substantially true — that the nature of the engagement was what it purported to be — that there was to be no treaty nor protocol, but merely an interchange of despatches, which however had not yet taken place, and it was under consideration to make such an arrangement general. The proposal arose as follows. Several Powers, I said, since the beginning of the war, have proposed that a com- bined neutrality should be made of all the neutral Powers. His Majesty's Government have always objected to any formal compact, although pro- fessing their desire to exchange freely ideas which would tend to circum- scribe the war or which would lead to any prospect of peace. The Italian Government last week informed me that it was still desirous of maintaining neutrality, but that pressure was applied to it from more quarters than one, which made it difficult for it to do so; and it applied to Her Majesty's Government to give it some assistance. I replied that I still objected to any formal engagement ; but that, if it would be of any use to the Italian Government to interchange an assurance that Great Britain and Italy would not depart from their neutrality without announcing to each other their intention, I was ready to do so. 1 To Lord Lyons, No. 242, August 18th, 1870. 42 NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 I told M. de Lavalette further that I have informed the Russian Government of what had passed . . . and have asked it whether some such arrangements between neutral Governments might not be useful to the lesser Governments who desired to maintain their neutrality, and that the Russian Government had assented. ..." Such a proposal was in fact addressed to all the European States, and met with general assent. Austria, indeed, wished to widen the scope of the understanding by an agreement between neutrals not to take isolated steps towards mediation; as she was determined not to move on her own single initiative, owing to the belief that Prussia would not accept her mediation as impartial, and to her fear of Russia. She finally, however, agreed to the British proposal on September 9th. Granville himself was firm in his intention to take part in no mediation either collective or individual, unless it seemed to offer a solid hope of success. He refused, on August 17th, an appeal by Italy, who, alarmed at the rapid successions of German victories, offered to agree beforehand to any conditions which Great Britain might propose to maintain the integrity of France. Nor was he shaken, when the Provisional Government, which had risen to power on the ruins of the empire (September 4th) sent over Thiers, who visited all the neutral Great Courts in succession, to implore mediation with all the impetuous eloquence for which he was famed. He urged, in three successive interviews (September I3th-i6th),every argument which might induce Great Britain to help a country which had overthrown the responsible authors of its defeat. " It was not," he said, " for the interest of England that a dishonourable peace should be patched up which would leave France weak and irritable, unable to assist England, but ready for every occasion for recovering her lost prestige " ; while again he urged the warning that "there was nothing that North Germany, with a population of 60 millions, could not do, acting as a machine and led by such a man as Count Bismarck." Granville replied, very coldly, that We had done all in our power to obtain peace; we went beyond what we had a right to do in urging Spain to abandon a candidate whom she had a right fully to choose. We succeeded in removing the ground of quarrel. But the French Government had not been satisfied, and, leaving us on one side, had hastened to declare hostilities. From the first, we told all who pressed us that it was not our intention to offer ourselves as mediators, unless we had reason to believe that mediation would be acceptable to both parties, and that there seemed to be a basis on which both belligerents would agree to negotiate; but that by all we could learn such a state of things had not arisen. ALSACE-LORRAINE 43 He told Thiers, further, that he believed it would be much easier for the King and Bismarck to agree to conditions which the army and Germany might not consider to be ample, if the concession was made spontaneously and not upon the advice of a neutral, who had taken no part in the difficulties of the war. Granville was, moreover, of opinion, as he afterwards told the Pro- visional Government, that their refusal to cede "an inch of their soil or a stone of their fortresses " was an obstacle in the way of peace. Acting on this belief he, after a protracted struggle in the Cabinet, defeated Gladstone's "effort to speak with the other neutral Powers against the transfer of Alsace and Lorraine without reference to the populations1." Gladstone continued to press his views with the greatest persistency; the matter, he contended, "involves considera- tions of legitimate interest to all the Powers of Europe. It appears to bear on the Belgian question in particular. It is also a principle likely to be of great consequence in the eventual settlement of the Eastern question." In any case, whether mediation were practicable or not, he declared that, if no voice were previously raised against an enforced transfer, "it will in my opinion be a standing reproach to England," and finally prophesied to Lord Granville (December 20th, 1870) that he feared "this violent laceration and transfer is to lead us from bad to worse, and to be the beginning of a new series of European com- plications." But no British protest was made against the cession, notwithstanding the unanimous and touching declaration of the Deputies from Alsace-Lorraine in the National Assembly at Bordeaux (February 1 6th, 1 871). Gladstone's forebodings have been fulfilled to the letter, for, in the words of President Wilson2: "The wrong done to France by Prussia in 1 871, in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine. . .unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years." It was not because the remainder of the Cabinet approved of Bismarck's intentions that they prevented the action desired by Gladstone ; but because they believed that any protest would by its futility simply exacerbate the conflict. Armed mediation, in which Russia would not have joined, they believed — and probably with justice — would have created great danger of a universal European conflagration. It is possible, however, that British remonstrances might have had some effect on Prussia after the denunciation of the Black Sea Clauses by Russia; as Odo Russell's negotiations with Bismarck showed him to be at that time desperately 1 Entry in Gladstone's Diary, September 30th, 1870, quoted by Morley, Life of Gladstone, n. 346. 2 Point viii. 44 NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 anxious to prevent the extension of the War. The French themselves were to blame for losing the last opportunity of putting their case before the representatives of Europe by omitting to send a Plenipo- tentiary to the London Conference, until after the Preliminaries of Peace had been signed. For Granville had let it be known, in spite of Bismarck's opposition, that, when he presided over the Conference, " if at the end of the Conference or even after one of its sittings the French Plenipotentiaries should wish to take advantage of the presence of the Plenipotentiaries to bring any subject before them, in that case it would not be my duty to interfere.. . .1 cannot concur in Prince Bismarck's view, if it be his view, that the Conference remains a Conference after it has been adjourned or closed. No special character attaches to the place where it may be held. The Conference ceases as soon as it is formally adjourned or closed. Every Plenipotentiary is freed from any restriction which may have been imposed . . . and is at liberty to address any one or more of those who may still remain or are willing to listen1.' ' The aim of Granville was simply to remain impartial throughout the struggle ; and, as is inevitable when the most violent passions are aroused, he was exposed to the continual reproaches of both parties. His reply to BernstorfFs remonstrance against the unrestricted export of coal and warlike stores to France explains his attitude in a few words. "It seems hardly to admit of doubt that neutrality, when it once departs from strict impartiality, runs the risk of altering its essence, and that, the moment a neutral allows his proceedings to be biassed by predilection for one of the two belligerents, he ceases to be a neutral." In pursuance of this view, he was always ready to facilitate meetings between Representatives of the two belligerents to discuss an armistice; but, except in one instance, he resolutely refused to express any opinion on the conditions of peace. The reduction of the indemnity demanded from France from six to five milliards of francs was, partly at least, due to the representations of the British Govern- ment. The neutrality to which Russia had committed herself had a very different object in view from that sought by Granville. Germany had been able to embark on the War in the confident expectation that Austria would be mobilised because of her fear of a Russian attack, if she threw in her lot with France. Lord A. Loftus had been fully justified when he expressed his confidence that Bismarck had no fear of the Russian policy towards Prussia, so long as the Tsar lived and Gortchakoff remained Minister (March 12th, 1870). But Russia's 1 To Odo Russell, No. iii, February 25th, 1871. THE GORTCHAKOFF CIRCULAR 45 friendly attitude was not inspired by a disinterested desire to promote the Union of Germany. The Tsar had felt bitterly the humiliation imposed on his country by the clauses of the Treaty of Paris which provided for the neutralisation of the Black Sea, and he constantly expressed the view that their existence "was a blot on his reign." Indeed, such a limitation of the free exercise of sovereignty by a Great Power did not carry with it the promise of permanence. Lord Pal- merston, its principal author, used, with extraordinary levity, to tell Russian statesmen when they objected that the provisions could not last, that they would "last ten years1." Whenever any question arose in the Near East which required the collective action of the Powers, the Foreign Office was preoccupied with the fear that Russia would demand the revision of the Treaty of Paris. It was certain that Prussia attached no importance to the Black Sea Clauses which Bismarck afterwards described as "politically absurd, and therefore in the long run impossible." So early as August, 1866, Lord Cowley reported that the French Ambassador at Petrograd appeared to think that Prince Gortchakoff has profited by the opportunity to express the expectation of the Russian Government that if they are silent in the subject of the territorial acquisitions now made by Prussia, they may count on the goodwill of Prussia in obtaining a modification of the Treaty of 1856, whenever a favourable occasion may present itself. Baron Talleyrand even hints that a secret treaty may have been signed to that effect2. It is improbable that, either then or subsequently, any such formal compact was made between the two Powers ; but Bismarck has himself stated that he took the initiative in 1870 in sounding Gortchakoff and promising him the support of Prussia3. The Russian action, however, did not take the form, which respect for international law would have dictated, of demanding from the co- signatories of the Treaty of Paris the desired modification. Certain 1 See Granville's speech in the House of Lords, February 14th, 1871 : " General Ignatieff told me that he remarked to Lord Palmerston, 'These are stipulations which you cannot expect will last long,' and Lord Palmerston replied, 'They will last ten years' ; and his despatch to Sir A. Buchanan, British Ambassador at Petro- grad, No. 303, November 13th, 1870. Confidential." Baron Brunnow said in conversation: "He had warned Lord Palmerston that it could not last, and Lord Palmerston said it would last ten years." For what follows cf. Correspondence respecting the Repudiation by Russia of the Obligations of the Treaty of March 30th, 1856. Private. Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. (A copy of these is preserved among the papers of Sir A. Buchanan.) 2 Lord Cowley, No. 191, Confidential, August 21st, 1866. 3 Bismarck's Reflections and Reminiscences (English Translation), 11. 114. 46 NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 Russian military preparations which had been noticed during October, 1870, made the Turks fear that some violent coup might be imminent; they were inclined, however, to believe that the Russian intention was to occupy that portion of Bessarabia, the cession of which in 1856 had deprived Russia of control over the mouth of the Danube. But, on October 29th, immediately after the fall of Metz had rendered it absolutely impossible for France to throw in her lot with Great Britain, and made it probable that Peace would be speedily concluded, Gort- chakoff despatched to the Russian Representatives abroad a Circular, in which he distinctly denounced Clauses XI, XIII and XIV of the Treaty of Paris. The Tsar, he declared, could "no longer hold himself bound by the stipulations of the Treaty of March, 1856, as far as they restrict his sovereign rights in the Black Sea." This repudiation he endeavoured to justify by two arguments. The Tsar could not " admit, de jure, that treaties violated in several of their essential and general clauses should remain binding in other clauses directly affecting the interests of his Empire." He referred, in particular, to the union of Moldavia and Wallachia in 1866 under Prince Charles of Hohen- zollern, which, accomplished through revolution, had received the implied sanction of the Powers. Neither could he admit, " de facto, that the security of Russia should depend on a fiction which had not stood the test of time." Great Britain and France, he pointed out, had concentrated naval forces in the Mediterranean, Turkey was at liberty to maintain a navy in the Straits; and the introduction of ironclads " unknown and unforeseen" in 1856 still further imperilled the Russian position in the Black Sea. When Sir A. Buchanan at Petrograd heard of the Circular, he immediately, without waiting for Instructions from his Government, wrote to GortchakofT that he would expect to receive orders to ask for his passports and to leave immedi- ately. But the Cabinet was by no means inclined to take any action which would precipitate a rupture, and would either involve Europe in a general war or leave Great Britain to fight Russia single-handed. The reply to Russia, therefore, took the form of a despatch to Buchanan, which, though firm in its language, contained nothing in the nature of an ultimatum. Granville refrained from discussing whether the Russian desire to be freed from the restrictions of the Treaty was in itself reasonable or not. He confined himself to elaborating the single point, that no single Power can free itself from any of the stipulations of a treaty except by obtaining the previous consent of the co- signatories. The effect of unilateral denunciation, such as Gortchakoff GRANVILLE AND BRUNNOW 47 claimed the power of exercising, "is to bring the entire authority and efficacy of treaties under the discretionary control of each one of the Powers who may have signed them; the result of which would be the entire destruction of treaties in their essence." Gortchakoff had declared that Russia fully adhered to the general principles of the Treaty of Paris; but, "however satisfactory this may be in itself, it is obviously an expression of the free will of that Power which it might at any time alter or withdraw." It was, therefore, "impossible for Her Majesty's Government to give any sanction, on their part, to the course announced by Prince Gortchakoff." The final paragraph, however, suggested a more conciliatory attitude by the remark that, if Russia had requested the Signatories of the Peace of Paris to examine "whether anything has occurred which could be held to amount to an infraction of the Treaty, or whether there is anything in the terms which, from altered circumstances, presses with undue severity upon Russia, or which, in the course of events, had become unnecessary for the due pro- tection of Turkey, Her Majesty's Government would not have refused to examine the question in concert with the co- Signatories to the Treaty." Granville was less reserved in an interview with Brunnow on the following day. The Russian Ambassador had known nothing of the Circular beforehand1, and regarded the British reply as both " sudden " and "unexpected." He complained that it had not opened with an acknowledgement of the Tsar's assurance that he meant to observe the principal stipulations of the Treaty. "Was it possible," Granville replied, "that the Government of a great country should express satis- faction with an assurance from the head of another State because, when denouncing a portion of his treaty obligations, he said that he did not denounce them all?" Brunnow could only observe that " the value of treaties, particularly in late times, depended much on their longevity " — a side-allusion to the recent Treaties for the protection of Belgium, which the Russians chose to regard as a tacit admission that the obliga- tions assumed by the Powers in 1839 could no longer be considered binding. Brunnow, who "was much perturbed and sometimes angry " during this interview, asked whether he should prepare for departure, but was told by Lord Granville that "the imperial Government had 1 To Buchanan, No. 303, Confidential, November 13th, 1870. "I told Baron Brunnow that, although of course he would not and could not admit it, I was sure he disapproved the Circular as much as I did. Baron Brunnow confessed that it had taken him as much by surprise as it had done me ; that, if he had had the mis- fortune of being Foreign Secretary, he should have first negotiated with Turkey and then with the other parties to the Treaty." (This passage is omitted in the final draft of the despatch.) 48 NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 taken one step and we another, and I did not wish to anticipate any event." The British attitude for the moment was deliberately calculated to leave Russia in uncertainty as to our intentions. "Promising peace is as unwise as to threaten war," was the expression used by Lord Granville to the Prime-Minister. The practical question to be decided was this : if the country went to war with Russia, who would be its allies and who its opponents? The resentment in Turkey, the country most directly affected by the Circular, was great, and was increased by the offensive cynicism of Gortchakoff's explanatory Despatch, in which he assumed that he was doing the Porte a service by removing the main cause of friction between it and Russia. Sir H. Elliot, the British Ambassador, had indeed prophesied, a few days before the news became public, that Turkey would undoubtedly fight1. He wrote, without qualifications, that "the neutralisation of the Black Sea is a bulwark as strong and more reliable than the signed guarantees of all the Great Powers of Europe. If it were not for it, Turkey would be almost helpless at the mercy of Russia. . . . The Turkish statesmen are so fully convinced of this and feel so keenly that if there should once be a powerful Russian fleet on that sea, after the completion of the railway system has rendered easy the rapid concentration of the enormous military forces of the Empire, it will be in the power of the Russian Government to strike a fatal blow at the independence of the Sultan, at any moment when the Allies of the latter are unable to come forward to his assistance. They would rather fight now for that neutralisa- tion, which they regard as their best ally, than passively await the greater danger, which will threaten them when they have it no longer to trust to." But when Turkey was actually faced with the event, the problem did not solve itself with the same simplicity. The Russian move had placed her in the necessity of declaring and waging an offensive war, which would suit neither her disordered finances nor her military capacity. She would probably have been willing to proceed to extremities, if Great Britain and Austria would have given their simultaneous support. As it was, the Turkish Ambassador in Vienna remarked plaintively to Beust: "The Porte derives little comfort from alternate assurances that each of her Allies is willing to help her, if the other will only set the example, whilst the peril of her position is daily increasing2." Feeling within the Austro-Hungarian empire was in fact bitterly 1 From Elliot, No. 254, October 30th, 1870. 2 From Bloomfield, No. 203, Confidential, November 24th, 1870. ATTITUDE OF THE GREAT POWERS 49 divided. The hatred which the Hungarians felt towards Russia, their ruthless conqueror in 1849, was still unabated. Andrassy, the Foreign Minister, told Bloomfield in great excitement that, "so far as Hungary was concerned, he should be ready for action at once, the sooner the better, for Russia was not so well prepared for war as was generally supposed. . . l." But the Slav races and the Czechs in par- ticular were no less violently in favour of Russia, while the German element, with its representative, the Imperial Chancellor Beust, was eager for a conciliation. Such fundamental divisions necessarily limited Austrian policy. Moreover, Beust himself had never concealed his view that the restrictive clauses had "placed Russia in the Black Sea, in a situation unworthy of a Great Power," and had actually proposed in January, 1867, the convocation of a congress, which would agree to free her from those disabilities. His reply to the Circular, therefore (November 10th), though vigorous in wording, contained no express refusal to sanction the course adopted by Russia. GortchakofF, Buchanan wrote to Granville, would find this reply "easy to answer." Italy, which frankly subordinated its policy to that followed by Great Britain and Austria, could be relied on to cooperate in any steps which would prevent the general peace from being disturbed. France, entirely powerless in a military sense, had received the news with general satisfaction, "as likely to lead to European com- plications which will stop Prussia2." Thiers at once urged on Lyons that "England, Austria, Italy, Turkey and Spain should now unite with France to check the aggression of Prussia and Russia," and thought "that without war this would lead to a Congress in which all Europe would settle the terms of peace." This view, although perfectly natural to French statesmen in their present extremity, was not very helpful to Granville, as its motive was plainly to bring about that collective mediation to which he had repeatedly refused his sanction. It was, in fact, clear, as Granville had seen from the commence- ment of the crisis, that the attitude of Prussia would play the decisive part in determining that of Austria and Italy, and that Prussia's in- tentions could be extracted from Bismarck alone, since both Thile at Berlin and Bernstorfl at London confined themselves to colourless expressions of surprise at the Russian action. Accordingly, Odo Russell was at once (November nth) despatched to Prussian headquarters at Versailles as a Special Envoy to Bismarck. His Instructions were L From Lord Bloomfield, No. 200, Confidential, November 23rd, 1870. 2 From Lord Lyons, No. 1803, Confidential, November 14th, 1870. w.&g. Ill ,, 5o NEUTRALITY, 1 866-1 874 very general, as the first object of the Cabinet was to gain such infor- mation as would enable them to decide on their next move. The Chancellor had maintained complete silence, doubtless in the belief that the Circular would, after a preliminary protest, be tacitly accepted. His only concern was to circumscribe the War, and to prevent any European interference between France and Germany. Moreover, the military situation was, at the moment, causing the German Staff some anxiety; for Orleans, reoccupied by the French on November 10th, still remained in their hands, and seriously menaced the investment of Paris. The Cabinet had made an excellent choice in their Envoy. The combination of frankness and subtlety in Odo Russell's character appealed to Bismarck, who afterwards treated him, during his tenure of the Embassy at Berlin (1871-84), with an esteem and intimacy accorded to no other British diplomatist. Two interviews took place between them, on November 21st. In the former, Bismarck simulated surprise at the Russian Circular and entire disapproval of the method and the time chosen by the Russian Government ; but expressed him- self as unable to interfere or even answer the Circular for the present. He strongly recommended that a conference should be held at Con- stantinople before resort to hostilities. But, in the evening, Russell, who had convinced himself that the Chancellor respected strength above everything else, boldly out-stepped his Instructions and told him bluntly that the question " was of a nature in its present state to compel us, with or without allies, to go to war with Russia." The conversation was prolonged till midnight ; but before it closed Bismarck "came round to the British point of view, and felt that in our place he could not recede V He now offered to take the initiative of pro- posing a conference at Petrograd, at which the question might be peacefully settled. The way of peace was soon afterwards made easier for the Cabinet by a despatch from Gortchakoff, which was com- municated to Lord Granville on November 25th. It was effusive in its protestation of friendship, and while not explicitly withdrawing in any way from the attitude of the Circular, attenuated the effects of the denunciation of the Treaty into "the abrogation of a theoretical principle without immediate application.,, It was now time to decide between three alternative courses of action : either to go to war against Russia with the possible support of Turkey, which was becoming the more doubtful in consequence of Bismarck's efforts to induce that Power to come to a separate under- 1 Letter to Lord Granville, November 30th, 1870. A CONFERENCE ACCEPTED 51 standing with Russia ; or to accept the Circular, which Lord Granville's despatch of the 10th had categorically refused to do; or, finally, to enter into a Conference. Bismarck's proposal, as it stood, was in- admissible; for, as Granville caustically told BernstorfF, it "only stated that if we would ask the Prussian Government they would ask Russia to agree to a conference to be held at St Petersburg, whence the Circular, which had caused so painful an impression had emanated, with a view apparently to giving, with the support of Prussia, to Russia all that she desired1." But Bismarck made no difficulty in agreeing to the required modifications. Invitations to the conference were to be sent "on the express understanding that it should be in no way prejudiced by any previous assumption as to the result of its delibera- tions"; but the British Government "would feel bound, in concert with the other Powers, to weigh with fairness and without bias any claims which Russia might advance and any proposals which she might make2." A very conciliatory despatch to Buchanan (November 28th) stated that if GortchakofT's refinements on the Russian Circular, quoted above, "are to be construed into an announcement that Russia has formed and stated her own opinion of her rights, but has no intention of acting in conformity with it without due concert with the other Powers, they go far to close the controversy in which the two Governments have been engaged." Austria and Italy readily agreed ; Turkey was anxious to receive an assurance that the delibera- tions of the conference would be confined to the Black Sea Question. Granville pointed out that the terms of the invitation made it impossible to come to any definite agreement beforehand as to what matters should be discussed, but agreed that it would be most inadvisable to extend the scope of the deliberations. France, at first, refused on the ground that the proposal emanated from Prussia ; then endeavoured to make her acceptance contingent on the prior enforcement of an armistice on Prussia by the neutral Powers, and the inclusion in the deliberations of the Conference of the conditions of peace between the two belligerents, and finally, after accepting the conference, was not represented at it till its penultimate meeting (March 13th, 1871) — owing to lengthy disputes between Bismarck and Favre, as to the method by which the latter should obtain the necessary safe-conduct from Paris. The Conference, which met on January 17th, 1871, prolonged its six sessions over a period of two months. Its labours produced three 1 To Loftus, No. 324, November 24th, 1870. 2 To Russell, November 25th, 1870. 4—2 52 NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 positive results. At the first formal meeting all the Plenipotentiaries agreed to a Protocol by which they recognised "that it is an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a Treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the Contracting Powers by means of an amicable arrangement.'' This Declaration amounted to a withdrawal by Russia from the claim put forward in the Circular, and was indeed a logical corollary of the British proviso that the Conference should meet without any previous assumptions as to its results. It also removed the obligation, which legally bound Great Britain to go to war to prevent any infringement of the Treaty of Paris, by making it appear that no infringement of the Treaty had taken place. But the subsequent history of Europe fails to justify the assertion that the Declaration has added any additional security to the sanctity of Treaties. " In diplomacy," as Bismarck was fond of saying, " one hand must wash the other." After signing Granville's Protocol, the Plenipoten- tiaries proceeded to abrogate, in accordance with Russian demands, the three Clauses of the Treaty of Paris which provided for the neutralisation of the Black Sea. Finally, Turkey was granted a corre- sponding advantage. While the principle of closing the Straits to warships was maintained, the Sultan was allowed the power to open them "in time of peace to the vessels of war of friendly and allied Powers, in case the Sublime Porte should judge it necessary in order to secure the execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris." This liberty would have proved of service to Turkey, had she wished at any time to engage her Allies in a war with Russia, as it would have enabled her to reinforce the Turkish Black Sea Fleet before war had been declared. If, however, her object was, not war, but negotiations backed by force, the entry of a foreign fleet into the Bosphorus would be calculated to precipitate the very crisis which she desired to avoid. To assert that Granville's diplomacy had resulted in giving the command of the Black Sea to Turkey seems a great exaggeration of language1. So long as the entrance into the Black Sea in the event of war between Turkey and Russia remained in Turkish hands, a British fleet could always pass into and control that sea as it did in 1854; the revision of the clause merely rendered it less probable that the Turkish fleet would suffer defeat or destruction before the arrival of allied reinforcements. The removal of the neutralisation had, in fact, little influence on the relations between Russia and Turkey. It failed, on the one hand, 1 See Lord Fitzmaurice, Life of Lord Granville, n. 76. EFFECT OF REVISION OF PARIS TREATY 53 to produce that improvement of relations which Gortchakoff professed to anticipate. The neutralisation had been itself an effect, not a cause, of their mutual hostility. While the Christian populations under the Porte could still complain with justice of misgovernment and oppres- sion, and were steadily progressing, through the self-consciousness of nationality, towards fitness for an independent existence, over which Russia expected to exercise an exclusive influence, the relations between her and Turkey inevitably grew worse instead of better. Both Lord Stanley and Lord Granville were oppressed by the immense respon- sibility devolving upon Great Britain as a guarantor of the integrity of Turkey by the Tripartite Treaty of 1856, and perceived its provisions to be obsolete, since their enforcement would, in practice, be im- possible1. But, on the other hand, the Russian freedom of action in the Black Sea did not, as Elliot gloomily prophesied, leave Turkey almost help- less. On the contrary, the War of 1877-78 was not decided or even appreciably affected by naval operations, but by the final success of the Russians in capturing Plevna and forcing the barrier of the Balkans2. Great Britain emerged from this dangerous crisis as satisfactorily as could be expected, and probably with less discredit abroad than at home. Here, public opinion, which is seldom impressed by the niceties of diplomatic formulae, was convinced that the country had surrendered to the threats of Russia; for it was impossible to deny that, what Russia had demanded, she had obtained. Thus, the hatred and fear of Russia, which had begun to die down after the Crimean War, received a strong stimulus, and manifested itself in 1878 with a violence and intensity which have become proverbial. The attention of the country was diverted from the significant part played by 1 Lord Stanley said in 1867 to the French Ambassador: "It was dangerous to seem to negotiate with the Porte on a reciprocal basis of good government by it and obedience by the subjects, as we could not possibly guarantee the latter half of the bargain. Maladministration was not the primary cause of the discontent which had its root in feelings of nationality and religion, which the best Government could not wholly remove and which indeed with increasing prosperity was likely to grow stronger." (To Cowley, March nth, 1867.) Granville wrote to Elliot (No. 208, Confidential, October 6th, 1870) : " I have already told the Turkish Ambassador that I could not give assurances as to future contingencies. Would it not be more friendly to say more and to point out that there are contingencies in which Turkey must feel, now that she could not rely on our aid, and to impress upon her that her real safety will depend upon the aspirations and feelings of the populations over which she rules?". . . 2 See, as to Russia's tentative efforts, down to 1908, to secure complete freedom of navigation in the Black Sea, A. Stern, "Zur Geschichte der Meerengenfrage," in Wissen und Leben, xvi. 6 (Zurich, 1923). 54 NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 Bismarck. He had throughout dominated and directed the policy of Europe; he had successfully maintained the diplomatic isolation of France, and had created the German empire, at the very time when the Conference was engaged in its deliberations. Up to 1870, his policy had aimed with extraordinary success at obtaining from Europe the necessary liberty of action by which Prussia made Ger- many; henceforward, he was so to direct and manipulate diplomatic conditions in Europe as to maintain intact the supremacy in Europe which Germany had already won. The position of the Chancellor was not, indeed, to remain for long so unassailable as to justify Odo Russell's estimate, in 1872, that "Napoleon was not more powerful than Bismarck is at this moment." But the centre of power and diplomacy had, without dispute, been transferred to Berlin. British statesmen, like all others, had to shape their policy in accordance with their views of the future position and intentions of Germany. Bismarck had already told Odo Russell confidentially at Versailles, "that his ambition for Germany was an alliance with England and Austria in preference to a Russian alliance ; but he did not see his way to it yet1 " ; and he multiplied his expressions of goodwill, when the Special Envoy had become the Ambassador at Berlin. It was easy to believe that Bismarck was expressing his real feelings ; for the prospective advan- tages to Germany were obvious. She would hope to guarantee all that she had won, and to perpetuate the isolation, and therefore the help- lessness, of France. But Great Britain could expect no corresponding reciprocity. It was certain, as Bismarck himself admitted, that Germany would never, by acceding to the Tripartite Treaty, become a guarantor of the integrity of Turkey ; it was most unlikely that she would even agree on any joint policy in the Near East, which might bring her into antagonism with Russia. In fact, the Liberal Government during its last three years of office, occupied with the Alabama Arbitration abroad and with its comprehensive legislative programme at home, stood entirely aloof from a Europe which was beginning to feel its way towards an inevitable new grouping of its Powers. B. Sea Policy and the Alabama Claims, 1 861 -1907 The "Alabama Claims," the Treaty of Washington concluded between Her Britannic Majesty and the United States of America on May 8th, 1871, and the International Arbitration which, in pursuance of that Treaty, decided those claims, constituted a group of events 1 From Russell, No. 16, Secret, December ist, 1870. SEA-POLICY AND NORTH AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 55 which formed not only a definite stage in the evolution of British Foreign Policy in relation to the Law of the Sea, but also a turning- place in the history of that Law. The policy of the dominant Sea- Power was, and is, something more than the policy of a single nation. Despite the accidents of events and the errors of individual statesmen, that policy presents an organic growth of principles rather than the selfish policy of an individual Power. Those principles, in ever-growing measure, have represented what has been accepted as the inevitable relationship of neutrals with belligerents, of neutrals with neutrals and (in time of peace) of all nations with one another. Sooner or later, a complete doctrine of Neutrality was destined to emerge, and the rapid transformation of the character of Sea-Power, as the result of new methods of propulsion introduced about the middle of the nineteenth century, made it certain that it could not be long delayed. The North American Civil War, which began in April, 1861, as the consequence of the Secession from the Union in November, i860, of seven States — South Carolina, Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana and Texas — under the designation of "The Confederate States of North America,'* created conditions which could not but result in war at sea. The Seceding States in the spring of 1861 were joined by the States of Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee and Arkansas. The United States of America, after a century of extension and consolidation, were reft asunder. A vast unbroken region in central and southern North America from Mexico northward to the Potomac River asserted with ample arms and a solid political organisa- tion the right of self-determination and independence. It was neither a revolt nor a revolution. It was a deliberate setting-up of a new Rational hearth. The northern region of the great republic — "the North," as it was called — decided at all costs to maintain the Union; and in this country there was a political and social repercussion of the terrible struggle which was raging in the vast areas of North America. Great Britain, on the question of principle, was split in twain, and the cleavage became clearly apparent in the light of the early successes of the secessionists. Each of the antagonists strove to lean upon Great Britain, their mother-country. The North looked for moral support not only in respect to the doctrine of National Unity and all that it meant to civilisation, but also in respect to the great policy (of which Great Britain was the protagonist) of the extirpation of Slavery1. The South looked for the "material support of Great 1 See J. L. Motley's letter to the Duke of Argyll of June, 1861, Autobiography and Memoirs of the Eighth Duke of Argyll, 11. 173. 56 NEUTRALITY, 1 866-1 874 Britain and relied on the economic difficulties and disasters caused by the interruption of the supplies of cotton to the manufacturers of the Northern counties. The cleavage of English opinion took un- expected lines. The starving operatives of the north of England, whose material interests lay with the success of the apparently triumphant Secessionists, repudiated the ''Slave States" and gave the North their moral support. Disraeli held the same view and gave no support to the South. On the other hand, Gladstone was so impressed with the doctrine of self-determination in the form which it had then assumed as to declare, in the autumn of 1862, that Mr Jefferson Davis " had made an army and had made a navy, and, what was more, had made a Nation." So late as the summer of 1863, Gladstone affirmed that the maintenance of the Union was impossible. A steady foreign policy in these circumstances was difficult to maintain and liable to strange deflexions. It was destined to turn ultimately on Gladstone's state- ment that the south "had made a Navy." For British statesmen, the problem, when stripped of all its passions and conflicting sympathies, was a problem of sea-policy. If this had not been plain from the first — and it cannot be denied today that Lord John Russell was ill-advised and obstinate in his early dealings with the question — Liverpool soon made it plain. The coming of the War found this western seaport teeming with the rich and un- scrupulous agents of the Confederate States. Into Liverpool there had drifted, as by the influence of some economic magnet, hundreds of British and American sea-adventurers of every kind, but, for the most part, of the old piratical type. The quays of Liverpool hummed with rumours of sea-adventure ; and the things that the British Government did not know, that the Custom-House officials and their London chiefs did not choose to know, were the common talk of every marine-store dealer in the famous seaport. The naval side of the War developed with great rapidity. In April, 1861, the Confederates secured Fort Sumter (at the north of Charleston Harbour), the military arsenal of Harper's Ferry on the Potomac, and the naval arsenal at Norfolk. On April 15th, the President of the United States called out the militia, and, on April 17th, Jefferson Davis (who had been elected President of the Confederate States in February) issued a counter-proclamation inviting applications for letters of marque and reprisals against the United States. Lincoln's inevitable answer, two days later, was to declare a blockade of the Seceding States. Confederate vessels were captured and condemned, and the Supreme Court held that "a state THE BLOCKADE OF THE SECEDING STATES 57 of war" existed. In these circumstances, the British Government had no alternative. On May 14th, 1861, a Proclamation of Neutrality was issued with the necessary reference to the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1819. Great offence was given to the North by this action ; but, in fact, a similar course had been followed by the United States in the Canadian Rebellion of 1837, and, moreover, a recognition of a state of war did not involve any recognition of Independence1. On June 1st, the British Government forbade any belligerent warships to carry prizes into any harbour of the empire, and, on January 31st, 1 862, excluded all ships of war from the Bahama Islands and forbade any ship of war to stay more than twenty-four hours in any other imperial port. The Government, moreover, in its anxiety to avoid any charge of favouring the Con- federate States, recognised from the first the blockade of a coast line of 3000 miles declared by Lincoln, though in truth it was, for a con- siderable time, by no means effective. It was at this stage that Liverpool became the storm-centre of British policy. It was the interest of the cotton trade to make the blockade of the Southern ports ineffective. It was the business of the blockading forces to make this blockade effective. In the case pre- sented on the part of the British Government to the Tribunal of Arbitration, constituted under Article I of the Treaty of Washington, it was contended that the right of blockade is a belligerent right, and the enforcement of it belongs to the belligerent and not to neutral powers. That blockades to be binding must be made effective by the blockading power, is a settled and salutary rule ; and this indeed is the sole protection of neutrals against an undue and extravagant extension of the right of blockade. It follows, of necessity, that to the exertions of the blockading Power, and to those alone the task of making them effective must be left. It will be desirable to examine this declaration of policy in the light of Anglo-American relations ; but, first, it is necessary to refer in bare outline to the facts which gave rise to the Alabama Claims and to the subsequent tendencies of British and American policy. In June, 1862, it became clear that Liverpool had determined to break the blockade not only by running cargoes but by strengthening the Confederate fleet. In a strong letter to Lord Russell, dated June 23rd2, C. F. Adams, the United States Minister in London, referred to the case of the gunboat Oreto (which became the Florida) in the Confederate 1 See The Education of Henry Adams, an Autobiography, p. 153. (Constable, 1919.) 2 Papers presented to Parliament, 1872. 58 NEUTRALITY, 1 866-1 874 service, which had been built at Liverpool, and sailed thence in March, 1862; and to a sister ship — "a new and still more powerful war steamer " — then within nine or ten days of completion. This was the 290th ship laid down in the building-yards of Messrs Laird at Birkenhead. It was admittedly "a ship of war." When completed and armed, "she will be a most formidable and dangerous craft, and, if not prevented going to sea, will do much mischief to our commerce. The persons engaged in her construction say that no better vessel of her class was ever built." No one in Liverpool doubted the destination of "No. 290," and the password among the crew, who were enlisted from July, 1862, was "290"; but Adams merely asked the British Government for "such action as may tend, either to stop the projected expedition, or to establish the fact that its purpose is not inimical to the people of the United States." On June 25th, Lord Russell replied, "I have lost no time in referring the matter to the proper Department." Delays, due to bad fortune or carelessness and to the amazing view of the Commissioners of Customs, that "at present there is not sufficient ground to warrant the detention of the vessel," were tolerated by Lord Russell. However, all the necessary evidence was submitted to him by Adams on July 24th, including an opinion from one of the most eminent of English lawyers, R. P. Collier, K.C., who stated that "it appears difficult to make out a stronger case of infringement of the Foreign Enlistment Act, which, if not enforced on this occasion, is little better than a dead letter1." There can be no doubt that Lord Russell ought to have acted at once on such evidence and on such an opinion. His vacillation, perhaps, reflected the cleavage of national opinion and the view held by a section of the nation that it was perfectly legitimate to ride through the policy of the Foreign Enlistment Act of 18 19 on purely technical grounds. In June, Lord Russell ought to have taken im- mediate action. On July 24th he had his last opportunity, but did nothing for four days. He then wrote, on July 28th, to Adams that the papers had been referred to the Law Officers of the Crown. There were delays in securing this opinion, due to the illness of one of the Law Officers; but the opinion, when it came, entirely confirmed the opinion of Collier. The delay, however, hardly mattered ; for No. 290, 1 Sir Robert Collier was Solicitor- General from October, 1 863 , and was appointed Attorney- General in 1868. In 1885 he was created Lord Monkswell. (Lord John Russell was created Earl Russell on July 30th, 1861.) THE OPERATIONS OF THE ALABAMA 59 on the fatal July 28th, went for a trial trip out of the Mersey, from which she never returned. She was joined by most of her crew in a bay on the Welsh coast, sailed round the north coast of Ireland and arrived at the island of Terceira (among the Azores) on August 20th. There she was met by a British barque loaded with guns and war material, and later by the S.S. Bahama, bringing Captain Semmes, more guns and the rest of the crew. Here The Alabama was equipped outside the three-mile limit, and, on Sunday, August 24th, 1862, she was commissioned by the authority of the Confederate States Govern- ment and began the devastating cruise of twenty- two months, which ended in her destruction on Sunday, June 19th, 1864, off Cherbourg, by the U.S.S. Kearsage. It is not necessary here to retell the story of the Alabama, or to estimate in detail the great losses that she inflicted on the loyal subjects of the United States Government. These were the fruit of Lord Russell's vacillation. An acute observer declared that his four days of indecision cost England a million sterling a day1. Lord Russell, in his Recollections, accepted full blame. He wrote: " I assent entirely to the opinion of the Lord Chief Justice of England that the Alabama ought to have been detained during the four days I was waiting for the opinion of the Law officers. But I think that the fault was not that of the Commissioners of Customs, it was my fault as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs2." It is unnecessary, as it would be painful, further to recall Lord Russell's explanations of his error and his account of his belated efforts to stop the Alabama at Liverpool, Queenstown and Nassau. Adams's moderation of tone in the face of great provocation offers a model for Ambassadors. He contented himself with writing, on September 30th : " The extent to which Her Majesty's Flag and some of her ports have been used to the end of carrying on hostile operations is so universally understood that I deem it unnecessary further to dwell upon it. But, in the spirit of friendliness with which I have ever been animated towards Her Majesty's Government, I feel it my duty to omit no opportunity of urging the manifestation of its well known energy in upholding those laws of neutrality upon which alone the reciprocal confidence of nations can find a permanent base." 1 Lord Houghton (in Fitzmaurice's Granville), n. 81. See also Mr Sidney Low and Mr L. C. Sanders' History of England during the Reign of Victoria, p. 264. There are many records of the cruise of the Alabama. Very vivid accounts by eyewitnesses were published in The Century magazine for March, 1886. The account of life on board by one of the hands is a horrible picture of a pirate crew of earlier centuries, a gang of murderous ruffians. On the other hand, the account given by the First Officer of the ship is much more favourable. Probably, the tiuth lies between these two accounts. 2 See also The Education of Henry Adam'., p. 150. 60 NEUTRALITY, 1 866-1 874 Adams, in this sentence, removed the whole subject of sea- policy from the arena of local politics and passion to the region of history, tradition and reasonableness. He knew, as possibly Lord Russell's legal advisers at that time did not know, that there was a continuity of British and American policy in relation to neutrality which could or should be the only test of the troubles involved in the losses that British carelessness had imposed on his sorely tried republic. It is in this connexion noteworthy that, in answer to his further letter of November 20th, 1862, dealing with the relations of the two countries on the subject of neutrality from the latter part of the eighteenth century, Lord Russell offered to amend the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1 8 19 : an offer that was carried into effect in 1870. The difficulties of policy that have for more than a century beset the accepted doctrine of Neutrality have been almost entirely due to the tardiness in the emergence of that doctrine. It was first enunciated in 1793 by the United States of America in Jefferson's famous procla- mation ; but it was limited by the fact that, at that date, the international rules relating to Contraband and Blockade in restraint of belligerent trade had reached a definite form, and the doctrine of Neutrality was so framed as not to interfere with these rules. Jefferson declared in 1793 that a neutral nation must, in all things relating to the War, observe and enact impartiality towards the parties ; that favours to one to the prejudice of the other would import a fraudulent neutrality, of which no nation would be the dupe ; that no succour should be given to either unless stipulated by treaty, in money, arms, or anything else directly bestowing favour. This development of the views of Gentilis in the seventeenth century, and of Vattel and Rousseau in the eighteenth, carried with it two implications. It is the neutral Sovereign and not the Sovereign's subjects whom the rule or doctrine binds, and, therefore, while enlist- ment in neutral territory, and the arming of vessels in neutral waters are alike unlawful, yet the neutral Sovereign has no duty to restrain his subjects from trade with any belligerent or any fellow neutral. These implications follow at once from Rousseau's doctrine that nations, not nationals, are at war. In policy these implications have survived, though Rousseau's doctrine finally disappeared in the Five Years' War that ended in November, 19 18. Jefferson laid special stress, in ominous words, on this right of nationals to trade: " American citizens have always been free to make, vend and export arms. It is the constant occupation and livelihood of some of them. To ANGLO-AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF CONTRABAND 61 suppress their calling, the only means, perhaps, of their subsistence, because a war exists in foreign and distant countries, in which they have no concern, would scarcely be expected. It would be hard in principle and impossible in practice." This doctrine or policy and its implications were never overlooked in England or in America. The duty of the neutral Sovereign was conscientiously enshrined in the American Neutrality Acts of 1794 and 1 8 18, and the British Foreign Enlistment Acts of 18 19 and 1870, the latter being the direct fruit and a step towards the peaceful settle- ment of the Alabama Claims. The rights of the neutral nationals were already enshrined in the rules of law which, from the days of Lord Stowell to our own, have been steadily evolved with the intention of giving reality to those very rules relating to Contraband and Blockade, which have made anything in the nature of absolute or true Neutrality impossible. Had the doctrine of Neutrality emerged before the doc- trines of Contraband and Blockade, the duty of a neutral Sovereign to restrain his subjects in the pursuit of trade in goods that are essential to the maintenance of a war might have been enunciated ; but the policy of successive neutrals during successive Wars made this impossible. Hugo Grotius, in 1625, laid down the complete doctrine of Contraband, including the doctrine of Pre-emption that played so great a part in the War of 19 14. Grotius, in effect, declared that no person belonging to a non-belligerent State has the right to play the part of a belligerent. If he does so he must share the fate of a belligerent in respect to goods useful in war. Such goods included goods ancipitis ususy goods capable of a double purpose and in fact useful in war. The belligerent who might suffer injury has full rights of self-protection; and, even if the shipper is innocent and has no noxious purpose, yet the goods may be seized, subject, in certain circumstances, to restitution. The Treaty of Whitehall between England and Sweden in 1661 practically adopted the doctrine of Grotius, and the English Courts crowned the list of Contraband contained in that Treaty by a recognition of this practice of Pre- emption. So the Anglo-American doctrine of Contraband arose, whereby Absolute and Conditional Contraband were recognised and special cases of necessary seizure were met by the recognition of the equitable practice of Compensation or Pre-emption. The Continental Powers for the most part rejected this conception of Conditional Contraband. Yet the practice by which the capture of goods ancipitis usus involves 62 NEUTRALITY, 1 866-1 874 compensation where a guilty mind cannot be brought home to the shipper was a fair answer to Continental objections, while it brought in for trial all real cases of Contraband. This doctrine was fully at work before Jefferson enunciated his theory of Neutrality ; but the policy of the Washington Government in 1793 gave permanence to the practice that the neutrality of a Power is consistent with the assiduous belligerency, at their own risk, of its subjects. If the doctrine of Wolff rather than that of Vattel had been adopted in 1793, the United States and Great Britain would have decided to police their own subjects and have thus ended many temptations to war. The question of Blockade is not less important. Blockade springs from the idea of Siege. No neutral could cross the lines of a besieged city, even if the lines of investment were on the sea ; and this led to what Grotius called the Closure of Ports. In 1584, and again in 1630, the Dutch had declared certain ports closed, and, though an effort was made to limit in practice such closure to Contraband, yet after 1700 it was well recognised that all commerce could be legitimately ex- cluded from a port definitely invested by sea. The principle is that a non-belligerent shall not be allowed to supply any goods that will tend to prolong the resistance in any defined area. The Blockade must be recognised, must be effective and one that does not distinguish between neutrals. In these circumstances, a belligerent has a right to condemn the ship, and probably the cargo, of any non-belligerent who seeks to succour a blockaded enemy. Blockade and Contraband are penal measures against the subjects of neutral Powers who, for their own profit, decide to intervene in a war. The Washington Administration in 1793 adopted for the benefit of their own subjects a policy of Neutrality which included a law of Contraband and Blockade invented to penalise subjects of neutral Powers intervening in a war. The United States might have forbidden its subjects to traffic in Contraband, or to run cargoes through blockaded areas. This would have been a step forward; but, so soon as the policy of 1793 had been adopted by England as well as by America, the doctrine had to be carried to its logical conclusion. This conclusion was foreseen by Lord Stowell and Sir William Grant during the Napoleonic Wars. The doctrine of Continuous Voyage, which sprang from what is known as the Rule of the War of 1756, extended the rule as to Contraband to cases where the goods were colourably consigned to a neutral port, this being merely a stage on the journey to the belligerent forces. Lord Stowell held that the THE DOCTRINE OF CONTINUOUS VOYAGE 63 real destination was the test. No doubt there was a question as to whether the test was the real destination of the ship or of the goods. But Dr Westlake has rightly pointed out1 that Lord Stowell never committed himself to the view that the real destination was that of the ship. Such a conclusion would have been a logical absurdity, since the question of guilt lies with the shippers. The American judges during the War of Secession were not likely to be misled on this point, and, in the case of the Peterhof2, the Supreme Court boldly and without hesitation applied the doctrine of Continuous Voyage to the transport of goods. The Court gave the doctrine its legal extension to a doctrine of Continuous Transport, whether by sea or land, when the goods were shipped with the guilty intention of supplying the enemy with Contraband. The British Courts during the War of Secession expressly recognised this developed doctrine of Contraband and applied it during the War of io^with further logical extensions. The devices of non-neutral shippers were endless, and the range of Contraband became practically endless. In order to make the doctrine of Non- access complete, the British Government claimed so to apply the doctrine of Continuous Transport as to allow the capture of cargoes consigned to neutral ports "to order" or to an unknown consignee, while the doctrine was carried to the length that all Contraband goods were shut out from a neutral country, which was proved to be sending supplies to the belligerent. All this was the logical and inevitable extension of the policy adopted by Jefferson in 1793 ; and all this would have been avoided, had the doctrine that a neutral nation must police its own nationals been adopted at that date. At the time when the Alabama Claims were accruing this growth of policy was in active process, and North and South alike were watching the development of that policy with eager eyes. It was unfortunate that, at such a time, British statesmanship should not have perceived the line that lay between the duty of neutral Governments not to intervene in a war and the right of neutral nationals, at their own risk, so to intervene, and should have confused the notions of a ship as a Contraband article and of a ship as an illegal expedition. The line of distinction was clear enough, had British statesmen known the history of the policy and of the doctrine which it was their duty to apply in the case before them. The reaffirmation of the principle of the Union in North America, 1 International Law, part n. p. 296. 2 5 Wallace 28 [1866J. 64 NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 at vast cost in lives and treasure, created on the other side of the Atlantic a Power that had been integrated and become strong in the furnaces of fratricidal war. In a sense, modern America dates from the successful emergence of the re-united States from a struggle that threatened its life. It emerged triumphant, but through the nation there thrilled a deep dislike and distrust of Great Britain, of the mother-country who was believed to have failed them in their distress. Such a belief was ill-founded, for errors of judgment are not errors of heart ; but the belief grew and was grafted into earlier griefs and became a kind of national tradition, fostered, as it is even still to some extent fostered, by school histories which all true American historians condemn. Lord Russell's vacillation and defective knowledge of history bore bitter fruit that was still ripening so late as the year 19 14; but some part of the harvest came to sudden maturity immediately after the conclusion of the War of Secession in 1869. American states- men and journalists alike were determined to make the case of the Alabama and her sister ships a test of the future relations between the two countries ; and a growing party, flushed with victory, were not only tempted but anxious to try conclusions by war with the mother- country. Such a feeling was by no means universal ; yet the peace party would not have been strong enough to preserve peace, had statesmanship proved incapable of finding a via media. Mr Lucien Wolf, in his Life of the First Marquess of Ripony goes so far as to say that, towards the end of 1870, "war with America had become almost a question of opportunity and the opportunity was ominously nigh1." The wiser and greater minds on both sides of the Atlantic were, however, in no mood for a repetition of 1812. In 1869, John Lothrop Motley, despite President Grant's instinctive dislike of him — a dislike that extended to anyone that Grant could not understand2 — had been sent as Minister to the Court of St James ; and he was no war-maker. Henry Adams was then in London, seeking an opportunity to discuss the Alabama Claims with the British Ministers. The younger Adams looked on the Claims, so he says, as his own special creation, "dis- cussed between him and his father long before they had been discussed by Government." He, too, was no more of a war-maker than his father. The crash of the War of 1870 gave time for the wiser minds to think. President Grant, so long as there was peace, wanted peace. He would have been very dangerous if war had actually begun, or if 1 Life of the First Lord Ripon, by Lucien Wolf, 1921, 1. 237. 2 The Education of Henry Adams, p. 276. GREAT BRITAIN AND THE ALABAMA CLAIMS 65 he had thought that it must begin ; but war was not his goal. He had no goal except to let things drift. " Grant had no objects, wanted no help, wished for no champions. The Executive asked only to be let alone. This was his meaning when he said: 'Let us have peace1."' The only danger was, lest the policy of drifting should lead to the cataracts. It was the business of Hamilton Fish, the Secretary of State, to watch the drifting; and he was as little of a war-maker as Adams or Motley. Yet the position was dangerous and the danger was intensified by the very simplicity of General Grant, whose message to Congress on December 5th, 1870, on the relations between the two countries was by no means friendly. Fortunately, the British Govern- ment had already perceived the dangers of the position. The Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 had been passed and on November 19th, the Cabinet had considered a Memorandum, drawn up by Lord Tenterden of the Foreign Office, in which it was asserted that "as a matter of national exigency there must be a friendly adjustment of American claims2." The American Senate seemed inclined to determine the President's policy of drift into a very unfriendly direction. Lord Clarendon had accepted an Arbitration Treaty proposed by the American Government. This the Senate had thrown out, and it was therefore useless to suggest that the Alabama Claims should be sub- mitted to arbitration. The mystery which has hitherto wrapped the almost unexpected rapprochement reached by the two Governments has been cleared up by Mr Lucien Wolf from the confidential docu- ments to which he had access for the purposes of his Life of Lord Ripons. Lord Tenterden proposed to the Cabinet a way out of the impasse. He suggested that the two Governments should appoint High Commissioners to consider outstanding matters relating to Canadian Fisheries and allied subjects, and that the proposal should emanate from the British Government in such a form as to lead the United States Government to accept it on condition that the Alabama Claims should be included. Sir John Rose, a Canadian lawyer and statesman, who had settled in England, but had large business interests in America, was sent to Washington to sound the Government and to discuss the question with Hamilton Fish. The latter had no desire for war and, indeed, earnestly wished for reconciliation; but it was necessary that he should satisfy the potential War Party. He was, therefore, inclined to insist on expressions of regret and compensation ; 1 The Education of Henry Adams, p. 267. 2 Life of the First Lord Ripon, 1. 238. 8 Ibid. I. 240. W.&G. Ill S 66 NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 but he did not press this. He, no doubt, felt that the British Govern- ment would go as far as possible in their desire for peace, and that a hint in the right direction was, as it proved to be, sufficient. The business was rapidly carried through. On January 26th, 1871, a Note was addressed to the United States Government proposing a High Joint Commission on Canadian Fisheries and similar questions. On January 30th, Fish asked that the Alabama Claims should be included in the reference. This was conceded by the British Government on February 1st, and on February 3rd the American acceptance of the British proposal was officially notified. Any American was plainly at liberty to affirm the simple truth that the British Government had yielded to the demand of the United States Government and had referred the Alabama Claims, without a moment's delay, to the Joint High Commission. It is not often that secret diplomacy has so successfully applied methods resembling those of the nursery to the pride of nations. The British Commissioners were skilfully chosen. They were Lord de Grey and Ripon, representing the Government, Sir Stafford North- cote, representing the Opposition, Sir Edward Thornton, the British Minister at Washington, Sir John Macdonald, Prime-Minister of Canada, and Professor Montague Bernard who, as Chichele Professor of International Law at Oxford, knew something of the history of the Anglo-American doctrines of Neutrality, Blockade and Contraband. Lord Tenterden, who invented the fair and simple device, was the appropriate Secretary. The understood process was followed, when, at the third sitting of the Joint Commission, the Alabama Claims came up for discussion. On April 8th, Lord de Grey expressed " the regret felt by Her Majesty's Government for the escape of the Alabama and other vessels from British ports and for the depredations committed by these vessels." It was the truth, and Fish accepted it from his heart "as a token of kindness1." Then the bomb fell. The American Government laid its cards on the table and proposed that Great Britain should pay as compensation an agreed gross sum, or, alternatively, that the question of liability should be referred to a competent tribunal ; but that, in any event, the following principles should be applied to the decision as to the Claims : " 1. Any Great Maritime Power with a strong Government possessed of the material resources requisite to enable it to perform its duties, is 1 Despatches from the High Commissioners, April 8th and ioth, 1871. THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS 67 bound to use active diligence in order to prevent the construction or getting out, arming, equipping or augmenting the force, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel whereby war is intended to be carried on upon the ocean against a Power with which it is at peace, during hostilities between that Power and its insurgent citizens who have been recognised as belligerents by such Great Maritime Power. 2. When such vessel shall have escaped, such Power is bound to use like diligence to correct and detain her when she comes again within its jurisdiction. 3. Such Power is further bound to instruct its naval forces in all parts of the globe to arrest and detain vessels so escaping, whenever found upon the High Seas. 4. Any Power failing to observe either of the rules of international law above described, is justly to be held responsible for the injuries and depre- dations committed and damages occasioned by such vessels." The British Commissioners were placed in a difficult position. The American proposals, as they stood, clearly could not be accepted; and yet to break off the labours of the Commission by a definite refusal was an impossible alternative. In these circumstances, the Commis- sioners, led by Lord de Grey, advised the Cabinet by telegram on March 15th1 to accept the best that could be wrung from the American Representatives : namely, that the American proposals as amended by agreement should be an Instruction to an Agreed Tribunal. The Cabinet had assumed that all would go well and that the British Com- missioners would secure with ease a solution that would reestablish cordial relations. Everything had been done to secure this. The Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, though of course it was not international law, had carried English Municipal Law into an equality with the American Law, and beyond that no agreement could go. The American proposals, as they stood, were totally inadmissible, and the question before a distraught Cabinet was how far the principle of amendment could be trusted. Lowe, Cardwell and Goschen were opposed to any agree- ment. Forster and Sir Roundell Palmer were firmly in favour of the proposed compromise. Gladstone, Lord Kimberley and Lord Halifax were doubtful but were in favour of an agreement. Lord Hartington was silent and doubtful2. Commonsense carried the day — common- sense and trust in the carefully-chosen Commissioners. The Govern- ment agreed to the principles as amended, while insisting that no 1 Life of Lord Ripon> i. 245. 2 See Letters of Lord Granville and W. E. Forster to Lord de Grey, Life of Lord Ripon, 1. 246-7. 5—2 68 NEUTRALITY, 1866-1874 such principles were in force when the Alabama Claims arose1. Thus, the fateful agreement was made and the reliance upon Lord de Grey and his colleagues was well justified. The Americans had asked more than they expected to secure, and so obvious was this that they abandoned three-quarters of their original demands, and the rules of guidance for the Tribunal of Reference went little beyond the rules of the British Foreign Enlistment Act of 18192. Had the American Commissioners asked for less, they would have secured more. The Treaty of Washington was signed on May 8th, and approved by the Senate on May 22nd, 1871. It must have created considerable satis- faction in America to know that Lord Russell declared this a British surrender, though, on June 12th he withdrew his hostile motion in the House of Lords. Indeed, the whole transaction was designed to save the feelings of everyone. Lord de Grey, writing at the beginning of June to Lord Granville, stated that it was necessary "to reconcile by some compromise more ingenious than elegant the conflicting desires of the Senators, President and Canadians, without letting go the substantial objects we had in view." Those objects were legitimate and desirable : the preservation of peaceful relations and also of a sound policy of neutrality. It was no easy task, and furnished a notable illustration of Ovid's maxim — obsta principiis. In this case, the remedy seemed likely to come too late. Commonsense had to work in an atmosphere laden with fire-damp. No protocols of the daily proceedings were taken, and the agreed summaries throw little light on the struggle; and therefore, as Sir Stafford Northcote wrote to Lord Granville, " the history of our exploit will never be written as it deserves to be, and de Grey will never get all the credit he deserves for his strategy. ... I have told you already how much de Grey has impressed us all by his judgment, tact and temper, and by the high tone he has maintained all through the affair3." Lord de Grey carried the Davy lamp which in a very dangerous atmosphere made progress possible and creditable to Americans and English alike. The Three Rules contained in the Treaty of Washington ran as follows : "A Neutral Government is bound: First, to use due diligence to prevent the getting out, arming or equipping within its jurisdiction of any vessel which it has reasonable grounds to believe is intended to cruise, or to carry on war against a Power with which it is at peace; and also to use like diligence to prevent the 1 Despatch from the High Commissioners, April 5th, 1871. See Life of Lord Ripon, 1. 24Q. 2 Letter from Lord Tenterden of March 6th, 1871. 3 Life of Lord Ripon, 1. 251. Fitzmaurice, Granville, II. 87, 89. THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 69 departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part within such jurisdiction, to warlike vise. Secondly, Not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or for the purposes of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men. Thirdly, to exercise due diligence in its own ports or waters, and as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of the foregoing obligations and duties." These Rules were, in the words of the Washington Treaty, adopted by the British Government " in order to evince its desire of strengthen- ing the friendly relations between the two countries and of making satisfactory provision for the future. " The High Contracting Parties, therefore, agreed "to observe these rules as between themselves in the future and to bring them to the knowledge of other maritime powers, and to invite them to accede to them." The First Rule hardly went beyond the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1819; but Dr Westlake considers that the Second and Third Rules in effect extended to territory and were not limited to " ports and waters1." The British Government were not, however, out of the troubled waters. In 1869, Charles Sumner, in the debates on the Reverdy- Johnson Convention, had put forward as part of the Alabama Claims, claims in respect of the remote consequences of the depredations committed by the Alabama, the Florida, the Georgia and the Shenan- doah. The Commissioners had assumed that these Indirect Claims had been abandoned, and, on June 12th, 1871, Lord Granville stated that they had disappeared under the limited reference to the Arbitrators. Lord Cairns, however, held that the Treaty justified the American demands2. The point was a very fine one. In a despatch from the British Commissioners of March 8th, 1871, it was stated that the United States Government did not put forward the Indirect Claims, and that this was an important concession. In the signed Protocol, it was stated that the Indirect Claims might be revived in the event of a non-settlement. Language, indeed, could hardly have made it plainer that these far-reaching Claims were excluded from the Arbitration ; but they were in fact put forward in the American Case of December 15th, 1871. The Cabinet and the country were deeply moved. Russell, Lowe, Card well, Goschen and Gladstone insisted on 1 International Law, vol. It. War, p. 222. 2 Wolfe, p. 252. Buckle, Beacons field, v. 178. 70 NEUTRALITY, 1 866-1 874 our withdrawal from the Arbitration, and even Granville rightly became doubtful of American goodfaith. On the other side, Hamilton Fish attempted to justify the Claims on the ground that the amicable settlement in question referred to the first alternative in the original American proposal, and not to the case of an arbitration. His position was arguable, but really untenable, and the outburst of public opinion in England made it clear to American statesmen that to press these Claims was to ruin all. General Schenck, the American Minister in London, tried once again to revert to the first alternative and secure a direct settlement without an arbitration. Sir Stafford Northcote, in an interview, made it clear that this was impossible, and on April 24th, 1872, General Schenck was given to understand that a way out must be found, or the Treaty was at an end1. Fish found the way out. He decided to " ride off upon an adverse decision of the Arbitrators " ; and, once again, the essential commonsense of pacific Ministers found a method of saving national pride and of preserving the Treaty. It was definitely understood that the Arbitrators would rule out these In- direct Claims, and it is not surprising to find that the records of the Arbitration register this interesting fact. Secret diplomacy has been much condemned ; but it is only fair to say that it was secret diplomacy, and secret diplomacy of almost childlike simplicity, that placed finally the relations of Great Britain and the United States of America on a basis which not even the shock of the War of 19 14 could unsettle. The Arbitrators were duly appointed by Great Britain, the United States of America, Brazil, Italy and Switzerland in accordance with the Treaty of Washington, and the Tribunal of the Arbitration duly met at Geneva. After no less than thirty- two sessions, their decision was formulated, on September 14th, 1872. Great Britain had to pay, in respect to the devastations of the three ships (the Alabama, the Florida and the Shenandoah), damages amounting to 15,500,000 dollars. It is not necessary here to deal with the proceedings or the legal arguments2. Policy ends, or should end, when the Court takes seisin of a case. It is only necessary to notice two points. The first needs no further comment: the Tribunal ruled out the Indirect Claims. The second concerned the construction that the Tribunal put upon the words "due diligence " in the first Rule of reference. Though the question of construction could not affect the agreement to submit the Alabama 1 Fitzmaurice, Granville, n. 64. 2 See Westlake, u.s., also Cambridge Modern History, XII. 16-22, and legal authorities collected by L. Oppenheim, International Law, §335. See also J. B. Moore, Arbitrations (1. 653-9) and Phillimore, International Latv (111. § 151 a) for the text of this record. THE SEA-POLICY OF NEUTRALITY ESTABLISHED 71 Claims to the Tribunal, the British Government declined, and in- evitably declined, to be bound in future by this construction. The Tribunal held that the due diligence of a nation must be in proportion to the risks to which either belligerent may be exposed from failure to fulfil the obligations of neutrality on his part. Professor Oppenheim points out that, had this been generally accepted, " the most oppressive obligations would have become incumbent upon neutrals.' ' He adds that no such general acceptance has taken place and that " due diligence" must have its regular meaning in municipal law, namely such diligence as can reasonably be expected when all the circumstances and con- ditions of the case are taken into consideration1. With this exception, the First Rule was adopted by the Second Hague Conference of 1907 : the words, "to employ the means at its disposal," being substituted for "to use due diligence." Hence, the sole difficulty arising out of the Arbitration has disappeared. " These Alabama Rules," says Dr Westlake, " will always be memorable in the history of international law, not only as having been the means of settling a threatened dispute, but as a first and not unsuccessful attempt to supply some of the axiomata media which Bacon taught the necessity of interposing between the first principles and the detailed results of any science, and the want of which is conspicuous in the theory of neutral duties." The Rules, the Treaty of Washington and the subsequent Arbitra- tion at Geneva represent also the climax of a Sea-policy of Neutrality which, even if it is not consistent with the highest peace policy, brought finally together the two greatest maritime nations in the world. After Geneva, the common elements of this policy were so fully understood, that in the most crucial moments of stress between belligerent Great Britain and neutral United States in 1915, Mr Bryan, the Secretary of State, in writing to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, frankly declared that some of the doctrines, which appear to bear hardly upon neutrals at the present time, are analogous to, or outgrowths from, policies adopted by the United States of America when it was belligerent. The Government, therefore, cannot consistently protest against the application of rules which it has followed in the past, unless they have not been practised as heretofore2. Such a communication between two great Departments of American Government was the direct fruit of the wisdom with which Lord Granville, Lord Selborne, Lord Ripon and Sir Stafford Northcote repaired the shortcomings of Lord Russell and brought back Sea- policy into the lines of reasonableness and tradition. 1 International Law, § 363. 2 State Department Publication, January 24th, 191 5. CHAPTER II FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 I. Forward Policy in Central Asia, 1 874-1 880 STATESMEN in India, though differing on some fundamental questions of foreign policy, were at all times agreed in regarding the North-west Frontier as the Empire's greatest source of anxiety, and Afghanistan, lying as it did between two great rival Powers, as the weakest link in an imperfect chain of defence. A succession of Viceroys, from Canning onwards, taught by the bitter lesson of 1838-42, had adhered to the conservative policy of letting Afghanistan alone, deeming active intervention so hazardous as to be justified only by the avoidance of still greater risks. Opposed to this school of thought was the "forward" party, represented particularly in military circles, which wished to anticipate a development of events already assumed to be inevitable, and at once bind all the frontier rulers and chiefs to the British Government by means of alliances, missions and, where necessary, subsidies in the form of money and material of war. The problem of the North-west Frontier became serious only after the annexation of Sind (1843) and the Punjab (1849) had brought the Indian empire to the belt of territory beyond which lay Afghani- stan. Although not forming part of Afghanistan, this territory was inhabited by tribes, more or less lawless, who accepted its ruler as suzerain and rendered to him some sort of feudatory service. There were two obvious methods of regulating British relations with the Ameer and his dependencies. One was to assert political influence by force, and the alternative was to trust to the moral effect of a friendly understanding, formally defined. The former of these lines of policy had been tried in 1838 with disastrous results; and its failure ensured the adoption of the second, which was consistently followed for over thirty years. British garrisons were stationed at strategical points as near to Afghanistan as was prudent ; but to respect the independence of the Ameer's dominion and refrain from interference in its internal affairs was still regarded as an axiomatic principle of British Policy. The accepted bases of the political relations of Great Britain with Afghanistan were contained in Treaties and Agreements of 1855, 1857, 1869, and 1873. By a Treaty of March 3rd, 1855, concluded THE FRONTIER QUESTION AND AFGHANISTAN 73 with Dost Mohammad Khan during the governor-generalship of Lord Dalhousie by Sir John Lawrence, as Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, the East India Company undertook to respect the inde- pendence of the territories then in the Ameer's possession " and never to interfere therein " ; while the Ameer gave a pledge that he would be the friend of the Company's friends and the enemy of its enemies. By a Treaty of 1857, arising out of the Anglo-Persian War, a subsidy was promised to Dost Mohammad for the period of the War, and he agreed to the residence at Kabul, Kandahar, Balkh and elsewhere of British officers for controlling its employment, as well as to the maintenance of a Vakeel at Peshawur. The officers were to be with- drawn on the cessation of the subsidy ; but the Ameer was to receive henceforth at Kabul a permanent Vakeel, appointed by the British Government, but not a British officer, and he was still to be represented by a Vakeel at Peshawur. Both Agents were duly appointed ; but the Ameer's was withdrawn in 1858 and not replaced. Dost Mohammad died in 1863, leaving a large legacy of trouble for his kingdom in the shape of sixteen sons, many of whom were, at one time or another, mixed up in the internecine disputes of the succeeding two decades — some as active claimants to the Throne. He had named his third son, Shere Ali, as his successor, and the elder brothers gave a grudging assent. Although in continual conflict with his own kin, Shere Ali maintained his position for fifteen years with but one break, and during the whole of that time was able to count on British support. While Great Britain had been advancing towards Afghanistan from the south, Russia had been approaching ever nearer from the north ; and, to make the resulting situation the more perplexing, there were no exact frontiers, for these had changed continually with the fortunes of war. Already in 1867, Sir John Lawrence, who followed Lord Elgin, suggested to the Home Government that it would be wise to make some communication on the Frontier question to Petrograd in order to obviate possible misunderstanding in the future. The Government replied that they entertained no anxiety regarding Russia's movements, and that the establishment under her auspices of order and civilisation in backward regions was to be preferred to the continuance of the existing state of unsettlement and anarchy. These were likewise Lawrence's views, though his foresight went further. It is customary to identify him in a special manner with the policy described by himself as one of " masterly inactivity." Beyond 74 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1 874-1 885 doubt, he was hostile to any measure that suggested aggression or encroachment, or threatened to weaken the confidence of the Afghans — and herein he was maintaining an old tradition of proved wisdom. While, however, he was far from regarding the Russian advance as a necessary menace, and while he recognised it as no less inevitable and natural than the corresponding advance of British authority on the other side of Afghanistan, he also saw that it contained the possi- bility of danger. For that reason, he was eager to come to an under- standing with Russia as to the limits within which the spheres of influence of the two countries should extend, and the transgression of which by Russia should, in his view, involve her in "war with England in every part of the world." He thought the time had come for this understanding, when, after absorbing successively Tashkand and Khokand, Russia in 1868 occupied Samarkand. As regards Afghanistan, however, he favoured to the end a policy of non- intervention, commended by a money subsidy and the provision of arms to the Ameer as before, with an undertaking that Great Britain would support his independence so long as she could count on his fidelity. The policy of Lawrence was in the main followed by the Earl of Mayo (1868-72), though with a concurrent slackening of the Ameer's attachment and cordiality. Having been given money, Shere Ali demanded more and more of it, and complained when it was not forthcoming. It was hoped that a meeting between the Viceroy and the Ameer, which took place at Amballa (March 27th-29th, 1869), would restore the earlier confidence. Shere Ali, professing fear of Russia, formally asked for a guarantee of his independence and security, the recognition of his younger son, Abdulla Jan, as his successor, assistance in the form of arms and ammunition as might be needed, and a fixed yearly subsidy. The Indian Government opposed, and the Home Government rejected, the demand for an unconditional guarantee, and their attitude was approved by both political parties at the time; but the Viceroy was authorised to promise the Ameer money, arms, and ammunition at the full discretion of his advisers. Interpreting his Instructions narrowly, as he was bound to do, all Lord Mayo could promise was that the Ameer's applications for assistance would be received always "with considera- tion and respect." The question of the Succession was evaded. The caution and reserve shown by his Ally disappointed the Ameer, whose alarm, though it may have been exaggerated, was not THE NEUTRAL ZONE PRINCIPLE ACCEPTED 75 difficult to understand. The Home Government had themselves begun to perceive the importance of coming to a clearer understanding with Russia. Just before the Amballa meeting, Lord Clarendon had dis- cussed the Central Asian Question with Baron Brunnow and suggested "the recognition of some territory as neutral between the possessions of England and Russia, which should be the limit of those possessions and should be scrupulously respected by both Powers. " Brunnow communicated with Prince GortchakofT, who replied that the idea of maintaining between the two empires in Asia "a zone to preserve them from contact" had always been favoured by the Tsar. He also gave the assurance that the Tsar regarded Afghanistan as " completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise her influence." The assurance was deemed satisfactory, but in- sufficient. In the past, there had never been any reluctance on Russia's part to disclaim the intention of further advance in Central Asia, or even to disown the inconvenient action of zealous soldiers on the spot, eager to make reputations for themselves. Nevertheless, in spite of all assurances and disclaimers, Russia had, in fact, continued to go forward; and where she went she invariably remained. It will always be a point of dispute how far the suspicion of Russian designs, which was diligently fostered by a powerful party in England throughout the 'seventies, accentuated the very danger against which it was directed. Russia had, of course, just the same right to approach Afghanistan from the one side as Great Britain had from the other. If the interests of the Indian empire called for a policy of annexations and protectorates, so did those of the Russo- Asiatic empire; and the reasons which operated in the one case applied equally in the other. When this has been said, however, it must be allowed that Russian diplomacy was not as straightforward as it might have been ; and the habit of the Tsar's advisers of carrying on two policies, the one at Petrograd, official and conciliatory, and the other in Central Asia, unofficial and at times aggressive, yet open to repudiation at discretion, inevitably increased distrust. The principle of a neutral zone having been accepted, the boundary of Afghanistan had to be fixed. The Oxus was taken as the general northern line, a final Agreement to that effect being reached in January, 1873, at which time Russia gave positive assurances, not only that the Emperor did not intend to take Khiva, but that orders had been issued to prevent such a step. Lord Northbrook was now Viceroy, having succeeded Lord Mayo, 76 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 who was assassinated in February, 1872. Like his predecessor, North- brook was a safe man, in whose character the English qualities of slow-going caution and sterling commonsense were shown at their best. Above all, he had a passion for justice and fair-dealing. It was his conviction that, in political relations, Eastern ideas and practices should be met with Western, and that, if the European could not compete with the Oriental in duplicity and intrigue, he could meet him successfully with the more generous weapons of frankness and honesty. His successful administration in India, however, synchro- nised with a relapse in external relations. Ground was lost in Afghanistan, and, while the British blamed the Ameer, the Ameer blamed the British. The Seistan boundary settlement of 1873 sorely displeased Shere Ali, who felt — as many Anglo-Indians felt with him — that in that transaction his interests had been sacrificed to the cause of Anglo-Persian amity. He, also, harped continually upon the question of a guarantee and resented its not being offered to him in the form which could alone remove his legitimate anxiety. In 1870, General Kaufmann, Governor- General of Russian Turkestan, had addressed a letter of courtesy to the Ameer, who had replied to it in terms approved by the Viceroy. Two years later, Kaufmann pro- posed a regular exchange of correspondence between himself and Kabul, and thereby alarmed the Ameer, who was not relieved by the Indian Government's assurance that Russia had promised to regard his country as outside the sphere of her influence. For Russia was still pressing on. Not only did she retain Samar- kand, after occupying it avowedly as a temporary measure, but, in August, 1873, she obtained the cession of Khiva by treaty. This proceeding led Lord Granville to send to the British Ambassador at Petrograd a despatch in which, while deprecating a too close enquiry into how far the Treaty was in accord with Russia's past assurances, and disclaiming the exaggerated apprehensions current in England, he stated it to be increasingly desirable that a clear and frank under- standing as to their relative spheres of interest should "continue" to exist between the two countries. In his alarm, the Ameer now not only asked for a larger subsidy, more arms and ammunition, help in building forts on the Northern Frontier, and for the recognition of his favourite son as successor, but demanded an assurance that he would be able to count on British help in the event of his territory being invaded. In October, the Viceroy conferred with the Afghan Foreign Minister at Simla, but LORD NORTHBROOK'S POLICY 77 failed to satisfy him. He was authorised to give the assurance that the British Government would afford the Ameer assistance in the event of unprovoked aggression, so long as he followed their advice in foreign affairs ; but it was made clear that they reserved the right to judge whether and when help should be given. Any unconditional guarantee of protection was positively refused. To the last, Lord Northbrook declined to share the fears of Russian designs which periodically perturbed a section of the public at home. "We are quite comfortable in India, but England is all in a flutter," he wrote home in 1873 1 on tne occasion of one of these alarms. He was of Lawrence's opinion, however, that the weakness of Great Britain's position con- sisted in the fact that she had not made sufficiently clear to the Russian Government the paramount importance for her of intimate relations with Afghanistan and the danger of any disturbance of the frontier of that State. " I go heartily with Lord Lawrence and against fuss and interference," he wrote so late as January, 1875 5 "Dut there is a point upon which I would fight, and I should let the Russians understand this very clearly." The Gladstone Administration resigned in February, 1874, ana* m the succeeding Cabinet of Disraeli Lord Derby was for four years Foreign Secretary, and Lord Salisbury, for the same time, Secretary for India. Gladstone's defeat led to his abandonment of the leader- ship of his party and practically — though he continued to repre- sent his old constituency — to his temporary retirement from political life. Not all his colleagues lamented this self-effacement; yet the absence of his steadying influence, his instinctive regard for the moralities of national life, his warm humanitarian sympathies, and his lynx-eyed scrutiny of the blunders and foibles of his opponents was a great loss to the House of Commons, and in Foreign Affairs it meant the withdrawal of a wholesome check upon the actions of a statesman who was irresistibly attracted to ambitious designs. In his appeal to the nation in the general election, Disraeli had blamed the outgoing Government for showing too little energy in Foreign Affairs, and too much in domestic legislation. That order of things it was his intention to reverse. For twenty years Disraeli, both as statesman and writer, had been educating his party to the recogni- tion of Great Britain's wider imperial destiny. Having now behind him a compliant House of Commons and a consistently sympathetic House of Lords, he lost no time in putting his ideas into practice. It was his ambition to revive the spacious days of Elizabeth ; Great 78 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1 874-1 885 Britain's influence should again be felt to furthest Thule. Without her word nothing should be done in Europe, for he was determined to win for his country the place in Continental politics which Germany under Bismarck was usurping. Still more distinctly, he aspired to make his country, instead of Russia, the imperial mistress of the East. Long ago, indeed, he had conceived of her as less a European than an Asiatic Power1. The accomplishment of designs so bold in- volved a reorientation of Great Britain's Foreign Policy and a change of emphasis in her relations with several of the Powers. It was a tribute to his remarkable will-power and concentration of purpose that he succeeded so easily in winning his party for a transformation so fundamental and so contrary to long tradition. There was no immediate change of policy in India, though strong influences at once became active to that end at home. In particular, Sir Bartle Frere, ex-Governor of Bombay, and now a member of the Indian Council, falling back upon a minute of Sir Henry Raw- linson's of 1868, succeeded in convincing the Secretary of State of Russia's sinister designs and in winning his acceptance of Rawlinson's specific for frustrating them. This was the appointment of a British Resident, in addition to the existing native Agent in Afghanistan, to be stationed, first at Herat, but later at Kabul. Lord Salisbury formally made himself the mouthpiece of the "forward" school by a despatch addressed to the Viceroy on January 22nd, 1875, which he reinforced by private letters. In this document, fateful because it led to the abandonment of the old prudent policy, and the opening of a new era of rash experiment and daring adventure, it was stated that the Government had anxiously followed the course of events in Central Asia, and particularly on the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan, and were impressed by the need for precautionary action. It was felt that the information which reached the Indian Government as to what passed in Afghanistan and on its frontiers was neither sufficient nor trustworthy, and that there was reason to suspect that the Ameer controlled that information at will. In order to remedy this evil, the Viceroy was directed to "take measures, with as much expedition as the circumstances of the case permit, for procuring the assent of the Ameer to the establishment of a British Agency at Herat" ; and it was added that, when this had been done, a similar step might be desirable in regard to Kandahar — but not to Kabul, on account of "the diffi- culties which are interposed by the fanatic violence of the people." 1 Speech at Aylesbury, July 13th, 1866. LORD SALISBURY AND THE KABUL MISSION 79 Neither then nor later, however, did Lord Salisbury take seriously the alleged menace of a Russian advance upon India; what he chiefly feared was that Russia might seek to foment Afghan hostility against Great Britain, with the object of supplanting British influence at the Ameer's Court. Lord Northbrook lost no time in telegraphing (February 18th) that in the opinion of his Government "the time and circumstances appeared unsuitable for taking the initiative in the matter," and that the Ameer might be unwilling to allow a British Agent to reside at Herat without harbouring disloyal intentions to the British Government. He, therefore, asked for discretion as to the time and opportunity of giving effect to his Instructions. Lord Salisbury sanctioned a delay of three or four month's. In the following month, and again in June, the Viceroy reported that the opinion of the officers of the Punjab was averse to any pressure being applied to the Ameer in the way and for the purpose proposed. The attitude of the Indian Government was not, however, absolutely negative, for, in view of the situation which would arise if Russia occupied Merv, it was suggested that such a step would make it necessary to give to the Ameer additional assistance and more specific assurances that Great Britain would help him to defend Afghanistan against attack from without; and that then would be the proper time to establish a British Resident at Herat, as part of a new treaty arrangement,. In his reply (November 19) Lord Salisbury confessed to serious apprehension of Russian aggression. A short time before, in fact, a Russian Agent had been received at Kabul for the first time, and thenceforward there was a more or less regular exchange of courtesies between the emissaries of the Government of Turkestan and the Ameer. By the end of 1875, Russia was, also, completing the subdual and annexation of Khiva and Khokand, and the early appropriation of Merv seemed certain. Adhering as firmly as before to the proposal of a British Agency, the Indian Secretary, on behalf of the Govern- ment, now instructed Lord Northbrook to find without avoidable delay " some occasion for sending a mission to Kabul and to press the reception of this mission very earnestly upon the Ameer." It was to be the object of the Mission to arrange for the stationing of British officers in his kingdom. In their reply (January 28th, 1876) the Viceroy and Council still resisted the proposal by an argument which went to the extreme limits of official prudence, ending with the grave warning: "We deprecate, as involving serious danger to the peace of 8o FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1 874-1 885 Afghanistan and to the interests of the British Empire in India, the execution under present circumstances of the Instructions conveyed in your Lordship's despatch." Several months before this, Lord Northbrook had written to Lord Salisbury, in a private letter (Sep- tember 30th, 1875) : " My firm opinion is that to do anything to force him (the Ameer) to receive agents of ours in his country against his will is likely to subject us to the risk of another unnecessary and costly war in Afghanistan before many years are over." It was now too late for any counsels of prudence to have effect. At home, the "forward" party was in full hue and cry. A " spirited Foreign Policy " was the parole of the day. A beginning had been made in Europe, and the continuation was to be in Asia. Convinced that his work in India was done and his influence with the Home Government undermined, Lord Northbrook resigned in November; and he re- turned to England in the following spring. Some time before this, the Prime-Minister had given two fresh proofs of his wish to strengthen British prestige in India. In the autumn of 1875, the Prince of Wales, at his suggestion, paid a visit of several months to India and there met the chief native rulers. Early in the following year, he sprang on the Houses of Parliament a proposal to confer upon the Queen a distinct title in virtue of her Indian dominion. The proposal was not popular in the country ; but, since the Queen was known to favour it, the necessary Bill met with little opposition, though the undertaking was given that the new title should not be used in the United Kingdom. On the first day of 1877, the Queen was accordingly proclaimed at Delhi and other Indian cities as "Empress of India" (Kaisar-i-Hind). The new Viceroy appointed was Lord Lytton, then British Minister at Lisbon1. If the offer of the position was a great surprise to him, as he has recorded, it was no less such to the public. Lord Lytton's distinction had been rather literary than political. Although he had many qualities of statesmanship, and in particular the rare gift of imagination, he had never touched questions of high politics, he had had little or no experience of parliamentary life, and to this particular office, as he admitted to Disraeli, he came with "inexperience of all ad- ministrative business and ignorance at the outset of Indian affairs2." 1 Disraeli offered the Viceroyalty to Lord Lytton in a letter of November 23rd, 1875, and he left England on March 1st following. 2 Letter to Disraeli of December 1st, 1875. Lord Lytton's Indian Administration, p. 3. (In the following August Disraeli was raised to the peerage as Earl of Beaconsfield.) THE APPOINTMENT OF LORD LYTTON 81 Lord Lytton, however, was not required to have an Indian policy ; one had been prepared for him in advance, and he was merely selected as the likeliest instrument for executing it. Sir A. C. Lyall, his first Foreign Secretary, spoke of him as having come to India "more as a Government official than as an Oriental ruler." He was to inaugurate the " forward" movement which Lord Northbrook had for a time delayed, and he carried his Instructions with him in the form of an elaborate Memorandum. While these Instructions were perfectly explicit as to the object in view, they left him a wide discretion as to the methods by which this object was to be attained. Briefly, he was to concede the demands made by the Ameer in 1869 and 1873, and, in particular, to insist upon the reception of a British Mission in return. For a short time longer, events in Europe held back active measures. There, the attention of the British and Russian Govern- ments was concentrated upon an Eastern problem nearer home, and, throughout the whole of the year 1876, because approaching this problem from different angles and with different motives, the two Governments had barely succeeded in maintaining the appearance of harmony. In a great empire like that of Great Britain, Indian and Colonial Policy has perforce to march together in close step with general Foreign Policy; and while difficulties were increasing in Europe the time was inopportune for precipitating complications in Asia. Meanwhile, his knowledge of the preoccupations of the British Government and of the delicate relations in which Great Britain stood to Russia encouraged in the Ameer an attitude of greater independence. Reports of his growing disaffection began to alarm the Indian Government, and when, early in 1877, he was alleged to have preached a jihad against British rule in India and to have opened direct communications with the Russian authorities, contrary to his bond, formal complaint was made to his advisers. An open breach with Russia occurred when, after the abortive Constantinople Conference, she declared war on Turkey (April 24th, 1877), claiming a justification which the British Government denied. In that War, as in the succeeding Peace settlement1, Great Britain's influence was thrown wholly on Turkey's side. Russia, therefore, only followed the rules of fair fighting when she decided that, as her opponent had struck her in one place, she would strike back in another. The later developments of the Eastern controversy thus 1 Cf. infra, pp. 140-2. w.&g.iii 6 82 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1 874-1 885 produced violent repercussions in Central Asia, and their gravity was not lessened by the fact that Russia's action there was tactical rather than part of a deeply laid scheme of territorial aggression1. Twelve days after his first meeting with the Indian Council, then far from sympathetic, Lord Lytton took the first step in the pursuance of the policy entrusted to him, when, through the Commissioner at Peshawur, he informed the Ameer of the intention to depute a Special Envoy to wait upon him at an early date, with a view to notifying the Queen's Imperial title and his own assumption of office. In his reply (May 22nd), the Ameer declined a conference, on the ground that it could serve no purpose, unless the Indian Govern- ment had something new to say, which went beyond the conversations at Simla. Answering a further letter, the Ameer so far relented as to propose that the British native Vakeel at Kabul should be called to Simla, to report upon affairs at that Court, and should thereafter communicate to him the views and wishes of the British Government. This meeting took place on October 6th, and the result was to show the Ameer to be in a bad humour and dissatisfied with many things which the British Government had done or omitted to do. He still brooded over the refusal of the more definite alliance for which he asked in 1873, ann< ne nac* come to the conclusion that the British Government cared for him only in so far as they were enabled by his help to serve their own interests. He objected to the despatch of a mis- sion to Kabul on the threefold ground : that he expected no practical result from it, that it would inflame native feeling, and that Russian counteraction would be the inevitable consequence. It was, never- theless, clear that the Ameer was willing to receive any amount of subsidy, and that, if an alliance could but be shaped to his liking, he would rather admit British officers than forfeit it, provided the British Government would recognise his younger son, Abdulla Jan, as his successor, and not otherwise interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Lord Lytton offered to meet the Ameer on both points, and practically to accept his 1873 demands, the details to be arranged at a conference. By this time, he had broken down opposition in the 1 Describing in a letter to the Queen (July 22nd, 1877) the measures which were to be taken if war broke out with Russia because of her apprehended occupation of Constantinople, the Prime-Minister wrote: "It is Lord Beaconsfi eld's present opinion that in such a case Russia must be attacked from Asia, that troops should be sent to the Persian Gulf, and that the Empress of India should order her armies to clear Central Asia of the Muscovites, and drive them into the Caspian. We have a good instrument for this purpose in Lord Lytton, and indeed he was placed there with that view." (Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beacons field, vi. 155.) THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 83 Council, and was able to report to Lord Salisbury that he anticipated "no further opposition in carrying out my views." The Conference was held at Peshawur in January, 1877, the Indian Government being represented by Sir Lewis Pelly and the Ameer by his Minister Syud Noor Mohammad and the Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan, whose powers were ad referendum. The discussions dragged on for a long time. There was agreement on many points; but, when the question of despatching Missions was raised, the negotiators at once found themselves in front of a dead wall. Then, the Viceroy addressed to the British Envoy a long letter (March 3rd) of which the object was to stimulate the Ameer's wish for an alliance by convincing him that at present the British Government were under no obligations to him. It cannot be said that this reasoning was altogether free from sophistry, and its effect was necessarily unfavour- able. Lord Lytton contended that, under the Treaty of 1855, the Government had "contracted no liabilities whatever on behalf of the Ameer," not even reciprocating his pledge to be "the friend of its friends and the enemy of its enemies." Nevertheless, the Treaty certainly bound the Government to respect the territories then in the Ameer's possession and to maintain " perpetual peace and friend- ship" with Afghanistan — commitments capable of a very restricted, but also of a very wide, interpretation. Lord Mayo's undertaking of 1869 had gone further, while the Simla Agreement of 1873, though it gave only a conditional promise of help in the event of foreign aggression, in reality involved a moral and even a political obligation which the British Government would have ignored at their peril. It was, of course, competent for Great Britain at any time to denounce her Treaties altogether in due form, as a preliminary either to the conclusion of a new agreement or to the entire abandonment of conventional relations with Afghanistan. But confidence in her good faith was certain to be weakened by an attempt to prove that the engagements which had existed for twenty years, though meaning much to the Ameer, meant nothing at all to his supposed friend and ally. It was an inauspicious fact that Lord Lytton showed so little readiness to view the question from the standpoint of a ruler as proud, suspicious, self-willed, and masterful as himself. If obliga- tions which the Ameer had held to be, though insufficient, at least genuine so far as they went, were to be robbed of all value, it was hardly reasonable to expect him to enter with fervour into a new agreement which might be diluted at a future date in a similar manner. 6—2 84 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 A white light is thrown upon the frame of mind in which Lord Lytton proceeded with his task by a passage in a letter which he addressed a little later to Captain Cavagnari, the new British Agent at Peshawur (May 19th, 1877): Mejudice, the radical defect in the conduct of our past relations with Shere Ali is that the tone of it has never been in wholesome accordance with the realities of our relative positions — the weakness of his position and the strength of our own We can get on without Shere Ali ; he cannot get on without us. Ere long he must either go to shipwreck alto- gether, or else return to the old moorings on the Peshawur side in a temper chastened by sharp experience1. The fact is that, from the beginning, Lord Lytton was determined to drive the Ameer; never once did he seriously try to lead him. The Government at home had, so far, cordially approved all the Viceroy had done. "We must completely and unflinchingly support Lytton," Lord Beaconsfield wrote to the Foreign Secretary (April 1st, 1877) ; "we chose him for this very kind of business." The support which the Viceroy received from home at this juncture was, indeed, so unreserved as to encourage him to greater independence of action than he had yet dared to assert. While large events were shaping themselves in Afghanistan, a smaller "forward movement" was carried out with complete success in another part of the same frontier. Energetic soldiers like Colonel Sandeman and Colonel Roberts had long been reconnoitring on the borders of Baluchistan. Lord Northbrook had sanctioned overtures to the friendly ruler of that State, with a view to bringing him formally under British influence ; and Sandeman was engaged on this business when Lord Lytton arrived. Eventually, by the Treaty of Jacobabad, concluded with the Khan of Khelat (December 8th, 1876) Baluchistan passed under British protection, and the right was obtained to station British troops at Quetta. British influence was also strengthened in Chitral and Gilgit in the north at the same time. The incident did not improve the Ameer's humour or facilitate the proceedings at Peshawur. In the midst of the Conference, too, his Minister Syud Noor Mohammad, who had arrived there sick, died (March 26th). The consequence was the suspension of the negotiations, and Sir Lewis Pelly left Peshawur on April 12th without 1 Lord Lytton' s Indian Administration, p. 162. In the same work is quoted a letter of August 27th, 1876, in which Lord Lytton says of the Ameer: "A tool in the hands of Russia I will never allow him to become. Such a tool it would be my duty to break before it could be used." THE MISSION TO KABUL 85 a treaty. Hereupon, the British native agent at Kabul was withdrawn, and for some months there was a complete break in political rela- tions between the Governments of India and Afghanistan, though news from Kabul continued to trickle through the receiving office at Peshawur. The negotiations which had ended so unsatisfactorily left both sides with full liberty to go their own way, and both claimed and exercised this liberty. For a time, Lord Lytton applied himself to the task of working out an alternative solution of the Afghan Question — the method of disintegration. Fearing that Shere Ali had irre- trievably slipped out of his hands, he contemplated the division of his kingdom, thus rendering him impotent for harm. Soon events in Europe made their influence felt. Smarting under the humiliations which she had there sustained at Great Britain's hands, Russia did not hesitate to make the most of her advantages in Central Asia. In the summer of 1878, news was received of active Russian plottings in Kabul. In July, General Stoletoff, bearing letters from General Kaufmann, made his way to the Ameer's capital, where he was cordially received. If, as is maintained, he took back with him a formal Treaty of Alliance, it was a paper arrangement, for it did not help Afghanistan in its later difficulties. Convinced that the time for resolute action had now come, Lord Lytton, by urgent entreaty, obtained the Government's permission to insist on the immediate reception of a British Mission. Hitherto, the door into Afghanistan had been closed by prejudice, and bolted and barred by suspicion and fanaticism. Now he was resolved to force it, though he well knew the dangers which lurked behind, for some of his most experienced advisers had repeatedly warned him of them. The Envoy chosen was Sir Neville Chamberlain, who was to be accompanied by Major Cavagnari1; Major St John, Captain Ham- mick, and a medical officer, with Kazi Syud Ahmed, and a sufficient escort. It was necessary that the Ameer should be informed in advance by a native emissary, in order to prepare the way and to allow of the necessary arrangements being made for the quiet passage of the Mission through Afghan territory. The departure of this advance agent was delayed owing to the death of the heir-appa- rent, Abdulla Jan (August 17th), and he reached Kabul only on 1 The testimony of this gallant officer was quoted by the Indian Government, in a despatch of June 7th, 1875, in support of its contention that the Ameer would be "most unwilling to receive a British agent at Herat." 86 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 September 10th. The Ameer received him ungraciously and firmly declined the proffered overtures. In the meantime, the Mission had set out. Travelling by the Khyber Pass route, it had no sooner reached the outpost of Ali Masjid, at the entrance to the defile, than it came to a standstill. There, the commander of the fort refused permission to pass his lines. In reply to protest, he said that he had no authority from the Ameer to allow the Mission to go forward, and that in its absence further progress would if necessary be resisted by force. When parley, ex- postulation and threat proved unavailing, the Mission returned to Peshawur (September 23rd). The news of the rebuff offered to the Mission met with a mixed reception from the British Cabinet. The action of the Russian Agent and of the Ameer was, of course, irregular and aggravating; but the Viceroy's impulsive method of countering it was felt to be indiscreet and inopportune. For, at this time, the two Governments in Europe, their dispute over the Eastern Question having been adjusted, seemed at last in a fair way of coming to a complete understanding on the Question of Central Asia. Accordingly, Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury (Foreign Secretary since March), who managed the more important Foreign Affairs in partnership, were both opposed to the idea of rash reprisals. The former was certainly in no mood for a second rupture with Russia, after the first had been healed so satis- factorily. He did not forget that the Treaty of Berlin, quite recently concluded (July 13th), had been represented by him as an all-round settlement with Russia in Asia as well as in Europe. The country had responded enthusiastically to his Ave " Peace with honour !" when he returned from Berlin ; " but if they find there is no peace they will soon be apt to conclude there is also no honour1." He was, therefore, disposed at first to condemn the Viceroy's impetuous action as spoiling the good work which he and his lieutenant had accomplished in Berlin. Headstrong counsels abounded at that time. " Jingo" voices in India and at home were calling in chorus for the immediate chastise- ment of a half-savage ruler who had proved truculent as well as treacherous. Without any concession to passion, however, there were grave political considerations which made it difficult to overlook the affront. Western authority in Oriental countries is based on the principle that prestige is power. Many moderate men, free from 1 Letter of September 17th, 1878. WAR AND PEACE CONDITIONS 87 any feeling of vindictiveness, believed that, if it were to go forth in the East that a border-chief could with impunity set at defiance Great Britain and the Envoy of the Empress-Queen, the British tenure of India might not be worth a year's purchase. Rejecting the Viceroy's request for permission to adopt forcible measures, however, the Cabinet decided to continue the military preparations; but, in the meantime, to try the effect upon the Ameer of another message, the text of which, for caution's sake, was to receive its explicit approval before despatch. This letter, as authorised by the Secretary of State on October 31st, and delivered to the Afghan commander at Ali Masjid on November 2nd, demanded from the Ameer an apology and an undertaking to receive a permanent British Mission within his territory, failing which his intentions were to be regarded as hostile and he was to be treated as a declared enemy of Great Britain. No reply to the British ultimatum having been received within the time limit fixed (November 20th), three British forces of invasion were set in motion simultaneously. The northern force, under General Browne, moved on the Khyber Pass, taking the obstructive fort of Ali Masjid and then Jellalabad, so clearing the way to Kabul; the centre column, under Sir Frederick Roberts, followed the Kurum Valley, capturing the Peiwar Khotel after a sharp engagement; while, in the south, Generals Biddulph and Stewart operated, the former advancing from Quetta to Pishin, which he occupied without re- sistance, while the latter took command there of the Kandahar expe- ditionary force, which he brought to its destination on January 9th, 1879. Shere Ali had, in the meantime, fled from Kabul into Afghan Turkestan (where he died in February), leaving in command his son Yakoob Khan, whom he had liberated after long imprisonment. On the last day of the month, his belated reply to the ultimatum was received : no apology was tendered, but he agreed to a British Mission. No attempt was made by the Russians to increase the invaders' difficulties. On the outbreak of hostilities the Kabul Mission with- drew into its own territory, and, when the Ameer appealed for assistance, he received only the good advice to make peace. Authority having been thus asserted, peace was offered to Afghanistan on terms which practically realised the Salisbury-Lytton programme. Unfortunately, it had to be concluded with the make- shift ruler, Yakoob Khan, in default of anyone holding authority by the known will of the Afghan people. It was signed on behalf of the Queen by Cavagnari, who was associated with the "forward" 88 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1 874-1 885 policy from the beginning to its tragic denouement. By the Treaty of Gandamak (May 26th), the Ameer agreed to conduct his foreign relations in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government, to enter into no engagements with foreign States, and not to take up arms against any such States except with British con- currence. Kandahar and Jellalabad were to be returned to the Ameer so soon as his Government was reestablished ; but Great Britain was to acquire certain frontier districts and to retain control of the Khyber Pass and the Pishin, Sibi and Kurum districts. On the other hand, the British Government were to have a Resident in the country, with the right of stationing British Agents to such parts of the Afghan frontier as occasion might require, so as to guarantee Afghanistan against unprovoked foreign aggression, and to pay a regular and increased subsidy. No time was lost in accrediting a British Envoy to the new Ameer. Yakoob Khan had suggested Kabul as the place of residence, and Sir Lewis Cavagnari, having been chosen for the post, arrived there with his suite on July 24th. The reception of the Mission was " everything that could be desired1"; and Cavagnari's first month in the Afghan capital confirmed the first favourable impressions. A letter from him of August 30th to the Viceroy, though not making light of a difficult and still obscure position, seemed confident and betrayed no anxiety. At the end of the letter he regretted that the entry of the Mission into Kabul had been ignored by the Press at home, and added his fear that "the British public require a blunder and a huge disaster to excite their interest." The fear was to be justified. Three days later, the Residency was attacked by a body of mutinous Afghan troops from the Herat garrison, and the members of the Embassy were brutally massacred. The effect of the crime in India was stupefying, while a cry of horror went through England. Stunned though he was by a disaster which seemed to turn the proud boast of " Peace with honour" into a cruel jest, Beaconsfield in that trying crisis exercised statesmanlike restraint. Not once did he lose head or nerve, or palter to the bar- barous cry for crude revenge. It was clear that the Treaty of Gandamak must be regarded as null and void, and new arrangements devised in its place. If Yakoob remained faithful and the Sirdars rallied to him, Beaconsfield thought Great Britain ought not to abandon him; if, 1 Letter of Cavagnari to Lord Lytton, July 24th, 1879. {Lord Lytton's Indian Administration, p. 342.) THE POLICY OF DISINTEGRATION 89 however, the Ameer was dead or had fled, the right course would be to consolidate the military frontier, and retain Kandahar; though, for the rest, Afghanistan might be left to fall into pieces, if it must, and be partitioned amongst feudatory chiefs. This was, in effect, the policy of "disintegration" upon which Lord Lytton had long before been prepared to fall back, if all methods of conciliating the Ameer and converting him into a trustworthy ally failed. A long and toilsome road had still to be trodden, before the situation in Afghanistan became sufficiently clear to make possible the adoption of any kind of policy for the regulation of the country's future relations with India and Great Britain. Of the ensuing War the most notable incident was General Roberts's brilliant march to Kabul, which he entered on October 12th. Yakoob Khan had already surrendered himself to the British camp with his Ministers. As the result of a strict legal investigation, he was acquitted of complicity in the massacre, but was held to be culpable in that he had not interposed effectively for the protection of the Mission as he might have done. Such of the ringleaders in the massacre as could be brought to justice were put to death. Yakoob was not loth to abdicate, and he was sent into India for safety. His departure was the signal for a revolt throughout the Kabul region which was not suppressed until the end of December. Through- out 1880, however, there was intermittent fighting in the frontier districts. Word had gone forth from the India Office in London, which now allowed itself to be entirely led by the Viceroy, that Afghanistan was no longer to exist as a united dominion. Lytton's idea was the formation of a new western kingdom, with Kandahar as its capital, covered by a British cantonment at Pishin, and constituting a tributary State of the Indian empire; and, in April, Shere Ali, a cousin of the late Ameer, was experimentally appointed Governor of this territory. Before further progress with the settlement of the country could be made on these lines, political events at home created a new situa- tion. Encouraged by the success of the Ministerial candidates in two bye-elections, Lord Beaconsfield dissolved Parliament in April. The election was fought over the clear issue of Foreign and Colonial Policy, and the result showed that swing of the pendulum which is so characteristic of British political opinion. Once more, the nation pro- claimed its distrust of any extreme course of policy and its instinctive preference for the line of caution and safety. In all the three kingdoms, in counties and boroughs alike, the Government suffered a crushing 90 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 defeat. For the Prime-Minister the result was a final fall, and it says much for the chivalry of English party life that the sympathies of not a few of his political opponents accompanied the old master of state- craft, enfeebled, disillusioned, and broken, into his lonely retirement at Hughenden, where he died a year later (April 19th, 1881). The work of settlement and reorganisation was completed under the viceroyalty of the Marquis of Ripon. For, with right feeling and great good sense, Lord Lytton decided not to outstay in office the renunciation and reversal of his policy, and he resigned with the Government to whose confidence he owed a dramatic, if trying, ex- perience. It was impossible to restore without modification the status quo ante helium. The idea of annexation was abandoned, and it was decided to evacuate Afghan territory and leave the Afghans as much as possible to themselves — which was all they asked. A timely auxiliary appeared in the person of Abdur Rahman (son of Shere Ali's half-brother Mahommad Afzul Khan), who had just returned from exile in Russian territory. On July 22nd, 1880, he was installed Ameer in Kabul, after his acceptance of the arrangements made by the Treaty of Gandamak, with two exceptions : Kandahar was to be under a separate ruler, and the admission of a British Resident was not to be pressed, though it was suggested that by mutual agreement a Mohammadan Agent of the British Government might be stationed at Kabul for convenience of intercourse. Subject to his compliance with these conditions, the Ameer was to receive a guarantee against external aggression. The retention of Kandahar was not of long duration. While the negotiations with Abdur Rahman were in progress, Ayoob Khan, a younger son of the late Ameer, who had asserted himself at Herat, began an advance on the town. General Burrows set out thence to oppose him, but suffered a disastrous reverse at Maiwand (July 27th). Kandahar being hard pressed, General Roberts, with 10,000 picked men, carried out between August nth and 31st his famous march of 313 miles from Kabul to the beleaguered city, before the walls of which he engaged and routed the aggressor (September 1st). The subsequent withdrawal of the British garrison from Kandahar again encouraged Ayoob Khan, who had reestablished himself at Herat, to attempt its capture, and in the following July he succeeded. In September, however, Abdur Rahman, having consolidated his position, defeated the pretender and chased him across the frontier, thus making himself master of the whole of Afghanistan. REVOLT IN HERZEGOVINA 91 II. The Reopening of the Eastern Question, 1 875-1 877 A. The Revolt in Herzegovina and Bosnia, 1 875-1 876 At the beginning of the 'seventies, almost the entire Balkan penin- sula, from the Mediterranean to the southern and south-eastern frontiers of Austria-Hungary, with the exception of Greece, still continued under either the direct sovereignty or the suzerainty of Turkey. Roumania, formed out of the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia in 1861, Servia, a principality since 1830, and Montenegro had alike obtained virtual autonomy, though they were still tributary States. Hellas was a kingdom, but only in parts ; for a large irredenta, including Thessaly and Epirus, remained outside the limits of the monarchy, as determined in 1830. The European empire directly subject to the Sultan comprised Bulgaria, Roumelia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Thessaly, Epirus, Thrace, and Macedonia. Within these still centrally governed provinces there existed great diversity both of race and religion, and the broad rule everywhere applied that, while the adherents of the Moslem faith practically escaped oppression, they systematically oppressed their neighbours. The Christian populations were deprived of the commonest liberties and rights of citizenship, as understood in Western countries; they enjoyed very inadequate protection before the law ; the small peasantry laboured under bad land-laws; taxation was everywhere arbitrary, exorbitant, and ruthlessly enforced. Inter-racial rivalry strengthened the hands of the Turkish rulers, who played off one people and one faith against another, having learned by long experience that, in proportion as the subject populations were divided, it became easier to misgovern them with impunity. Lord Aberdeen had predicted that the Crimean War would secure the Peace of Europe for a quarter of a century. It was hoped that Turkey would take to heart the need for internal reform, the duty of which had so often been impressed upon her. She did little or nothing; and, where bad political conditions do not become better, they usually become very much worse. The harshness of Turkish rule underwent no alleviation in the Balkans, and, in the absence of Constitutional government, revolt was the only vent for pent-up discontents. In July, 1875, news reached the Governments of Europe that the Christian population of Herzegovina, exasperated by the extortions 92 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1 874-1 885 of the tax-gatherers, had risen in revolt. For a time, the news attracted little attention, and it was assumed that the outbreak would exhaust itself in the usual way. Instead of this, the movement spread to Bosnia, and it was soon seen that the Porte had to deal with an insurrection of a dangerous type. In one of their proclamations, the insurgents declared their determination "to win liberty or to die to the last man." From the first, Servia and Montenegro were profuse of sympathy with their kinsfolk, and much surreptitious support found its way to the seat of disturbance ; but strong hands restrained them from joining in the quarrel. Russia and Austria-Hungary were particularly interested in the welfare of the Balkan populations — the former as the head of the Slavic family of nations and the self-constituted protector of the Christian races living under Ottoman rule, the latter as a semi-Slavic State sensitive to every outside movement directed towards the ex- tension of the Panslavic idea. Russia was not inclined to interpose in the insurrection, so long as it seemed to be prospering, since it was her policy to encourage the autonomy of the Slavic provinces of the Ottoman empire in the hope that they would look to her for more direct protection. To Austria the insurrection was unwelcome for two reasons. Not only was it a menace to her own tranquillity and security, but Count Andrassy, who had succeeded Count Beust in the control of Foreign Affairs in 1871, had long cherished the hope of seeing the revolted provinces pass one day under Habsburg rule. Without Bismarck's quick sagacity, Andrassy was not less clear and deliberate in his aims than the German Chancellor had been, and, when it seemed necessary , as unscrupulous as he in his choice of means. IIisL42aram.Qunt concern was Austria's self-preservation, and, if the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was part of his Balkan policy, he sought aggrandisement, not for its own sake, but as a safeguard against disintegration. To make Austria more Slavic seemed to him the only alternative to her becoming less so. Nevertheless, he had no wish to see the Ottoman empire violently dissolved. It was no part of his plan that Austria should even play the part of a gendarme in Turkey, and for the present he was unwilling either to take or to sanction any step that would weaken her. His line of action as regarded the coveted provinces in particular was, instead of driving out the Turks, to support them in possession so long as they showed themselves amenable to reasonable influence, but to supplant them so soon as, owing to their own folly or weakness, their position became THE CONSTANTINOPLE EMBASSIES 93 untenable1. In no event was he prepared to tolerate the creation on Austria's frontiers of a strong Slavic State, whether in the form of a Greater Servia or in that of a Greater Montenegro. Germany's attitude towards the Balkan Question, on the other hand, was one of entire detachment and freedom from sentiment. Bismarck would rather have seen the Christian subjects of the Sultan governed well than ill, and he preferred peace to war, almost as much in other countries as in his own ; but the only question that was vital to him was the interest of Germany, and that interest required the maintenance of good relations between all three Eastern Powers. The relation of Great Britain to Turkey was still that of a more or less candid friend, deeply concerned to preserve the Ottoman empire from dissolution, yet conscious that this purpose could only be attained in so far as Turkey showed the will and the power to reform herself. The positive side of this policy had not of late been urged with undue emphasis. The British Representative at Constantinople at that time was Sir Henry Elliot, who since 1867 had wielded an influence recalling in some respects that of Stratford Canning, that earlier "voice of England in the East." His position was unique. In that home of intrigue and insincerity, where suspicion, jealousy, backbiting, and calumny then made up a large part of the substance of political life, only a man of strong character and unsullied probity could hold his own with dignity, and this Elliot succeeded in accom- plishing2. Keeping aloof from all scheming, he as a consequence enjoyed the confidence of all the schemers, and even of the chief of them, his Russian rival, IgnatiefF, who was distrusted as much by the Porte as by his diplomatic colleagues, now habituated to their doyen's vanity, unveracity, and deceit. After Elliot and IgnatiefF hardly any other diplomat seriously counted at Constantinople. The German and Austro-Hungarian Am- bassadors cooperated more or less closely with their Russian colleague ; such weight as France carried at the time usually went to the British side, for Elliot had done his best to encourage cordial relations between that Power and the Porte, thus securing support for his efforts to 1 See Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrdssy, sein Leben und seine Zeit, II. 260-1. 2 A letter written early in 1878 to Lord Derby by Sir Austen Henry Layard, Elliot's successor, soon after his arrival at Constantinople, is interesting as con- taining an experienced English diplomatist's clear-cut first impressions of political life there. "One lives here," he said, "in an atmosphere of intrigue, corruption, and rascality that only those who have personal experience of the place can appre- ciate. It is Byzantium over again. The threatened fall of the Turkish empire can be sufficiently accounted for by this state of things" (February 20th, 1878). 94 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1 874-1 885 counteract an ti -Turkish influence. The Italian Ambassador was also a safe auxiliary. No foreign Representative enjoyed so largely, and none deserved so well, the confidence which was reposed in Elliot by Sultan, Grand- Vizier, and Ministers alike. No important foreign, and few domestic, decisions were taken without consultation with him, and it is creditable to his candour and judgment that he could be relied on to give — if not always with sufficient decision — the advice which the circumstances demanded1. He was in truth a constant and trusted power behind the Throne. To the Grand- Viziers he openly spoke of himself as " a friend of Turkey," and this attitude found its complement in bitter hostility to, and unreasoning distrust of, Russia — sentiments which he did his utmost to foster at home. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether Elliot's absorbing attach- ment to Turkey and her interests was really advantageous either to that country or to his own, inasmuch as it inevitably blinded him to Turkish shortcomings. Further, by acting as the Porte's unofficial adviser, he did much to undermine the independence of the Sultan and his Ministers, who gradually came to look to Great Britain for guidance and support as of right, so that their sense of responsibility was weakened, together with their capacity and will to act vigorously in any emergency. In accordance with his Instructions, Elliot's influence was directed towards restricting the area of disturbance and persuading the Porte to lose no time in restoring order and removing the causes of dis- content. He held strongly to the opinion that the Sultan should be left to quell the disturbance without interference of any kind from the outside, and for this opinion he won both Lord Derby, the Foreign Secretary, and the Prime-Minister. Instead of taking steps to redress the grievances underlying the revolt, the Porte as usual did nothing, even for a time making no attempt to restore order. From the first, it had regarded the whole movement as insignificant and negligible, like a moorland fire that would burn itself out in a night. Meanwhile, the insurrection spread, and volunteers from Dal- matia, Servia, and Montenegro threw themselves in increasing numbers into the struggle with the common enemy. The subject soon found its way into the House of Commons, where there was much plain speaking about the slow progress of reform in Turkey, insomuch 1 "Upon questions of importance it is to Great Britain and not to Russia that the Porte turns for counsel." Elliot to Lord Derby, July 4th, 1875. SPREAD OF THE REVOLT 95 that the Sultan conveyed to Elliot his fear that Great Britain " was not so well disposed to him as formerly" — a fear which the Ambassador was compelled to confirm1. Early in August, the Governments of the Eastern Powers, as a result of a Conference held in Vienna, proposed that Consuls instructed by the Embassies in Constantinople should proceed to the scene of disturbance, and advise the insurgents to desist from hostilities and make known their grievances to the Turkish authorities, at the same time warning them that no support could be expected from the Powers. This proposal was acceptable to the Porte, at whose request Lord Derby endorsed it, though "with reluctance," as a measure 4 'scarcely compatible with the independent authority of the Porte over its own territory." In one particular, Elliot was successful; he dissuaded the Porte from enrolling Bashi-Bazouks in Bosnia, when there seemed a danger that these savage irregular troops might be let loose on the province2. The action of the Consuls had a negative result. The Porte, after sending Server Pasha to Herzegovina as Special Commissioner, made a promise of reforms ; but this failed to impress the insurgents, who demanded a European guarantee that the reforms would actually be carried out. By the end of September, there was already talk of a Conference of the Powers. Elliot, jealous of Russian influence, dis- liked the idea and did his best to discourage it. A local revolt now threatened to become a general Balkan melee. In Servia national feeling was seething, and it seemed probable that Prince Milan, in spite of his promise of neutrality to Russia, would soon be no longer able to hold back his restive army. If Servia joined the insurgents, however, Montenegro would be sure to follow. In October, therefore, both Austria-Hungary and Russia gave the Porte formal warning that, unless the revolt were speedily suppressed, inter- vention must be expected. Andrassy sounded the Powers as to their attitude towards the possible occupation of Bosnia by Austria — following the precedent of the French occupation of Syria after the 1 Letters of Sir H. Elliot, July 30th, and August 17th, 1875. 2 So soon as Elliot heard, in September, that the Bashi-Bazouks were being enrolled, he warned the Minister of War of the inexpediency of that proceeding, "as the known habits of these irregulars would lead to excesses which must bring discredit upon the Government." More than once he repeated the warning. The Grand- Vizier himself compared these soldiers to "a pack of hounds in pursuit of a wild animal, which they will try to tear in pieces in spite of the keeper's whip and efforts to drive them." (Letter of Mr Sanderson to Sir Henry Elliot, November 20th, 1875.) I 96 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 massacres of Christians by the Druses there in i860 — and was dis- appointed that the idea received no countenance, least of all from the British Government. Elliot, who, owing to his jealousy of any inter- ference with the complete independence of the Porte, seemed at times to be out of touch with the actualities of the situation, was still urging Lord Derby not to show "too great readiness to acquiesce in any measure of intervention that might be resolved upon at Vienna." He wished the reforms to be carried out, but insisted that the Porte should introduce them proprio motu. By this time, Disraeli had recognised that great events were pending in the East. Once more, the Eastern Question had been opened, and it seemed as though the task of settling it was about to fall to him1. Plans of intervention were quietly maturing in Vienna, and it was contrary to his conception of Great Britain's influence that she had not been invited to join in the deliberations. It was at least anomalous that of the three Powers now desirous of taking the lead in the Question two had borne no part in the Crimean War, while Great Britain, France and Italy, who had fought together on Turkey's side, were being ignored. In a Guildhall speech on November 9th, the Prime-Minister uttered the significant warning that, while the interests of the Eastern Powers were doubtless involved in the Question, those of Great Britain were equally important; and he added that the Government "might be relied on to guard and maintain their trust." While the statesmen of the Eastern Powers were still deliberating, the Sultan stole their thunder, when, on December 1st, he formally sanctioned a series of reforms which would have done him credit, had there been an honest intention to carry them into execution. Andrassy, anxious to secure for Austria the credit for the amelioration of the lot of the Christians, vainly appealed to the Porte to hold its hand. On the urgent pressure of Elliot, whose advice was taken at every step, the reforms were promulgated by a firman on De- cember 1 2th. Christian Sub-governors (and afterwards Governors) were to be appointed ; Christians were to be put on an equality with Mussulmans in regard to tenure of property ; all vestiges of serfdom were to be abolished ; the police were to be reorganised and Christians were to be employed in that service ; taxation was to be reformed, and 1 " I really believe the Eastern question, that had haunted Europe for a century, and which I thought the Crimean War had adjourned for half another, will fall to my lot to encounter — dare I say, to settle? " Letter to Lady Bradford, November 3rd, 1875 (Life of Beaco7is field, vi. 14). THE ANDRASSY NOTE 97 a system of provincial self-government was to be introduced. In the absence of any guarantee that its promises would be translated into fact this document excited no enthusiasm. The Vienna deliberations ended in the Andrassy Note, which was communicated to the Powers on December 30th. The Eastern Powers proceeded on the assumption that the Sultan would be amenable to friendly advice, and accordingly disclaimed any idea of wanton or offensive interference in the internal affairs of Turkey. The Note expressed apprehension that the insurrection would spread to Bulgaria and Crete in the spring, and that, eventually, Servia and Montenegro would join it, a fear justified by the event. In the interest of pacifica- tion, therefore, it proposed the granting of complete religious liberty to the two provinces, the abolition of the system of tax-farming, the application of the proceeds of direct taxes levied in the provinces to the purposes of their respective populations, under the control of representative bodies constituted in the sense of the imperial firman of December 12th, the creation of a special Mission, composed of Mussulmans and Christians in equal numbers, to control the execu- tion of the reforms proposed by the Powers or promised by the Porte, and the amelioration of the condition of the rural population. In his reception of the Andrassy Note Lord Derby, for once, threw off the influence of the Ambassador in Constantinople. Recognising that a stand had to be made, sooner or later, against the Porte's policy of inactivity and procrastination, he favoured the prompt acceptance of the Note with its consequences. "It is too late," he wrote to the Prime-Minister (January 1st, 1876), "to stand on the independence and dignity of the Sultan. A Sovereign who can neither keep the peace at home nor pay his debts must submit to some disagreeable consequences." Disraeli agreed to support the Note, influenced by the Powers' request that he would do so, but equally by the fear that if Great Britain refused to join them the Eastern Powers would act without her. The result was that the Note secured the support of an undivided Concert. The Sultan accepted it with bland acquiescence, as he had accepted similar expostulations before, and treated it with the old indifference. Both the imperial firman and the Note were stillborn. Soon events occurred which gave a new turn to the development of the Eastern problem and the relations of the Powers towards it. On May 6th, the German and French Consuls at Salonica were mur- dered in a Mussulman riot. Prompt recompense and the punishment W.&G.III 7 98 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 of the criminals were demanded of the Sultan, and, after the usual prevarication and delay, were alike conceded. Early in the same month, the Tsar, with his Chancellor Gortchakoff, passed through Berlin, and the occasion was taken for a second Conference between the chief Ministers of the Eastern Powers. The result was a bolder restatement of the Andrassy Note in the form of the Berlin Memo- randum of May 13th. It was the governing idea of the authors of this document that in the settlement of Bosnia and Herzegovina was to be found the key to the peace of the Balkans in general. They accordingly proposed that Turkey should conclude an armistice with the insurgents for two months, and that, in the interval, attempts at a reconciliation should be made by applying the principles of the Andrassy Note. Should no satisfactory results follow, the three Powers were to be free to resort to more effectual measures — a veiled threat suggestive rather of Gortchakoff than of either Andrassy or Bismarck. Andrassy returned to Vienna confident, as he told the Delegations there on May 18th, that European peace was assured "as far as human foresight could perceive." The efficacy of the Memo- randum depended, however, upon two factors: first, its acceptance by the other Powers, without which its proposals could have no chance of enforcement, and then the willingness of Turkey to act upon it. France and Italy accepted, but Great Britain rejected, the proposals, holding, rightly or wrongly, that the proper order of events was, first, the suppression of the insurrection, and then the concession by Turkey of such reforms as circumstances might require. In coming to this decision the Government reflected the opinion of the Ambassador in Constantinople, who, in his turn, was in constant communication on the subject with the Grand-Vizier. If one effect of the British Government's action at this point was to encourage Turkey in obstinacy, another was to throw her still more upon Great Britain's hands and support. It is not too much to say that, from that time forward until the eve of the settlement of the Eastern Question, the main lines of Turkish policy were determined in London. The political and moral responsibility which fell upon the British Government and nation in consequence was incalculable. Henceforth, it was impossible to shake the Sultan's faith that Great Britain stood behind him, ready to protect him to the last extreme against the designs of his enemies; and this faith encouraged the Porte again and again in opposing the collective pressure of the Powers. I THE BERLIN MEMORANDUM 99 The British Government's action in rejecting the Berlin Memo- randum was severely judged abroad both then and later, and Bismarck, Gortchakoff and Andrassy 1 alike attributed to it the entrance of Servia on the scene and the far more serious developments which followed. At home, opinion was divided. The violent pro-Turkish party, which saw the menace of Russian aggression in every attempt to induce the Sultan to govern his subjects with justice and clemency, applauded the Cabinet. Nevertheless, not a few of the Prime-Minister's followers entertained serious misgivings concerning the wisdom and morality of the policy which he was pursuing. In the Cabinet he had a majority on his side; but the strongest of his colleagues, if not absolutely hostile to him, were still halting between two opinions2. On the other hand, the view that a valuable opportunity of rendering a great service to the cause of civilisation had been wilfully sacrificed was held by statesmen so far apart in their general view of the Eastern Question as Gladstone and Stratford de Redcliffe. Granville, though his hands were tied by the fact that he had been already head of the Foreign Office and would probably return to it, contended that, even granting the Government to have been justified in rejecting the Memorandum, they were wrong in failing to produce alternative positive proposals of their own. In the meantime, the Sultan experienced in Constantinople in his own person the lawlessness and violence which he had so long condoned and protected in other parts of his empire. On May 10th, nationalist riots broke out in the capital, the Ministry fell to cries of "Turkey for the Turks," and the place of the Sultan's reactionary advisers was taken by reformers. At the end of the month (May 30th), Abdul Aziz was deposed, and his nephew, Murad II, was proclaimed as his successor " by the will of God and by general consent." A week later, the ex- Sultan committed suicide. Murad's reign proved brief and inglorious, for he was a weakling, fit only to be the puppet of schemers. On August 31st, he, too, was deposed, and his death by suicide or murder followed shortly afterwards. The new Sultan was Abdul Hamid II, who inherited an impe- cunious treasury, an empire torn asunder by discontent and revolt, and the reproaches of the greater part of the civilised world. Never- theless, all the Powers, with the exception of Russia, wished to give the new ruler a chance of proving voluntarily his good intentions, 1 See particularly Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrassy, II. 318 and in. 1. - Cf. Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury, 11. 80. ioo FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1 874-1 885 and the Berlin Memorandum was withdrawn. Disraeli acclaimed this proceeding as a justification of his Government's policy of ab- stention, and could proudly boast: "All the Great Powers, Russia included, seem anxious to defer to England, and something like the old days of our authority appear to have returned1." Fresh fuel was added to the insurrectionary fires at this time. At the beginning of July, Servia, and a month later Montenegro, de- clared war against their ancient enemy. Both States hoped to emerge from the struggle with frontiers enlarged at Turkey's expense. For Servia, however, though a Russian general commanded her army and many Russian officers enlisted in it as volunteers, the war was a succession of humiliating defeats, more galling to the Tsar than the disobedience of his protege. In the desperate hope of stemming a movement which had now passed the assigned limits, Gortchakoff proposed that the revolted provinces should be granted autonomy, though still under Turkish suzerainty; and, contrary to Elliot's advice, Lord Derby favoured the idea, though not Gortchakoff's further suggestion that both Servia and Montenegro should receive an increase of territory. Andrassy refused to agree to any change of status in the provinces which would stand in the way of their later absorption in the Austrian monarchy ; he also objected to an enlarged Servia, though willing to buy Mon- tenegro's goodwill by an extension of frontier. A reconciliation of views was reached, however, as a result of a Conference between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Emperors and their leading Ministers at Reichstadt on July 8th. It was there agreed that, if Turkey were beaten, Serbia and Montenegro should receive an increase of territory, while the bulk of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be annexed by Austria, Russia acquire Bessarabia and territory in Asia Minor, Bulgaria, Roumelia, and Albania become independent, Thessaly and Crete be added to Greece, and Constantinople become a free city. B. The Bulgarian Atrocities, 1876 While Europe was still painfully exercised over the Bosnian in- surrection, a further shock was administered to it by an outburst of barbarism in another part of European Turkey. Bulgaria was an unprogressive province of the empire, whose population indulged in no grandiose dreams of independence, and would, with good govern- 1 Life of Beaconsfield, vi. 37. THE BULGARIAN ATROCITIES 101 ment, have proved a bulwark of peace and order in the midst of an unstable political system. Of late years, this province had on the whole received tolerable treatment, and the Sultan's action in making the Exarchate independent of the Greek Patriarchate had been greatly appreciated as a recognition of Bulgarian nationality. For some years, revolutionary propagandism had been carried on stealthily and on a small scale by a committee, composed for the most part of middle- class politicians of advanced views ; but there had been little or no response from the people at large. Nevertheless, letters sent by the Constantinople Ambassador to the Foreign Office in October, 1875, reported signs of unrest and of a temper which might with provocation give rise to anxiety. Elliot, to his credit, promptly warned the Porte of this ferment, and strongly urged the removal of the Bulgarian grievances before disaffection spread. To make matters worse, in the same month massacres of Bulgarians, accompanied by floggings, outrages on women, and the pillaging of houses, were committed by Mussulmans in the Adrianople and other districts. By the end of the year, a vague apprehension gained currency that more serious events would happen in the spring. One of the centres of discontent was the Tatar-Bazardjik district, in the sandjak of Philippopolis, and here the spirit of revolt took shape, on May 2nd, 1876, in excesses committed by armed bands of Christian Bulgarians, on whom the Mohammadans retaliated with savage ferocity. Of these events Elliot received information, as well as of one or two similar outbreaks, and of the arming of Bashi-Bazouks and others, who had been guilty of excesses in their turn. As before, when the Bosnian insurrection broke out, he had besought the Porte not to put the Bashi-Bazouks in the way of temptation1. He now duly reported the disturbances to his Government, taking care — accustomed as he was to see Muscovite intrigue everywhere — to suggest that Russia was at the bottom of the mischief; and he wrote with satisfaction of the prompt steps which were being taken to suppress it. For a moment, there seemed a likelihood of a widespread rising, and the portents were gloomy. But it was not till six months after he had heard of the first outbreak that the Ambassador and the British public learned from the London Daily News what had since occurred, and now came 1 From October 1875 onward he was constantly urging the Porte to keep a firm hand upon them, and each time he received fair assurances which proved to be worthless. 102 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 to be known as the Bulgarian Atrocities, which were, in an unpre- cedented way, to stir the indignation of this country. For once, the Sultan and his advisers had not been taken by surprise. They had been often and severely reproached for their ineffectual attempts to stamp out the Herzegovinian insurrection while it was still under control, and they determined not to commit the same mistake again. Without waiting to parley with the rebels, the Government let loose in the disturbed district bands of Bashi-Bazouks under the nominal command of Achmed Aga and Mohammad Aga, who speedily re- stored quiet on a plan of their own. Falling upon one disaffected town, that of Batak, these irregulars brutally murdered all but 2000 of its 7000 inhabitants. Slaying, mutilation, pillage, violation, burning, perpetrated with every refinement of cruelty and barbarity which fiendish ingenuity could devise, continued day and night, and within a month 12,000 Christians had been done to death. A copy of the despatch of our Vice-Consul at Adrianople which contained an account of the Atrocities had been sent to our Consul- General at Constantinople, but it does not appear what had become of the duplicate sent to the Embassy there. On the other hand, the report had been seen by the correspondent of The Daily News, in whose columns the substance of it was published on June 23rd. Several days later, questions were asked on the subject in the House of Commons ; whereupon, relying on Elliot's incomplete reports, and on the fact that the first published accounts of the Atrocities had ap- peared in a leading Opposition newspaper, Disraeli referred to the horrors as "to a large extent inventions," and professed to regard the allegations against the Turks as part of the political capital of un- principled critics. For his early sceptical attitude the Prime-Minister cannot, in the circumstances, be fairly condemned: he spoke and judged according as he knew, and at that time he never suspected that the half had not been told him. As to their inadequacy, Elliot's despatches speak for themselves. On June 8th, after the revolt had been suppressed and a whole population had been wiped out, he informed Lord Derby regretfully that "cruelty and in some places brutality" had occurred. He re- fused, however, to credit the worst reports, as being exaggerations, but added that there was "evidence that the employment of Cir- cassians and Bashi-Bazouks has led to the atrocities which were to be expected." Six days later, he forwarded a Consul's account of the cruelties, but discounted it. "No doubt," he wrote, "many of the DISRAELI AND THE FOREIGN OFFICE 103 revolting details that are given are either purely imaginary or at least grossly exaggerated." He even threw doubt on The Daily News' stories by the suggestion that they owed their origin to ill-informed American missionaries, ''good men but ultra- Bulgarians," and by inference certain to exaggerate. As confirmation of the worst stories accumulated, he had to let in the light ; but he did it gradually, screen- ing the eyes of British Ministers from the full glare so long as possible. Before a month had passed, Disraeli was bitterly complaining behind the scenes that the Foreign Office, owing to its "mis- management" and "the ineptitude of its agents," was serving the Government badly and "letting him down," since the information supplied to him was proving "neither ample nor accurate1." At the very time that the Government were still endeavouring to discredit the independent reports which had reached England and to diminish their effect on the excited public mind, Consular reports which went far towards a complete confirmation of them were reaching the Constantinople Embassy, and the Ambassador, the scales now fallen from his eyes, was urgently imploring the Porte to put an end to the orgies of murder and lust. When fuller facts reached the Foreign Office, far too tardily, Lord Beaconsfield2 for a time feared the pub- lication of the despatches on the ground that it would involve " a great exposure of our diplomatic system abroad and at home," since both Elliot and his Department "had shown a lamentable want of energy and deficiency of information throughout3." These strictures on the Ambassador were again, in the circum- stances, justifiable. Elliot did not, and could not, deny that excesses had taken place; but, by throwing doubt here and suggesting reservation there, he succeeded in taking the sting out of the earlier reports, with the result that the Government were misled and the public deceived. When, however, being in full command of the facts, he began to take the Atrocities seriously, it was too late to undo the harm which had been wrought by his previous supineness and unwillingness to credit the facts4. It may be true that many of the 1 Letter to Lord Derby, July 14th, 1876. 2 Disraeli was created Earl of Beaconsfield on August 21st, 1876. 3 Letter to Lord Derby, August 7th, 1876. 4 Beaconsfield wrote of Elliot on August 15th, 1876, when the results of Mr Walter Baring's investigation were coming in: "His conduct has seriously com- promised and damaged the Government, and the more that is done now by him to redeem the situation, the more evident he makes it that all this should have been done months ago. Exertions which are made in August to counteract the mis- takes of May can achieve no reputation ; as a public servant the nation has utterly 104 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 individual instances of brutality reported were either exaggerated or imaginary, but it is equally true that incidents identical in character occurred again and again during the Terror through which the Bulgarians passed in May and June. No one can read the despatches, little warmed by any wholesome indignation, which passed from the Constantinople Embassy to the Foreign Office at that time, without feeling that the national reputa- tion was seriously compromised. There had been a serious decline from the humanitarian tradition represented by Palmerston when it was possible for a town-crier to proclaim in the streets of Adrianople, in spite of its manifest absurdity, the shameless falsehood that the Bashi-Bazouks who were being called up for service would be remunerated by the British Government. Lord Derby's influence at that time was, as Gladstone wrote, "good, but there has been too little of it." The Foreign Secretary had early instructed Elliot to demand the suppression of the excesses and the punishment of the criminals, and, from June forward, he was constantly urging the Ambassador to lift up his voice against the murderers and spare not1. His honest indignation was in strong contrast to Elliot's early reserved and halting censures. When at last W. Baring, Second Secretary of the Constantinople Embassy, after a full investigation on the spot, presented his report (September 1st), there was no longer any possibility of whitewashing the Turks. The quintessence of this document was contained in the sentence: "The manner in which the rising was suppressed was inhuman in the last degree (the horrors probably surpassing those committed in 1863 by the Russians in Poland), fifty innocent persons suffering for every guilty one." He estimated that 12,000 Christians had been massacred, and 58 villages destroyed, in the sandjak of Philippopolis, while only 200 Mussulmans had lost their lives. He, also, reported that "the vast majority of the Mussulman population look upon the perpetrators of the horrors not as criminals but as heroes, who for their praiseworthy efforts to extirpate a noxious condemned him" {Life of Beaconsfield, VI. 49). For the circumstances in which the Adrianople Vice-Consul's despatch failed to reach the Ambassador, and its existence remained unrevealed till a much later date, see Sir H. Elliot's Recollections (1922), p. 260 and Introduction ; comparing also the letter of Mr R. H. Francis in The Times Literary Supplement, May 4th, 1922. 1 E.g. letters of August 8th and 29th, and September 15th. In the second of these, he tells Elliot that " the impression produced here by events in Bulgaria has completely destroyed sympathy with Turkey. The feeling is so universal and so strong that if Russia were to declare war against the Porte Her Majesty's Govern- ment would find it practically impossible to interfere." GLADSTONE'S "BAG AND BAGGAGE ' CRUSADE 105 race have deserved well of their country," and added that the Govern- ment "did much to encourage this idea by dealing out with a liberal hand decorations and rewards to such miscreants as Achmed Aga1." Nevertheless, by the end of September no attempt had been made to punish the criminals, though 2000 Bulgarians had been arrested for alleged complicity in the incipient revolt. Elliot completely endorsed Baring's report. The Bulgarian Atrocities gave to Mr Gladstone an unexampled opportunity for one of those impassioned appeals to the moral sense of the community into which he was wont to put the full force of a highly emotional nature. The Queen had been indignant with the stories which had slowly filtered through from Bulgaria and had urged her Prime-Minister to throw more warmth into his condemna- tion of the brutalities. Lord Beaconsfield, however, had compromised himself by his too flippant scepticism. After having deprecated the stories as evil exaggerations, on the strength of official information, it was difficult for him to go back upon his words in public, whatever he might do in private; what he had said he had said, and, the credit of his Government being at stake, he left the subject alone. So it came to pass that the political advantage of a great moral move- ment rested with his rival. In September Gladstone published his famous "Bulgarian Horrors" pamphlet, which contained a damning and unanswerable indictment of Turkish misrule, and pointed to the ejection of the Turk from Bulgaria, "bag and baggage," as the only possible remedy2. The pamphlet had an immediate and unexampled effect ; but the agitation reached its climax when the resting Achilles left his tent early in December and threw himself into the open fray. The old British enthusiasm for the cause of "oppressed nationalities" broke out like a storm and swept the country from south to north ; and con- stituencies which, more than a century before, had rung with the cry 1 Someone took care that the Blue Book containing the report on the Atrocities was translated for the Sultan's edification. 2 Gladstone proposed to apply this "bag and baggage" ejection to the province, and not (as Lord Beaconsfield among others represented) to European Turkey as a whole, as Sir Stratford Canning had suggested in 1821. The famous passage runs: "Let the Turks now carry away their abuses in the only possible manner, namely by carrying off themselves. Their Zaptiehs and their Mudirs, their Bimbashis and their Yuzbashis, their Kaimakams and their Pashas, one and all, bag and baggage, shall, I hope, clear out of the province they have desolated and profaned" (The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East). " Lord Gran- ville thought the passage too strong and wanted it out of the pamphlet" (Lord Morley's Life of Gladstone, 11. 550). 106 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 "Wilkes and liberty!" now echoed to " Gladstone and emancipa- tion!" The agitation may have been overdone; but the impulses underlying it were real and generous, and for a time British life was lifted out of the atmosphere of dull routine and mere material pre- occupations1. Only London seemed to be little affected by the moral outburst, while the greatest enthusiasm was shown in the reserved, yet highly emotional, North. After the rebellion in Bulgaria had been crushed and Turkey was able to give undivided attention to the prosecution of the War, the Servian rising had no longer even the remotest chance of success. Not for the first or last time in their history, the Serbs had to confess, in the words of their Prime-Minister, Ristich, the spokesman of the Greater Servian movement , * ■ Nous avonsfait une grande illusion . ' ' For months, armistice and peace negotiations were carried on between Turkey and the Powers, of whom Great Britain acted as an informal mandatory. The Porte sought to impose severe conditions; but to these not even Lord Beaconsfield would listen, holding that the "atrocities" created a justification for pressing the Porte to a degree beyond what had hitherto been contemplated. Conscious, however, of the difficulty of holding the balance between Russia and Austria- Hungary, neither of whom he trusted, he contemplated, in October, a treaty with Germany for a bon accord, which was to be something less than an alliance, with a view to maintaining the territorial status in the Balkans, in the belief that it would secure Great Britain against Russia and Germany against France. But the idea failed to find favour with the Cabinet. Finally, Great Britain put forward as reasonable bases for the conclusion of an armistice, which it was hoped would prove the precursor of a settled peace, the restoration of the status quo ante helium in Servia and Montenegro, autonomy for Bosnia and Herze- govina, and guarantees against future administrative abuses in Bul- garia. Austria's agreement to these proposals was only obtained after the idea of autonomy had been so diluted that it had dwindled into a mere reform of local administration. Still the Porte held out, though Elliot had urged the Sultan to place himself unreservedly in the hands of the mediating Powers, since Her Majesty's Government 1 In the Public Record Office are preserved six large volumes of resolutions of protest against the Bulgarian Atrocities addressed to the Foreign Secretary from September onward. They came from political meetings, representing all parties, town and village meetings, municipal and other local government councils, labour organisations, meetings of agricultural labourers, and religious bodies of all kinds. THE CONSTANTINOPLE CONFERENCE 107 would then be "able to exercise a salutary influence in the decisions to be come to1." It was only after Lord Derby had warned Turkey that, if she rejected the terms proposed, others more onerous would be pressed on her by force, and had instructed Elliot to leave Con- stantinople failing her compliance, and after Russia had demanded an unconditional armistice on pain of immediate declaration of war, that the Porte yielded. C. The Constantinople Conference , 1876 Just before the suspension of hostilities, the British Government had decided to invite the Treaty Powers to meet in conference at Constantinople with a view to discovering conditions for a general settlement of the Balkan troubles. Gladstone called the decision "the best thing the Government have yet done in the Eastern Question." Lord Derby had been eager to anticipate action in Petro- grad, fearing that if Russia took the initiative she would wish to lay down the basis of discussion, with the result that Austria, whose cooperation in resistance to any attempt upon the integrity of the Turkish empire was so important, might decline to take part. All the Powers accepted the invitation. The British Ambassador at Constantinople had discouraged the idea of a conference at that stage, convinced that it would wish to probe inconvenient subjects. A conference might have to come after peace had been established; but, even so, he urged that it should be limited to the question of the revolted districts2. By that time, how- ever, Lord Derby had emancipated himself from the influence of an adviser whose persistent pro-Turkish sympathies seemed altogether to incapacitate him from taking a European view of what was a European problem and was becoming more so every day. Elliot had done his best, it is true, to speed up Turkey in the matter of the reforms, and had failed. Considering how strongly the Porte believed that it had a permanent lien on British sympathy and support, his failure was perhaps inevitable, and was not discreditable to him. He laid himself open to just criticism, however, in that, with little or no reason for confidence in Turkey's willingness to act, he had nevertheless based all his recommendations on the assumption that she would act, and had succeeded in persuading the Government to orientate their attitude from the same fallacious point of view. His policy of I1 Letter of September 14th, 1876. 2 Letter to Lord Derby, September 4th, 1876. 108 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 non-intervention and leaving Turkey to reform herself as and how she would had broken down, and, excepting himself, no one had any longer a word to say for it. When in September Musurus Pasha, on behalf of his Government, protested to Lord Derby against diplomatic interposition in the affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an infringe- ment of the Sultan's rights, the Foreign Secretary answered that the Powers had never abandoned their right to urge upon the Sultan the proper treatment of his Christian subjects, and that recent events had shown the exercise of this right to be more necessary than ever before. The attitude of Russia was changing from one of impatience and irritation into one of a frank disposition to war. Whether the world believed him or not, the Tsar had hitherto consistently professed pacific intentions; now, a distinctly warlike spirit came over him. Convinced that he was called upon to play the role of Protector of the Christian populations, and that envious rivals were attempting to frustrate his mission, he listened more readily than before to the suggestions of Ignatieff and the Moscow Pan-Slavist party. That he was honestly concerned to remove British suspicions of his ultimate aims, which he somewhat bitterly resented, cannot be doubted. To Lord Augustus Loftus he said at Livadia (November 5th): " Avant tout, imprimez-vous trots points. Le testament de Pierre le Grand n'existe pas; je ne ferai jamais des conquetes aux Indes; je n^irai jamais a Constantinople." Even, he said, if necessity should oblige him to occupy a portion of Bulgaria, "it would only be provisionally and until peace and the safety of the Christian population were secured." All such assurances failed to convince Lord Beaconsfield. Speaking at the Lord Mayor's banquet on November 9th, 1876, he uttered a boastful challenge of which the application could not be mistaken. "If," he said, "England were to go to war in a righteous cause, her resources would prove inexhaustible. She is not a country that, when she enters into a campaign, has to ask herself whether she can support a second or a third campaign. If she enters a campaign she will not terminate it until right is done." On the following day, without knowledge of this threat, the Tsar declared, in the presence of notables of Moscow, that unless Turkey ceased to make war upon her own subjects and agreed to accept reforms at the bidding of the Powers collectively, he would intervene alone and compel her by force of arms. There was a certain justification for Russia's disposition to take matters into her own hands, and it consisted in the fact that she was BRITISH POLICY DEFINED 109 negotiating on unequal conditions. She knew that in dealing with Turkey she was dealing with two Powers at once, since behind the Porte in counsel, influence, and interest stood Great Britain. The Conference met from December 12th to January 20th, 1877. Lord Salisbury had been chosen as the British Plenipotentiary, with Sir Henry Elliot as prompter and adjoint. Than Lord Salisbury no better choice could have been made. He was neither a pro-Turk nor an anti-Russian, but simply an unemotional, unbiassed, clear- and just-minded British statesman, who was concerned to draw from an honest sifting of the facts of a difficult problem honest conclusions, and to act upon them. The apparent hopelessness of Ottoman rule had convinced him that nothing could be done for the Christian races without the application to the Porte of strong pressure perfectly definite in its purpose ; and, though he was as yet quite as much opposed as was the Prime-Minister himself to the dissolution of the Turkish empire, he was free from preconceived views as to how far interference with its internal organisation should go. To decide that question was the main object of the Conference. Lord Beaconsfield took accurate measure of the Conference when he wrote to the British Plenipotentiary: "It will consist of a meeting between you and Ignatieff. It is possible that the meeting may have results." Before it assembled, the Foreign Secretary submitted to the participating Governments a series of propositions, by way of defining the scope and purpose of its deliberations. They included (1) the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire; (2) a declaration that the Powers would not seek for any selfish terri- torial advantage, exclusive influence, or commercial concessions1; (3) as the bases of pacification, the general observance of the status quo in Servia and Montenegro, and an undertaking by the Porte to grant to Bosnia and Herzegovina a system of local institutions giving to the population some control over their affairs and guarantees against the exercise of arbitrary authority, with no question, however, of the actual establishment of a tributary State ; guarantees of a similar kind to be provided against maladministration in Bulgaria; the reforms already agreed to by the Porte to be included in the administrative arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, so far as they might be applicable, in those for Bulgaria. These propositions found general 1 A similar declaration had been made on September 17th, 1840, in the Protocol for the Pacification of the Levant, and again on August 3rd, i860, in connexion with the Pacification of Syria, greatly to the regret of France. no FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 acceptance, and, together with the Andrassy Note, they governed the proceedings of the Conference throughout. On the suggestion of the Prince of Wales, Lord Salisbury travelled to Constantinople by way of Paris, Berlin, Vienna and Rome, for the purpose of conferring with the leading statesmen in these capitals, a wise precaution discouraged by the Foreign Office. The Prime- Minister, however, had urged his representative to trust his own intuitions rather than the promptings of " Tenterdenism1 " ; and this preliminary round of visits unquestionably strengthened his position and made clearer to him both the problems with which he had to deal and the difficulties in the way of their practical solution. He found Bismarck even more doubtful of success than Beaconsfield ; his dis- trust of Andrassy was increased; and the suspicion which he had already formed, that the principal obstacle to a satisfactory settlement would be Turkey and not Russia, was strongly confirmed2. The Plenipotentiaries met for preliminary deliberation from December 12th to 22nd, and on the 23rd the Porte's representatives were invited to confer upon the proposals which had been drawn up, Safvet Pasha, the Foreign Minister, now acting as President of the Conference. Perhaps no important joint deliberation of the Great Powers has been characterised, on the whole, by a readier spirit of accommodation than was shown by the Constantinople Conference. The secret of the harmony which prevailed throughout its proceedings lay in the fact that the assembly was singularly well balanced, and that its members were honestly determined to seek and find a practical basis of agreement promising success to the purpose which all the Powers had in view. At the outset, Lord Salisbury gave, both to the Conference and to the Porte, a full assurance that, while his Government would not join in any measure of active coercion against Turkey, they would in no way protect her from the consequences of resistance to the reforms which might be proposed. Ignatieff began by countering the British propositions with a scheme for the reorganisation of a Greater Bulgaria as an autonomous territory, still under Turkish suzerainty, but administered by Christian Governors, to be nominated by the Porte subject to the assent of the Powers. Turkish troops were to continue in the province, but in cantonments, and the importation 1 Lord Tenterden was the, somewhat pragmatical, Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Office at the time. See Life of Salisbury, 11. 95. 2 Letters to Lord Derby, November 9th and 26th. Ibid. 11. 92 and 102. TURKISH CONSTITUTION PROCLAIMED in of Circassians was to cease1. The execution of these reforms was to be supervised by an International Commission, supported by forces — Belgian or Italian — sufficient to impose its decisions and to preserve tranquillity. Although this scheme failed to meet with much favour, some of its proposals were embodied in the programme of reforms which was submitted to the Porte when the full Conference began its sessions. This programme underwent much modification in the course of the ensuing negotiations ; and in its final form it proposed a rectifica- tion of frontiers for Montenegro, to be decided by an International Commission, and the recognition of the status quo ante helium in Servia, subject to the settlement of frontier difficulties on the Bosnian side by a Commission. With reference to Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria, governors-general (valis) were to be appointed for the first five years by the Porte after prior agreement with the Powers ; with redivision of the provinces for administrative purposes and the creation of provincial and local bodies, taxation reforms, including the abolition of tax- farming, the reorganisation of the judicial system, and the appointment by the Powers of two Commissions of Control, to watch over the execution of the regulations and to assist the local authorities. On the day of Turkey's entrance into the Conference (December 23rd) a Constitution was proclaimed for the empire (Midhat Pasha, the Young Turk leader, had just become Grand- Vizier). Laudable though this step was, there was no mistaking its real purpose, which was to justify the Porte in rejecting the reforms upon which the Powers were agreed and, in other words, in scouting the Conference as superfluous. For a month, the Plenipotentiaries of the Powers, Lord Salisbury (who did not share Elliot's trust in Midhat) among the most earnest and urgent of them, endeavoured to persuade the Porte to accept the joint programme of reforms, but in vain. That the British Plenipotentiary was severely handicapped by the lukewarm- ness of Sir Henry Elliot, the " friend of Turkey," who applied the brake whenever possible, is certain2. Sir William White, who was 1 See letters from Sir H. Elliot to Lord Derby as to the Circassians, e.g. : "After the great Circassian immigration, many of that lawless people were very impru- dently established in colonies close to the Serbian frontier" (September 21st, 1875) ; and " Circassian villages are simply depots of plunder in which the local authorities, even if they have the will, have not the power to make any effectual search" (December 3rd, 1875). 1 In reporting to Lord Beaconsfield on January 15th his intention to leave Constantinople if the final terms were not accepted by the Porte, Lord Salisbury complained that Elliot refused to promise to leave at the same time. "This," he ii2 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 diplomatically engaged in Constantinople at the time, suggests that the British Embassy staff, immoderately pro-Turkish in sympathies, like- wise did its utmost to defeat Salisbury's statesmanlike endeavours1. In addition to these auxiliaries, however, the Porte had at its disposal still more effectual weapons of obstruction of its own. Every sort of prevarication, subterfuge, and chicane was employed by the shiftiest minds in Constantinople in the attempt, first to delay, and then to wreck, the work of the Conference. Proposals accepted one day were rejected the next ; an assent which when given had seemed clear and unambiguous was soon explained to mean something quite different, and in fact to be no assent at all. Even though at one time the Porte announced its acceptance of the proposals in principle, when it came to the discussion of details objection was offered to the entire scheme. All sorts of counter-proposals were produced; but they simply amounted to turning the positive measures of the Powers into flat negations. When Salisbury warned the Grand- Vizier in grave language of the "extreme danger " which he was running, that Turkey stood absolutely alone, and that if war broke out she might find herself exposed to aggressive action from other States, Midhat only replied that if it were the will of God that the empire should fall he would be resigned to that fate ; but he would not capitulate upon the question of reform. All through the stubborn contest of wits and diplomatic strategy, the Turkish Ministers were imploring Lord Salisbury, in the name of traditional friendship, to detach himself from his colleagues; and, when these attempts failed in Constantinople, Musurus Pasha and a Special Envoy, in the person of Odian Effendi, tried in London to influence, first, Lord Derby and then, behind his back, the Prime- Minister — in each case with the same result. In the plainest and firmest language possible, Lord Derby refused to deviate from the policy agreed upon by the Powers and warned the Envoy that, if Turkey found herself at war with Russia, Great Britain would not raise a finger to help her. Odian Effendi replied that Turkey had said, "will make our success much more unlikely. It will be treated as justifying the rumours that he represents a different policy from the Conference, and that the British Government will not support me." It appears that at Salisbury's request an Instruction was sent that the two Delegates should leave together. See also letters from the German Ambassador in Paris to Prince Bismarck (January 6th, 1877), an<* from the German Ambassador in Constantinople to the Foreign Office in Berlin (January 14th, 1877) in Die Grosse Politik der europaischen Kabinette, 1871-1914, 11. 121, 123-5. 1 For evidence on this head see Life of Salisbury, 11. 1 17, 120-3 ; also Sir William White, his Life and Correspondence, by H. S. Edwards, pp. 1 16-18. FAILURE OF THE CONFERENCE 113 600,000 men under arms and did not fear a struggle with Russia. Somehow and somewhere, the Sultan's advisers at that time found encouragement sufficient to convince them that the British Govern- ment were " bluffing" and playing fast and loose with the other Powers, and would at the critical moment turn round and desert them1. The last word of the Plenipotentiaries was spoken on January 15th, and the Porte was given until the 17th to make up its mind. On the preceding day, a meeting of the Grand Council, consisting chiefly of State dignitaries and officials, met to pass judgment upon the Powers' proposals. According to Lord Salisbury, the Sultan was now won over. The Grand-Vizier, however, was opposed to the reforms, and he so represented them to the Council as to secure an emphatic re- pudiation. Such a decision was at least a relief to the Plenipotentiaries, since they now knew where they stood and were at liberty to return home. The Porte's final attempt at compromise was a plea for just one year more, in which to convert the Ottoman deserts into smiling places. It ignored the fact that it had had fifty years' grace already, and had abused instead of using it. Lord Salisbury crystallised the result of the four weeks of futile negotiations in the words : " The Porte only proposes to execute its former promises; it refuses to promise anything new or to give any guarantee for the future," while the Italian Plenipotentiary's comment was: "They put us off with good intentions where we think it necessary to have realities." On January 22nd Lord Salisbury had to make to Lord Derby the sorrowful confession: "The principal object of my mission, the con- clusion of a peace between Russia and Turkey, has not been attained." So far did the Porte's defiance go that its Representatives ostentatiously absented themselves from the general meeting of the Conference on the previous day. The fact, however, that peace was not assured meant that war must almost inevitably ensue. As Lord Beaconsfield had predicted, two men had dominated the Conference, Lord Salisbury and Ignatieff — yet not as antagonists or 1 A telegram sent by Lord Salisbury to Lord Derby on January 8th, 1877, several days after the reception of the Special Envoy in London, shows that he was mystified by what was taking place, for the Grand-Vizier had just told him that he believed that he could "count upon the assistance of Lord Derby and Lord Beaconsfield." Lord Derby replied (January 9th) that he had warned Musurus Pasha in a contrary sense, adding: " It is not in my power to speak more plainly than I have done on this subject, and I feel satisfied that no language different to this is being held by any person connected with Her Majesty's Government." See also Life of Salisbury, 11. 112 and 127. W.&g.iii 8 n4 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 even rivals, but as reasonable coadjutors emulating each other in the furtherance of a great task of civilisation1. If the repute of Great Britain as the friend of "oppressed nationalities" had been com- promised by her cool reception of the Berlin Memorandum, it was abundantly redeemed by the bold and consistent attitude of her Plenipotentiary at Constantinople. While Lord Beaconsfield approached the Eastern Question from the purely political standpoint, as one of power and prestige, and gave to British interests, real or imaginary, almost exclusive consideration, Lord Salisbury saw in addition the moral and humanitarian issues which were involved, and viewed the question in its larger European relations. Undeterred by the know- ledge that the Prime-Minister unfairly suspected him of pressing the Porte unduly2, he persisted in this attitude to the end, fully justi- fying Gladstone's judgment of him as a statesman who uhas no Disraelite prejudices, keeps a conscience, and has plenty of manhood and character3." As the head of a Cabinet, Lord Beaconsfield was a hard taskmaster, and when he was in a fault-finding mood his tongue had the edge of a file. The other and more generous side of his character was shown by his chivalrous greeting when his Envoy returned to England, disappointed and disillusioned4. Though the Conference had resulted in a deadlock, it had had the result of strengthening Russia's position just in proportion as 1 On January 19th, 1877, Lord Salisbury wrote to Lord Carnarvon that the failure of the Conference had been due, in the first instance, to the Turkish Govern- ment's belief in Russia's weakness, and, in the second, to the impression conveyed in the same quarter, that his views were not really those of the British Government. {Life, 11. 123.) 2 "Salisbury seems most prejudiced and not to be aware that his principal object in being sent to Constantinople is to keep the Russians out of Turkey, not to create an ideal existence for Turkish Christians" (Letter of Lord Beaconsfield to Lord Derby, December 28th, 1876). Lord Beaconsfield's judgments were notoriously very impetuous and in consequence erratic. In the same letter he wrote of Lord Salisbury: "He is more Russian than Ignatieff: plus Arabe que V Arable. While Russia, I believe, is meditating and preparing compromise, and the Porte not disinclined to that, Salisbury sees only obduracy and war." Yet within fourteen days he wrote, in another temperamental letter (January 8th, 1877) ; " Salisbury succeeded in moderating the Russians, and I have done my best to moderate the Turks." The truth was that someone had conveyed to the Porte the suggestion that Russia really disliked the prospect of war, which was a fact, and would bear a good deal of squeezing. The moderation was on her side, not on that of the Turks. 3 Letter of December, 1876, quoted in Lord Morley's Life of Gladstone, II. 560. 4 " I hope you will not permit the immediate result of the Conference unduly to oppress you. Trust me, before very long you will bless the day which permitted you to obtain such a mastery of men and things, and especially as connected with the East, as this momentous enterprise has afforded to you." (Letter of February 6th, 1877, Life of Beaconsfield, vi. 114.) THE PORTE'S DEFIANT ATTITUDE 115 that of Turkey had been weakened by her obstinacy and short- sightedness. In spite of the suspicion under which she had entered the Conference, it was admitted that Russia had honestly and tem- perately striven for a modus vivendi, and that for the failure to discover one no blame attached to her. Cleared, to that extent, in the eyes of Europe, she now endeavoured to induce the Powers to acknowledge her as their mandatory in a further attempt to bring the Porte to reason. Wisely or not, their consent was withheld. III. The Russo -Turkish War and the Treaty of San Stefano, 1 877-1 878 After the abortive Constantinople Conference, conversations were continued for a time in London, and on March 31st the Powers laid before the Porte a Protocol, requiring the adoption of measures for the amelioration, without further loss of time, of the condition of the Christian populations in the European provinces of the empire. The warning was added, that any neglect to carry out the under- takings demanded would be deemed incompatible with the interests of the Powers, as of Europe in general, and would cause them to consider what steps the consequent situation might call for. Turkey was, also, urged to negotiate with Russia at once, with a view to mutual demobilisation, so soon as peace had been concluded with Montenegro. The Porte replied (April 9th, 1877), protesting against this further admonition as an unjustifiable encroachment upon the Sultan's sovereignty and independence. It was willing to meet the Powers on some points, but on all that it deemed vital it was inflexible. It repudiated any outside right to interfere in Turkish affairs in future, but, while refusing to yield to force, reaffirmed its intention to carry out its own reforms. The answer was regarded as a challenge to Russia ; the British Ambassador in Constantinople so described it to the Grand-Vizier, who admitted that it had been designed to bring matters to a crisis and force Russia to make a full disclosure of her intentions. There was, in fact, an influential war party in the Sultan's entourage, and the Mussulman population in the provinces was eager to cross swords again with the old enemy. Lord Derby in London and the British Ambassador in Constantinople did their best to persuade the Porte to accept the Protocol, but in vain; for it was a settled principle of Turkish policy always to offer to do something 8—2 n6 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 less than the situation required. When, at last, the Sultan, overcoming the resistance of the war faction, agreed to invite the mediation of the Powers, it was too late; for Russian troops were already crossing the Pruth and the Asiatic frontier of Turkey. A drastic solution of the Eastern imbroglio had now become inevitable. In spite of all his public declarations to the effect that the maintenance of the independence and complete integrity of the Ottoman empire was a fundamental principle of British policy, even Lord Beaconsfield had, in private intercourse, already abandoned that position. There was, indeed, a large element of opportunism in the policy which he was pursuing, nor could it be pretended that he knew from the beginning how far, or even in what precise direction, that policy would take him. The arena of diplomatic conflict was for him more or less new ground, and the experience of the past afforded but little help towards any constructive solutions of the problems which had arisen. His attitude on the territorial question in particular was for a long time undecided and obscure, and changed continually. While labouring under the irritation caused by the Bulgarian Atroci- ties, he had been prepared to neutralise Constantinople with its vicinity and make it a free port "in the custody and under the guardianship of England, as the Ionian Isles were1." Immediately before the Constantinople Conference, he thought of purchasing from Turkey a port on the Black Sea — Batoum, Sinope, or Varna — as a means of neutralising Russian action2. In a letter written to the Foreign Secretary when the Conference was over, he adroitly analysed ''the famous phrase ' integrity and independence,' " and drew the con- clusion that an empire might retain its integrity even though its limits were curtailed, and that the continuance of sovereign power was independent of any question of territorial area3. " If war begins," he wrote to Lord Derby a few days later, " I think it will end in partition." War actually began on April 24th, and therewith the Ottoman political system passed again into the crucible. Russia had already concluded a Convention with Austria-Hungary (January 1st) by which Servia, Montenegro, and the strip of territory lying between these two States and forming the sandjak of Novi-Bazar, were, in the 1 Letter to Lord Derby, September 4th, 1876. 2 Conversation with Gathorne Hardy, November 28th, 1876. Gathorne Hardy, First Earl of Cranbrook: a Memoir, 1. 377. 3 "England and Austria and France will assert their integrity, and expect it to be acknowledged, though they have all of them lost more provinces than Turkey." Letter of January 29th, 1877. THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR 117 event of hostilities, to be treated as neutral. A supplementary Con- vention, of March 18th, determined the territorial changes upon which the two Powers were to insist if the dissolution of the Turkish empire followed. Austria was to receive, in permanence, Bosnia and Herze- govina with a population of a million and a quarter, while Novi-Bazar was to be divided between Servia and Montenegro. Russia was to receive Bessarabia from Roumania, and to have discretionary power to make acquisitions in Asia Minor. The Convention thus yielded to Austria-Hungary, without that Power needing to draw the sword or to mobilise a single battalion, all that Andrassy wished. On April 16th, Russia concluded a further Convention with Roumania, permitting the passage of an army of invasion through that State, while the Tsar pledged himself to maintain and defend its existing integrity. At the end of the month, Montenegro resumed hostilities as Russia's ally. In a Circular Letter addressed to the Powers, Gortchakoff claimed justification for the action taken, on the ground that the Porte had refused to listen to reason. "Nothing remains," he added, "except to let this state of things continue, or to obtain by force what the Powers have failed to obtain by persuasion." In his reply to this letter, Lord Derby declined to admit that the Porte's answer of April 9th "removed all hope of deference on its part to the wishes and advice of Europe and of security for the application of the suggested reforms," and disputed the assumption that the course which Russia was following was "in accordance with the sentiments and interests of Europe." The British Government declared their intention to observe neu- trality, so long as the interests held to be vital to Great Britain were respected. These were stated to be the maintenance of complete freedom of communication between Europe and the East by means of the Suez Canal ; the exclusion of Egypt from the sphere of military operations; and the recognition by Russia of the inviolability of Constantinople and the navigation of the Bosphorus and the Darda- nelles. Gortchakoff furnished assurances upon all these points. The acquisition of Constantinople in particular, he said, was outside the purview of the Tsar, who recognised that its destiny was in any case a question of common interest which could only be regulated by an entente gener ale, though he was of opinion that, in the event of change of tenure, it should not pass into the hands of any European Power. In a conversation with Lord Derby on June 8th, Count Schouvaloff tde the further offer that, assuming the neutrality of the Powers, n8 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 if Turkey sought peace before the Russian armies had crossed the Balkans, this line should not be passed and hostilities should cease on certain conditions. These conditions, with the single exception of the extent of the future Bulgaria, were more favourable to Turkey than those which were imposed on her by the Powers a year later. It cannot be said that Russia, in entering the War, attracted much sympathy except from the Slavic world and those spheres of Western, and particularly Anglo-Saxon, opinion which may be de- scribed as anti-Turkish in principle. Even in this country, although Gladstone had recently roused public feeling against the Turk, there was a strong wing of the Liberal party which declined to approve any action that might embarrass the Cabinet at such a time. When the eloquent tribune proposed to challenge the Government's policy, his intention was diplomatically countered by the joint efforts of his colleagues Lord Granville and Lord Hartington, who were not convinced that the nation was so profoundly moved by indigna- tion against Turkey as the author of The Bulgarian Horrors believed1. On the other hand, the Russophobes were clamouring for war. No- where did the war passion find such marked expression as in the metropolitan zone. Most people in Russia believed that the War would be a mere promenade for their armies ; but they were soon to be undeceived. Roumania furnished the master-key to the field of operations, since she lay between the Russian frontier and the Danube, beyond which stretched Bulgaria and the Balkans, with Turkey proper on the southern side. The principality was still a vassal State of the Ottoman empire; and Turkey, regarding the Russian Convention with Rou- mania as a violation of the Treaty of Paris, began at once the bom- bardment of Kalafat, on the Danube. Hereupon, Prince Charles formally declared war, and simultaneously his country's political independence (May 21st). Another month passed before Russian troops, under General Gurko, crossed the Danube at two places — in the north-east in the Dobrudja and opposite Sistova, in Bulgaria. Reaching the Balkans, the invading army forced the Shipka Pass, and its progress was, for a time, so rapid that a continuous march to Adrianople and even Con- stantinople seemed probable. With a change in the Turkish military 1 Lord Hartington, with blunt commonsense, uttered a truth generally appli- cable to rhetorical politicians when he said of Gladstone that he refused to understand that not all the people who listened to and admired his speeches agreed with them. ATTITUDE OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 119 command a turn in the fortunes of war supervened, and the Russian armies were thrown on the defensive, Gurko suffering a serious defeat at Stara Zagora, south of the Shipka, and being driven back to the mountains, while Osman Pasha occupied Plevna, and, digging himself in, held the Russian hosts at bay. Further advance became impossible until this strong position had been reduced, and its siege began on July 20th From May onwards, Lord Beaconsfield and the Foreign Secretary had been eagerly pressing upon Andrassy the expediency of a common policy; and, on July 26th, a verbal agreement was arrived at — the Prime- Minister called it "a moral understanding" — affirming solid- arity of interests and pledging the two Governments to identical, but separate, diplomatic action, and, should their interests be endangered, to subsequent united military measures. They agreed to oppose the exercise of an exclusive protectorate by any Power over the Christian populations of the Balkans, and to demand the cooperation in the determination of the terms of peace of all the Signatories to the Treaty of Paris ; Russia was not to be allowed acquisitions of territory on the right bank of the Danube or to occupy Constantinople ; the existing arrangements as to the Dardanelles were to be maintained; and no great Slavic State was to be established in the Balkans to the prejudice of its neighbours. Andrassy was, nevertheless, as resolute as ever to keep out of the War. He explained his Government's policy in the words (June 22nd): " Mettre a Vabri nos inter its sans nous exposer a la necessite de devoir les sauvegarder les armes a la main — tel a ete des le debut de la arise, tel teste le but constant de nos efforts." Meeting Bismarck in September, Andrassy told him of the agreement, and was assured that he had acted wisely in concluding it. When the siege of Plevna, marked by many heroic onslaughts heroically repelled, had lasted for four months, General Todleben, the defender of Sebastopol, resorted to close investment, and, on December 10th, Osman Pasha surrendered with his gallant army. In the meantime, the Russians and their Allies won new successes in other parts of the theatre of war. Every attempt of the Turks to capture the Shipka Pass had failed. To the westward, the Montenegrins had defeated the enemy in the Zeta valley and captured Nikshich, after a siege of four months. Servia joined forces in December and was fighting with greater credit than in the late War. In Asia Minor, the campaign had gone altogether against the Turks, and Kars had been captured by Loris Melikoff, a General of Armenian extraction. 120 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 By this time, an ugly temper had seized hold of a large part of the British people, and, in proportion as the successes of the Russian arms multiplied, the desire for war increased. On the other hand, the Cabinet, which had been divided on Eastern policy from the beginning, was becoming daily more difficult to control. A section, which took its cue from Lord Derby, was determined not to have war at any price; Lord Salisbury represented a moderating middle party, and was against war at the present moment1; while among the remaining Ministers were several bitter Russophobes, though at that stage hardly one of them seriously contemplated the prospect of hostilities. With the war party in the country Lord Beaconsfield himself was widely supposed to be in sympathy, the truth being that, while he welcomed its vociferous support, he never allowed it to influence his action or his judgment. It is now known that it was not the power behind the Throne, but the Throne itself, which was at that time most eager for war2. Nevertheless, for the Queen's combative attitude her Prime-Minister must be held essentially responsible. He had worked so strongly and persistently upon her feelings and prejudices that, in the end, he had infused in her a far greater distrust of, and hostility to, Russia than he had himself ever entertained. Lord Beaconsfield 's principal concern at that time was that Russia should not occupy Constan- tinople. So early as June, he had asked the Porte to invite the presence of the British fleet there, and had even offered to occupy the Gallipoli peninsula for the duration of the War, if a proposal to that effect were formally made to him. So determined was he to keep the Russians away from the capital that, when he found its occupation to be regarded by Lord Derby, and also by Lord Salisbury, as Russia's good right in virtue of her military success, he persuaded the Queen to tell the Foreign Secretary that it was her wish that it should not be permitted, and led her to believe that Great Britain's entrance into the struggle would be a necessary consequence of the act. When, however, it became necessary to restrain the Queen's eager- ness for resolute counter-action in Turkey's behalf, the task proved difficult. In reply to her appeal (June 27th) for prompt measures with a view to checking Russia's forward march — "Be bold!. . .pray 1 See his letter to Beaconsfield of December 24th, 1877, in Life of Salisbury, 11. 169. 2 The story, which is one of the most curious in our modern political history, is fully told in the sixth volume of the Life of Beaconsfield. THE POWERS DECLINE TO MEDIATE 121 act quickly!" — the Prime-Minister, while "sympathising with all Your Majesty's feelings in the present critical state of affairs," pointed out that military expeditions took time and that the occupa- tion of the Dardanelles or any part of the Turkish empire was im- possible without the Porte's permission, which would be given only if Great Britain assumed the character of Turkey's ally; while, as for a declaration of war against Russia, "there are not three men in the Cabinet who are prepared to advise that step." Palmerston, in his day, systematically kept the Queen in ignorance of important State documents. It might, perhaps, have been well if, on some delicate questions of policy, Lord Beaconsfield had told his Sovereign either more or less than he did, and avoided the consequence of communica- tions made to her in one sense being interpreted in quite another. So far did he, at that time, share with the Sovereign the management of affairs of State that he reported to her upon the votes of his colleagues in Cabinet, and classified them according to their support of "her" policy, as he professed to regard it, while the Queen, in return, praised or blamed her Ministers accordingly. On the fall of Plevna, Turkey and her friends in England knew that the end could not be far off, and panic was as great in London as in Constantinople. On December 12th, the Porte appealed to the Powers to mediate with the enemy; but they declined. At the end of the month, Great Britain was asked to perform that service, and she put the belligerents into direct communication; for the Tsar refused to negotiate through any third party. In the meantime, his armies were still advancing victoriously. Recrossing the Balkans, Gurko took, in succession, Sofia (January 3rd, 1878) and Philippopolis (January i6th-i7th), inflicting a signal defeat on Suleiman Pasha, while Skobeleff and Radetzky captured an entire Turkish army at Senova, near the Shipka Pass (January 9th). Peace now became indispensable for Turkey, whose armies, de- moralised by a succession of defeats and retreats, were incapable of resisting the Russian march to Constantinople. On January 20th, Adrianople was occupied by Russian troops — for the second time in half a century. The Serbs and Montenegrins were, also, multiplying their successes, the former occupying the old Servian town of Nisch and the latter capturing Spizza, Antivari, and Dulcigno (January 18th), thus satisfying for the present the old Montenegrin longing for an outlook on the sea. The visible and ostensible attitude of the British Government 122 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 had hitherto been one of patient vigilance, though much scheming had been going on behind the scenes. Now that Turkey was beaten and at the mercy of her enemies, Russophobe passions again flared up dangerously. Parliament was called together earlier than usual, and this added greatly to the public excitement. Though still a united body, however, the Cabinet was far from being of one mind. More than ever, it was the Prime-Minister's object to prevent the occupation of Constantinople. With this purpose in view, the Govern- ment had, for months, been entreating the Sultan to allow a British squadron to enter the Dardanelles; but he had declined, resentful that his old ally, while so ready with advice, had given him no real help. When Plevna fell and the way to the south lay open, Lord Derby pressed the Russian Government to give an undertaking that no attempt would be made to occupy the capital or the Dardanelles, and was told that to seize Constantinople had never been the Tsar's intention, but that, if Turkey insisted on protracting the War, he would claim the complete freedom of action which is the right of every belligerent State. A renewed promise was, however, made, that British interests, as already defined, would be respected, and it was added that, if other interests were involved and were now clearly specified, the Tsar would endeavour to bring them into accord with those of Russia. At a Cabinet on January 12th, Lord Beaconsfield proposed that the fleet should be sent to the Dardanelles, a measure to which Lords Derby and Carnarvon offered strong opposition. A split was only prevented by the adoption of Lord Salisbury's amendment to ask Turkey's sanction to the movement of the British fleet — which was refused — and to request an undertaking by Russia that she would not occupy Gallipoli. Impatient at the influences which seemed to be restraining her trusted Minister, the Queen, in a letter written at this time, denounced "the great barbarians" (the Russians), the "low tone" of a country which was not sufficiently enthusiastic for war, and the Cabinet itself, of which she was "utterly ashamed " ; and even talked of abdication (January 10th, 1878). On January 23rd the peace-loving section of the nation heard with alarm that the Mediterranean squadron had been ordered to proceed through the Dardanelles to Constantinople. The decision to adopt this strong measure brought to a head the growing division in the Cabinet. Lord Derby and Lord Carnarvon tendered their re- signations, but, the order being countermanded, the Prime-Minister OUTBREAK OF " JINGOISM" 123 persuaded the former to stay. There was little generosity in the act ; for though he was now satisfied that his hesitating colleague could no longer do harm in the Cabinet, Lord Beaconsfield greatly feared that he might do harm outside. The Queen gave reluctant consent to Derby's remaining. As a further precautionary step, a vote of six millions for military preparations was asked for, A war spirit without parallel since the Crimean campaign, taking the new-fangled and ugly form of "Jingoism," was now abroad, and the Armistice of Adrianople (January 31st) failed to allay the fever, since in spite of it the Russian troops continued to advance. It was clearly Russia's aim to force Turkey to accept conditions of peace before the Powers could intervene. To complicate the situation, the Greeks, who had long been eager to enter the fray, were now threatening to throw in their lot with the victorious Power, hoping to share in the division of the spoils. It was largely owing to British pressure and promises that they were restrained. For several weeks longer, war between England and Russia seemed to hang upon a thread. On February 7th, intense excitement was caused in London by the report, received by way of India, that Russian troops had reached Constantinople. The Queen urged an immediate declaration of war, and, on being told that the situation did not justify so extreme a measure, was disappointed and again talked of laying down her " thorny crown1" ; whereupon Lord Beaconsfield im- parted to her the obvious fact, insisted on by Lord Derby and Lord Salisbury from the first, that "it was never in the power of a neutral State to prevent the entry of the Russians into Constantinople." The Cabinet decided, however, on the Prime-Minister's proposal, to despatch a division of the fleet to Constantinople "for the protection of life and property," and to invite the other neutral Powers to take similar action. The report which led to this decision proved to be unfounded; but it made the passing of the vote of credit a mere matter of form. The British fleet moved forward accordingly, in spite of Turkish protests, while Russia's reply was to advance further towards the capital. Just two years before, Gladstone had wished to despatch vessels of war to Constantinople by way of menace to Turkey. Turkey's faith that Great Britain would extricate her from diffi- culty had been rudely shaken, though the Sultan had still a good friend in the British Ambassador. Sir Henry Elliot had been removed 1 Letter to Lord Beaconsfield, February 9th, 1878. i24 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 to Vienna at the end of 1877, and his place had been taken by Sir A. H. Layard, whose views were as antagonistic to Russia as his own. The policy carried on in Constantinople was in consequence but little affected. Layard fanned the dying embers of hope, so long as he dared, without adding new fuel in the shape of actual assurances which he had no authority to give or power to substantiate. On January 7th, the Grand- Vizier had startled him by a " vehement and bitter" condemnation of Great Britain's alleged faithlessness and treachery. After exemplifying her alleged deceit, he added," Such is the justice and humanity of England. She has abandoned her old and faithful ally, and leaves us to be crushed by her and our implacable enemy, because forsooth a few Bulgarians were killed1." He even said that he was now in favour of turning from Great Britain, and settling with Russia on the best terms he could get. The outburst was not quite just, but it was far from being altogether the contrary. For years, Turkey had been regarded in London almost as a vassal of the British Crown, and the control of the Porte's Foreign Policy might be said to have passed into British hands. The Turk had been so long tutored and patronised, protected and pampered, that his self-reliance and power of initiative were sapped, and in a time of supreme crisis there was left in him no residue of vigour or power of resistance. Yet now, after almost the last vertebra of backbone had been taken out of him, he was expected to stand upright and play his part like a man. So late as February, the Sultan, who had already offered to place his fleet at Great Britain's disposal, was still begging that his old ally would help him "with men, money or in any other way," so as to enable him to defend his capital, which he declared the Russians should enter only over his dead body. When the British Government were importuned to say their last word on the subject (February 12th) Lord Derby instructed Layard, in a despatch which received its final form from the Prime-Minister's hand, to inform the Porte that they were "not prepared under existing circumstances to incur the re- sponsibility of advising an armed resistance to the entry of Russian troops into Constantinople." The cold comfort was added that such action by Russia would be a violation of the Armistice, which would entitle the Porte to protest, though it was to be presumed that "armed resistance would be fruitless and disastrous." Being requested, hereupon, to remove Russia's justification for advancing on the capital by withdrawing the British fleet from Constantinople waters, or, 1 Letter to Lord Derby, January 8th, 1878. TURKISH DISILLUSIONMENT 125 alternatively, to come out into the open as Turkey's ally and assist her in repelling the enemy, the British Government flatly refused to do either (February 18th). Thus, at the last, Turkey's eyes were opened to the real position. Trusting to a hundred signs and intimations, she had reposed in Great Britain a blind confidence, staking everything on British attachment and friendship. Now, she learned that the only tie between the two informal Allies was that, not of Turkish, but of British, interests. As these latter, however, were not endangered, a casus foederis was held not to exist. The Government still used their best endeavours to keep the Russians away from the capital; but it must be gravely doubted whether the idea of helping Turkey to resist them had ever been seriously entertained. This position was beyond a doubt correct. What exposed the Cabinet to reproach was the fact that it should have allowed its position and intentions to be at any time open to mis- understanding. The episode of Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein had been repeated, not to England's credit. Lord Beaconsfield had yet to satisfy his followers in the country. Behind him, egging him on, was a shouting rather than fighting majority of the nation, whose roused emotions he had made no attempt to restrain, and who had called for the translation of his many bold words into equally bold deeds. He had, however, landed himself on the horns of a dilemma. He had raised the expectation that the occupation of Constantinople would be regarded as a casus belli \ but now, when the danger seemed imminent, he had to admit that Russia was quite within her rights. In this predicament of his own causing, he sought and obtained from Russia an undertaking that she would not occupy Gallipoli, on condition that Great Britain refrained from landing troops on Turkish territory either in Europe or Asia (February 19th). A little later, he suggested to the Cabinet an idea which he had privately ventilated before — the purchase of some point of Turkish territory which might be " conducive to British interests " : a Black Sea port and a commanding position on the Persian Gulf were mentioned. The Quixotic notion of a Mediter- ranean League, which Italy and Greece, France and Austria were to join, for securing the independence of that sea and frustrating Russian aggression, was also seriously discussed. No one appears to have asked what motive France could have for entering an organisation so unequally balanced, or how it could exist without her. 126 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 On March 3rd, Peace Preliminaries were signed on behalf of the belligerent Powers by General Ignatieff and Safvet Pasha at San Stefano. The terms were not communicated to the British Govern- ment until the 23rd; but, on the 8th, the Cabinet resolved that in the event of their "compromising the maritime interests of Great Britain in the Mediterranean, a new naval station in the east of the Mediter- ranean must be obtained, and if necessary by force." This assertion of the doctrine of might as against that of right was to be applied to the injury of the very State whose independence and integrity Great Britain was at that moment professing to protect against a Power which had defeated it in fair warfare. Two years earlier, when the Eastern Question was beginning to look serious, the Prime-Minister had written (May, 1876) : "Whatever happens we shall certainly not drift into war, but go to war, if we do, because we intend it." The words faithfully define his policy; but it must be added that he did not go to war, because he never intended to do so. A study of the diplomatic despatches and conversations which passed between the Foreign Office and the Porte at that time, and of Lord Beaconsfield 's concurrent correspondence with the Queen, his colleagues, and his friends, makes it impossible to resist the conclusion that all the admonitions, remonstrances, and veiled threats which were addressed to Russia on the subject of Con- stantinople were a gigantic piece of bluff1. Lord Beaconsfield was, of course, determined to prevent the occupation of the capital if it were by any means possible, and in support of his assurances to the Queen on the subject he went as far towards an open breach with Russia as he dared; nevertheless, there is no justification for sup- posing that he was ever prepared to go to war on this issue alone, but every reason to conclude that he was ready, if the fortunes of diplomacy went against him, to accept accomplished facts and make the best of them. That he went even so far as he did was due to his knowledge that it was safe to apply to Russia, in her then exhausted state, a very strong degree of pressure: Raouf Pasha, the Turkish Minister of War, who was sent on a mission to Petrograd in March, brought home the assurance that the military authorities there were thoroughly alarmed by the prospect of a war with Great Britain. 1 The biographer of Lord Salisbury records that " at a later period he came to doubt whether there had been substantial grounds for the charge" made by Liberal politicians that Beaconsfield had "the intention of manoeuvring England into a war in defence of Turkey," though both he and Lord Carnarvon had for a time believed it. Life of Salisbury, n. 137. LORD DERBY'S RESIGNATION 127 At a Cabinet held on March 27th, the Prime-Minister proposed the immediate calling-out of the Reserves and the despatch of a large native force from India, with a view to occupying ports in the Levant commanding the Persian Gulf and the country round Bagdad, so as to neutralise the Russian conquests and influence in Armenia1. In the event, this proposal of the forcible occupation of the territory of a friendly Power was not carried out ; but, towards the end of May, an Indian expeditionary force of 7000 native troops was landed at Malta, from which garrison it happily became unnecessary to move it. Lord Derby was the only dissentient from the decision, and he now definitively resigned. In so doing he merely withdrew from an in- tolerable position; for his place in the Administration had almost become that of a Minister without portfolio. On March 8th the Prime-Minister had informed the Queen that the Cabinet had " taken the management of the Foreign Office into its own hands." For some time, he had, practically, himself acted as Foreign Secretary, so far as the Eastern Question was concerned; while Lord Derby's functions were those of an executive officer and more or less friendly critic. Lord Salisbury received the vacant office, the reversion of which he had expected for some time. All this time, pourparlers of a different kind were proceeding in two directions. At the end of January, a busy exchange of diplomatic Notes between London and Vienna began. Lord Beaconsfield sprang on the Cabinet the proposal of a defensive alliance with Austria- Hungary, and Lord Carnarvon alone opposed it. Negotiations were accordingly resumed with Andrassy on the basis of the "moral under- standing " of the preceding July, but for a long time without definite result. Andrassy had not abandoned the hope of coming to a satis- factory agreement with Russia. He was as indisposed to hostilities as ever, and was not convinced that Great Britain would fight in any event; hence he had hitherto played for delay. The publication of the terms of peace, however, compelled him to come to a definite decision : his first comment on the San Stefano Treaty was : " Russia has played us false." Simultaneously, there had been negotiations on the subject 1 Cyprus and Alexandretta appear to have been suggested as suitable for occupation. Lord Derby left a Memorandum of the proceedings of this Cabinet in which Lord Beaconsfield's speech advocating the seizure of Turkish territory without permission was summarised as follows: "An emergency has arisen: the balance of power in the Mediterranean is in danger; every State must now look to its own interests Proposes to communicate with the Porte, to guarantee the revenues now received, so that they shall not lose. This does not involve alliance with the Porte. Nor is it inconsistent with anything we have done." i28 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 of a Conference of the Powers. So soon as it became certain that the War would end in Russia's favour, Great Britain and Austria- Hungary had given both the belligerent Powers to understand that no modification of the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 would be regarded as valid without consultation with the Signatory States. Accordingly, early in February, Andrassy sounded the Powers as to their willingness to confer on the subject, and all agreed with or without condition. The British Government made their participation dependent upon the submission of the entire Treaty to the free judgment of the Powers — a condition to which Russia demurred. The Treaty of San Stefano was a forced contract, and its territorial provisions went far towards justifying those who had suspected Russia of pursuing interested ends under the pretence of performing a dis- interested public duty. The principal proposal was to create a Greater Bulgaria as an autonomous principality, covering broadly, by the incorporation of Roumelia and the larger part of Macedonia, the territory lying between the Danube, the Black Sea, and the Aegean. Little more was to be left to Constantinople than Epirus, Thessaly, Thrace and the peninsula of Chalcis. The proposal was, in effect, the revival of the medieval Bulgarian empire, as it existed before the Turkish Conquest. A Russian Commissioner was to assist in the organisation of the new system of administration and to supervise it for two years. Servia was to receive a considerable increase of terri- tory (including the old town of Nisch) together with independence, and her liability to pay tribute to Turkey was to be cancelled. Mon- tenegro, which the Tsar had always specially favoured, was to be trebled in size and doubled in population by the absorption of districts of Herzegovina, Albania, and the sandjak of Novi-Bazar. It was to retain Nikshich, Spizza, Antivari, and Dulcigno, which had been occupied during the War ; and its political independence, which had existed in practice for many years, was now to be formally recognised. It was proposed that the original recommendations relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina which the Powers had urged on the Porte at the Constantinople Conference (implying a limited autonomy) should be at once enforced, subject to such modifications as the Russian, Turkish, and Austro-Hungarian Governments might deem needful. Reforms were also to be introduced in Crete, Epirus, Thessaly, and other parts of European Turkey, and security and good government were to be assured to the Armenians. In general, Russia was liberal TREATY OF SAN STEFANO 129 in the grant of Constitutions to the Balkan territories, though as yet without Constitutional government herself. Roumania fared worst under the Treaty, though she had rendered Russia invaluable assistance during the War, and, at one time, had stood between the great Muscovite Power and imminent disaster. She was to receive political independence, but was to retrocede to Russia southern Bessarabia1, in exchange for a portion of the Dobrudja, which was to be taken from Turkey in part payment of the War indemnity. Russia required for herself, in addition, Ardahan, Kars, Bayazid, and Batoum in Asia Minor, with a strip of Asiatic coast. The indemnity was fixed at 1410 million roubles, commutable in territory to the extent of 310 millions. Further, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were to remain open, in time of war as of peace, to the merchant vessels of neutral States bound to or from Russian ports. In its territorial aspects, the Treaty of San Stefano was dictated by an almost exclusive consideration for certain favoured Slavic States. Russia showered favours upon the races which she had drawn, or hoped to retain, under her Protection, but did little for those outside the range of her influence. Thus, the national claims of Greece were altogether ignored. The Treaty was further vitiated by the worst defect of most former Treaties of conquest : in that it bartered human beings like chattels and placed large populations under alien rule, not only against their will, but with total disregard of ethnical or historical claims. Petitions promptly rained upon the British Government from aggrieved nationalities — Turks, Roumanians, Greeks, Albanians — protesting against arrangements so inequitable and begging for their revision. Roumania was prepared to join in war against Russia at once, if Great Britain would take the lead. To representations from these quarters Lord Beaconsneld and the new Foreign Secretary were not indifferent ; but the considerations which chiefly weighed with them were the danger to the Ottoman empire of a Greater Bulgaria subject to control from Petrograd, and the menace to British interests in Asia Minor. Austria was equally opposed to the Treaty as ignoring her claims in regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina, preparing the way for the creation of a powerful Slavic State on her borders, and, in I1 Lord Beaconsfield suggested this restitution in a letter written to Lord Derby the preceding September. W.&G.III 130 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 consequence of the proposed enlargement of Bulgaria, blocking the road to Salonica, the ultimate goal of Habsburg ambitions. Even France was alarmed by the prospect of a Russian naval base on the eastern side of the Mediterranean ; and an attempt made at that time to float a Russian loan on the Paris market failed. The first important official act of the new Foreign Secretary was the issue to the Powers of a Circular Note (April 1st) criticising the proposals of the San Stefano Treaty, and stating the attitude and policy of the British Government with perfect definiteness and clarity. This Note, the main propositions in which he had submitted to the Prime-Minister in a letter of March 21st, was in substance a challenge to Russia in the name of all the Powers which were prepared to take their stand on the maintenance of the existing Balance of Power, whether in Europe or Asia Minor, and the binding force of international treaties. Lord Salisbury recalled the fact that, in the Declaration annexed to the First Protocol of the London Conference of 1871, the Signatory Powers affirmed it to be "an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty, or modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the Contracting Powers, by means of an amicable arrangement." It was impossible, he said, without violating the spirit of this Declaration, to acquiesce in the withdrawal from the cognisance of the Powers of any Articles in the Treaty of San Stefano which modified existing arrangements or were incon- sistent with them. Coming to the details of the Peace Preliminaries, he indicated the British Government's suspicion of the creation, in the proposed Greater Bulgaria, of a powerful Slavic State, possessing harbours on the Euxine and the Aegean, and controlled by Russia, which would thereby obtain "a preponderating influence over both political and commercial relations in those seas." It was also objected that the territorial severance from Constantinople of the Greek, Albanian and Slavic provinces which were still to remain under the government of the Porte would create constant administrative difficulty and em- barrassment, and not only weaken the Porte itself politically, but expose the inhabitants of the provinces to the danger of anarchy. The indemnity was criticised from the standpoint of its form rather than of its amount, since it was to be open to Russia to commute part of it into territory or leave it as an unredeemed liability — a provision capable of proving a powerful instrument of coercion. THE SALISBURY CIRCULAR 131 Turkey having frustrated the objects of the Powers as agreed upon at the Constantinople Conference, he admitted that large changes might now be necessary in the Treaties by which south-eastern Europe had hitherto been ruled, since "good government, assured peace, and freedom for populations to whom these blessings have been strange," were still the objects of Great Britain's earnest concern. His Government would, therefore, have willingly entered a congress in which the stipulations contained in the Preliminaries of Peace could have been examined as a whole, "in their relation to existing treaties, to the acknowledged rights of Great Britain, and to the beneficent ends which the united action of Europe has always been directed to secure." They were unable to take part in a congress whose deliberations were to be restricted in the manner proposed by Prince Gortchakoff . Both as an exposition of policy and z piece justificative ,the Salisbury Circular was a State document of great ability and power, and the praise awarded to it by Lord Beaconsfield, whose part in its production was merely that of retoucheur, was well deserved. The Porte had already asked the British Government to help it to obtain modifica- tions of the Treaty in regard to the limits of Bulgaria (which it wished to restrict to the territory between the Danube and the Balkans), the Armenian cessions, and the indemnity, and a promise had been given accordingly. In an elaborate reply (April 9th) Gortchakoff challenged the British Government to abandon their negative standpoint and say not merely what they did not want, but what they wanted, seeing that matters could not remain as they were. Every Power taking part in the congress, he promised, would have the same complete freedom of action which Russia claimed for herself. He contended that the proposed Greater Bulgaria was merely a development of the State which was contemplated by the Conference of Constantinople, and justified the retrocession of Roumanian Bessarabia as the reversal of an intolerable decision which was forced on Russia in the time of her impotence. Cessions of territory, he added, were a natural conse- quence of war, and if England had wished to spare Turkey she should have joined Russia, as she was twice invited to do, in bringing to bear upon the Porte such pressure as would have averted hostilities. Turkey concluded peace with Servia a little later, but continued on a war footing as regards Montenegro. 9—2 i32 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 IV. The Berlin Congress and its Issues, 1 878-1 880 A. The Berlin Congress, 1878 Lord Beaconsfield claimed that the Salisbury Circular had "put the country on its legs again." It certainly clarified the European situation and brought all the Powers to a sense of actualities. At Petrograd and in at least one other imperial capital, where conviction had hitherto been lacking, it was recognised that the British Cabinet had decided to make a firm stand in the defence of interests which it honestly believed to be menaced by Russia's action. From this time onward, the Eastern crisis showed signs of abatement, and diplomacy passed into smoother waters. In a letter written a few days after the signing of the San Stefano Treaty, Lord Beaconsfield claimed that Great Britain was strong enough to have a policy of her own and to carry it through — a policy of which the purpose should be to "vindicate and assert her own rights and interests"; and he protested: "we must think less of Bismarcks and Andrassys and Gortchakoffs, and more of our own energies and resources1." In truth, he had gained powerful auxiliaries in the persons both of the German and Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministers. In his relations to the Powers principally concerned, Bis- marck had hitherto "hedged"; now, he took a more decided stand on the side of Great Britain and Austria, and in token of his change of mind began to show an unwonted zeal in the cause of conciliation. The proposal of a conference of the Ambassadors, originally planned for Vienna, had in the meantime grown into something larger. Gortchakoff had suggested that the conference should be composed of the leading Ministers of the Powers, as Plenipoten- tiaries, for he intended to take part himself; and Bismarck, accustomed to decide questions of policy proprio motu, agreed, for once, with the Russian Chancellor. This larger view prevailing, Berlin was by general consent accepted as the meeting-place of what was now described as a Congress. There remained the British Government's objection to sending Plenipotentiaries to Berlin or elsewhere, merely to confirm a series of f aits accomplis. They claimed, with perfect justification, that the Treaty of San Stefano should be submitted in its entirety to the jurisdiction of the Powers, whose duty and right it would be to de- termine how far it was inconsistent with the Treaty of 1856 and the Protocol of 1 871, and to approve or reject any departures from these 1 Letter of March 8th, 1878. THE SALISBURY-SCHOUVALOFF CONVENTION 133 agreements according to their full discretion. Gortchakoff wished merely to communicate the Treaty to the Congress, leaving to each Power represented there full liberty of judgment and of action (la pleine liberie de ses appreciations et de son action). Such a concession, however, ignored the question in dispute, since it implied that Russia would not regard herself as bound, in case of disagreement, to abide by the decision of the other Powers. This evasion of the condition of their acceptance of the Congress only strengthened the British Cabinet's conviction of its importance. Finally, Gortchakoff cut short the dispute with the curt intimation that the Russian Government "leaves to the other Powers the liberty of raising such questions as they may think fit to discuss, and reserves to itself the liberty of accepting or not accepting the discussion of these questions." The deadlock which ensued was resolved by a secret understanding between the two Governments. Holding tenaciously to the view that the Congress, if held at all, must possess unlimited jurisdiction, and convinced that no good could come of a series of roaming discussions directed to vague and undefined objects, the British Foreign Secretary conferred with the Russian Ambassador with a view to ascertaining how far the Treaty of San Stefano might be brought into line with the views of his Government, and so serve as the basis of a general agreement. The result was the conclusion of the Salisbury- SchouvalofT Convention of May 30th, by which the two Powers agreed upon the broad lines of a settlement mutually acceptable. In reality, the difficulties between them proved easy of adjustment. Russia was told that Great Britain cared little about Servian and Montenegrin ques- tions, provided her views in regard to Bulgaria and the proposed annexations in Asiatic Turkey were fairly met. In the end, the idea of a Greater Bulgaria was abandoned, the territory south of the Balkans being left to Turkey, while Russia's acquisition of Bessarabia and of certain points in Armenia, including Batoum, was to stand. Turkey's promises to Russia in regard to Armenia were to be made to Great Britain, also, who was likewise to have a voice in determining the future organisation of the Greek provinces of European Turkey. Moreover, Russia renounced the idea of commuting any part of the war indemnity into a further acquisition of territory. The Secret Convention was divulged in the columns of a London newspaper by the malfeasance of a copying clerk in the Foreign Office, employed on the transcription of confidential State documents at the pay of eightpence an hour. The Prime-Minister's annoyance at the i34 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 disclosure turned to dismay when he learned that the Foreign Office had decided to expose itself by prosecuting the offender. The practice of secret diplomacy never exercised the Chanceries of Europe more assiduously than during the few weeks immediately preceding the Berlin Congress. Great Britain, Russia, Austria- Hungary and Turkey were all engaged simultaneously in concluding surreptitious conventions and treaties. While negotiating with Russia, Lord Salisbury was bargaining with Andrassy, whom Gortchakoff was known to be making strong efforts to capture. Ever since the conclusion of the Declaration, or "moral understanding," of July, 1877, the British Government had been pressing Andrassy to enter into a more binding agreement. In diplomatic usage, a reciprocal Declaration is a treaty with the strings untied; and he was now determined to tie the strings. Neither Lord Salisbury nor Lord Beaconsfield trusted Andrassy, and it was their lack of confidence in him, caused by his refusal to enter into a definite self-commitment, that had induced them to fall back on the Anglo-Russian Convention1. Even during the negotiations now begun, Lord Salisbury believed that Andrassy might at any time turn round and come to an agreement with Russia, providing for the partition with her of the Balkan peninsula by a line running from Servia to the Gulf of Rendina. On the other hand, Andrassy had heard with alarm of the negotiations between London and Petrograd, and was anxious to know what they meant. Bismarck shared his apprehensions, and on May 25th urged Lord Salisbury not to come to any agreement with Russia that would be prejudicial to Germany's Ally. After much pressure on Lord Salisbury's part, and much wavering on Andrassy's, an understanding was reached. Lord Salisbury defined the broad object of British policy in European Turkey at that time in a letter to our Ambassador at Vienna, wherein he told him that " all practicable support should be given to the races which are likely to act as a barrier to the advance of the Slavonic Power." These races were, preeminently, the Turks and the Greeks. On May 27th, while 1 In a letter to Elliot at Vienna of June 3rd, 1878, Lord Salisbury wrote: "The necessity for a special agreement on the part of Her Majesty's Government with Russia would not have arisen, if the Austrian Government had responded at an earlier period to the overtures which have been repeatedly made to them by Her Majesty's Government to come to an agreement for the full cooperation of Austria and England in dealing with the state of things resulting from the War between Russia and Turkey. Her Majesty's Government have never been able, notwith- standing the assurances which they have on various occasions received from Count Andrassy, to acquire the conviction that Austria might not altogether desert them, and they have accordingly been forced to provide against that contingency." THE VIENNA AND CYPRUS CONVENTIONS 135 at Petrograd Schouvaloff was commending the draft Anglo-Russian Convention to the Tsar, Lord Salisbury sent to Vienna another draft Convention for Andrassy's consideration. The principal stipulations were that the two Powers were to insist on the Balkan range as the boundary of Bulgaria, Roumelia continuing under the political and military supremacy of the Sultan ; the duration of the Russian occupa- tion of Bulgaria was to be limited to six months from the signature of the definitive Treaty ; European was to be substituted for Russian supervision of Bulgarian reorganisation; while Great Britain was to support any propositions which Austria might make at the Congress with respect to Bosnia and, generally, as to the future frontiers of Servia and Montenegro, yet to be under no engagement to go to war on the question of the precise boundaries of these two States. It was understood that Austria had no immediate wish to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, but was only concerned to bring them within her un- disputed sphere of influence, perhaps to the extent of occupation for purely administrative purposes. A Convention embodying the above provisions was signed in Vienna on June 6th. One other Secret Treaty was concluded by the British Govern- ment on the eve of the Congress; it related to the integrity of the Sultan's dominions in Asia. The tripartite Treaty of April 25th, 1856, gave Great Britain the right to ask France to cooperate in preventing any appropriation of Turkish territory. But France, conscious of liabilities nearer home, had throughout made it clear that in no cir- cumstances would she fight on our side, much less on our behalf, against Russia. If, however, Great Britain undertook to perform police duty for Turkey in Asia Minor single-handed, it followed that she could fairly claim permission to adopt whatever measures might seem necessary to the due discharge of that task. By a Convention of June 4th, signed in Constantinople by Sir A. H. Layard and Safvet Pasha, Great Britain entered into a defensive alliance with Turkey, pledging herself to defend by force of arms the Asiatic dominions of the Sultan, as they might be fixed by the Congress, should any ttempt be made upon them by Russia. In return, the Sultan under- )k to introduce reforms, to be agreed upon later between the two \nvers, into the government of these territories and for the protection )f the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in them, and further " assign the island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England," in order to enable her to "make necessary provision for tecuting her engagement." 136 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 The Anglo-Russian Convention having been divulged prematurely, it became a question whether the complementary agreement with Turkey should be frankly published at once or be disclosed at some opportune moment as the proceedings at the Congress developed. For the present, it was kept back, though Russia was told of its purport. Some weeks later, Lord Salisbury also informed Waddington, the French Foreign Minister, of the conclusion of the Convention and the reasons for it. For Great Britain the security of the Indian empire was a paramount concern; that security required the main- tenance of an open way through Asia Minor and the Middle East, and therewith the continuance of Turkish power there. Cyprus had been acquired as a base from which assistance would be given to Turkey in case of need, since Malta was too far distant for the purpose. Nevertheless, he added that "whenever Russia shall, for whatever reason, return to her Asiatic frontier as it existed before the last war, Great Britain would immediately evacuate the island" (July 7th, 1878). In order to lighten the shock of the revelation, Lord Salisbury told Waddington that "advisers of no mean authority" had urged the British Government to appropriate a far larger slice of Turkish territory — to wit, Egypt, or at least the borders of the Suez Canal, and even parts of Asia Minor, but that, out of regard for French susceptibilities, they had virtuously declined these suggestions. • The disclosure created in France alarm and resentment, and also a feeling that Great Britain had not acted straightforwardly. Although, as Waddington wrote, France in entering the Congress had "expressly excluded from discussion the state of things existing in the Lebanon, the Holy Places, and Egypt," the British Government was appropriat- ing an island " situated in the most favourable strategic and maritime position for commanding at once the coasts of Syria and of Egypt1." The French Government asked, as a condition of continued har- monious cooperation, that the British Government should offer an assurance that there would be no interference with the spheres of interest of the two countries in the valley of the Nile; and this assurance Lord Salisbury gave as regarding not only Egypt, but Palestine and Syria. He even let it be known that Great Britain would raise no objection if France were, in her turn, to take Tunis2. 1 Despatch of Waddington of July 21st, 1878. 2 A year later (March, 1879), Lord Salisbury suppressed the British Consulate- General in Tunis and reduced it to a Consulate of the second class, which meant the recall of an energetic official who, in the eyes of France, had been too zealous in the protection of British interests. THE BERLIN CONGRESS 137 At home, the Convention was variously judged. The Liberal party as a whole condemned it as a dangerous leap in the dark, while the Ministerialists applauded it and upbraided the Government for not having taken a larger portion of the Ottoman empire while they were about it. So soon as he knew that Great Britain and Russia were ready for debate, Bismarck issued invitations to the Congress of Berlin, whose first session was held on June 13th, 1878. All the Great Powers, together with Turkey, sent as Plenipotentiaries leading Ministers of State, and the Ambassadors accredited to the German imperial Court were attached to the Congress as Special Envoys. Great Britain was represented by Lord Beaconsfield1, Lord Salisbury and Lord Odo Russell, whose intimate relationship with the German Chancellor was of great assistance to his colleagues ; and the other leading Plenipo- tentiaries were : for Germany, Prince Bismarck and Prince Hohenlohe- Schillingsflirst (afterwards Chancellor) ; for Russia, Prince Gortchakoff and Count SchouvalofT; for Austria-Hungary, Count Andrassy and Count Karolyi; for France, M. Waddington; for Italy, Count Corti; and for Turkey, Alexander Karatheodori Pasha and Mehemet Ali Pasha, the former of Greek, the latter of German, extraction. None of the small States whose interests were to be adjudicated upon was allowed Representation ; but Delegates from Roumania and Greece were heard when questions affecting these countries arose. The presidency fell as a matter of course to Bismarck. The British Plenipotentiaries proceeded to the scene of their labours well supported by material and moral auxiliaries, and in a very confident mood. "We have," Lord Salisbury wrote to Lord Lyons (June 5th), "assembled a powerful fleet at Portsmouth, and we have six or seven first-rate ironclads to do what may be necessary in the Mediterranean, besides smaller ships." Better still, the Govern- ment's relations with Bismarck were "particularly good." Lord Lyons was to be trusted to keep the temperature of Paris cool, and to see that the statesmen there "confined themselves to epigrams." By reason of ill-health, Beaconsfield had intended to take part in 1 Desirous though she was that the Prime-Minister should represent Great Britain at the Congress, the Queen had scruples on the score of his health, and for that reason would have preferred a nearer city, Brussels, The Hague or Paris, as the meeting-place. If, however, Beaconsfield was seriously handicapped by his 73^ years, still more so, with his 80 years, was Gortchakoff, who had to make a land journey of equal length. Both of these veteran statesmen had, accordingly, to divide their stay in Berlin between the Congress room and the quiet of their hotels. 138 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 only the early sessions of the Congress, leaving Lord Salisbury, in whose judgment and loyalty he had perfect confidence, to "complete all the details of which he is consummate master1 " ; but he remained in Berlin to the end. Never did a Power attend an international Court of arbitration so panoplied by prior treaty guarantees, com- mitments and reservations as Great Britain in entering the Congress of Berlin. Lord Beaconsfield said truly, "We have made our book with Austria, and Turkey is in our pocket." Protected by agreements with both belligerents and also with the only neutral Power directly concerned in the future organisation of the Balkans, the British Plenipotentiaries could enter upon the negotiations with composure, since what was lost in one direction was certain to be gained in another. The general lines which were to be followed by them were laid down in a series of Instructions sent to Lord Odo Russell at Berlin on June 8th. Any proposals legitimately tending to benefit and strengthen the Austro-Hungarian monarchy were to be supported. Great Britain was to "go far" towards meeting Russia in regard to her acquisitions in Asia, and in particular to allow her to retain Batoum, Kars, and Ardahan, inasmuch as " the other Powers would not be likely to care." There was to be no active interposition by Great Britain in matters not directly concerning her, and, in particular, she was not to "inter- vene conspicuously" in relation to the frontiers to be assigned to Servia and Montenegro and the arrangements which might be pro- posed as to Bosnia and Montenegro ; but support was to be given to measures for ensuring the welfare and good government of the populations concerned. The general policy to be followed as to Turkey was to be one of consideration for her interests ; Bulgaria was not to be allowed to extend south of the Balkans, and the future organisation of that territory was stated to be the part of the Treaty which affected England most closely. From first to last, the Congress resolved itself into an intellectual tourney between three outstanding figures, Beaconsfield, GortchakofF, and Bismarck; and all three men were in the doctors' hands. Never did weary Titans acquit themselves more gallantly. Bismarck feared that the British Plenipotentiaries had come in an aggressive mood, and might put forward demands so extreme that, rather than comply with them, Russia would prefer to go to war. Even the tradition of the Congress as handed down represents Lord Beaconsfield and Gort- chakoff as stripped gladiators, confronting each other with tense 1 Letter to the Queen, May 31st, 1878. BISMARCK AS " HONEST BROKER" 139 muscles and glaring eyes. The picture is remote from the truth. They were rivals; but their rivalry was that of clever chess-players, sedate, polite, and good-humoured, each straining resolutely for his own hand, but always with perfect loyalty to the rules of the game. Beaconsfield was for a time something of an enigma to Bismarck, who, himself the author of so many coups, was always in fear that the inscrutable English statesman with the oriental face and temperament would spring a dramatic surprise upon the Congress. He touched a weak point in British diplomacy when he discovered that Beaconsfield and his adjutant, Lord Salisbury, were not in all points agreed, the latter clearly not sharing the Prime-Minister's extravagant Russo- phobia and more disposed than his colleague to bring a European, international mind to the judgment of the problems in hand. Fortunately for the British view of things, the opinion was current in Russian circles that Great Britain was prepared at any time to withdraw from the Congress if her demands were too brusquely handled; for the effect was to make Russia cautious. The Russian Plenipotentiaries, however, had another reason for circumspect pro- cedure; for they soon made the disconcerting discovery that their country had few friends in the Congress, since the San Stefano Treaty was held to belie all its past professions of unselfish purpose. Andrassy claimed that by the Congress he had put Russia "in the prisoner's box " ; and in the Berlin negotiations she was unquestionably regarded as a suspect whose designs called for close scrutiny, while the mutual orientation of the Powers was distinctly to her disadvantage. Great Britain and Austria-Hungary systematically worked together, and 'ranee and Italy, alike distrustful of Russia's ambition to become a Mediterranean Power, were usually to be found in their company, rermany, true to Bismarck's promise, played the part of the "honest broker," and succeeded in it so well that, when the Congress was over, )oth Great Britain and Russia claimed its decisions as a triumph for their respective purposes. Next to the success of his mediatory offices, Bismarck's great concern was that Turkey should not, by her old tricks of procrastination, equivocation, and intrigue, repeat the fiasco of the Constantinople Conference. The Turkish Delegates were soon to learn that they had come to Berlin not to carry on negotiations, but to accept dictation1. The order of procedure was that all questions were introduced 1 "Bismarck sits upon the Turks mercilessly," Lord Salisbury wrote home on June 22nd. i4o FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 publicly and then, in appropriate cases, negotiated, and if possible settled, privately between the countries chiefly concerned. True to his rule of putting first things first, Bismarck asked the assembled Plenipotentiaries to begin their discussions with the Sixth Article of the Treaty of San Stefano, dealing with Bulgaria, since the success or failure of the Congress depended on its coming to an agreement on the future extent and organisation of this particular territory. On this subject, the Treaty of Berlin, which embodied the decisions of the Plenipotentiaries (July 13th), simply gave concrete form to the general principles affirmed in the Anglo-Russian Convention. It pro- vided that Bulgaria should be cut in two, exclusive of Macedonia, which was disregarded in the new arrangements. The northern, and larger, portion was to be an autonomous principality, tributary to Turkey, bounded by the Danube, the Black Sea (with an outlet at Varna), the Balkans, and the frontiers of Servia, its ruler to be " freely elected by the population and confirmed by the Porte with the consent of the Powers." South of the Balkans, the province of Eastern Roumelia was to be formed, with administrative autonomy and a Christian Governor- General, but subject to the political and military authority of the Sultan ; its future government was to be organised by a European Commission (Articles I-XXII). Austria, according to this plan, received a mandate empowering her to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina, subject to Turkish suzerainty (Article XXV) ; and, since it was a part of her bargain with Great Britain that the Russian design of creating a chain of Slavic States stretching across the Balkan peninsula should be frustrated, it was decided that the sandjak of Novi-Bazar should not be divided between Servia and Montenegro, as Russia desired, but be garrisoned by Austria, in accordance with her wish, without prejudice to Turkish sovereignty. In the private negotiations with the Porte which Austria, with British support, had carried on in Constantinople before the opening of the Congress, the cession of the provinces "en toute pro- priete" had been asked for ; but this claim was abandoned. Austria was, however, to take over from Montenegro the Dalmatian port of Spizza. Something had to be done for Servia, Montenegro and Roumania ; and, though Lord Beaconsfield had little sympathy with these re- bellious tributary States, it was one of the ironies of the peace settle- ment that more concern was shown for their welfare by Great Britain and Austria than by Russia herself. Servia was to receive full inde- pendence with an increase of territory, but was refused any access to : THE TREATY OF BERLIN 141 the Adriatic (Articles XXXIV-XLII). Montenegro was, also, to become a sovereign State, and was doubled in size, and furnished with an outlet to the sea at the Bay of Antivari ; but she was to return Dulcigno to Turkey and, as already stated, to cede Spizza (Articles XXV-XXXIII). Roumania could hardly have received harsher treatment, had she fought against Russia instead of on her side. She was, indeed, declared independent ; but she was required to return the Bessarabian territory which had been transferred from Russia to Moldavia in 1856, and was assigned, instead, the sterile tract of the Dobrudja, inhabited by an alien population (Articles XLIII-XLVI). The Greek Delegates present in Berlin were heard on their country's behalf, and put forward a strong claim to consideration, pointing to the passive attitude of Greece during the troubles of the last three years and the mischief which she might have done, if she had entered the War. They asked for a large increase of adjacent territory, together with Crete. The Powers, however, merely urged the Porte to accept a rectification of the frontier in Thessaly and Epirus (13th Protocol and Article XXIV). In Crete, the Porte undertook to apply conscientiously the Organic Statute of 1868, with such amendments as might be called for (Article XXIII). Albania was still treated as the Cinderella of the Balkans. The rovince lost territory to Servia and Montenegro, and its claim to independence, and even its petition for a Christian Governor, fell on deaf ears. In Asiatic Turkey, Russia acquired Ardahan, Kars, and Batoum, the last-named subject to the condition, spontaneously offered by Gortchakoff, that it should be a " free port, essentially commercial" — a condition repudiated eight years later by Russia without the assent of the other Powers. On the other hand, she renounced the acquisi- tions of Erzeroum, Bayazid, and the valley of Alaschgerd (Articles LVIII-LX). A stipulation, short but definite, was devoted to Armenia, for hose welfare Great Britain had tacitly made herself responsible by e Convention of June 4th. This stipulation bound the Porte to troduce " without further loss of time such ameliorations and reforms are called for by the local conditions of the provinces inhabited by e Armenians, and to take measures to protect them against the ircassians and Kurds." The measures adopted were to be announced riodically to the Powers appointed to supervise their execution i42 FORWARD REACTION AND POLICY, 1874-1885 (Article LXI). Of the Christians of Macedonia there was no mention. New provisions for the regulation of the navigation of the Danube were introduced (Articles XLVI-LVII), and the Signatory Powers declared that the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and the London Protocol of 1 87 1 remained in full force, except in so far as any of their provisions were annulled or modified by the new Treaty (Article LXIII). In closing the Congress on July 13th, Bismarck paid a well- deserved tribute to "the spirit of conciliation and mutual goodwill which has animated all the Plenipotentiaries," and added: "The Congress has deserved well of Europe. If it has been impossible to fulfil all the aspirations of public opinion, history will, at all events, do justice to our intentions and to our work." On the whole, the Treaty of Berlin might fairly be claimed as a triumph for Anglo-Austrian policy : it remained for later years to show whether the Treaty could be regarded as a vindication of that policy. It would be wrong to say that it showed no concern for the victims of Turkish misrule. It averted from the Balkan States and provinces the horrors of a further conflict between Russia and Turkey ; it re- moved many abuses and wrongs which had long and vainly cried for remedy; it did justice to the political aspirations of races whose advance on the road to independence had for generations been slow and halting, converting three tributary States into free principalities, creating a new tributary principality, and alleviating the hard yoke of Ottoman rule over peoples for whose complete emancipation the time was not yet ripe, — achievements which directly benefited, in the aggregate, eleven millions of people. Nevertheless, the underlying motive in the case of most of the negotiating Powers was not, in the phraseology of Napoleon III, the "pensee humanitaire" but the "pensee politique"; and the result was only a temporary settlement based on political expediency. Lord Beaconsfield had entered the Congress holding a power-of-attorney for Turkey, Bismarck with a watching brief on behalf of Austria and, in a secondary degree, of Russia; but the wider standpoint of the European nations and of civilisation at large was without special representation, though the force of circumstances prevented it from being altogether overlooked. Lord Beaconsfield said at a later date that, next to serving Turkey, he had aimed at shattering the entente of the three empires ; and he maintained that he had succeeded in the task1. 1 See letter of November 4th, 1880, to Sir H. D. Wolff, quoted in his Rambling Recollections, 11. (1908), 265. VIOLATIONS OF THE TREATY 143 Lord Beaconsfield returned to England claiming that he had brought back from Berlin "Peace with honour," and that the Treaty of Berlin and the Anglo-Turkish Convention had together removed from Europe and the British empire all occasion of distrust and alarm. He had, however, to meet many reproaches from the more unreasoning of his pro-Turkish followers, and their complaint that the Ottoman empire, whose integrity was to have been preserved at all costs, had nevertheless been partitioned. He ridiculed the idea that there had been any partition at all. A country might lose provinces, he replied, but that was not partition. "A Power which calls one of the strongest cities in the world its own, has still at disposal an army and a fleet, and rules over twenty million people, cannot be described as a Power whose territory has been partitioned1." Those who deplored the cessions of Turkish territory in Asia were reminded that Russia, after all, had won the War, and that international usage recognised the right of conquest; and he added — with his eyes directed more to Central than to Near Asia — a much-needed rebuke to the intemperate Chauvinists who saw in the expansion of Great Britain's Eastern rival nothing but greed and menace: "Asia is large enough for both of us. There is no reason for these constant wars, or fears of wars, between Russia and England." Nevertheless, no solemn international covenant has been so systematically and openly infringed and ignored, in part by the Signatory Powers themselves, as the Treaty which was concluded in Berlin in July, 1878, "in the name of Almighty God." Large States and small States have one after another overridden and evaded stipu- lations objectionable to them. Within seven years (1885), Bulgaria violated the Treaty and defied the Powers by absorbing Eastern Roumelia. A year later (July, 1886), Russia repudiated the conditions under which Batoum had been assigned to her — a proceeding in- dulgently tolerated by all the Powers except Great Britain, on whose behalf Lord Rosebery protested vigorously against it as a dangerous violation of the sanctity of treaty engagements which would tend to make future international agreements difficult and to cast doubt on those already concluded. Greece received far less territory than was designed for her by the 13th Protocol of the Congress, and had to wait for forty years for more generous treatment. The Porte made no effort to reform the government of Crete, with the result of repeated insurrections, leading to the transference of the island to the custody of 1 Speech in the House of Lords, July 19th, 1878. 144 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 the Powers in 1898. Further, in total disregard of the reaffirmation of the integrity of the Ottoman empire by Article LXIII of the Treaty, France seized Tunis in 1881; and from 1882 onwards the authority of Great Britain step by step superseded the dominion of Turkey in Egypt and the Soudan provinces. Later (1908) Austria, with the connivance of Germany, arbitrarily converted the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina into formal annexation. Within times still more recent (19 12), the Balkan States took into their own hands the repartition of European Turkey, the Powers refraining from active in- terference ; while Italy possessed herself by force of Tripoli (191 2). In spite of the provisions laid down in their favour at Berlin nothing was done for the good government and security of the Armenians, who continued to be given over to oppression, pillage, and massacre. B. First Overtures for an Anglo-German Alliance , 1879 The issue of the Berlin Congress did much to revive for a time the political influence of Lord Beaconsfield at home, which had shown signs of decline, and, had he dissolved Parliament immediately after his return, while his laurels were still green, he would probably have received a striking reaffirmation of national confidence. Even Gladstone believed that the country was still with his rival. But, though a master of political strategy, Beaconsfield forgot that the British nation likes its emotions to be taken by storm, and made the fatal mistake of giving it time to reflect. When an appeal was made to the constituencies nearly two years later, the reaction was in full flood, and the sand-castles of a flamboyant imperialism were swept away. On the other hand, Andrassy returned to Vienna to find his Balkan policy criticised with extreme bitterness by those who had hitherto been his loyal supporters. Only at the Emperors urgent wish did he remain in office until the aftermath of problems incidental to a great territorial readjustment should have been cleared away. Shortly before his retirement, he concluded with Bismarck the Dual Alliance which formed the basis of the later Triple Alliance. The more the Tsar reflected upon the Berlin settlement, the more he was con- vinced that he had been out-manceuvred, and that Germany had failed in her duty to an old Ally. His resentment found sharp expression when, in the course of the succeeding boundary negotia- tions, he came to the conclusion that Germany was still of set purpose using her influence against Russia and Russian interests. In some AUSTRO-GERMAN ALLIANCE 145 brusque letters, he accused William I of want of loyalty, and, re- minding him of the service which he had rendered to Germany in 1870, bade him mend his ways. Bismarck had said to Gortchakoff during the Berlin Congress: " Do not compel me to choose between Russia and Austria-Hungary.' * Apart from this outbreak of pique, the fact that Andrassy had made a mysterious journey to Petrograd, suggesting the possibility of an Austro-Russian agreement, which it was expedient to circumvent, and the further suspicion that Russia was beginning to reciprocate the advances long attempted by France, convinced Bismarck that the best days of the Triple Entente were over, and that for future security Germany must look to a new combination. A Convention concluded at Vienna on October 7th, 1879, providing for a Defensive Alliance between the German and Austro-Hungarian empires, to meet the contingency of an attack upon either of these Powers by Russia, was his answer to the Tsar's menace. Francis Joseph welcomed the Dual Alliance warmly; but William I accepted it with reluctance, conscious that it foreboded the rupture of an old dynastic tradition, and, contrary to Bismarck's wish, he insisted on informing the Tsar of the existence, though not of the provisions, of the Convention1. While the negotiations with Andrassy were still in progress, Bis- marck endeavoured to bring Great Britain into the same partnership. Four years before, in the year of the war-scare which marked the alienation of Gortchakoff and brought Russia and France nearer together, he had sent his confidant Lothar Bucher to London, to explore the possibility of forming a more intimate friendship in that quarter. The result appears to have been negative; but, from that Ime, Bismarck dropped hints to the British Ambassador in Berlin n the same subject, and during the Congress he sounded both .ord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury, receiving encouragement from le former. During his intercourse with Beaconsfield he had come ) regard Great Britain in a new light. Her Prime-Minister's bold roclamation of an imperialistic policy, as evidenced by the Suez Canal shares purchase and the firm stand which he had made against Russia both in Europe and Central Asia, suggested to him that Great Britain was destined to play again her old part in foreign affairs and that the days of non-intervention were ended. An alliance of the two military empires with the strongest of naval Powers would be a perfect realisa- tion of his ideal of a "coalition a trois." 1 Bismarck's Gedanken und Erinnerungen, n. p. 248. w.&g.iii 10 i46 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 On September 26th, 1879, Count Munster visited the Prime- Minister at Hughenden, bringing with him a proposal of an alliance. He asked that the communication might be regarded, for the time, as a personal one, and said that the manner of its reception would determine whether it would be repeated in official form, adding that Bismarck had not as yet mentioned the subject to the Emperor. Beaconsfield was reminded that, three years earlier, Bismarck had already made suggestions of the kind through the British Am- bassador in Berlin ; and it was now hinted to him that if an alliance had been concluded earlier, the Eastern complications and the Russo- Turkish War might not have occurred. In its absence, Germany had been compelled to fall back upon Russia ; but that makeshift had now failed. Of the immediate future Bismarck drew a lurid forecast. " Russia is preparing to attack Austria; the peace of the world will be threatened ; it is in the nature of things that it will not be a localised war ; it will be a great and general war. Peace is necessary to Germany ; no country more desires or requires peace. To secure it, he proposes an alliance between Germany, Austria and Great Britain1." It was suggested that, while under the arrangement proposed Germany would enjoy security against any war of aggression aimed against her, Great Britain would receive support for her policy and interests in the Levant and the East generally2. Beaconsfield assured the Envoy that he personally welcomed these overtures, and obtained permission to confer with the Queen and also with the Foreign Secretary, then abroad. In communicating with both he favoured a sympathetic attitude. To Salisbury he said that the German alliance would be likely to be popular ; for the country would regard it as a natural sequence to the Government's past attitude of suspicion towards Russia as a Power from which menace to the Empire was one day to be feared. The Queen was not indisposed to respond to Bismarck's advances, provided there were no alienation of France ; but Salisbury was sceptical and suspected that Bismarck wished to use Great Britain as a merely temporary convenience. On Beacons- field's suggestion, it was arranged that the Foreign Secretary should 1 Life of Beaconsfield, VI. 488, and Life of Salisbury, 11. 364-5 2 The editors of Die Grosse Politik der europdischen Kabinette, 1 871-19 14, take the view that the object of Bismarck's overtures was only to ascertain what the attitude of Great Britain would be in the event of Germany declining to give un- reserved support to Russia's Eastern policy and losing her friendship in consequence, and it is true that Count Munster 's Instructions went no further than this. The Ambassador also reports that the suggestion of an alliance came from Lord Beacons- field. Die Grosse Politik, etc. iv. 3-14. ALLIANCE OVERTURES TO GREAT BRITAIN 147 discuss the question privately with the German Ambassador ; and this was done at Hatfield on October 15th, a week after the signing of the Austro-German Treaty. As a result of a frank exchange of views, Salisbury now formed the conclusion that the urgency of the German overtures had diminished since Count Mlinster had first begun them. Thereupon, he gave an assurance that in the event of a Russian attack on Germany and Austria British goodwill and assistance might be relied on, while, as for France, he said that Bismarck might feel sure that Great Britain would not allow an attack on Germany through Belgium, and he was also confident that she would even be able to re- strain any French Government from joining Russia against Germany1. No more definite approach to an alliance appears to have been made on either side, and it is possible that Bismarck, discouraged by the absence of a more cordial response in the first instance, had already cooled down on the subject and looked for no practical result. Twelve days after the Hatfield conversation, Count Karolyi, the Austro- Hungarian Ambassador, informed Salisbury confidentially of the conclusion of the Dual Alliance, but made no allusion to the question of Great Britain's adhesion to it. It is quite evident that Beaconsfield experienced a sense of keen relief at not having been pressed to return a positive answer to Bismarck's offer. For, as he wrote to the Queen (November 5th), 4 'it would have been a difficult and even dangerous affair to have altogether rejected the contemplated alliance." In the circumstances, his satisfaction at the time that Great Britain was still "as free as air, and this, too, without showing any want of sympathy with the Austro-German views," was legitimate2. The Queen's comment on the episode, suggestive of a return of her former statesmanlike grip of realities, was, "We are well out of it." The words aptly describe the feeling which muse have come over Bismarck himself, when in the general election of the following April the British nation pronounced emphatic condemnation upon all "spirited" Foreign Policy and sent the Beaconsfield Administration into retirement. The Triple Alliance was completed, two years later, by the adhesion of Italy (May, 1882). 1 Life of Salisbury, n. 367-9. 2 Nevertheless, according to a German diplomatist, who took part in more than one later attempt to draw his country and Great Britain closer together, Lord Beaconsfield, shortly before the fall of his Ministry, sketched the outlines of an Anglo-German alliance for Bismarck's examination. See Hermann Freiherr von Eckardstein, Diplomatische Enthiillungen zum Ursprung des Weltkrieges, p. 13. Cf. infra , pp. 276 ft. 148 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 C. The Execution of the Treaty of Berlin, 1 878-1 880 As was to be expected, Turkey was in no hurry to execute the Treaty, and, at the beginning of September, two months after its signature, Bismarck, pressed by France, whom he was desirous of conciliating, suggested the issue of an Identic Note to the Porte on the subject. The British Government, while declaring their intention to see the Treaty enforced, thought such action premature, and failed to make allowance for the Sultan's difficult position. This was, also, the view of other Powers, and Bismarck himself accepted it. When nine months had passed and the Porte had still taken no steps to draw up the Constitutions required by Article XXIII for Crete and other portions of European Turkey, Salisbury (on August 7th) made immediate and strong representations at Constantinople, recognising (as he wrote to our Ambassador there) that "the Sultan's inclination to come to an agreement and our power of insisting will diminish with each succeeding month"; but they had little effect. The beneficiary States which were able to rely on their own strength speedily made good their treaty rights. Under the Anglo- Turkish Convention, Great Britain occupied Cyprus in July, 1878, and placed the island under a High Commissioner, the Turkish tribute being fixed at £92,800. Nearly three years later (February, 1881), during negotiations with Turkey as to the Greek frontier, Mr (after- wards Viscount) Goschen, then British Envoy Extraordinary at Con- stantinople, proposed that the island should be given back to the Porte as a makeweight ; but the idea did not spread beyond the inner circle of the Cabinet, where it found no favour. Austrian troops promptly entered the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (July 29th), heralded by a proclamation stating that they did so " for the better preservation of order and tranquillity." Moham- madan risings at once followed, and a large army had to be employed in their suppression. The military occupation of the sandjak of Novi- Bazar was effected in September of the following year. Turkey retained all other jurisdiction, administrative, judicial and financial; and, on the whole, this experiment in dual control, on a small scale, worked smoothly and efficiently, the only disturbing influence being the Greater Servian agitation encouraged from the outside. The spring of 1879 nao^ arrived before practical progress was made in fixing the frontier between Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, and the Russian Government was anxious that the task should be com- I THE BULGARIAN UNION MOVEMENT 149 pleted before the time came for the withdrawal of the Tsar's troops. Major-General Hamley was the British Commissioner, and his In- structions were to secure for Turkey such a frontier as she would be able to defend, fortify, and garrison. Before the frontier was settled, there were frequent bickerings between the Commissioners on both sides; and in January, 1879, Gortchakoff, in an arrogant despatch, charged the British Government with deliberately impeding progress. Salisbury had no difficulty in proving that the delay in question was due to the action of the Russian agents, who had assured the inhabitants of Eastern Roumelia that the arrangements made by the Treaty of Berlin were merely temporary, and that the province would after all be joined to Bulgaria. A friendly understanding, taking the form of reciprocal pledges to enforce the Treaty provisions without fear or favour, facilitated the remainder of the frontier negotiations; and, early in June, the British Commissioner was able to report to Lord Salisbury that the result of his efforts had been "as advantageous to the defence of Turkey as could be desired." For a time, Russian influence was supreme in the principality. The first ruler, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, a dashing young Prussian officer who had fought in the late War, was a nephew of Tsar Alexander II. Russian Ministers were imposed on him, and Russian officers were freely seconded to his army. Before long, however, the Bulgarians began to question the advantage of being emancipated from one Power in order to be yoked to another; and, in 1883, the Prince rid himself of his foreign advisers, though Russian intrigue continued active in the country. Although for a time defeated, the cause of Bulgarian Union was kept alive by agitation both in the principality and in the severed province. The movement was, also, encouraged by much petty tyranny and chicanerie on the part of the Suzerain Power and its agents, and by resentment at the Porte's jealous and short-sighted policy in keeping Bulgarians out of the Roumelian administrative service. When the Liberal party came to power in Great Britain in the spring of 1880, the cause of Union received new stimulus, and on May 31st Sir William White, our Diplomatic Agent at Bucharest, warned Lord Granville that active measures might be expected at any time. The plan matured only five years later. On September 18th, 1885, the Turkish Governor-General of Eastern Roumelia was deposed by a band of military officers and despatched to Constantinople, and the Union of the province with Bulgaria under Prince Alexander was 150 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 proclaimed. With great lack of discretion, the Prince accepted the proffered extension of his rule without consulting Turkey, his Suzerain, Russia, his Protector, or the Signatory Powers collectively. The Sultan protested and made defensive preparations, but did nothing further. What was more surprising was the attitude of the two Powers which had so bitterly wrangled over the question of a Greater Bulgaria in 1878. While Lord Salisbury (now Foreign Secretary in his own first Government), so soon as he had ascertained that the Powers were not conjointly disposed to reestablish the Treaty status by force, decided to support the Union, Russia refused to assent to an arrangement which she had vainly endeavoured to carry out seven years before. Though so far bloodless, the coup d'etat occasioned violent re- percussions throughout the Balkan peninsula. Greece and Servia at once demanded territorial compensation at the expense of Turkey, and the Cretans again proclaimed Union with the Hellenic kingdom. King Milan of Servia (who had assumed the royal status in March, 1882) rashly declared war against his neighbour; but within a week (November i4th-20th) his kingdom lay prostrate at Bulgaria's feet. Only Austria's intervention prevented the Bulgarians from making a triumphant entry into Belgrade. The Treaty of Bucharest (March 3rd, 1886) restored the status quo. A little later, the Personal Union of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia was recognised by the Powers, the Sultan appointing Prince Alexander Governor- General of the de- tached province. Greece was prevented from attacking Turkey by the stern action of the Powers, France alone standing aloof. It was by the firm attitude adopted first by Lord Salisbury and later, on his relinquishment in 1886 of the Foreign Office, by the Earl of Rosebery, that the restless little State was held in check. When the Government of M. Delyanni refused to comply with the demand for disarmament, a blockade of the Greek coasts was instituted by five of the Powers, France abstaining. Delyanni 's resignation eased the situation, and by the capitulation of Tricoupis, his successor, the blockade was raised and peace was preserved (June 6th, 1886). No sooner had Prince Alexander of Bulgaria's new status been confirmed by the Powers than he laid down, not unwillingly, a some- what thorny Crown (September 7th, 1886). His successor was Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, who was elected by the Grand Sobranje on July 7th, 1887, though without receiving recognition by the Powers until February, 1896. While the early readjustments under the Treaty of Berlin were THE CLAIMS OF GREECE 151 in progress, a Liberal Government came into power in England (April, 1880), animated by a stronger desire to see the provisions of the Treaty put into force. Lord Granville returned to his old post at the Foreign Office. He was not a man of rapid decisions ; but he was conscious of the responsibility of his party and the country to the populations which had been freed from Turkish rule, and determined that the Porte should honour its many pledges. Its inertia was, however, still blocking the way, wherever the apathy or indecision of the Powers allowed it, and the suspicion was widespread that the British Government and their Representative in Constantinople were no longer favourable to the exercise of pressure. Sir A. H. Layard's past attitude was inconsistent with zealous acceptance of the ideas represented by the new Ministry. Once before, in a critical time, Great Britain had spoken to Turkey with two voices, and the result had been disastrous. He was, therefore, given leave of absence until another Embassy could be found for him, and Goschen was sent to Constantinople as Special Ambassador and Plenipotentiary, with a view to the adjustment of the Greek and Montenegrin frontier questions and the securing of better conditions for Armenia. The Greeks had wished to begin the retracing of their northern frontier almost before the signatures to the Treaty were dry, and had to be reminded that, as the arrangement proposed was dependent on moral suasion, the first step must be to come to an amicable under- standing with the Porte. A long time was spent in futile negotiations, Turkey objecting that, while she had originally been asked to give Greece an inch, she was now called upon for an ell: the promise of a frontier rectification had become a demand for a province. Here- upon, France, who had played a very insignificant part in the Berlin Congress and the events which led up to it, seldom exposing herself to odium from any side and never to the remotest possibility of langer, posed for a time as the champion of the rights of the Hellenic ice. But no sooner had it become plain that zealous support of the rreek claims would bring her into antagonism with Turkey, than le fell back into her old passive attitude. At that time, France was >reparing to seize Tunis, and this fact, known only to herself, indis- >osed her to ruffle the Porte unnecessarily. In March, 1880, since lo progress had been made, Salisbury proposed the appointment of international commission for investigating the question on the >ot and making definite recommendations to the Powers. A change 152 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 of Government having occurred immediately afterwards, Granville suggested, instead, a conference in Berlin ; and to this the Porte agreed. When the recommendations of the Conference were communi- cated to the disputant States (July 15th), Turkey declined to accept them, and the deadlock continued. Invited by Granville to advise on further action, Bismarck suggested that the Plenipotentiaries should negotiate with the Porte in Constantinople as to a fresh frontier in Thessaly, but substituting Crete for the portions of Epirus con- ditionally awarded by the Treaty of Berlin, so as to avoid trouble with the Albanian Mussulmans there. The Plenipotentiaries met on February 20th, 1881, Goschen taking a leading part as British Representative. In a Collective Note addressed to the Greek Govern- ment on April 7th, the Powers assigned to Greece Thessaly and the district of Artis in Epirus, but made no mention of Crete. This arrangement gave Greece something less than the Berlin decision, and, as it left out of account a considerable Hellenic population in Epirus, it created no enthusiasm ; but the Greek Government agreed to accept it, as did the Porte, and, with the signing of the Turco- Greek Con- vention of May 24th, a stormy dispute was for a time disposed of. To the new Liberal Government fell likewise the initiative in the settlement of the Montenegrin frontier difficulty. In conformity with Article XXXII of the Treaty, Montenegro duly withdrew her troops from Dulcigno, and she was able to take peaceable possession of the territory assigned to her on the Herzegovina frontier; but not so in the case of that granted to her in compensation at the expense of Albania. A stalwart but lawless people, who feared civilisation far more than oppression, since against the latter they had always been able to defend themselves, the Albanians objected to the seizure of any of their lands, murdering the Sultan's first Envoy and refusing to obey the second ; and fighting between them and the Montenegrins followed. The Powers suggested the cession of a different district, and the Porte agreed ; but no sooner had the Turkish troops been with- drawn from it than the Albanians took possession, and there was reason to believe that they did so as part of a pre-arranged plot. Hereupon, the Ambassadors' Conference held in Berlin in June, 1880, recom- mended that Montenegro should receive back Dulcigno with the sea- board as far as the Bojana. However, Turkey objected, and encouraged the Albanians to revolt; and, in consequence, the British Government in September proposed the somewhat stale, but usually effectual, device of a naval demonstration, in support of a Montenegrin advance FATE OF CHRISTIAN POPULATIONS 153 to the port by land. This time, the threat failed to move the Sultan, and it was only when the alternative occupation of the prosperous port of Smyrna, with the sequestration of its customs revenue, was proposed, and the case became one of losing both daughter and ducats, that he yielded. It was not difficult to eject the Albanian garrison from Dulcigno, when its presence was no longer desired ; and Montenegro entered into possession peaceably on November 27th, the Allied fleets withdrawing several days later. Little was done under the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin which called for the introduction of administrative reforms. In October, 1878, indeed, Crete received a Constitution, known as the Pact of Halepa ; but, after an insurrectionary outbreak in the following year, the Sultan repealed it, and placed the island under a Mussulman Governor- General ; so that for another decade Turkish rule continued as before. The Armenians fared even worse. Article LXI of the Treaty required the prompt introduction by the Porte of reforms in the provinces inhabited by them. Sir A. H. Layard did his best to persuade the Porte to fulfil its obligation, but without success; and, on June nth, 1880, the Powers served on it an Identic Note calling attention to the deplorable condition of the provinces and demanding the execution of the Treaty provisions. An evasive reply was returned to this letter on July 5th, and, as nothing was done, a Collective Note was addressed to the procrastinating Government on September 7th, repeating the demand for action in more peremptory terms — but still without result. The zeal of the Powers in the cause of oppressed nation- alities had now begun to cool down ; and the later history of these unhappy outcasts of Christendom was darkened by periodical out- rages and massacres in which Turk and Kurd surpassed their worst records of savagery. The fate of the Macedonians, who were thrust back under Turkish le owing to the defeat of Russia's plan of a Greater Bulgaria, was in its y equally deplorable. Though not expressly mentioned in the Treaty, Macedonia was intended to benefit by the general stipulation on the subject of administrative reforms contained in Article XXIII. The pur- pose of this Article was not fulfilled, and the province became the cock- pit of Balkan strife. All the adjacent States — Servia, Bulgaria, Greece — were intent upon expansion, and, inasmuch as Macedonia was the natural outlet for their ambitions , its frontiers were periodically raided by its neighbours. Turkey seemed to humour each of the rivals in turn, yet succeeded in retaining undivided possession of the contested territory. 154 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 V. The Reorganisation of Egypt: the Dual Control, 1 875-1 880 Since the Great Powers confirmed Mehemet Ali in the hereditary Governor- Generalship — the title Khedive was not regularised till 1866 — Egypt had enjoyed an increasing measure of independence, though the Sultan's suzerainty remained unimpaired and was jealously re- asserted in successive firmans. British influence vied with French in the Viceroy's counsels, yet, faithful to the tradition which Palmerston had done so much to strengthen, without any attempt at aggression or needless interference. Not wishing to enter Egypt herself, and de- termined to bar entrance to any other Power, it was Great Britain's policy to maintain the Sultan's rights and to strengthen his Viceroy's position. Recognition of the fact that the nearest highroad to India lay through Egypt became, with the construction of the Suez Canal, the primary consideration of British statesmen; yet, neither before nor after the accomplishment of that undertaking, did concern for British interests exclude genuine solicitude for the country's pros- perity and better government. If, at any time, the voice of Great Britain can be said to have been clearly predominant at Cairo, it was in the middle of the century, under Said Pasha. That farsighted ruler died in January, 1863, giving place to Ismail, whose career of reckless extravagance proved his own and his country's undoing. Said Pasha had left a public debt heavy in proportion to the national resources ; for, while borrowing freely he had made insufficient provision for meeting the exorbitant charges of his foreign creditors. Whatever folly was to be laid to his account in this respect was, however, surpassed by the wastrel Ismail, whose master-passions were self-indulgence and prodigality. Inheriting a debt of three and a quarter million sterling, he succeeded in increasing it step by step, until it amounted to fifteen pounds a head in a popula- tion composed in the main of small and impecunious peasants and oppressed labourers. Ismail was a man of considerable parts, with bold ideas and not unwholesome ambitions. From the first, he showed great eagerness to enlarge his rights and jurisdictions as tributary ruler, and, by means of his success in ingratiating himself with the Sultan, he usually obtained what he wanted. From each visit to Constantinople he returned with a new firman making some addition to his preroga- tives, though inevitably also to the tribute payable to the Suzerain. EGYPTIAN FINANCE 155 These larger powers, which a careful ruler might have exercised with great public advantage, were not an unmixed good for the country; for the more independent Ismail became, the more he indulged in rash expenditure and the deeper he sank in debt. Much of his ex- penditure was, of course, incurred on account of public works of greater or less value; but, whether the money was intended to meet public or private objects, it was invariably spent wastefully. There was neither limit nor intelligence in his borrowing. He took money wherever it was to be had, and, with oriental largeness of spirit, never haggled about the rate of interest, with the result that harpies robbed him right and left. French financial groups in par- ticular were ever ready to supply the spendthrift with funds. In 1868 the Societe Generate pour le developpement du Commerce et de V Industrie lent him nearly twelve millions sterling. Two years later, the Banque Franco-figyptienne advanced seven millions on the security of the family estates of the Khedive — the so-called Daira loan. In that year, even the Sultan, though never notable as a purist in money matters, deemed it expedient to protest to the Powers against the conclusion of any financial arrangements at variance with the condi- tions laid down in his firmans or prejudicial to the country's revenues. When Ismail's credit was gone, he resorted to other means of raising money. Treasury bons were issued at various times, on which 10, 12, even 15 per cent, interest was paid. In 1871, the Monkabalah Law was passed, under which persons subject to assessment for property tax could, by making six annual payments in advance, obtain relief in perpetuity from one-half of this tax. This discreditable device brought the Khedive five million pounds; but it was a bad bargain for his Treasury. When, by firmans of 1872, he obtained the power to contract loans on his own account, the last check upon his rake's progress disappeared. Thus it came about that, by 1876, Ismail had icreased the public debt to over ninety million pounds, of which lount only a small fraction represented works of permanent public itility1. Every year of his reign, he had added to the debt a pound a lead for every inhabitant of his impoverished country, the taxation which had, in the meantime, increased by one-half. It was directly owing to Ismail's monetary embarrassments that 1 Lord Milner estimates the proportion at one-tenth at the most. See England Egypt, p. 229. 156 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 Great Britain at this time acquired in Egypt a commercial interest carrying important political implications. Among the Khedive's few valuable assets* were his shares in the Suez Canal Company. In the middle of November, 1875, ** was reported to Lord Derby, the Foreign Secretary, that Ismail had to raise by the end of the month a sum of between three and four million pounds, so as to meet the interest due on the public debt, and that, in his straits, he was negotiating with a French financial group for the sale of these shares. Negotiations had, in fact, been opened with two such groups, not as yet for the sale of the shares outright, but for their mortgage, and, several days earlier, the Khedive had made a conditional offer to one of them, which retained the option until the 19th. That the transaction had not already been completed was due in part to the action of the rival group, at the head of which was F. de Lesseps, who was urging his Government to acquire the shares and so bring the Canal en- tirely into French hands, but also to the Khedive's hesitancy before taking a decision of which he was only now coming to understand the political significance. De Freycinet has recorded that Ismail actually offered the shares to the French Government through the Societe Genirale at the price of 100 million francs, but that, though the Due Decazes, then Foreign Minister, favoured purchase, the Cabinet wavered and disagreed1. Equal indecision was shown by Lord Derby and the Foreign Office — by the latter not for the first or the last time in matters of the kind2. For, five years earlier (December, 1870) the same proposal had been made to Lord Granville when Foreign Secretary, on the initiative of the Khedive, who advised Great Britain, as contributing nearly four-fifths of the Canal traffic, to acquire the entire enterprise, in the interest both of British commerce and of the waterway it- self, which was then in an unsatisfactory position. At that time, de Lesseps himself was understood to be willing to sell out. The Foreign Office, however, decided to "give no opinion on the matter," and a fair chance of acquiring at a bargain price control of a great but undeveloped undertaking was allowed to pass by. For in that year the gross receipts of the Canal only amounted to a quarter of a million pounds, and the number of ships which paid dues was under 500. 1 C. de Freycinet, La Question d'figypte, p. 151. 2 It will be remembered how, nearly thirty years later, the Foreign Office similarly refused the opportunity of joining in the Bagdad Railway scheme on a copartnership basis, with the result that the scheme passed into hands which ultimately grew unfriendly, and the enterprise consequently became an international danger. THE CANAL SHARES PURCHASE 157 The same unbusinesslike attitude was, hereupon, once more shown. The idea of purchasing the shares appears for a time to have actually shocked the Foreign Secretary and his advisers. Lord Derby heartily disliked it, and hoped that it would not be necessary : all he cared for was that the Khedive should by some means be prevented from withdrawing from the Company, where his influence was a useful check upon the arbitrary ways of de Lesseps1. While, however, Lord Derby remained obstructive, the Prime-Minister, with a keener appreciation both of the commercial and the political possibilities of the transaction, was eager for purchase, and he soon took the matter into his own hands. Nevertheless, he had to overcome strong opposi- tion in the Cabinet before he gained his way (November 17th) and obtained carte blanche to see the business through. Already, the Khedive had promised to give the British Government an option, should he decide to sell; and, on the 23rd, to the chagrin of the French groups, the shares were purchased by the Cabinet for four million pounds, Disraeli obtaining the money from the Rothschild firm. Two days later, the contract was signed, and on the following day the shares were deposited in the British Consulate at Cairo2. Before the year was out, the Khedive wished to sell to so good a customer his contingent interest in the profits of the Canal ; but the offer was declined. Credit for the Suez Canal shares transaction has been variously claimed and assigned. There can be little doubt that Lord Derby received information that the shares were on the market from Frederick Greenwood, a public-spirited London journalist, though his service in the matter was officially ignored. For the actual purchase, the praise was wholly. due to the Prime-Minister. His biographer suggests that Disraeli, owing to his relations with the Rothschilds, had probably heard independently that the shares might be in the market, and even that he had for some time been watching for an opportunity to buy3. There was later some criticism of his action in allowing these private bankers to make a substantial profit out of 1 " I sincerely hope we may not be driven to the expedient. The acquisition would be a bad one financially, and the affair might involve us in disagreeable correspondence both with France and the Porte." Letter to Lord Lyons, November 19th, 1875 (Lord Newton, Lord Lyons; a Record of British Diplomacy, II. 87). 8 The number of shares mentioned in the contract of purchase was 177,642; but later the actual number in the Khedive's possession was ascertained to be 1040 less, and the purchase money was reduced proportionately, viz. from £4,000,000 to £3>97°>58o, equal to about £22. 10s. per share of a nominal value of £16. 3 See Life of Beacons field, v. 439, 440. 158 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 the transaction, instead of arranging that the Bank of England should provide the money until the House of Commons had passed the necessary vote; and the 2| per cent., yielding the sum of £100,000, which the bankers charged for a very short accommodation, "a good deal startled" the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury1. What was, however, altogether creditable — and to a later generation, less squeamish in such matters of public duty, incredible — was the fact that no one in the secret used his knowledge for personal gain. At that time, commerce, finance and statecraft had hardly begun to think in millions with the facility which came later, and the trans- action created everywhere a considerable sensation. At home, the purchase was unquestionably popular, and in the House of Commons Gladstone vainly endeavoured to whip up serious opposition to it. Abroad, except in France, where there was much resentment, the bold coup was similarly applauded. The King of the Belgians (Leo- pold II) professed to regard it as "the greatest event of modern politics." Queen Victoria rejoiced because "it was a blow at Bis- marck"; but a blow which France shared with him fell lightly on that statesman, who warmly congratulated the British Government on having done " the right thing at the right moment," and professed to regard the purchase as a new guarantee of European Peace. Just before, Bismarck had told the British Ambassador in Berlin that England might have Egypt itself if she liked; Germany would not object2. An immediate consequence of the transaction was the appointment of three British Directors to the Canal Company's Board; subse- quently, one-third of its membership was assigned to this country. Political effects followed. Before long, Great Britain clearly took the lead in Egypt, and in 1882 French influence experienced its Quebec at Alexandria. The earliest indication that the British Government now regarded Egyptian questions from a new angle of vision was shown by the despatch to Cairo of Stephen Cave, an expert of authority, for the purpose of investigating the character and proportions of the financial incubus which lay on the country. A vague intimation that some large plan was forming in Disraeli's mind, and also of the manner in which he hoped to carry it out, is contained in a letter written to Lord Derby apropos of the Cave Mission. "We want a 1 Sir Stafford Northcote to Disraeli, December 24th, 1875. Life of Beacons field, v. 441. 2 Lord Odo Russell to Lord Derby, November nth, 1875. ISMAIL SUSPENDS PAYMENTS 159 calm, conciliatory spirit to deal with Egypt," he wrote, V not to oppose their first impressions and suggestions, but to correct and change them in due time" (November 26th, 1875). Cave visited Egypt towards the end of the year, and reported in the following March. He found that, what with the heavy indebtedness and the Monkabalah Law, the state of the national finances was critical, yet that, given certain reforms and alleviations of interest, the position was not hope- less. The principal remedies proposed by him were the unification of the debt, the limitation of the budget to a maximum figure, the assignment of one-half of the revenue to the service of the debt, and the institution of an office of financial control. In view of the Cave Mission, the Due Decazes, not quite certain of his ground, and anxious lest his country's influence should be diminished, urged on Lord Derby the importance of a close under- standing between the French and British Governments, and suggested as an earnest of cooperation the creation of a joint commission for the control of Egyptian finance, to be exercised by the two countries, with or without Italy. In reply, the Foreign Secretary, who dreaded the thought of intervention anywhere — so much so that Lord Salis- bury said that he would have shrunk from annexing the Isle of Man — offered a general opposition to any measure that would entail "inter- ference with the independence of Egypt," and added that the British Government " could not view with indifference any attempt to gain administrative control over Egypt by another Power." Then, in April, the Khedive raised a signal of financial distress. His own and his country's credit being pledged up to the hilt, so that borrowing was now no longer possible, Ismail decided to resort to the last device of the insolvent gambler, and suspended payment of his debts, as his Suzerain, the Sultan, had done six months before. On April 8th a Decree was published prolonging for three months the Treasury Bills falling due in that month and May. Deeply con- cerned for the interests of the bondholders, and apprehensive lest a policy of more definite repudiation should follow, France pressed Great Britain more urgently than before to join her in asserting com- plete control over Egyptian finance. Yielding to the same pressure, the Khedive, by a Decree of May 2nd (probably drawn up in Paris), instituted the Caisse de la Dette publique. Four of the Great Powers were invited to nominate Commissioners, viz. Great Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, and Italy; and the last three exercised the option in favour of M. de Blignieres, Baron von Kremer, and M. Baravelli, 160 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 respectively. The British Foreign Office delayed action until the following year, when Sir Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer) was appointed. The Caisse proved merely a half-way house to the more direct and rigorous form of control upon which the French Government had set its mind, and, following on an Anglo-French Financial Mission consisting of Mr Goschen and M. Joubert, a Commission of Control was instituted by Khedivial Decree of November 18th. Of this Com- mission de Lesseps was President; Sir C. Rivers Wilson, a British Treasury Official, was Vice-president and Controller of State revenues, while de Blignieres was Controller of Treasury accounts and disburse- ments. The other members were Sir Evelyn Baring, Baron vonKremer, M. Baravelii, and Riaz Pasha. When, at the end of 1877, the country seemed on the threshold of bankruptcy and the spectre of repudiation again alarmed the bondholders, the British and French Governments carried their demand for a full and searching enquiry into the entire financial situation by Commission, and free from restriction or reserve of any kind. The Commission was duly appointed (March, 1878) and its result was a bold scheme of financial and political reforms. The financial measures recommended for the Khedive's spontaneous and prompt acceptance included the restitution to the State of the Daira lands, which had been bought with public money, the employment of their revenues in the liquidation of the outstanding debt, and the suspension of the Dual Control. Equally important were the political reforms ; for the Commission proposed to introduce the principle of Ministerial responsibility, and to give to Egypt a Constitutional status and, in a modified form, representative government. Less from conviction than under compulsion, the Khedive accepted the recommendations with- out demur. The enlightened influence of Nubar Pasha weighed heavily on the side of reform. While hostile to the principle of international interference in administration, even to the extent of the Anglo-French Financial Control, and eager that Egypt should govern herself alone, Nubar recognised the need for temporary outside assistance, and, as a measure of necessity, he particularly favoured the appointment of an Englishman as Minister of Finance. His unreserved approval of the Commission's recommendations did much to convince the Khedive of the uselessness of any further dallying with half-measures. By Decree of August 29th, the now Constitutional ruler charged Nubar with the formation of a Cabinet, which he described as " le A CONSTITUTIONAL REGIME 161 point de depart d'un changement radical de systime" In this Cabinet, the portfolio of Finance was offered to Sir Rivers Wilson and that of Public Works to de Blignieres: all the other Ministers were natives. The immediate business of the new Administration was to carry out the reform scheme. It was the wish of Lord Salisbury, who had succeeded Lord Derby as Foreign Secretary in March, that the functions of the Control established in November, 1876, should be sus- pended so long as England and France were represented in the Cabinet, but should be revived in case either of them should be dismissed with- out prior agreement with his Government; and to this France agreed. In the political reforms, a piece of machinery excellent in design and material had been created; but how would it work? Lord Salisbury was concerned not to lessen native responsibility, for which he regarded European cooperation as no adequate substitute. Hence, he reminded the Khedive that, though he had surrendered his personal power and a Constitutional regime had been introduced, his responsi- bility continued as before, and warned him that the new system would be made or marred by his personal bearing towards it. Instead of taking this admonition to heart, Ismail began a course of intrigue against his own Ministers, even using for his purposes the disaffected elements in the Army. After five months, he took the first step towards throwing off the irksome Constitutional fetters by dismissing Nubar (February 2nd, 1879). Had he dared, he would have rid himself of all his European advisers at the same time and returned at once to the comfortable old despotism. Faced by the threatened collapse of their laborious handiwork, the Powers through their mandataries, the British and French Govern- ments, served on the Khedive an ultimatum in which, without de- manding the reinstatement of Nubar, they insisted on the conditions necessary to ensure the execution of the financial reforms. To this end, the two European Ministers were to have an absolute veto upon expenditure of all kinds. France was still concerned, as ever, for the bondholders. Lord Salisbury heartily disliked this responsibility, and, while not indifferent to the interests of creditors, insisted on regarding the financial question as a whole1. A compromise was agreed to, as a result of which the Khedive's eldest son, Prince Tewfik, was to be the President of a new Ministry, the two Europeans 1 " It may be quite tolerable and even agreeable to the French Government," he wrote to Lord Lyons (April ioth, 1879), "to go into partnership with the bond- holders, or rather to act as sheriff's officers for them. But to us it is a new and very embarrassing sensation. Egypt can never prosper so long as some 25 per cent. W.&G.III 11 1 62 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 continuing in office. Nevertheless, in April, in another hot fit of revolt, Ismail dismissed the Council, including Wilson and de Blignieres, and made Cherif Pasha Prime-Minister. The first act of the incoming reactionary Ministers was to reject the European financial scheme and to produce one of their own. In this situation, the two Governments gave the Khedive to under- stand that they intended to adopt just such measures as they might deem necessary in order to protect their interests and promote the welfare of the people of Egypt. Already, Waddington, the French Foreign Minister, was urging upon his British colleague the summary removal of a wily and obstinate Viceroy, who would neither reform his country's administration himself nor allow others to do it for him. To so strong a measure Lord Salisbury for a time demurred; but, in the end, he came round to the French view. In all the Chanceries of Europe agreement prevailed that Ismail had wilfully thrown away a fair chance of vindicating his position, and that no further indulgence of his whims and perversity was admissible. Accordingly, after futile attempts had been made by the British and French Representatives in Cairo to procure his abdication, the Sultan was induced, by strong though covert pressure, to decree his deposition. This he did by telegraph on June 26th, appointing Tewfik, a better man though a weaker, his successor by right of primogeniture1. Great Britain and France, thereupon, reestablished the offices of Controllers- General without protest. of her revenue goes in paying interest on her debt. We have no wish to part company with France, still less do we mean that France should acquire in Egypt any special ascendancy; but, subject to these two considerations, I should be glad to be free of the companionship of the bondholders" (Lord Newton, Lord Lyons, n. 175). " In France finance, and even private finance, is politics," Lord Beaconsfield wrote to Lord Salisbury on June 6th, 1879 {Life of Beaconsfield, VI. 444) ; but he, likewise, did not want, and he believed the country would not approve, " a mere bondholders' policy" (June 24th, 1879, ibid. p. 445). 1 Lord Salisbury's assurance to Waddington on June 26th, that "the Turkish move reported to-day does not proceed in any way from our suggestion," and that all the Government had done was to urge the Sultan not to interfere with what was being done in Cairo, is hardly an adequate statement of what actually occurred. On June 22nd, the Foreign Office instructed Sir Henry Layard to "inform the Sultan that there are grounds for thinking that some communication from the Porte is encouraging the Khedive to resist the advice which has been tendered to him by the Western Powers ; that the misdeeds of the Khedive have been the fatal impediment to the advance of any money by European capitalists to the Porte, and that the Sultan is more interested than anyone else in a speedy and peaceful transfer of the Government of Egypt into other hands." The Sultan had, in fact, telegraphed to the Khedive that the question of his abdication was a matter for the Porte, and that the Powers had no right to make a proposal to him of a menacing character. On the 23rd, the Sultan was to be told that France and Great Britain had gone too DEPOSITION OF ISMAIL 163 That the deposition of Ismail was a desirable, and in the circum- stances unavoidable, act can hardly be doubted. Nevertheless, it con- tributed to bring about untoward consequences. The setting-up of a new ruler by external influence unquestionably heightened the existing Egyptian resentment against foreigners and strengthened nationalist sentiment; it may even have laid the train which, fired by the rebel leader Arabi, led to the explosion of 188 1-2. In the following year was passed the Law of Liquidation (July 17th, 1880), by which Egypt made what is known to bankruptcy law as an arrangement with creditors. This implied insolvency; but, instead of being declared a defaulter, the debtor was given his discharge on payment of a reasonable composition upon his liabilities. The rate of interest on the debt was reduced ; but, in return, a limit was placed on national expenditure, with a view to ensuring the future punctual honouring of the bonds. The laws establishing the Caisse de la Dette and limiting expenditure became the sheet-anchor of so much sound finance as was possible in a country which had been so long and so pitilessly bled by prodigal rulers and greedy usurers. Both of these measures were forced on the Egyptian Government from without, and the Powers which instituted them claimed the right to enforce them, and therewith to direct the entire financial administration. From international control of finance to control of domestic and foreign policy in general was a logical, and an inevitable, step. VI. The British Occupation of Egypt, 1 879-1 883 Egyptians in the mass had witnessed the abrupt removal of Ismail with comparative unconcern : like the rise and fall of the Nile, such was the will of Allah, and it was well. Different was the attitude of those sections of the population which represented what passed for public opinion. These, too, had little reason for lamenting the dis- appearance of a Khedive who had imposed upon their country an intolerable burden of debt and taxation. Nevertheless, they resented far to recede, and that, "if owing to encouragement from Constantinople the Khedive resists the will of the Five Powers, it will probably result in Egypt being severed from the Turkish empire altogether. . . . You should use all the means of influence at your command." On the 25th, Layard was empowered to ask whether the British Government would be satisfied if the Sultan at once deposed the Khedive, withdrew the firman of 1873 altering the Succession, and appointed Tewfik. Lord Salisbury replied that it would be necessary to consult France. The deposition followed next day. 164 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 the instrumentality by which Ismail had been supplanted, for none of them was credulous enough to suppose that the Sultan cared so much for sound finance and good government in the Khediviate as to have deposed Ismail of his own accord. An act in itself defensible was viewed with suspicion insomuch as it afforded additional evidence of the growing subjection of Egypt and its Government to outside dictation. The influence of the foreign population had long been resented, owing to the gross abuses which prevailed under the system of Capitulations. In no part of the Ottoman empire had the exercise of exterritoriality and the grant of concessions to foreign residents been carried so far as it had in Egypt, where, in 1876, the number of settled Europeans was estimated at 100,000. There were no fewer than seventeen Consular Tribunals, and in most of them the merest travesty of justice was administered. Europeans were systematically acquitted of crimes and offences which there was no difficulty in proving, while it was difficult for natives to come by their rights when the aggressors were aliens. Moreover, these exotic jurisdictions had gradually been extended in directions never intended originally. Apart from the often illicit protection given to them by their national Courts, foreigners enjoyed other privileges detrimental to the interests of the native population; and, in particular, their im- munity from certain kinds of taxation was a great grievance. Many foreigners, again, had benefited unduly by commercial privileges freely granted by the prodigal ex- Khedive under the pressure of financial difficulties, regardless of the country's permanent interests. Some- thing had been done by the Powers towards correcting the more flagrant abuses incidental to a system of divided jurisdiction by a law of February, 1876, creating Mixed Tribunals. Owing to the opposition of France, however, the operation of these Courts was restricted to civil cases, and within a large sphere of jurisprudence there was still one law for the native and another for the foreigner. A further grievance was the large and increasing number of foreigners in the public services, from the higher posts in which the natives were practically excluded. In the early 'eighties, on the testimony of a French statesman, "all the Government departments were run by French agents1." Egypt, according to this witness, was " France's adopted daughter," and, like many adopted daughters, she was loved chiefly for the sake of her fortune. The most efficient of 1 Deschanel, P., Gambetta (1919), p. 303. -: MILITARY RIOT AT CAIRO 165 alien Governments can never be an altogether satisfactory substitute for the least efficient of native Administrations. It may be true that the native ruling class was, in the main, incapable and largely corrupt ; but, at least, it was Egyptian and racy of the soil, and, when tried by native standards, its incompetence and venality cannot be said to have excited violent disgust. The personal quality of even the im- ported officials, however, was very unequal, and many of them were neither efficient nor upright; while, at the same time, their main- tenance proved a heavy burden on the Treasury. This intrusion of so large a foreign community, which for the most part had settled in Egypt for its own, and not the country's, good, was a source of profound offence to all sections of the native popula- tion, but most of all to the patriotic educated classes, little susceptible though they were to the cruder forms of prejudice and bigotry, and altogether free from taint of fanaticism. European statesmen had long talked of the possibility of the political internationalisation of Egypt. Here was an internationalisation of a far more objectionable kind progressing by leaps and bounds. The Army had grievances of its own, of which low and uncertain pay and favouritism were those which rankled deepest. Early in 1879, when, in consequence of the large reduction in the native force insisted on in the interest of economy, 2500 officers were suddenly put on halfpay without receiving the arrears due to them, a military riot occurred at Cairo (February 18th). It was directed generally against the Government, but particularly against Nubar Pasha and Sir Rivers Wilson, both of whom were roughly treated by a large body of armed officers, while the rioters took possession of the Ministry of Finance as the assumed source and origin of their mis- fortune. On that occasion, the Khedive adopted prompt measures and, with the help of loyal troops, soon succeeded in quelling the iot. Nevertheless, the incident was alarming as a symptom of deep- ated unrest; and the British Representative in Cairo, in reporting pon it to the Foreign Secretary, spoke of an uneasy feeling of dis- content as prevailing among the natives, owing to their jealousy of the large influx of highly-paid European officials. The precedent thus established by the soldiery was of evil augury. Soon, a more systematic agitation began against foreigners, of the kind which has occurred so often among Oriental peoples upon whom Western ideas and institutions have been forced prematurely. Secret meetings of malcontents were held; rumours of intended pogroms 1 66 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 \J\ against the Christians became current ; and the leaders of the movement were said to be in confidential communication with the direct agents of the Khedive. It was a misfortune that, at a time so critical, the responsible Government lacked initiative, energy, and resolution. For this, the Powers were not free from responsibility. Their repeated interferences and invasions of the Khedive's powers, however excel- lent the intentions underlying them, had weakened the Administration, which, in proportion as it forfeited public respect and confidence, also lost authority and the ability to compel obedience. In the Army, in particular, disaffection deepened, for the Khedive was able neither to pacify nor suppress the mutineers, who had found an able spokesman in Ahmed Arabi, a colonel of Fellah origin. The first dangerous mistake was committed by Tewfik, when, early in 1 88 1, he dismissed the Minister of War at the bidding of the mal- content officers. Before the end of the year, the whole Ministry had succumbed to the same influence; and, in February, 1882, Arabi himself became War Minister. In September, the Sultan had wished to despatch a force of occupation to his unsettled province, and the British Government were willing; but, as France objected, the despatch of a Turkish Commissioner was suggested as an alternative. With characteristic inconsequence, the Sultan's Ministers sent two Delegates, armed with different Instructions, and each being expected to act and report independently of the other. The British Government were as firmly opposed to active inter- vention as ever, and Lord Granville, the Foreign Secretary, wrote at that time that the only event which could justify even a temporary departure from this reserve would be "the existence of anarchy or some attack on the Canal." Influences, however, were at work, which were soon to force his hands. In France, Gambetta took office in November at the head of a Ministry most of whose members were but understudies of himself, who with the Presidency of the Council combined the control of Foreign Affairs. Jules Ferry, his predecessor, had leaned towards Germany more than the French nation approved. Gambetta came in as a strong advocate of a close understanding with both Great Britain and Russia. It was not that he loved either country — as to Russia he had declared only three years before that an alliance with an absolutist Tsardom was "unthinkable" — but he saw in such a double understanding the only safeguard against the Bismarckian policy of coalitions. "Let us keep the alliance with those two Powers as a reserve for the future," he had, just before he took office, said ,. FRENCH POLICY IN EGYPT 167 de Freycinet; "leaning on London and St Petersburg, we shall be invincible." He was not less desirous than Ferry had been to cooperate with Great Britain in Egypt; but the cooperation favoured by him was to consist of active measures which should exclude the possibility of participation in it by any other Power, since he held that in such a relationship not more than two were good company. Thiers had warned him on one occasion: "Whatever you do, never let go of Egypt"; and Gambetta held on so long as he was able1. Convinced that intervention would become inevitable, he was also prepared to find an opportunity for it. The calculating spirit and quickwittedness of French diplomacy were well shown in the steps taken by Gambetta to achieve this end. He was shrewd enough to see the advantage of assuming the lead, and \ this Lord Granville made easy for him. Before he had been a month in office (December 14th), he suggested, through Lord Lyons, that the moment was opportune for an intimate understanding between the two Powers, and suggested a frank exchange of views on the subject. For, while it was obviously their interest to give Tewfik all practicable support, the eventuality of the breakdown of his Govern- ment had to be reckoned with. Granville was, at first, unwilling to bind himself to hypothetical proceedings, and accordingly fell back upon the well-known diplomatic formula " liberty of action." Undiscouraged, Gambetta returned to the charge, and this time his impetuous will overcame opposition. As a result of conversations in the last week of the month, the terms of a Joint Note to the Khedive, whose authority was becoming ominously feebler, were agreed upon, and the Note was communicated on January 8th. It assured him that the two Powers would support him in his endeavours to cope with the difficulties of his situation, and invited him, in somewhat didactic terms, to draw from the assurance confidence and strength. Whether the Joint Note was called for or not by the circumstances of the moment, from the standpoint of Great Britain it was very untimely; for her partner had quite recently outraged nationalist feeling by wanton aggression in another part of the Ottoman empire. Intended to encourage Tewfik and exert a salutary influence on public ^ opinion, it actually intensified the anti-foreign movement, since, by seeming to suggest more active interference, it confirmed the appre- j hensions of thoughtful Egyptians that their country was about to share the experience of Tunis. Granville made a strong point of 1 Deschanel, P., Gambetta, p. 304. \A \J 1 68 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 the fact that he had not committed his Government to any definite measures, or to any measures at all. This restricted view of the significance of the Note was not accepted by Gambetta, who took its meaning to be that whither France went Great Britain would be prepared to follow. Reduced to the lowest terms, the Note was a pledge of conditional joint intervention. About this time, Bismarck, in response to the cooler temper of the French Cabinet since the fall of Jules Ferry, showed again special concern to strengthen friendly relations with the British Government, and with this idea in view he sent his son, Count Herbert, on a special Mission to London. He seems to have thought that the Foreign Office was only half-informed of the guiding lines of German foreign policy, and to have attributed the responsibility for this state of things partly to the British Embassy in Berlin and, in a greater degree, to the German Embassy in London. Odo Russell had, certainly, shown a disposition, on occasion, to accept the conversational confidences and conscious indiscretions of the magnetic Chancellor as serious indica- tions of policy, and to report them as such to the Foreign Secretary. Yet the fact remained that the two Governments seemed never to come nearer to a permanent understanding. Granville welcomed the overtures, and the assurance, which followed, of Bismarck's wish to give cordial support to British policy in Egypt made his path for a time easier. Replying, at the end of the month, to suggestions from Gambetta that the two Powers should assert Dual Control in a more definite fashion, he now stated the British position in language which admitted of no misinterpretation. "The British Government," he said, " had no ambitious designs in Egypt for itself, and would object to an exclusive influence being seized by any other Power." Gambetta had fired his last shot. On February 1st the impetuous tribune fell, and in de Freycinet he was succeeded by a Foreign Minister in greater sympathy with the official British attitude. Up to this point, that attitude had been one of abstention from intervention except on the clearest proof of necessity, in which event there was to be collective action by the Powers, including Turkey. Herein, Granville was in complete accord with the Head of the Government. Five years earlier Gladstone had warned the nation in prophetic words against the danger of setting foot in the Khediviate, predicting that such action would lead the country step by step forward until it found itself saddled with the responsibility, not only of Egypt, but of a great North and Central African empire. OUTBREAK OF REVOLUTION 169 For three months longer, the struggle between the Khedive and the military junta continued without apparent change in the situa- tion. Towards the end of May, 1882, British and French squadrons were despatched to Alexandria for the protection of the foreign population, of which a steady exodus had already begun. It was known, however, that while the French Government were professing loyalty to Great Britain, their agent in Cairo, de Blignieres, was con- sorting with the military conspirators and the anti-British party, and endeavouring to create faith in France as the country's one and only true friend. In that month, de Freycinet himself urged the deposition of Tewfik in favour of Halim Pasha, his uncle, of whose goodwill France had previously made sure. Now, insurrection raised its head again, and Arabi, who had been removed from the Ministry, was re- instated in deference to military pressure. Early in the following June, the Porte sent Dervish Pasha to Egypt to confer with the Khedive and his advisers and to take stock of the situation generally. A little later, the two Powers proposed that a Conference of Ambassadors should be held in Constantinople, taking as the basis of its deliberations the maintenance of the rights of the Sultan and the Khedive, the observ- ance of international engagements and the arrangements existing under them, whether with Great Britain and France alone or with all the Powers, the preservation of the liberties secured by the firmans of the Sultan, and the prudent development of Egyptian institutions. The other Powers agreed; but the Porte demanded a postponement of the proposals until it should have tried to settle the country in its own way. It was ominous that, at this time, batteries were being constructed at Alexandria in proximity to the anchorage of the British and French squadrons. Required to discontinue this work, Arabi, now to all intents a military dictator, refused. It was now too late to check by commissioners and conferences the mischief which had so long been brewing. The threatened storm broke with startling suddenness on June nth, when revolution flamed up in Alexandria, taking the form of the massacre of sixty Europeans iid an orgy of looting, before the rioters were suppressed by the Khedive's troops. The Constantinople Conference opened on June 23rd, by which me it was known that the Dervish Mission had proved a total failure ; for the Egyptian Ministry was in Arabi's power and the Khedive's orders were only executed with his assent and cooperation. On that day, the Sultan made, through Reschid Pasha, his Private Secretary, 170 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 a remarkable communication to Lord Dufferin (who had been trans- ferred to Constantinople from Petrograd in the previous year). Sus- picious of Great Britain's movements, he put to him the pointed questions: "What are the intentions of England in regard to the present? What are the views entertained by Her Majesty's Govern- ment with respect to Egypt as regards the future?" Lord Dufferin gave the assurance that his Government had but one desire, which was "the preservation in their full integrity of the Sultan's sovereign rights, as defined by the firmans and the maintenance of the order of things established under them." Great Britain's direct interests in the country, he said, were the freedom of the Suez Canal and an administration so satisfactory as to preclude any foreign Power from finding an excuse for intervention. Encouraged by these assurances, Reschid Pasha now asserted that the Sultan was ready and willing to come to an understanding with Great Britain to the exclusion of France, "which he hated"; and he offered to hand over to the former "the exclusive control and adminis- tration of the whole of Egypt, reserving to himself only those modified rights of sovereignty which he now possesses." Lord Dufferin replied that "if the Sultan were to hand over Egypt to Great Britain in fee simple with the approbation of all Europe, he doubted whether the British Government would accept such a burden of responsibility1." Gladstone and Granville took it upon themselves to refuse the Sultan's tempting offer, to the disappointment of the Queen2. The Conference accepted the proposal of the British Ambassador that the pacification of the country should be entrusted to the Sultan's troops, subject to strict limitations in regard to their employment and the duration of their stay. The Sultan was willing to send troops, but not to bind himself by conditions in doing so; and, as he refused to give way on that point, the Conference dragged on for many days without positive result. In the meantime, the condition of the country grew steadily worse, with the result that the British Government were brought daily nearer to the contingency of active intervention. Gladstone and Granville were convinced of its necessity, and the rest of the Cabinet now came round to it, with the single exception of Mr Bright, who resigned office. As the insurrectionaries in Alexandria had continued their de- fensive works with a view to commanding the harbour, the British 1 Despatch of June 23rd, 1882. 2 Lord Morley's Life of Gladstone, in. 80. BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA 171 Admiral on July 3rd received orders to fire on and destroy the forts and batteries, unless operations were discontinued after due warning. Though invited to join in this action, the French and Italian Govern- ments declined. On the nth, British vessels bombarded and destroyed the forts, and on the following day native troops fired the town, and departed, leaving the mob to pillage it, whereupon a British force was landed to restore order. So soon as the bombardment began the French fleet steamed away in virtuous disgust. Yet another chance remained for France to reconsider her attitude, and carry out her own policy of joint action, when, on July 15th, the British Government in- vited her, with the other Powers, to cooperate in measures for ensuring the safety of the Suez Canal. De Freycinet was willing, and his pre- decessor eagerly pushed him on. When, on the 18th, the Government asked the Chamber for a credit of eight million francs, Gambetta lent his fervent support to the motion. "Let not France be shorn of her heritage," he pleaded; "it is not for the sake of Egyptian nationality or the Egyptian national party that we ought to go to Egypt ; it is for the sake of the French nation. What I dread more than anything is that you may hand over to England, for good and all, territories, rivers, and rights of way where your title to live and to trade is no less valid than hers." The belief had, however, at this time gained possession of the French people that Bismarck was engaged in a plot for dragging it into a morass of foreign complications, and, though this apprehension did not prevent France from embarking on the Indo-Chinese and Madagascar enterprises, it now kept her out of Egypt. The Senate voted almost unanimously the money needed for the protection of the Suez Canal ; but in the Chamber the Government obtained only seventy-five votes, and de Freycinet resigned (July 30th). Thus it was that France, who had been the first to promise the Khedive help in time of need, and had so long tried to drive Great Britain into active intervention, left her ally to carry out alone the onerous task of pacification. Granville's judgment upon the episode and its issue was warranted: "We have done the right thing; we ive shown our readiness to admit others, and we have not the in- mvenience of a partner1." Just before this, Gladstone told the [ouse of Commons: "We should not fully discharge our duty if we id not endeavour to convert the present interior state of Egypt from 1 Letter to Sir A. Paget, July 28th, 1882. / I 172 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 anarchy and confusion to peace and order. We shall look, during the time that remains to us, to the cooperation of the Powers of civilised Europe, if it be in any case open to us. But if every chance of obtaining cooperation is exhausted the work will be undertaken by the single power of England" (July 22nd). Here was resolute language, of a kind understood and beloved of Englishmen, and the House readily voted the money needed for the equipment of an expeditionary force, By this time, the Sultan had tardily signified his willingness to enter the Constantinople Conference, and was also willing to send troops to his disturbed province, subject to the stipulation that, simultaneously with their landing, the British force should withdraw. Granville declined to comply with this demand, but remained still prepared to welcome Turkish military cooperation on the conditions already laid down, including the issue of a proclamation disowning Arabi as a rebel and supporting Tewfik's Administration. A proclama- tion to that effect was issued, and the proposal to despatch Turkish troops went as far as the drafting of a convention ; but prevarication and equivocation on the part of the Porte led to further delay. The Constantinople Conference had broken up on August 14th, and, when, a month later, a British expeditionary force, preparations for which had been in progress for some weeks, was landed at Alexandria under Sir Garnet Wolseley, the Convention still remained unsigned1. During the night of September I2th-i3th, Wolseley, his plans having been worked out to the smallest detail as to both time and place, led his force of 13,000 men on the famous march, silent as the stars which were his guide, to Tel-el-Kebir. There, at dawn, he attacked and decimated the rebel army, the remnant dispersing, glad to return to their neglected farms and homesteads. Arabi saved himself by flight. With the surrender of 1 1 ,000 native troops near Cairo and the occupa- tion of the capital by British cavalry the insurrection was at an end. Now the need and justification for Turkish intervention existed no longer. The Sultan might have finally rolled up the map of Egypt 1 The contention advanced by some admirers of Lord Dufferin, in proof of his sagacity, that he delayed the progress of the negotiations with the Porte of set purpose, until he could be assured that they would lead to no result, is hardly complimentary to that statesman, whose sagacity rests on better evidence. Lord Dufferin resented this suggestion. He wrote to the Foreign Secretary at the time: " From first to last we have acted in perfect sincerity and good faith." He had attained the result which he personally deemed most desirable, but, as he said, "without resorting to a single dubious act or expression." There the matter may be left. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REBELLION 173 on the morrow of Tel-el-Kebir ; for Turkish rule in that country had from that date ceased for ever. The Arabi rebellion has been judged in various ways, and its leader has been the object both of unfair condemnation and of indiscriminate apology. Though of humble origin, Arabi was a man of considerable natural capacity. That he was, also, according to his lights, a patriot, as many a rebel has been before him, cannot be doubted. To suppose that the revolt which owed so much to his leadership was merely a sordid military conspiracy would be to be- little both its character and its proportions. The initial military etneute itself had been directed, not against the British, French, Greeks or any Christian foreigners, but against the Turks and the preference shown to officers of the Sultan in the Egyptian army, coupled with the perennial abuses of oriental military systems, poor pay, rare reckonings, and heavy arrears. While, however, the mutiny of the soldiery limited the character of the movement at the outset, this was but a single, and ultimately became the least significant, phase of a genuine national outburst of discontent In its larger aspects, the episode undoubtedly focussed a long- maturing resentment against the inordinate growth of foreign domina- tion and the continual outside interference with native institutions, traditions and customs, which were converting the dependence of Egypt upon Turkey into a still more hateful subjection to Western intruders. Viewed as the expression of nationalist sentiments and aspirations, the revolt was as legitimate and unassailable in purpose as it was crude and indefensible in form. As, however, the movement broadened and thus came to draw more and more of its strength from appeals to prejudice and passion, the good elements were overwhelmed by the dubious and the bad ; every manifestation of foreign influence passed under the same unsparing condemnation simply because it was foreign ; and, finally, whatever stimulus to success was needed, beyond the forces of interested motive, political discontent, and nationalist jealousy , was supplied by religious fanaticism1. So it came to pass that the Arabi rising in the end represented the >mposite antagonism of the Egyptian people against extraneous in- lences of every kind which were pressing upon their country and In a despatch to the Foreign Secretary of June 19th, 1882, Lord Dufferin )te of Arabi, that " from being the mere chief of a military faction he had acquired >t only in Egypt but in the estimation of the Mussulman world of Constantinople id elsewhere the character and position of a champion of the rights of Islam against le aggression of the infidel Western Powers." 174 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 making of it something they did not wish it to be. Before that point had been reached, however, the movement had passed beyond Arabi's control; he no longer led, but was carried on by it; and the view is tenable that the directions into which it was ultimately diverted were not of his designing. Arabi and his fellow-conspirators were duly tried by an Egyptian tribunal, the prosecuting counsel being French and the counsel for the accused English; and the trial lasted through October and November. There was no wish that Arabi should suffer Oriental justice, and, the charge against him being reduced to one of rebellion, he followed the advice given to him and pleaded guilty. The death penalty was pronounced, but only formally ; for it was immediately afterwards commuted to exile with degradation from military rank. No less satisfaction was felt in England than in Egypt at finding the adage that " those who make revolutions a detni dig their own graves " for once falsified. The eye of the Sultan was unceasingly turned towards the Egyptian vineyard, which British energy was steadily making more fruitful ; for to the Turk sovereignty has ever meant tribute. In the midst of an unforeseen conjunction of difficulties, the Porte pressed the British Government to fix a definite day for the evacuation of the country. To enter into any undertaking of the kind was obviously impracticable ; yet, in spite of the possible developments of a constantly changing situation, the hope and intention of the British Government, both in 1882 and for many years, was a speedy withdrawal, subject only to the fulfilment of a given purpose. This was simply to "secure that the order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character and possess the elements of stability and permanence1." Whatever may have been the wishes of irresponsible politicians, pre- pared to appropriate territory anywhere, and if against the will of the Powers so much the more readily, it is not true, as some French writers maintain, that Great Britain contemplated annexation from the beginning, as France did when she entered Syria in i8602. In a situation which called for caution rather than great daring, for patience rather than hustling activity, and above all for an in- domitable faith in the capacity of crooked things to work straight, 1 Circular letter of Lord Granville to the Great Powers, January ist, 1883. 2 Thus C. de Freycinet, speaking of England's position in Egypt in 1882, writes: "A partir de ce moment elle ne pense plus a V evacuation; elle oublie quHl y a une Europe. Elle escompte I'avenir, comme si Vavenir tout entier lui apparteuait." La question d' figypte (1905), p. 326. 1 \ LORD DUFFERIN'S MISSION TO CAIRO 175 the peculiar temperament and gifts of Lord Granville at that time found appropriate scope. It was clearly impossible to allow France any opportunity of reentering Egypt by the door which she had first herself closed behind her in May, and then deliberately locked in July. Accordingly, a necessary safeguard was the cessation of the existing divided jurisdiction. In a despatch to the Powers of January 3rd, 1883, which may be regarded as the basis and justification of all further development of British policy in Egypt, Lord Granville laid down the objects which his Government intended to pursue in undertaking more direct responsibility for the country's welfare. He referred, in particular, to the need for reforms relating to taxation, justice, and local and national government, and foreshadowed the abolition of the Dual Control of Finance in favour of the appointment of a single European adviser. Sir A. Colvin, the British Controller at that time, hereupon resigned, and the Khedive abolished the two officers by decree. Granville, certainly, carried concession far by inviting France to nominate the new adviser; but, since she declined, Colvin was appointed. The French Government duly protested, and resumed " liberty of action." The sensitive pride of France had been wounded. Having renounced the relationship towards Great Britain of a partner, she assumed the role of sheer obstruction. For twenty years, she did little more in Egypt than block her rival's way and impede progress in every direction. Lord DufTerin had been sent from Constantinople to Cairo at the end of 1882, commissioned to carry out the needed reforms. Two months later (February, 1883), he issued a monumental report on Egyptian reorganisation, a document of statesmanlike grasp as well as literary charm. Its keynote was " the metamorphic spirit of the age." This spirit, it said, had reached and influenced the Egyptians, even of the strata to which the oppressed fellah belonged, "nor, like his own Memnon, has he remained irresponsive to the beams of the new dawn." Lord Dufferin believed that the Egyptians were capable of self-government, and, convinced that "the valley of the Nile could not be administered with any prospect of success from London," drew the logical conclusion that it must be governed in Cairo by the Egyptians themselves, under just so much guidance as might be un- \ avoidable. He, therefore, urged the creation, " within prudent limits," of representative institutions, from communal bodies upwards, in sympathy with "those instincts of patriotism and freedom which it has been our boast to foster in every country where we have set our 176 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 foot." The British Government, only too glad to do something positive towards meeting nationalist aspirations and conciliating Liberal opinion at home, approved of the recommendations, and they were promul- gated in an Organic Decree of the following May, in which month Lord DufTerin returned to Constantinople. So rapid was the transformation of the government of the country under the Occupation that, by the time of Lord Dufferin's departure, its status had become in effect, though not in form, a British pro- tectorate. The Khedive and his Ministers were allowed to preserve the outward show of independence; yet already they were little more than marionettes, playing to strings that were not always even in- visible. From Constantinople no interference was permitted, and, when the Sultan forbade the Khedive to make changes in the Adminis- tration without his consent, his Viceroy had to plead that he was no longer his own master. " Le veritable Khedive de VEgypte" he said, 1 ' c'est Lord Dufferin. C'est de lui quyema?ient tous les ordres, et le Khedive n'en est que V instrument de transmission." Sir Evelyn Baring was now appointed British Agent and Consul- General, and he settled down in Cairo to the work of his life in September, 1883. VII. The Rebellion in the Soudan and the Gordon Mission, 1 883- 1 885. In January, 1883, there were discussions between the British military authorities and the Khedive's advisers regarding the possibility of a reduction, which Lord DufTerin had recommended, of the army of occupation. Any such pleasant hope was frustrated by a new out- break of rebellion, this time in the Soudan provinces of theKhediviate. The Soudan had never been held by Egypt on a very secure tenure. Such sovereignty as had been exercised there dated from the time of Mehemet Ali ; but from the first it had been illusory and precarious. In that region, vast and vague, the rulers of Egypt had for a century been conquering, yet had never wholly conquered. Under Ismail, however, the Suakin and Massowah districts were formally assigned to Egypt by the Sultan, who confirmed the Khedive as their hereditary ruler. In 1870, Sir Samuel Baker, who had already done valuable work of exploration in Central Africa, annexed to Egypt the Equatorial provinces, suppressing the slave-trade and opening up the Great Lakes to navigation. In 1874 he was succeeded as Governor- General by General Charles Gordon, who did much for the settlement of the THE SOUDAN REBELLION 177 Soudan and the consolidation of Egypt's empire on the Upper Nile. He waged drastic war upon the slave-trade and rooted out the nefarious traffic within the territories under his rule; and then, in 1879, the year of Ismail's deposition, he resigned. Roughly, the area of the Soudan nominally held by Egypt in 1883 extended 1650 miles from north to south (Assouan to the Equator), and from 1200 to 1400 miles from east to west (Massowah to the western limit of the Darfur province). It was a hopelessly impoverished country, in which pashas oppressed, tax-gatherers plundered, and the soldiery were prone to violence; discontent and disaffection being widespread in consequence. All the conditions existing there were singularly favourable to the success of any leader who might prove able to focus the resentments and vague aspirations of a wild and fanatical population; and such a leader appeared in the person of a Mahdi, or Messenger of God. This remarkable man, the Sheik Mohammad Ahmed of Dongola, after he had lived for a time as a recluse upon an island in the Nile, waiting for his call, made himself known in the late summer of 1881, claiming to be a Saviour foretold of the Prophets and commissioned to emancipate the faithful from alien rule and win the heathen world for Islam. The religious appeal of the Mahdi, enforced as it was by rude eloquence and fiery fanaticism, produced a powerful effect upon the ignorant tribesmen. From the first, the crusade was taken up with great enthusiasm, and for the next two years its progress was unbroken. Such resistance as the Egyptian garrisons in the disturbed area offered was feeble and half- hearted, and the Mahdi 's victories swelled his hosts until there seemed a fear that Egypt itself would be overwhelmed. In the spring of 1883, General Hicks, an English officer on the iff of the Egyptian Army, who had been appointed its Commander- i-Chief , undertook, with the approval of the Khedive and his advisers, equip and lead an expedition for the reconquest of the revolted ;gion. The idea was discouraged, though not forbidden, by the British Government, who believed that their responsibility in the itter might be met by simply holding aloof from what, they were >nvinced, was an impolitic and dangerous enterprise. Hicks had a )d friend at Cairo in Lord Dufferin, who, nevertheless, urged him not to push his operations beyond the western bank of the White Nile, and to be satisfied with the reconquest of the province of Senaar. Although unquestionably acting in accordance with the wishes of the Khedive and the Egyptian Government, Hicks received very W.&G.III 12 178 FORWARD POLICY AND REACTION, 1874-1885 inadequate support from either in the necessary preparations1. When the expedition was already on its way, in the middle of April, Hicks had to complain to the Minister of War that he lacked both men and food, that the pay was in arrear, and that his river-boats were too few, out of repair, and without fuel. From modest beginnings his plans expanded. Having driven the rebels from Senaar, he determined to push on to Kordofan. Minor successes still encouraged him unduly, and, late in May, he reported to Lord Dufferin from Khartoum his belief that faith in the Mahdi was rapidly decreasing. By August, matters were badly amiss with the expedition; men, moral, money, transport — everything that was essential was lacking. Early in Sep- tember, Hicks and his army of 10,000 nondescript troops, ill-fed, ill-found, ill-disciplined and ill-paid, quitted Khartoum, and on the 24th the Nile, for a westward march in the direction of Kordofan, intending to challenge the Mahdi at El Obeid. Owing to treachery, he was led into the desert, and on November 5th, when but two days' march from his objective, his army was surprised by a strong rebel force, and he and all his men perished. In France, the Hicks disaster was ostentatiously welcomed, in the hope that it would expedite the end of the British occupation2. Its effect was precisely the reverse. While, on the one hand, it destroyed for the time the prestige of the Egyptian Government, discredited the native Army, and compromised British authority, it also frustrated the hope of reducing the force of occupation and banished to the land of dreams the idea of evacuation. For, if the presence of the British in Egypt now became more difficult than before, it also became more necessary. Moreover, a new danger had appeared in the person of Osman Digna, an ex-slavedealer, whom the Mahdi had appointed Emir in the Suakin district, and who had collected a large force with which he terrorised the surrounding population. Already, the expediency of abandoning the Soudan and concen- trating attention upon the defence of a nearer frontier had been urged upon the Egyptian Government by the British authorities. It was suggested that Kordofan and Darfur, with the region beyond, should be regarded as outside the Egyptian pale. To the renunciation of any part whatever of the territory the Khedive and his Ministers were vehemently opposed; but, owing to pressure, the decision to abandon 1 Hicks wrote to Lord Dufferin on his return to Constantinople: "Your de- parture from Cairo has been a calamity to me." 2 Letter of Lord Lyons to Lord Granville, November 23rd, 1883. THE BRITISH OCCUPATION 179 the Soudan from the latitude of Assouan or Wady Haifa was taken at the end of the year. Lord Granville, at this time, formulated the relations between the two Governments in a despatch which showed how far Egypt had already forfeited independence. "In important questions," he wrote to Sir Evelyn Baring, "where the administration and safety of Egypt are at stake, it is indispensable that Her Majesty's Government should, as long as the provisional occupation of the country by English troops continues, be assured that the advice which, after full consideration of the views of the Egyptian Government, they may feel it their duty to tender to the Khedive, should be followed. It should be made clear to the Egyptian Ministers and Governors of provinces that the responsibility which for the time rests on England obliges Her Majesty's Government to insist on the adoption of the policy which they recommend, and that it will be necessary that those Ministers and Governors who do not follow this course should cease to hold their offices " (January 4th, 1884). On this Instruction being communicated to him, Cherif Pasha, who had been Prime-Minister since September, 1882, resigned in protest, and Nubar Pasha formed a Ministry pledged to the policy of with- drawing from the Soudan. An endeavour was made by the British Government in June of this year to relieve the financial difficulties caused in part by the rebellion and the Alexandria indemnity claims. A proposal to release, for the purposes of the general administration, such part of the revenue as was not required for the service of the public debt was vigorously opposed by France, concerned as ever for the interests of the bond- holders, though by way of purchasing her support Lord Granville had promised that the British Occupation should cease in 1888 at the discretion of the Powers. Two Conferences were in consequence needed before an arrangement was arrived at by the London Con- vention of March 18th, 1885 ; and then the promise of conditional evacuation no longer held good. French writers later admitted the shortsightedness of their Government's attitude1. The abandonment of the Soudan implied more than the negative decision to leave it alone; for there were Egyptian gar~isons there, 1 "Notts avons eu le tort de ne pas profiter de cette occasion unique Plutot que de riduire le revenu de la dette egyptienne 282 BOER WAR AND INTERNATIONAL SITUATION up by giving proof of a much more conciliatory disposition, even in a matter relating to South Africa. While the Boers were not yet at all prepared to give in, they were coming to perceive that there was little hope for them without foreign help; on a last quest for it, President Kruger had sailed for Europe from Lorenzo Marquez on September nth on the Nether- lands cruiser Gelderland, which the Queen of Holland placed at his disposal, after obtaining from the British Government an assurance that he would not be molested. When he landed at Marseilles and proceeded to Paris, he was greeted with great popular demonstrations and received in audience by the President of the French Republic. He intended to visit Berlin and reached Cologne. Here he was also acclaimed as a hero by enthusiastic crowds, when he was abruptly warned by the authorities that his presence was not desirable in Germany, and that, in any case, he would not be received by the Emperor. The warm sympathy of the Dutch people and his reception by the Queen of the Netherlands at the Hague were but a poor compensation for the unexpected rebuff from Berlin. The ground was thus prepared for the resumption of conversations about an alliance, and, early in 1901, Baron von Eckardstein was able to inform his Government that the Colonial Secretary and his friends in the British Cabinet had been at last driven, by the renewal of Russian pressure in the Far East and French in Morocco, to recognise that the time had come for Great Britain to choose between joining the Triple Alliance or coming to terms, even should these prove very costly, with France and Russia. They had acknowledged their pre- ference for an understanding with Germany, and would do everything in their power to promote it. Just then Queen Victoria's last illness brought over the German Emperor to his royal grandmother's death- bed, and the warmth of feeling which he showed during the funeral ceremonies, in which he played a singularly conspicuous part, created a notable revulsion of British opinion in his favour, both in Court and Government circles and amongst the British public generally. In the course of his conversations with British Ministers, including Lord Lansdowne, to whom Lord Salisbury, while retaining the Premiership, had transferred the Foreign Office in November, 1900, the word "alliance " was not used ; but the international situation was discussed in so conciliatory a spirit and with so complete an agreement on both sides that actual negotiations for an alliance could be at once resumed. They did not, however, on this occasion have in view either ILL-TEMPER OF WILLIAM II 283 the "new triple alliance " discussed between Biilow and Chamberlain in November, 1899, or an exclusively Anglo-German alliance; but they extended to the accession of Great Britain to the existing Con- tinental Triple Alliance, in which Germany was the predominant partner; and the Germans themselves added the suggestion, which alone was ultimately to bear fruit, though in quite a different shape from that which they then had in mind, that Japan might be brought into this great defensive league. The new treaties were to include some provision showing that they were not in any way directed against the United States, and they were only to be kept secret until public opinion had been sufficiently prepared to allow them to be laid before the legislatures of the different Contracting Parties without encountering a storm of ill-informed opposition. Rapid progress was being made, when one of the Emperor's sudden bursts of ill-temper created a serious hitch. King Edward might even then have asked the question which he put some years later to Baron von Eckardstein, "If only I knew who really rules in Berlin!" Omnipotent as the Emperor was and omniscient as he conceived himself to be in the conduct of Foreign Affairs, Count von Biilow and the German Foreign Office, who rightly dreaded his wild and often very precipitate irruptions into the domain of diplomacy, considered themselves justified in carrying on negotiations in London to which the Emperor had assented in principle, without keeping him too closely informed as to the various stages of their progress. The form in which China was to pay the compensation claimed by Foreign Powers for losses caused by the Boxer disturbances gave rise to differences of opinion between London and Berlin, which, however, were not of sufficient importance to affect the much larger issues under discussion. The Emperor had always taken a keen personal interest in the Chinese imbroglio, and, irritated by what he regarded as the dilatoriness and ill will of the British Government, suddenly mounted his high horse, used very abusive language about British Ministers and finally wrote a rude letter to King Edward, in which he described British Ministers as "unmitigated noodles." The incident in itself was as trivial as the question which gave rise to it; but it made British Ministers ask themselves once more what reliance could be placed upon an under- standing with a country whose all-powerful Sovereign was liable to such fits of utter irresponsibility. The negotiations flagged, but received a fresh stimulus from the renewed French activities in Morocco and the far more ruthless activities of Russia in Manchuria. C J 284 BOER WAR AND INTERNATIONAL SITUATION But, when the British Government invited Germany to act upon the Anglo-German Agreement of the preceding year and to join in a protest at Petrograd against the high-handed action of the Russian Generals in Manchuria, the German Government replied that the Anglo- German Agreement did not apply to Manchuria, but only to the eighteen provinces of China proper within the Great Wall — an interpretation of the Agreement which once more justified Lord Salisbury's distrust of German good faith; and, while an acute con- troversy arose between the two Governments over this point, a fierce conflict of public opinion broke out again in both countries as to the South African War. The occupation of the two Boer capitals had not broken the stubborn resistance of the elusive Boer commandos, which not only managed to escape pursuit in spite of the much larger forces which the British had steadily brought into the field, but often inflicted very unpleasant surprises upon them. Anti-British feeling revived all over the Continent, and nowhere more fiercely than in Germany, when the military measures adopted by Lord Kitchener to deprive the combatant Boers of their supplies by massing the non-combatant population into concentration camps provoked malevolent criticism even in England. A " stop- the- war " campaign which some of the responsible leaders of the Opposition themselves encouraged found a ready echo abroad, and German newspapers indulged in the most venomous attacks upon the conduct of the British troops who were accused of inhuman cruelty. The German Government was known to have, in the reports from the German Military Attaches accom- panying the British Army, ample material for enlightening the German Press which it controlled, as to the truth in those matters, and for calling a halt to its organised campaign of vituperation and calumny. It did nothing, and, in a speech at Edinburgh on October 25th, Chamberlain protested that, severe as might be the military measures taken in South Africa, they were much less severe than those taken in the course of warlike operations by other nations now intent upon vilifying the British Army, and he referred, amongst other instances, to the doings of the Germans in France during the War of 1870. The rebuke was stern but not unmerited. At first, the German Press showed singular reticence and generally refrained from comments. Count von Biilow himself made no reference whatever to Cham- berlain's speech in a conversation with the present writer, who, as Director of the Foreign Department of The Times, had been privately END OF ANGLO-GERMAN CONVERSATIONS 285 invited by the German Foreign Office to Berlin for a discussion on the whole question of Anglo-German relations in view of the pro- posed alliance1. The Chancellor was chiefly concerned to establish in an exhaustive review of Anglo-German relations a large credit balance for Germany and to prove, in particular, the German case in regard to Manchuria. He professed to deplore the violent anti- British feeling, of which he did not deny the existence, in Germany, and ended with an emphatic assurance that, so long as he was Chan- cellor, he would not allow it to deflect him by a hair's breadth from his policy of unswerving friendship towards Great Britain. Never- theless, before many more days had passed, the German Press was suddenly given its head and fell furiously on Chamberlain for daring to institute comparisons between British mercenary troops and Germany's incomparable army. In the interval, the German Govern- ment had been given to understand that Great Britain was not prepared, in the circumstances, to proceed further with the alliance negotiations or to acquiesce in the German interpretation of the China agreement. So there was no longer any need for restraining German Anglophobia, and, when the Reichstag reassembled at the beginning of 1902, the Chancellor himself, distorting the language actually used by Chamberlain, delivered what purported to be a reply to him only less offensive in form than the phraseology already used in his accredited organs. The German Army, he said, stood on too high a pinnacle to be reached by any detractors, and, like Frederick the Great, he could only warn any Foreign Minister who ventured to attack it, that he was "biting on granite." Thus came to an end the long drawn negotiations for an alliance, fitfully carried on for nearly two years between Berlin and London in an atmosphere charged all the time with the passionate jealousy of Great Britain which the South African War had brought to the surface in Germany. It had been a curious chapter of secret diplomacy — as unreal indeed as it was secret — but it had had its uses. Outwardly, there was no striking change in the official relations between the British and German Governments, and, as the South African War gradually approached its appointed close, German public opinion relapsed into more or less sullen indifference, and its occasional ebullitions came to be regarded in this country as customary ex- hibitions of German boorishness which British public opinion could afford to treat with something like amused contempt. The worst 1 See The Times, September nth and 13th, 1920. (Letters to the Editor.) I 286 BOER WAR AND INTERNATIONAL SITUATION indecencies of the German Press could moreover always be matched in the French and in that of many other continental countries, whilst very few people in England understood how much closer than in other countries were the relations between the Government and the Press in Germany, controlled, as they were, by a special department in the German Foreign Office, which submitted every day voluminous excerpts not only to the Chancellor, but to the Emperor himself who duly returned them with his own marginal comments in blue pencil. British Ministers, however, had once and for all satisfied themselves that, if security could no longer be found for the British empire in the old policy of ''splendid isolation," it was least of all to be sought in an alliance with the German empire. The first result was the conclusion, within the next few months, of an alliance between Great Britain and Japan which, though advocated only a short time-pre- viously by the German Government, was promptly denounced as the treacherous betrayal of the sacred interests of a common white civilisation to an aggressive yellow race. Shortly afterwards, on his farewell visit to Windsor, Baron von Eckardstein, who had resigned in disgust at the bad faith and folly of his own Government/over- heard the word "Morocco," recurring too frequently not to sound ominous in his ears in the course of an intimate conversation between Chamberlain and Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London. Chamberlain had warned the Germans more than once during his negotiations with them as to the inevitable consequences of their failure, and the British Government was already feeling its way towards the entente , first with France and then with Russia, which was to shape the Foreign Policy of Great Britain during the next decade, in prevision of the day when, in fulfilment of Count von Billow's sinister speech in December, 1899, Germany would feel herself strong enough to play the part of hammer on the anvil of the world. IV. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1 898-1 902 The grave events of which Northern China was the scene in the second year of the South African War had the effect, on the one hand, of producing a certain temporary and superficial community of interests between Great Britain and Germany and, on the other, of demonstrating a far more real and enduring community of interests between Great Britain and Japan. In the Far East, Germany and Great Britain had been drawn THE FAR EASTERN QUESTION 287 together only by the menace of Russia's growing ascendancy in Peking. The establishment of a large sphere of Russian interests behind the strategical base, created by the leasing of Port Arthur from China, and the construction of the Manchurian railway, linking it up with the great Siberian trunk line were held to threaten both the older sphere of British interests in the Yang-Tsze valley and the more recent German sphere of interests in the Shantung peninsula, created by the occupation and leasing of Kiaochow. Japan had been drawn for the first time towards Great Britain, when, before the Chinese- Japanese War, Lord Rosebery recognised her long contested right to emancipate herself gradually from the many servitudes imposed upon her by the Western Powers when they compelled her to emerge from her long seclusion and throw her ports open to intercourse with the outside^ world. She was again drawn, still more closely, towards Great Britain at the close of the Chinese-Japanese War, when the British Government refused to join with Russia, France and Germany in coercing her into a revision of the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the retrocession to China of the hard-won fruits of her victories in the Liaotang peninsula. Japan, therefore, welcomed the British occupa- tion and leasing of Wei-Hai-Wei as a reply to the Russian occupation and leasing of Port Arthur in 1898, and, according to Count Hayashi, Chamberlain, already at that time, assured Baron Kato, then Japanese Minister in London, that Great Britain was quite disposed to enter into an alliance. When, in September, 1899, the United States, alarmed by the creation by foreign Powers of spheres of interest, which, in the case of Russia especially, tended steadily to expand and to be converted into spheres of monopoly, invited all the Powers concerned to make joint Declarations that they would observe the principle of equal economic opportunity for all nationsT Great Britain and Japan again found themselves in complete agreement in ex- pressing their immediate and unequivocal adherence to that principle, 'hroughout the Boxer disturbances there was closer agreement between rreat Britain and Japan than between any other two Powers and more iendly and more intimate relations prevailed between British and ipanese, and, it may be added, American troops on the spot, than Jtween them and any of the other foreign contingents. The appointment of Prince Tuan, himself a professed Boxer, to le Presidency of the Tsungli-Yamen or Chinese Board of Foreign Pairs showed that the Chinese Court was either powerless or twilling to repress the Boxer movement, or to ensure even the 288 BOER WAR AND INTERNATIONAL SITUATION safety of the foreign Representatives in Peking. On June ioth, 1900, Sujiyama, a member of the Japanese Legation, was murdered in the streets of the capital, and, nine days later, the German Minister, Baron von Ketteler, had the same fate. It was clear that the relief of the Peking Legations and the restoration of order in Northern China could only be effected by a considerable force, to be supplied as far as possible by all the Powers whose interests and dignity were in this case equally affected. But to have awaited the arrival of contingents from each of the several countries concerned would have meant dangerous and possibly disastrous delays. Russia, who was bent upon playing her own game and was already overrunning the whole of Manchuria, would have been only too willing to take over the whole affair on her own account. But to this the other Powers werejjuite unprepared to consent, and she could not openly separate her cause fronTtheirs. She had 30,000 men in Manchuria alone, and, making a virtue of necessity, she supplied a contingent to cooperate with those of the other Powers, but on lines which she kept more or less distinct. Of the other Powers, Japan, owing to her geographical proximity, was in a position to give earliest assistance, and was ready to do so. British forces were hurried up from Hongkong and from India, and French troops from Tongking and Americans from the Philippines. Austria-Hungary and Italy were represented only by small detach- ments, to show the flag. Germany was determined to play a con- spicuous part ; but she was a long way off. A large expeditionary force was at last despatched under Field-marshal Count von Waldersee, for whom the Emperor ultimately, by a characteristic device, secured the supreme command, however nominal in some cases, over the international forces in Northern China. It only reached Tsientsin after the Peking Legations had been relieved, on August 13th, by other allied contingents, among whom the British and Japanese were the first to penetrate to the hard-pressed British Legation, the chief Euro- pean place of refuge and centre of resistance. The appearance of unity between the Powers became still more difficult to preserve when the main object of the operations had been attained and negotiations were reopened with the Dowager Empress, who had fled to Siyanfu. The German forces, though too late to join in the relief of the Legations, were at pains to act up to the injunctions given to them before they started by the Emperor, William II, that they should inspire such terror in the Chinese as would make them tremble for generations to come; and they carried out a series of THE "OPEN DOOR" IN CHINA 289 punitive expeditions west and south-west of Peking which gave the unfortunate population a foretaste of German methods of frightfnl- ness. The Russians completed ^conguest of Manchuria to the borders of Korea on the one hand and the treaty-port of Niu-Chwang on the other. Meanwhile, negotiations between Germany and Great Britain resulted, on October ifah, IQQQ, in an agreement upholding the principle of the open door in China (Article I), ^disclaiming territoriarndesigns upon China on thepart of the Contracting Powers (Article II), and declaring (Article Illjjhat In case of another Power making use of the complications in China_jn order to obtain under any form whatever territorial advantages, the two contracting parties reserve to themselves the right to come to a preliminary understanding as to the eventual jteps to be taken for the protection of their own interests in China. Of greater value than the actual provisions of the Convention was the visible demonstration it furnished of an understanding between the two Governments at a time when the relations between Great Britain and Germany were subjected to a severe strain by the South African War. Germany had given hostages to fortune by sending to Northern China a large expeditionary force dependent for its communica- tions and its safety upon the goodwill of Great Britain, who was in possession of all the chief coaling stations between German and Far Eastern waters, and still undisputed mistress of the seas. In these circumstances ,*tfieTConvention served actually to bind Germany over to abstention from any interference in South Africa, while the Ger- man Government construed it as a recognition of the community and equality of German and British rights in China, and notably in the Yang-Tsze valley, which the British had hitherto regarded as their own particular sphere. Japan was the first Power to adhere, on October 29th, to the principles embodied in the Convention, and France, Austria- Hungary, Italy and the United States followed suit, while Russia accompanied her acceptance of the principles with the sarcastic comment "that the Convention had not perceptibly modified the situation in China," or "infringed in any way the status quo established in China by existing Treaties." The trouble was to discover what were the existing Treaties which Russia had in mind ; for she had followed up her occupation of Manchuria by a series of Treaties with the Chinese of which the terms and scope were kept secret, or, when they leaked out, were neither affirmed nor denied in Petrograd. In Peking, the Russian Representative stood ostentatiously w.&g. m 19 29o BOER WAR AND INTERNATIONAL SITUATION aloof from those of the other Powers, and finally separated himself from them when they pressed for the punishment of a number of Chinese officials concerned in the worst Boxer excesses. While seeking by such means to ingratiate herself with the Chinese, Russia continued to press them to sign a Manchurian agreement which was intended to confirm her in the possession of the provinces which she had occupied under cover of the Boxer troubles. Nor did she cease to press her demands upon China when, on September 17th, 1901, the Peace Commission of the eleven Powers at last signed at Peking with the Chinese Plenipotentiaries the final Protocol for the resumption of friendly relations. Throughout this critical period Great Britain and Japan had acted in close accord diplomatically in resisting and encouraging China to resist Russian pressure ; and herein they had the general support of the United States. For Japan especially, much more than the future of Manchuria was at stake. She perceived that Manchuria would only be a starting-point for the Russian penetration of Korea, whose in- dependence, in the eyes of all Japanese statesmen, was an absolutely vital interest for Japan. She had gone to war with China in 1894 in order to put an end to Chinese suzerainty over Korea, and there had been ever since an acute struggle between Russia and Japan at Seoul for ascendancy over the Korean Court. British statesmen were equally convinced that, so long as Russia remained in possession of Manchuria, she would completely dominate the Chinese Court at Peking, to the detriment of British influence and interests. In the diplomatic contest at Peking the German Representative had, in most cases, cooperated with the British, Japanese and American, rather than with the Russian Representative, and he had insisted stoutly and successfully on the despatch of a Chinese Prince to Berlin to do penance before the Emperor for the murder of Baron von Ketteler. During the negotiations for an alliance between Germany and Great Britain, the German Government had been the first to suggest that Japan should be drawn into it as an ally whose military support in the Far East would be of immense value to Great Britain in the event of a conflict with Russia. Baron von Eckardstein himself, in March, 1901, broached the question with the Japanese Minister in London, Count Hayashi, who had long been anxious to bring about an alliance between his country and Great Britain. Count Hayashi was quick to take the hint, and, having obtained authority from Tokio to sound the British Government, he made the first overtures DIFFERENCES CONCERNING MANCHURIA 291 to Lord Lansdowne on April 17th, 1901. The British Secretary of State gave him every encouragement, and, with the approval of Lord Salisbury and of King Edward himself, cordial conversations followed, in which the idea of a formal alliance was accepted on both sides in principle, so that only an agreement as to the actual terms remained for discussion. It was not, however, till October 16th that these negotiations entered upon a formal and final stage. By that time, fresh difficulties were hampering the progress of the Anglo- German negotiations. When the Germans found British Ministers eager to respond to the suggestion that Japan should be brought into the alliance, they began to fear that Great Britain might conclude an alliance with Japan before concluding one with Germany and would then possibly feel less anxious to bind herself to the latter. They therefore suggested that not till after the conclusion of the Anglo- German alliance should Japan be invited by Great Britain to join it. This point was left in abeyance, and a far more serious obstacle to an Anglo- German understanding arose when the British Government, invoking the Anglo-German Agreement of 1900, requested the German Government to support its protest at Petrograd against Russian action in regard to Manchuria. Germany maintained that China, as referred to in Article III of the Convention, meant only the eighteen provinces of China proper and did not include Manchuria, which was merely a Chinese dependency outside the Great Wall. Both sides insisted on their own interpretation, Germany being determined not to jeopardise her friendship with Russia by supporting the British interpretation against her. The Anglo-German negotiations broke down altogether as other circumstances revived the antagonism between the two countries; so that, when Count Hayashi bluntly asked Lord Lansdowne what were his plans with regard to including Germany in the alliance, the Secretary of State replied that he thought the best way was for Japan and Great Britain to carry on their own negotiations and to defer inviting Germany to join till later, if lecessary. The question of including her in the alliance was never in revived. But, just at this stage, the British Government learnt with some irprise and alarm that Prince Ito, the foremost of all the Japanese Elder Statesmen," had arrived in Europe from Japan on his way Petrograd. It was under Prince Ito's own Administration that !ount Hayashi had made the first overtures for an alliance with Great Britain, and he was known to have expressed complete agreement 19 — 2 292 BOER WAR AND INTERNATIONAL SITUATION with his successor, Count Katsura, when the latter proposed to pursue the same policy. Count Hayashi, who was left in complete ignorance of the purpose of Prince Ito's Mission to Europe, found himself in a position of great embarrassment, as there was no doubt that the Elder Statesman intended to sound the Russian Government as to the possibility of a direct understanding between Japan and Russia. Prince Ito was not alone among Japanese statesmen in be- lieving that a Russian alliance might be preferable to one with Great Britain, since the conclusion of the former could, they thought, alone avert an actual conflict between Japan and Russia, while that of the latter would merely place Japan in a much stronger position for hazarding such a conflict if Russia made it inevitable. The Japanese Government felt, however, that the negotiations with Great Britain had advanced too far by the time Prince Ito reached Europe for him to be left a free hand at Petrograd; and, though he proceeded to the Russian capital, and had several conferences with Russian Ministers, nothing came of them. Whatever views he may have entertained, they had not prevailed in the Council of Elder Statesmen held before the Throne at Tokio on December 7th, which decided unanimously in favour of the Anglo-Japanese alliance; and, after communications had passed between London and Tokio with regard to a few relatively unimportant modifications in the original draft, the Anglo- Japanese Agreement was actually signed by Lord Lansdowne and Count Hayashi on January 30th, 1902. Article I of the Agreement declared : "The High Contracting Parties, having mutually recognised the inde- pendence of China and Korea, declare themselves to be entirely unin- fluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in view, however, their special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically, as well as commercially and industrially, in Korea, the High Contracting Parties recognise that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests, if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Korea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subject." Under Article II Great Britain and Japan undertook that if, in defence of their respective interests as above described, either of them should become involved in war with another Power, the other ally would maintain a strict neutrality and use his efforts to prevent others from joining in hostilities against his ally. THE ANGLO-JAPANESE AGREEMENT 293 Article III provided that, should any other Power or Powers join in hostilities against that ally, the other was to come to His assistance and conduct war in common and make peace in mutual agreement with him. Under Article IV both parties agreed that neither of them should without consulting the other enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the interests above described. And, under Article V, that the two Governments should communicate with one another fully and frankly whenever, in the opinion of either, the above-mentioned interests were in jeopardy. Article VI stipulated that the agreement should remain in force for five years from the date of its signature, when it was to come at once into effect, and afterwards until the expiration of one year from the date on which either Power should have denounced it ; but in no case was it to expire while either ally was actually engaged in war, the alliance continuing ipso facto until peace was concluded. Though merely called an " Agreement,' ' this instrument was in fact a formal treaty of defensive alliance, the first under which Great Britain had in modern times contracted obligations of such a nature for a term of years. No less remarkable was the fact that this Alliance was concluded with an Asiatic Power which, less than fifty years earlier, was still shut off by its own laws from all intercourse with the outside world, and which had only recently emerged from its seclusion and passed from medieval into modern civilisation under actual coercion by the Western Powers. The effects were far-reaching. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance did not avert the conflict between Russia and Japan which the inordinate ambitions of the former Power, steadily encouraged from Berlin, had already rendered inevitable ; but the knowledge that Great Britain would stand by Japan if any other Power joined with Russia, confined the War to a duel between the two protagonists. If it helped Japan to achieve by force of arms a position of great ascendancy in the Far East, not altogether free from danger, as regards the integrity and independence of a distracted and enfeebled China, it placed Great Britain in a position to exercise a restraining influence over Japanese statesmen, and the very defeat which it enabled Japan to inflict upon Russia served to open the eyes )f Russian statesmen to the real trend of German policy and to ;nder them more responsive than they had shown themselves before to British overtures — backed henceforth by the friendly advice of ieir French allies — for a settlement of Asiatic differences. CHAPTER V CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 I. Great Britain and Germany, 1 902-1 905 ON the termination of hostilities in South Africa it appeared as if something of the old friendliness between Great Britain and Germany might be restored. In September, 1902, Lord Roberts and the Secretary for War, Mr Brodrick (afterwards Viscount Midleton), accepted an invitation to the German autumn manoeuvres. In October, the Kaiser declined to receive the Boer Generals, who had come to Europe to collect funds for their stricken fellow-countrymen, unless they were presented by the British Ambassador — a condition which they declined to accept1. In November, the Kaiser paid a family visit to Sandringham for King Edward's birthday, and the Prime-Minister, Lord Lansdowne and Mr Chamberlain were invited to meet him. Two days later, at the Guildhall banquet, Mr Balfour referred scornfully to the "fantastic imaginings " of the newspapers with regard to the visit; but it was speedily followed by armed cooperation against a recalcitrant South American State. Venezuela had long enjoyed unenviable notoriety for the frequency of its revolutions ; and the civil turmoil inevitably involved the sub- jects of Foreign Powers. At the opening of the new century, the country was in the grip of President Castro, who showed as little consideration for the Great Powers as for the rebels who challenged his rule. The series of incidents which were to goad Great Britain to action opened in February, 1901 , with the seizure of four vessels which had taken refuge in a storm on an island off the coast of Trinidad2. "Very serious notice should be taken," wrote the Governor to Lord Lansdowne, " otherwise neither life nor property will be safe in those parts of the island nearest the mainland." Other outrages quickly followed on Venezuelan soil. While Downing Street was addressing futile protests to Caracas, the Government of Venezuela retaliated with a complaint which recalled the Alabama controversy. At the end of 1 90 1 the Ban-Righ, a British vessel, was bought by Columbia; 1 The Kaiser was anxious to receive them, but yielded to urgent advice from England. See Eckardstein, Lebefiserinnerungen, II. 405-10. 2 See Venezuela, No. 1, 1903. VENEZUELA 295 and Venezuela urged the British authorities to detain her, suspecting that she would be employed to carry arms to the rebels. Lord Cran- borne, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, cogently replied that, since the Columbian Minister had declared the vessel to have been bought for his Government, and, since Columbia was not at war with Venezuela or any other State, it would constitute an act of war against Columbia to prevent her sailing. Accordingly, she sailed from a British port under a British flag to Antwerp, where she was laden with arms and ammunition. On reaching Martinique, she took on board a Venezuelan rebel, was handed over to the Columbian Govern- ment, and was proclaimed a pirate by Venezuela. After being em- ployed for a few weeks in acts of hostility against Venezuela, during which she was observed to fly the British flag, she arrived in a damaged condition at Trinidad, under Columbian colours, on March 23rd, 1902. For her depredations President Castro held the British Government responsible, stubbornly refusing to discuss British grievances till he had received satisfaction. Meanwhile, a British schooner was boarded and destroyed by a Venezuelan gunboat, and another vessel was confiscated on suspicion of carrying arms, her crew being put ashore in a destitute condition. On July 29th, Lord Lansdowne instructed the British Minister at Caracas to warn the Government that, unless it assured him that similar incidents would not recur and promptly paid compensation, the British Government would take such steps as might be necessary to secure reparation. Castro replied that claims could not be dis- cussed till the Ban-Righ question was settled, and repeated his old complaint that the Trinidad authorities had shown favour to the rebels. On receiving this reply, Lord Lansdowne requested the Admiralty to suggest "the most effectual and convenient manner of putting pressure on the Venezuelan Government.' ' The Admiralty replied that the North American and West Indies fleet could blockade selected ports in November, when the unhealthy season would be over. Convinced that Castro's obstinacy would yield to force alone, Lord Lansdowne welcomed support from other victims of Venezuelan misrule. He informed the German Ambassador, who broached the subject in conversation, that we intended to obtain satisfaction for the claims of British subjects, and that we should be quite ready to confer with the German Government with a view to joint action. The Ambassador replied that a joint naval demonstration might perhaps be undertaken; and, on October 22nd, a Foreign Office 296 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 Memorandum to the German Government officially invited co- operation. On November nth, Count Wolff-Metternich replied that Germany would support the warning to Venezuela, and agreed to our suggestion that the first step should be to seize the Venezuelan gunboats. Each Power should uphold the demands of the other. On the same day the Foreign Secretary telegraphed a final warning to Caracas, and instructed the British Ambassador at Washington to inform the Secretary of State of the British grievances and of the steps in contemplation1. John Hay replied that, though he regretted that European Powers should employ force against Central or South America, the United States could not object to their obtaining redress for injuries, provided that they aimed at no acquisition of territory. When, at the eleventh hour, Italy announced her desire to cooperate, Lord Lansdowne replied that there was no time for fixing the conditions of her conjunction, but that she might send a ship to join in the blockade. France, on the other hand, informed the British Government that the seizure of the customs, part of which had been earmarked for French creditors, would prejudice French interests; to which the Foreign Secretary replied that French interests should not suffer. To the warning of November nth Castro rejoined, as usual, that, far from there existing grievances on the part of Great Britain against Venezuela, the latter had serious grounds of complaint in the case of the Ban-Righ and the partisanship of Trinidad. This parrot-like response swept away the last hesitation, and on December 7th the British and German Ministers at Caracas presented ultimata. Even now the incorrigible Castro merely repeated his reply of November 14th, adding that the Treasury was empty. When the warships in the harbour of La Guayra were seized and the coast blockaded, he retaliated by arresting British and German subjects in Caracas, but quickly liberated them on the intervention of the Minister of the United States. In a flaming Manifesto the President denounced the attack as barbarous and cowardly; but, on December nth, he invited the United States Minister to propose that Great Britain and Ger- many should submit their claims arising out of the insurrection to arbitration. Since the offer only applied to a portion of the Allied claims, the coercion continued. Lord Lansdowne, however, accepted arbitration in principle, and expressed the hope that President 1 The American side of the Venezuelan incident is told in J. B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, vol. I. ch. 20, and Thayer, Life of John Hay, II. 284-90. VENEZUELA 297 Roosevelt himself would act as arbitrator. The President was not unwilling, and Castro agreed to the choice. The American Secretary of State, however, dissuaded the President from acceptance, and pro- posed a reference to -the Hague Tribunal, which was adopted by all the parties concerned. The blockade continued till February 13th, when Venezuela signed a Treaty recognising the British claims in principle, and under- took to pay at once those arising from the seizure and plundering of British vessels. Secondary demands were to be referred to a mixed Commission consisting of a British and a Venezuelan Representative, with an Umpire appointed by President Roosevelt. The Hague Tribunal was to decide whether the claims of the blockading Powers should have priority, as they demanded, or whether all the claimants should be on the same footing. Venezuela undertook to assign 30 per cent, of the customs of her two chief ports, and new arrangements were made for meeting the bondholders' interest. The Tribunal met in October to settle the question of priority, and the British con- tention was accepted. Though the British and German Governments cooperated har- moniously throughout the winter, their association was viewed by large sections of British opinion with profound distaste, and Ministers took pains to minimise their commitments. There was no alliance, declared Lord Cranborne; and Lord Balfour of Burleigh spoke of "a mere casual cooperation for a specific purpose and a limited time." The hostility shown was noted in Germany with surprise and resent- ment. "We have acted in full agreement and perfect loyalty," declared the Chancellor in the Reichstag1. "All the more curious is the hostility of a portion of the British Press, which is only explicable by a certain embitterment resulting from the violent attacks of the Continental Press during the Boer War. I am glad to say that no change has occurred in the relations between the monarchs and the Cabinets, who meet in the old friendly manner." The end of the partnership, however, left the relations of the two countries less satisfactory. "The suggestion for common action," writes Count Bernstorff, at that time Secretary to the German Embassy, "came from England; but we should have been wiser not to listen to it2." t American opinion, though deeply suspicious of German designs :nce a German squadron had been sent to Manila during the War of 898, had not become seriously incensed against the action of Great 1 Biilow, Reden, vol. i. January 19th, 1903. a My Three Years in America, p. 13. 298 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 Britain. Our avowed sympathy with the United States in the Spanish- American War, followed by the voluntary surrender in 1901 of our rights under the Clayton- Bui wer Treaty, had healed the smart of the crisis of 1 896, and made it possible for controversies, whether old or new, to be settled in an amicable spirit. When the blockade of Venezuela was over, the discussion of the treaties relating to the Alaska Boundary was resumed1. The discovery of gold in Klondike necessitated an exact delimitation; but negotiations, which began in 1898, proved fruitless, owing to the claim put forward by Lord Herschell, the British Commissioner. A proposal by Lord Salisbury in 1899 to refer the controversy to arbitration was declined by the United States, mindful of the unfavourable award in the case of the Seal Fisheries. The question slumbered till 1903, when Roosevelt warned the British Cabinet that, if the negotiations again fell through, he would establish the Boundary as the United States claimed it, adding that, while ready to discuss the minor issues, he would not agree to Arbitration on the large sections of Alaska demanded by Canada, and that the Canadian claim to deep water was indefensible. The British Govern- ment appointed Lord Alverstone, who, while the two Canadian Com- missioners maintained their full claims, was compelled by the evidence to accept the main contentions of the three American Delegates. The adoption of the American standpoint by the Lord Chief Justice in October, 1903, confirmed the belief in British goodwill, and, in the President's words, removed the last obstacle to absolute agreement between the two peoples. In the following year, Hay concluded Treaties of Arbitration with Great Britain and other Powers, referring to the Hague Tribunal matters not affecting territory, honour or vital interests, after the Contracting Parties had concluded an agreement defining the dispute. The Senate, however, jealous of its power, substituted the word " treaty" for "agreement," thus retaining in its hands the power to permit or forbid arbitration. This denoted a step backwards, since no dispute could be referred without a special treaty ; and the President naturally vetoed the amendment. The failure of his last effort for peace wrung from the Secretary of State a cry of distress. A treaty entering the Senate, he complained, was like a bull entering the arena. No one could say when the fatal blow would fall ; but it was certain that it would never leave the arena alive. His efforts, however, were 1 See Thayer, Life of John Hay, n. 203-13; Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 1. ch. 23. THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 299 not thrown away ; for the relations both of the Governments and the peoples became more and more friendly. Early in 1907, the British Cabinet paid the United States the compliment of sending James Bryce to Washington ; and the hoary dispute relating to the status of American fishermen in the waters of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia was, shortly after, referred to the Hague. The Venezuelan adventure was scarcely concluded, when the British Government was confronted with a problem of far greater importance to Anglo- German relations. Despite British predomi- nance in Constantinople for a generation after the Crimean War, only a few short railways were built in Asia Minor; and it was not till 1888, when Constantinople was linked up with Central Europe, that the project of a trunk line through Asiatic Turkey took practical shape1. In return for a loan, a German group, headed by the Deutsche Bank, obtained a Concession for 99 years to administer the line of 57 miles from Haidar-Pasha (opposite the capital) to Ismid, and to continue it to Angora, with a substantial kilometric guarantee and preferential right of extension. Angora was reached in 1892; and in 1893, in return for another loan, a concession was granted from Eski-Shehr (midway between Haidar-Pasha and Angora) to Konia, which was reached in 1896. By 1899 Germany had won the complete confidence of the Sultan, and the Anatolian Railways Company secured in principle a Concession to the Persian Gulf. Some London financiers had been associated with the German concessionaires in 1888, and in 1899 Chamberlain remarked to the Kaiser, on his visit to London, that he would like to see Great Britain cooperating with German enterprise in Hither Asia. But, while French financiers took shares in 1899, German efforts to secure British assistance were unavailing. The attempt was renewed in February, 1901, when, however, G. vOn Siemens, Director of the Deutsche Bank, returned empty-handed from a journey to London. On January 1st, 1902, the Company received a Concession for 99 rears to build a railway from Konia to the Gulf, with a kilometric larantee of 12,000 francs, and 4500 francs for working expenses, the security was not yet specified and no terminus was selected, lis document was merely a preliminary outline. The final Con- mtion was signed on March 5th, 1903, extending the line from ionia to Basra, via Adana, Mosul and Bagdad, with branches to 1 The story of the project and of Anglo-German negotiations was related by an icial of the Foreign Office in The Quarterly Review, October, 19 17. 3oo CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 Aleppo, Urfa, Khanikin and other cities north and south of the main line, and with preferential rights to build lines to the coast between Mersina and Tripolis in Syria. The Concession included conditional permission to work all minerals within twenty kilometres each side of the railway, to construct ports at Bagdad and Basra, and to navigate the rivers in the service of the railway. It was a magnificent gift, which required British goodwill to turn it to full account. On April 8th, in answer to a complaint from Mr Gibson Bowles that the Government were hanging on to the skirts of German financiers, the Prime-Minister (Mr Balfour) admitted that the matter was under consideration. Germany had suggested that British capital and control should be equal to that of any other Power ; that Great Britain should sanction the increase of the Turkish customs; that the Indian mails should be carried by the railway, and that we should employ our good offices to secure a terminus at or near Koweit. Whether or not we cooperated, he argued, the railway would be built. German and French financiers were in agreement, and we had to consider whether it was desirable that the shortest route to India should be entirely in foreign hands; whether the terminus should be at Koweit, within our own sphere of influence ; and, finally, whether British trade would benefit if British capital were represented. "I think that this great international artery," he con- cluded, "should be in the hands of three Powers rather than of two or one. It is to our interest that countries which we cannot absorb should not be absorbed by others." This announcement, which clearly indicated the leanings of the Prime-Minister, stimulated the campaign against cooperation; and on April 23rd he informed the House that the invitation had been declined. The Cabinet had desired the whole line, including the portion already constructed, to be inter- national, with equal rates, equal powers of control, construction and management for Germany, Great Britain and France. The German proposals did not offer sufficient security for the maintenance of these principles, and we were therefore unable to meet their wishes in regard to the Indian mails, a terminus at Koweit, or the appro- priation of an increase of the customs duties to the kilometric guarantee. It was quite true that the German proposals did not afford the "absolute equality" which we demanded; but it was hardly to be expected that the nation which had planned the great enterprise and taken its risks would accept a position which gave the majority of CANADIAN PREFERENCE 301 shares — carrying with them the power of control — to Great Britain and France. The Cabinet was well aware of the unpopularity of the Venezuela partnership, and knew that their followers would scrutinise with a jealous eye any renewal of the association. In asking so high a price for cooperation it virtually declined the invitation. It was a momentous decision, and has been judged in very different ways. It was greeted by Unionist opinion with relief, as an escape from the embrace of a Power whose ambitions were beginning to cause appre- hension; and we may add that it prevented the completion of the Bagdad Railway by 19 14. On the other hand, it was regretted by so stalwart a champion of an Anglo- German understanding as Sir Frank Lascelles, the British Ambassador at Berlin, as a needless widening of the gulf that had already opened between the two nations. The Bagdad discussions were quickly followed by the revival of a troublesome controversy. The grant by Canada in 1897 of a prefer- ence of 33 J per cent, on imports from the Mother-country had led to formal protests from Belgium and Germany against the breach of most-favoured-nation treatment. Lord Salisbury had replied by giving the year's notice required to terminate the Treaties and sug- gested a new agreement, allowing the self-governing Colonies to make their own arrangements for inter-imperial trade. According to German law, the general or higher Tariff automatically came into force on the termination of a commercial treaty; but in 1898 the German Government, in order to afford time for negotiations, con- tinued most-favoured-nation treatment for a year to every part of the British empire except Canada1. This provisional arrangement was renewed in 1899, 1900 and 1901, the law of the last named year pro- longing the provisorium till the end of 1903. On March 18th, 1903, Lord Lansdowne enquired what action Germany intended to take after December 31st. Baron Richthofen, the Foreign Secretary, replied that he hoped to prolong most-favoured- nation treatment to Great Britain, but that, if Germany were differ- entiated against in important parts of the empire, and if, in particular, louth Africa followed the example of Canada, he was doubtful whether public opinion would sanction it. At this point, a new element discord was introduced by the insertion of a clause in the Canadian 'ariff imposing a surtax of 10 per cent, on the goods of any country rhich discriminated against imports from Canada. In explaining this 1 See Correspondence with the Governments of Belgium and Germany, 1903. 'd. 1630. 302 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 decision Lord Lansdowne pointed out that it was only taken after the failure of every effort to secure fair treatment of Canadian produce, and would be revoked if Germany restored most-favoured-nation terms. Should the German Government persist in their attitude, and extend to the products of other British Colonies, and even to those of the United Kingdom, the discrimination which they had enforced against Canada, a very serious issue would inevitably be raised, involving the fiscal relations of the two countries. Each country had a grievance against the other, and on June 27th the German Foreign Secretary set forth his case in a lengthy despatch. The maintenance of the lower Tariff after the denunciation of the Treaty of 1865, he argued, revealed a special desire to meet the wishes of Great Britain, and the application of the General Tariff to Canada, far from inflicting a penalty, was merely the automatic consequence of the expiration of the Treaty. If the British Colonies were free to determine their own customs policy, other countries must be allowed to treat them as separate customs entities. The responsibility for the initiation and aggravation of the conflict could not be laid on Germany; but the Government was ready for an exchange of ideas, and would leave it to Great Britain to make suitable proposals. To this apologia Lord Lansdowne despatched a spirited rejoinder. Canada had not increased the duties on German goods or treated Germany differently from other countries. She had been made to suffer because she refused to extend to Germany, as to all other foreign Powers, a special concession made to the Mother- country. If it were true that the Colonies were independent customs units, which foreign Powers were at liberty to treat as such, it followed that no responsibility could attach to Great Britain in consequence of their acts. Having thus given vent to his indignation at the threat to punish the Mother-country for the generosity of one of her children, the Foreign Secretary concluded by promising to approach any dis- cussion of the difference in a most conciliatory spirit. Since, however, the British market was too valuable to risk for considerations of logic or pride, and since German trade with Canada continued to increase despite the preference, no more was heard of retaliation. The con- troversy, none the less, had added to the store of ill-will which was steadily accumulating between the two nations. The main cause of Anglo-German tension in the years following the Boer War was neither Venezuela, nor the Bagdad Railway, nor Canadian Preference, nor commercial rivalry, but the resolve of THE GERMAN FLEET 303 Germany to build a formidable Fleet. British anger at the Kruger telegram of 1896, declares Reventlow, converted Germany to the idea of a Fleet1. In 1898, a small programme of construction to be carried out by 1904 was accepted by the Reichstag, and the German Navy League was founded. Little interest, however, was aroused till the Boer War, when the Kaiser utilised the excitement created by the stoppage of German vessels on the east coast of Africa to secure acceptance of an enlarged programme to be completed by 19 17. The decision of 1900 brought Germany into what German publicists describe as the danger-zone; and in his political apologia, Imperial Germany, Biilow claims credit for careful steering. When Bebel quoted in the Reichstag articles by naval officers arguing that the fleet must be strong enough to defeat England, the Chancellor dis- missed them as rubbish to which no sensible German paid attention. Even when the programme of 1900 was completed, he pointed out, the German Navy would only stand fourth or fifth on the list; and it harboured no aggressive designs2. In July, 1904, King Edward visited his nephew at Kiel. Among the guests was Count SeckendorfT, formerly Chamberlain of the Empress Frederick, and a friend of both King Edward and Biilow. Finding that the King considered the Chancellor hostile to Great Britain, SeckendorfT informed the latter, who promptly forwarded a copy of the newly published volume of his speeches with the passages relating to England marked. In an inter- view sought by a British journalist in November3, the Chancellor continued his efforts to dissipate the suspicion of his policy and character. He consented to see Mr Bashford, so he explained to the Reichstag on December 5th, because in recent months certain British publicists had sown tares in the garden of Anglo-German relations. The fleet was purely defensive. I cannot imagine that the thought of a war can be seriously entertained by sensible people. So I do not take the enmities of a section of the English Press too tragically. I hope the destinies of both countries will always be guided by cool heads who know that England and Germany, not only now but for ever, are best served by the preservation of the present peaceful relations. The rumour that he was personally hostile to England he dismissed as unintelligible4. 1 Deutschland's Auswdrtige Politik, p. 96. 2 Reden, January 22nd, 1903. 3 Published in the Kolnische Zeitung and The Nineteenth Century, and reprinted in Biilow, Reden, 11. 393-400. 4 Hammann (Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges, pp. 144-5) relates that Biilow desired Germany's navy to consist mainly of defensive units, as advocated by Admiral Galster, but that Tirpitz insisted on capital ships. 304 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 Official assurances failed to dispel the anxiety of the British Government, which was fostered, not only by the Navy Law of 1900, but by provocative utterances of the Kaiser, who styled himself Admiral of the Atlantic, and of certain of his subjects. It was owing to the danger anticipated from a new quarter that it was decided, in 1903, to construct a first-class naval base at Rosyth; that the Cawdor programme of four battleships annually was sanctioned, and that Sir John Fisher, on his appointment as First Sea Lord in 1904, pro- ceeded drastically to overhaul the distribution and composition of the British Fleet. Our relations with France and the United States had by this time become cordial ; the Russian Fleet sailed away to its doom at Tsushima, and the Japanese Alliance safeguarded our interests in the Far East. The North Pacific and South Atlantic squadrons were accordingly abolished, the Mediterranean and China Fleets were almost denuded of battleships, and the Channel Fleet was strengthened. An Atlantic Fleet, resting on Gibraltar, was planned, and a home fleet was due to appear in the North Sea in 1906. Obsolete ships were scrapped; and, in October, 1905, the Dreadnought, the largest and most heavily armed vessel in the world, was laid down. Long before Great Britain had begun to suspect the ulterior designs of the German Navy, fleetless Germany had felt alarm at the irresistible strength of our Fleet; and her apprehensions were strengthened by occasional indiscretions in the British Press. In 1897, an article in The Saturday Review contended that, if Germany could be swept away to-morrow, every Englishman would be the richer. This mischievous nonsense attracted no attention in England ; but it was diligently exploited to whip up enthusiasm for a Fleet. In 1904, an article in The Army and Navy Gazette, suggesting that Great Britain should veto any further increase of the German warships, was accepted in Germany as the authentic voice of the Admiralty. Early in 1905 a still more threatening note was struck by a member of the Ministry. In explaining to his constituents the object and result of the policy of concentrating our Fleet in home waters, Mr Arthur Lee, Civil Lord of the Admiralty, urged his hearers to turn their face from France and the Mediterranean to the North Sea. If war were declared, it would be possible to strike the first blow before the other party read the news in the papers. The speaker in vain complained that he was misreported and misunderstood. The Kaiser complained to the British Ambassador1, and large sections of German opinion began to believe that their country was threatened by a See Baron Greindl's despatch of February 18th, Belgische Aktenstilcke, p. 3. THE GERMAN FLEET 305 sudden attack. The construction of the Dreadnought intensified the feeling of danger and impotence. " I was besieged by a demand for a large increase to meet British threats," writes Tirpitz1. "Even the Kaiser favoured propaganda by the Navy League and wished me to reduce the life of our big ships, which was longer than elsewhere. I resisted this and offered my resignation. My Bill of March, 1906, added the six large cruisers which had been refused in 1900, and obtained money to widen the Kiel Canal, through which Dreadnoughts could not pass." The naval rivalry entered on a new and more dangerous stage, and each Admiralty attributed aggressive designs to the other. A speech by the Prime-Minister on May 4th, 1905, explaining the views of the newly-founded Committee of Imperial Defence, contributed in some degree to tranquillise opinion. The Army and Navy, explained Mr Balfour, should be concentrated so far as possible ; but experts had decided that, even if the Regular Army were abroad and our organised fleets at a distance, an invasion would not be attempted with less than 70,000 men, and could not reach London. In the following month Lord Roberts issued an appeal to make rifle-shooting "a national pursuit. " Failing Conscription, he argued, the security of the State depended on the ability of the nation thus to take up arms in self-defence. He appealed for £100,000 to promote rifle clubs ; but the slender response showed that the German danger was not yet taken seriously by the people at large. II. Great Britain and France, 1902-1904 While our relations with Berlin were drifting from bad to worse, London and Paris made up their quarrel. Delcasse had informed his first visitor at the Quai d'Orsay of his intention to restore cordial relations2; and the decision to evacuate Fashoda cleared the ground for a new orientation. His views were shared by M. Paul Cambon, whom he transferred from Constantinople to London shortly after the Fashoda crisis, and whose first task here was to delimit boundaries in North Africa. "The work," he declared before leaving London in 19213, "went quickly and smoothly, for Lord Salisbury knew his own mind. . . .Then I suggested that there were several other matters which might be settled in an equally friendly spirit. He shook his head and smiled. ' I have the greatest confidence in M. Delcasse/ he 1 Memoirs, vol. I. ch. 15. 2 Stephane Lauzanne, The Fortnightly Review, February, 191 8. 3 See the interview in The Times, December 22nd, 1920. w.&g.iii 20 306 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 said, 'and also in your present Government. But in a few months' time they will probably be overturned, and their successors will do exactly the contrary. No, we must wait a bit.' " To the soreness created by Fashoda and the Dreyfus case a new irritant was added by the Boer War ; but the advocates of reconcilia- tion abated neither hope nor effort. Work of enduring importance was accomplished by Sir Thomas Barclay, who by long residence had won for himself a distinct place in the life of the French capital, and to whom it occurred that it would be of service to the good cause if the British Chambers of Commerce were invited to meet in Paris in 1900. The meeting was a great success, and English visitors flocked to the Exhibition. Though Kruger's visit took place shortly after, the seed had been sown, and the gross caricatures of Queen Victoria in the French illustrated papers disappeared. No decisive advance, however, was possible while Lord Salisbury's influence was supreme and the Boer War in progress, and Delcasse remarked impatiently to Sir Thomas Barclay that it was hopeless to try to conciliate England. Salisbury withdrew into private life on July 12th, 1902, full of years and honours, and Lord Lansdowne now obtained a free hand. "I told him of my talk with Lord Salisbury," records M. Paul Cambon, " and suggested the subjects on which I should have liked to negotiate an agreement. He asked me whether he might make a note of them, but I said he need not trouble, as I would write him a letter. Next evening, at a dinner-party at Buckingham Palace, I was placed next King Edward, who said, 'Lansdowne has shewn me your letter. It is excellent. You must go on. I have told the Prince of Wales about it. You can discuss it also with him.' After dinner, the Prince spoke to me eagerly of the letter, and said what a good thing it would be if we could have a general agreement. He wanted to know when it would be concluded. I told him we could not go quite so fast as he might wish." The Ambassador's conversations with Chamberlain and Lord Lansdowne in 1902 indeed brought about no agreement. In the spring of 1903 King Edward set forth in his yacht on the first foreign tour of his reign, and, after visiting Lisbon and Rome he reached Paris on May 1st, for the first time for more than three years1. "The visit was his own idea," testifies Cambon. One day Lord Lansdowne told me that on the way back from the Mediterranean the King wished to stay in Paris. I asked whether it would be an official visit, and said that, however unofficial it might be, the President 1 The King's journeys are chronicled by J. A. Farrer, England under Edward VII. KING EDWARD IN PARIS 307 would at least have to ask him to dinner. Lord Lansdowne thought it would be quite an informal affair, and shewed some apprehension as to how he would be received. I informed my Government, and Lord Monson was not a little astonished by an enquiry from the Quai d'Orsay as to how the King would wish to be received. He telegraphed to the King, who answered that he desired his reception to be as official as possible, and that the more honours that were paid to him the better. So I went to Paris to help in arranging matters. Before Lord Monson started to meet the King, I suggested that he should advise him to make a little speech at the first opportunity and to say how much he always felt at home in Paris. When he arrived at the Bois de Boulogne station, the crowd was enormous and respectful, but a trifle cold; but after he had made his speech at the British Chamber of Commerce the whole atmosphere changed. He won the hearts of the Parisians in a day. Without King Edward the Entente might never have been made1. The President of the Republic was equally anxious for cordial rela- tions and equally willing to run risks. "I had misgivings about the expediency of a visit," confesses Sir Thomas Barclay, "for, though the Entente had been ardently and successfully championed through- out provincial France, the fierce passions, which in Paris had developed into an over-sensitive patriotism, had not calmed down. When the President sent for me, I suggested that the visit should wait until next year. 'Impossible/ replied M. Loubet; 'the King wishes it. I know the danger ; but I shall send for the leaders and tell them he is not responsible for the acts of his Ministers, and that he has been always a friend of France2.' " The speech, which won the heart of France, struck a personal note rare in royal utterances. "It is scarcely necessary to tell you with what sincere pleasure I find myself once more in Paris, to which, as you know, I have paid very frequent visits with ever-increasing pleasure, and for which I feel an attachment fortified by so many happy and ineffaceable memories. The days of hostility between the two countries are, I am certain, happily at an end. I know of no two countries whose prosperity is more interdependent. There may have been misunderstandings and causes of dissension in the past; but that is all happily over and forgotten. The friendship of the two countries is my constant preoccupation, and I count on you all, who enjoy French hospitality in their magnificent city, to aid me to reach this goal." The visit terminated the acute stage of the estrangement between the two countries. "A new Triple Alliance is in process of 1 See The Times, December 22nd, 1920. 2 Barclay, Anglo-French Reminiscences, pp. 219-220. 20—2 3o8 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 formation," reported Eckardstein from Paris to the German Chan- cellor1. King Edward's share in the momentous transformation which followed has, no doubt, been exaggerated by foreign observers, ignorant of the working of British institutions. "The King," writes Lord Sanderson, "did much to promote an atmosphere of goodwill; but he did not start the notion nor take any active part in the details2." "His visit gave a great impetus to the movement," records Lord Lansdowne in his official survey of the influences which were to produce the agreements of 1904. But even these guarded tributes secure him honourable mention among the architects of the entente cordiale. Three months later, President Loubet returned the King's visit, and was lodged at St James's Palace — the first French Chief of the State to cross the Channel since Napoleon III. "I hope," declared the royal host with a warmth unusual on such occasions, "that the welcome you have received today has convinced you of the true friendship, indeed I will say the affection, which my country feels for France. I shall never forget the reception that was recently given to me, and the sentiments which I now express are those which I have always entertained. I hope our countries will always retain the most intimate relations and the deepest friendship." The toast of the Lord Mayor at the Guildhall was no less cordial. " Now we have shaken hands in the firm intention of letting no cloud obscure the path we have marked out, is it too much to hope that our statesmen will find means of removing for ever the horrible possibility of a war between the two peoples who have so many common interests, and whose hopes and aspirations are the same?" The reference of the Lord Mayor to removing the possibility of war was inspired by an Arbitration Convention at that moment in course of negotiation. The first documentary symbol of the rapprochement was due to Sir Thomas Barclay and Baron d'Estournelles de Constant. On July 16th a formula approved by the French Cabinet was presented at Downing Street: " Differences of a juridical order, particularly those relating to difficulties of interpretation of existing conventions, shall — provided they affect neither the vital interests nor the honour of the Contracting Powers and cannot be solved through diplomatic channels — be submitted to the permanent Court of Arbitration in accordance with Article 16 of the Hague Convention." 1 Eckardstein, Erinnerungen, n. 425. * Memorandum on M. Cambon's interview in The Times, December 22nd, 1920. EGYPT AND MOROCCO 309 The formula was approved by the Cabinet, and the Treaty was signed on October 14th. In welcoming M. Delcasse\ who had accompanied President Loubet to London in July, Lord Lansdowne observed: "And now we are going to talk." A long and fruitful interview took place; and the conversations, which lasted eight months, were carried on by the two Foreign Ministers and M. Paul Cambon, with assistance from Sir Eldon Gorst, then Financial Adviser to the Egyptian Government. Success was rendered less difficult by the very magnitude of the field of controversy. However impossible it might appear to settle particular issues in isolation, sacrifices might be tolerable as items in a balanced settlement. The diplomatic artists worked in large perspective, con- vinced that the removal of inflammable material would be more than worth the renunciation of this or that ancient claim or glittering ambition. "The immediate origin of the Entente," records Lord Cromer, "is to be found mainly in the local situation in Egypt. Egyptian finance was then in a flourishing condition; but, owing to the inter- national fetters imposed in circumstances which had wholly ceased to exist, the country was unable to derive any real profit from the surplus funds. The position had, in fact, become intolerable. It was determined to make an effort to improve it. A high Egyptian official, Tigrane Pasha, was sent to Paris to feel the pulse of the French Government. Responsible Frenchmen had simultaneously come to the conclusion that it was practically impossible for the British Government to redeem the pledge to evacuate Egypt. The British advances were therefore met in a friendly spirit. The Fashoda incident convinced France that Great Britain would remain in Egypt as long as she wished; but the humiliation was gradually softened by the discovery that the occupation was beneficial to the material interests of France. It was equally desirable for both countries that the situation should be cleared up. France could not evict her rival, but she could still inconvenience her1." Not less eager to clear her path in Morocco than Great Britain was to secure a free hand in the valley of the Nile, France, by the conquest of Algeria, came to take a special interest in the tranquillity 1 "The actual determining cause of the Entente," adds Lord Sanderson, "was Lord Cromer's anxiety for an arrangement with France which would let him place Egyptian finances on a more satisfactory footing, and pave the way for abolishing the Capitulations. The proposals relating to Egyptian finance formed a sort of nucleus from which the further agreements developed themselves." 3io CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 of its neighbour. The frontier was roughly fixed by Treaty in 1845, and, in 1877, Muley Hassan petitioned for a permanent military mission to aid the reorganisation of his country. The wall of obstruc- tion was breaking down, and in 1880 the Powers, on the initiative of Great Britain, met in Conference at Madrid. The insidious practice of extending Consular protection to natives, which furnished a pretext for interference, was restricted, and all the Signatory Powers of the October Treaty obtained most-favoured-nation treatment. The occu- pation of Tunis on the east and Senegal on the south made many Frenchmen desire to round off their West African dominions by incorporation of the whole or part of Morocco ; and the surrender of Fashoda created the demand for a substitute. Pacific penetration began ; and, in 1900, M. Delcasse secured the benevolent neutrality of Italy by the recognition of her claims to Tripoli. If Egypt and Morocco thus provided the elements of a bargain satisfactory to both parties it seemed that the principle of barter might prove equally acceptable in other parts of the world. Great Britain was anxious to sweep away the grievance of "the French Shore " of Newfoundland ; and France entertained some minor am- bitions in West Africa which it was in our power to satisfy. While the other differences presented less difficulty, the outbreak of the Japanese War increased the necessity for a comprehensive settlement. The King's Speech, delivered on February 2nd, 1904, registered the new spirit of cordiality. "Apart from its intrinsic value, the Arbitra- tion Agreement affords a happy illustration of the friendly feelings prevailing between the two countries." The note of confidence and satisfaction was echoed by the Liberal leaders. "The country feels deep gratitude to the King," declared Lord Spencer, "for the impulse and support he has given to this friendly feeling"; and Campbell- Bannerman echoed the sentiment in the Lower House. "I do not think you will find, either here or in France," rejoined Lord Lans- downe modestly, "that too much credit is taken to themselves by the diplomatists for this happy condition of things. I believe it to be due mainly to a deep-seated conviction on the part of the two countries that there is no real divergence between our interests, and that the greatest of our common interests is peace." Two months later, on April 8th, a Convention relating to Newfoundland and West Africa, accompanied by four Declarations, concerning respectively Egypt and Morocco, Siam, Madagascar and the New Hebrides, was signed1. 1 See France, No. 1 (1904) and No. 2 (1904). EGYPT AND MOROCCO 311 The most important of the agreements which collectively form the Treaty of 1904 was the following Declaration respecting Egypt and Morocco. I. His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no inten- tion of altering the political status of Egypt. The Government of the French Republic declare that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation or in any other matter, and that they assent to the annexed Khedivial Decree containing the guarantees considered necessary for the protection of the interests of the Egyptian bond-holders. The post of Director of Antiquities shall continue to be entrusted to a French savant, and French schools shall continue to enjoy the same liberty as in the past. II. The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco. His Britannic Majesty's Government recognises that it appertains to France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are conterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial and military reforms which it may require. They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France for this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights which Great Britain enjoys in Morocco in virtue of treaties, convention or usage. III. The British Government will respect the rights which France, in virtue of treaties, conventions and usage, enjoys in Egypt. IV. The two Governments, being equally attached to the principle of commercial liberty both in Egypt and Morocco, declare that they will not countenance any inequality either in the imposition of customs duties or other taxes or of railway transport charges. This engagement shall be binding for thirty years. Unless this stipulation is expressly denounced one year in advance, the period shall be extended for five years at a time. V. The British Government will use their influence in order that the French officials in the Egyptian service may not be placed under less advantageous conditions than the British officials in the same service. The French Government will do the same for British officials in the Moorish service. VI. In order to ensure free passage of the Suez Canal, the British Government declare that they adhere to the stipulations of the Treaty of 1888, and agree to their being put in force. VII. In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, the two Governments agree not to permit the erection of any fortifications or strategic works on the coast of Morocco between, but not including, Melilla, and the heights which command the right bank of the river Sebu. This condition does not apply to the places at present in the occupation Spain. 3i2 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 VIII. The two Governments, inspired by their sincere feeling of friendship for Spain, take into special consideration the interests which that country derives from her geographical position and her territorial possessions on the Moorish coast. In regard to these interests the French Government will come to an understanding with the Spanish Government, which shall be communicated to the British Government. IX. The two Governments agree to afford one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the execution of the present declaration. A Khedivial Decree, in 68 Articles, annexed to the Declaration, laid down regulations for the administration and repayment of the Egyptian debt. "If accepted by the other Powers concerned," wrote Lord Lansdowne, "it will give the Egyptian Government a free hand in the disposal of its own resources, so long as the punctual payment of interest on the debt is assured. The Caisse de la Dette will remain; but its functions will be strictly limited to receiving certain assigned revenues on behalf of the bondholders, and insuring the due payment of the coupon." The surplus of 5J millions in its possession was to be transferred to the Government. Financial liberty for Egypt was balanced by the settlement of the juridical position of the Suez Canal in time of war in accordance with the wishes of France. Lord Lansdowne 's despatch defines with equal precision the manner in which the British Government regarded the aspirations of France in Morocco : In spite of well-meant efforts to assist the Sultan, but little progress has been effected. Without the intervention of a strong and civilised Power there appears to be no probability of a real improvement. It seems not unnatural that in these circumstances France should regard it as falling to her lot to assume the task of attempting the regeneration of the country. Though in no wise desiring to annex the Sultan's dominions or to subvert his authority, France seeks to extend her influence in Morocco, and is ready to submit to sacrifices and to incur responsibilities with the object of putting an end to the condition of anarchy which prevails upon the borders of Algeria. His Majesty's Government are not prepared to assume such responsibilities or to make such sacrifices, and they have therefore readily admitted that, if any European Power is to have a predominant influence in Morocco, that Power is France. Next to Egypt, no part of the world had given rise to so much ill-feeling between the two countries as Newfoundland; and the settlement of the Fishery dispute was the second outstanding achieve- ment of 1904. The controversy dated from the Treaty of Utrecht, which, while recognising that the island should thenceforth belong to Great Britain, gave to the French "the right to catch and dry fish" THE NEWFOUNDLAND FISHERIES 313 on part of the coast henceforth known as "the French Shore." By the Treaty of 1783, a new stretch of coast was substituted, in order to prevent the frequent quarrels of the fishermen, and Great Britain undertook to prevent British subjects from interrupting the French by their competition, and to remove fixed British settlements on "the new French Shore." The friction arising from divergent interpretations of these Treaties increased with the economic development of the island and the grant of self-government. Frequent attempts were made to settle the differences, and in 1857 and 1885 Conventions were signed, though, owing to the opposition of the colony, they were never ratified. The failure of the second of these efforts was followed by a renewed assertion of French rights in their extreme form; and Newfoundland retaliated with a Bait Act, forbidding the sale of bait to French fishing boats except on "the French Shore." The French, thus restricted, turned in some cases from cod to lobster fishing, which the British Government argued was not included in the Treaty rights, and which thus introduced a new element of discord. "It was obviously our duty," wrote Lord Lansdowne, "to find some means of terminating this dispute, which has involved a constant risk of col- lisions between the two Governments. Such collisions have, in fact, only been averted by the tact, moderation and good temper exhibited by the naval officers of both Powers. The existence of these French rights over two- fifths of the coast has meant the obstruction of all useful developments." By the First Article of the Convention signed on April 8th France renounced her privileges under the Treaty of Utrecht and its suc- cessors. By the Second, she retained the right of catching all kinds of fish in territorial waters on " the French Shore " during the fishing season. French fishermen might enter any harbour on "the French Shore" and obtain bait or shelter on the same conditions as the inhabitants, but subject to the regulations now in force, or hereafter determined for the improvement of the fisheries. The policing of the fishing on " the French Shore " and the prevention of illicit liquor traffic were to form the subject of a separate agreement. Article III provided for compensation to the fishermen obliged to abandon their establish- ments on "the French Shore." Thus the main cause of friction, the right of landing on "the French Shore," was at length removed. The French negotiators contended that the surrender of an ancient privilege required territorial compensation; and the British Government, recognising the strength of the argument, made three concessions in West Africa. The frontier fixed in 1898 between the 314 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 British colony of the Gambia and Senegambia was slightly modified, in order to give France access to the navigable portion of the river. The Los Islands, commanding Konakry, the capital of French Guinea, were ceded, with the stipulation that the rights of British fishermen there should be maintained for thirty years. Of far greater importance was the revision of the 1898 boundary between British and French Nigeria, which compelled French convoys from the Niger to Lake Chad to follow a circuitous and waterless route or to pass through British territory. France thus obtained 14,000 square miles and uninterrupted access from her territories on the Niger to those on Lake Chad. It was further agreed that on the Lake itself the frontier line should, if necessary, be modified so as to assure to France communication through open water at all seasons between her possessions on the north-west and the south-east. A third document contained a Declaration concerning Siam, Madagascar and the New Hebrides. As to Siam, the two Powers confirmed the Agreement of 1896, in which they undertook to refrain from armed intervention or the acquisition of special privileges in the basin of the Menam. France now recognised all Siamese possessions on the west of this* neutral zone and of the Gulf of Siam, including the Malay Peninsula and the adjacent islands, as henceforth under British influence ; while Great Britain recognised all Siamese territory on the east and south-east of the zone as henceforth under French influence. As regards Madagascar, the British Government aban- doned the protest which had been maintained against the Tariff introduced after the annexation of the island. Finally, the difficulties in the New Hebrides arising from disputes as to land-title and the absence of jurisdiction over the natives were to be referred to a Commission. At the close of his covering despatch, Lord Lansdowne argued that, desirable as were these Agreements on their intrinsic merits, they should be regarded not merely as a series of separate transactions, but as forming part of a comprehensive scheme for the improvement of the relations between the two countries. The antipathies and suspicions of the past had given place to friendship : And it may, perhaps, be permitted to the Government to hope that, in thus basing the composition of long-standing differences upon mutual concessions, and in the frank recognition of each other's legitimate wants and aspirations, they may have afforded a precedent which will contribute something to the maintenance of international goodwill and the preservation of the general peace. BRITISH VIEWS OF THE TREATY 315 The Treaty was accepted in the spirit which had inspired its authors. Lord Spencer having hailed it as a great achievement, Lord Lansdowne declared that its reception had been all that he could have expected or desired. In a memorable debate on the second reading of the Anglo-French Convention Bill (necessitated by the monetary indemnity for French private rights in Newfoundland and by cessions of territory) the House of Commons found an opportunity for expressing its not less hearty satisfaction ; and the tribute of the Under-Secretary to his Chief was warmly cheered: "It is due to Lord Lansdowne to say that the result would never have been obtained at all but for his patient perseverance and sympathetic tact, with which he has insisted through these long months on sub- ordinating all minor considerations to the great object he had at heart. " Earl Percy proceeded to summarise the provisions of the Treaty, pointing out the value of our gains in Newfoundland and the slenderness of our sacrifices in West Africa. Egypt gained virtual control of her own finances and of the surplus hitherto locked up, with power to pay off her debt in the most economical manner. Above all, she could enter on capital expenditure without charging it to annual revenue. The mixed administration of the Port of Alexandria and of the railways and telegraphs would disappear, and the functions of the Caisse de la Dette would be limited to securing the punctual payment of interest. The regularisation of our position as a Signatory of the Suez Canal Convention had always been the aim of Lord Salisbury. While we had purchased a free hand in Egypt, we had given up nothing in Morocco, where indeed we should be substantial gainers. Our trade would increase, as it had increased in Tunis, and our strategic position would be strengthened by the veto on the fortification of the Straits of Gibraltar. In Mada- gascar we merely recognised a fait accompli, and in Siam we reaffirmed the agreement of 1896. "The distinctive feature," he concluded, "is that the parties pledge themselves not merely to abstain from poaching on each other's preserves but to do all in their power to further one another's interests. We promise to give one another, as friends, advantages which are ordinarily given only to allies ; and it is as the pledges of friendship rather than as the terms of a compromise between jealous and exacting litigants that we ask the House to assent to these concessions. I hope the agreement will prove a working model for the adjustment in other parts of differences between ourselves and rival nations." Sir Edward Grey and Campbell- Bannerman followed with a 316 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 benediction from the Front Opposition bench. In a speech to the Liberal League Lord Rosebery declared that no more one-sided agreement was ever concluded between two Powers at peace, and that he hoped that the country which held Gibraltar might never have cause to regret having handed over Morocco to a great military Power. Lord Cromer, on the other hand, records that the day of the signature of the Treaty was the happiest of his life. England gained by the removal of financial restrictions and obtaining a practically valid sanction to a position which was previously to some extent irregular. France also gained. The large French interests at stake in Egypt are secured by specific engagements, and are still more amply secured by the traditional character of British predominance. The Governments of Germany, Austria and Italy subsequently adhered to the Khedivial Decree, and "the Egyptian Question" ceased to be an international problem. The French Yellow-book, issued on May 26th, expounded our partner's view of the bargain. Both Governments, declared M. Delcasse, recognised that great moral and material interests demanded an amicable settlement. In New- foundland, France had only abandoned privileges which were difficult to maintain and in no way necessary, while the essential right of fishing in territorial waters was preserved, and the right of fishing for and purchasing bait along the whole extent of " the French Shore " was explicitly recognised. In West Africa, the British concessions were of considerable importance. "Under our influence," the French Minister continued, "Morocco would be a source of strength for our North African Empire. If subject to a foreign Power, our North African possessions would be permanently menaced and paralysed. The moment had arrived to decide who was to exercise preponderant influence. The present state can only last on con- dition that it is sustained and improved. On the importance of securing from England the promise not to hamper us it is superfluous to insist." The sacrifice in Egypt was small. No change was to be made in the political status, and all necessary guarantees for French financial interests had been obtained. M.Delcasse's unreserved satisfaction with his handiwork was shared by few of his countrymen. M. Hanotaux, who had directed the Foreign Policy of France from 1894 to 1898 with firmness, if not always with success, denounced the long list of his concessions since 1898. "On the Nile, in China, Siam, Muscat, Constantinople, Egypt, Newfound- land, Tripoli, it is only retreat." The Foreign Minister should have FRENCH VIEWS OF THE TREATY 317 profited by the unique opportunity of the Boer War to solve both the Egyptian and the Moroccan problems1. "It is a retreat in good order," commented Rene Millet, ex-Governor of Algeria. "The error of twenty-five years ago perhaps rendered it inevitable; but why celebrate it as a diplomatic triumph? We are not yet in Morocco, while England is in Egypt. We exchange rights for hopes. To hold Morocco we lack just a trifle — the consent of the Sultan." Moreover, though Italy had been satisfied, Germany had been deliberately set aside. "It is impossible for France to undertake anything without knowing the inner mind of Germany. Of all pretensions the maddest would be to wish to isolate her. One does not isolate a strong Govern- ment— one exposes oneself to its resentment." The veteran Freycinet, on the other hand, though lamenting the final surrender of French aspirations in Egypt, declared the entente worth the price2. The Treaty was far more sharply criticised in the Palais Bourbon than at St Stephen's. England, declared M. Deschanel, had nowhere made a real sacrifice ; for she retained in Morocco all that mattered to her — liberty of commerce. One sees a powerful school of diplomacy, resting on long tradition, admirably informed and served, which yields nothing essential, which manages to create new guarantees even in what it appears to surrender, which always keeps the marrow and throws away the bone. Tendencies were driving British policy towards us. We should have obtained better conditions if we had arranged our affairs one by one. All speakers, however, approved the policy of accord with England ; and, on November 12th, the Chamber by a vote of 443 to 105 sanc- tioned the Convention concerning Newfoundland and West Africa, though M. Delcasse was forced to accept a motion pledging him to further negotiations with regard to the Newfoundland fishermen3. The Senatorial Committee of Foreign Affairs reported that, though not beyond reproach, it was useful to the country, and the Senate ratified it by a majority of 215 to 37. The process of cleaning the slate, so auspiciously begun in 1904, was completed at leisure. The friction between French and British traders and missionaries who had settled in the New Hebrides in the course of the nineteenth century led, in 1887, to an Anglo-French 1 Preface to R. Millet, Notre politique exteneure. 2 La Question d'figypte, ch. 4. 3 In 1905 445 fishermen received compensation from the British Government; but the regulations to be issued by the two Governments relating to the marine police on "the French Shore" gave rise to prolonged discussion. 318 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 Convention, which provided for supervision by a mixed commission of naval officers. The remedy proved inadequate, and annexation or partition was demanded by different schools of politicians, not only in the islands, but in France, Great Britain and Australia. On October 20th, 1906, a Convention was signed in London declaring the New Hebrides "a region of joint influence," each Power exercising jurisdiction over its own nationals. A British and French High Com- missioner were appointed, with authority over the native chiefs, while order continued to be maintained by the Naval Commission and police forces of equal strength. A mixed Tribunal was created with three Judges, the President of the Court being chosen by the King of Spain. A further question was settled, which had troubled the relations of the two Powers since 1896. A French railway company, formed to construct a line from Jibuti to Addis Abeba, obtained assistance from the French Government in 1902; but a British group had secured a majority of the shares. In 1902 the frontier between Abyssinia and the Sudan was delimited, and the Negus bound himself not to construct any work on the Blue Nile or the Sobat which could interfere with its flow, and authorised the passage of the Cape to Cairo Railway through his territory. British influence was supreme, and in April, 1905, Menelek contemptuously refused the French Company permission to continue the railway to the capital. The British financiers urged that the line should be neutralised or built with funds advanced by the Bank of Abyssinia, that is, with English money. On July 6th, 1906, Great Britain, France and Italy signed an Accord recognising the interests and the status quo in Abyssinia. Great Britain received assurances as to the flow of the Nile, Italy was authorised to continue her railways in Eritrea, and the construc- tion and exploitation of the whole line from Jibuti to the capital remained in the hands of the French Company, with an English, Italian and Abyssinian representative on the Board. A year later, a Franco- Siamese Treaty secured for France the territory bordering on Cambodia in return for the abolition of ex- territoriality. The goodwill displayed by Great Britain in this matter was rewarded when France smiled on the doubling of British posses- sions in the Malay peninsula. Finally, in June, 1907, Great Britain and France concluded an arrangement with Spain guaranteeing their respective possessions in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and thus securing an additional pledge for the safety of the road to India. LORD CURZON ON RUSSIA 319 III. Great Britain and Russia, 1900-1905 While British and French statesmen were joyfully burying the hatchet, the antagonism between Great Britain and Russia remained a source of acute anxiety. The Anglo- German Treaty of 1900 and the Anglo- Japanese Alliance of 1902 proclaimed, as from the housetops, our suspicion of her aims in the Far East; and our responsibility for the defence of India led us to watch her activities in the Middle East with even more jealous eyes. A conterminous frontier and the weak- ness of Persia furnished Russia with constant opportunities of exerting political and economic pressure; and in the closing years of the nineteenth century the rivalry of the two Powers at Teheran was unconcealed. Though the Imperial Bank of Persia represented British interests in the capital, Russian influence predominated; and the Shah's need of money enabled our competitor to rivet her yoke more firmly on the neck of a decadent State. The position was closely analysed by Lord Curzon, in a lengthy despatch dated September 21st, 1899, the first_year^of his Viceroyalty , in response to a request from the Cabinet for the views of the Govern- ment of India1: "The political interests of Great Britain are mainly, but no longer exclusively, Indian. Ever since the first visit of the late Shah to Europe, Persia has been drawn increasingly into the vortex of European politics. She is one of those countries which must inevitably have attracted the attention of Europe, partly from in- creasing infirmity, but still more from the opportunities~^uggested by their latent though neglected sources of strength. Closely pressing upon Persia and Afghanistan is the ever-growing momentum of a Power whose interests in Asia are not always in accord with our own, while the Gulf is beginning to attract the interest of other and some- times rival nations. For the present, our ambitions are limited to prevent the interest we have built up from being undermined. We have no desire to disturb the political status quo as long as it can be maintained; but we press for an early decision and for early action, since, unless we bestir ourselves, there is good reason for fearing that the already trembling balance may be disturbed to our disadvantage. The advance of Russia across the deserts that form the natural barrier between West and East Persia could not be regarded without uneasi- ness by the Government of India ; for Russian pledges to respect the interests and independence of Persia are quite insufficient to save Persian or British interests from erosive agencies." 1 Persia, No. 1 (1908). 320 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 At the moment when this weighty despatch reached London, the attention of the Cabinet was monopolised by the Boer War. It was a time rather for graceful concessions than for valiant resistance to future dangers, and Russian influence in Persia increased apace. Fresh advances from the Russian Bank brought the total loan up to four millions; Russian concessionaires were allowed to build roads from Tabriz to Teheran and to Kazvin, and in 1902 a Russo-Persian Commercial Treaty threatened the Indian tea- trade. Not content with dominating the north, Russia pushed forth her tentacles in the east and south. Though Seistan adjoined the Indian frontier, she despatched a Consul in 1900 to fish there in troubled waters, and the Russian Bank opened branches in the province. To counterwork her influence, Lord Curzon built a railway from Quetta to Nushki, thence across the plains to the frontier, and finally to Nasratabad, the chief town of Seistan, opening post and telegraph offices en route and establishing a Consul at the terminus. Though there was little trade in this remote province, Russian intrigues were thus held in check. Even more vital to the safety of India and the prestige of the empire was the maintenance of our position in the Persian Gulf, where Russian emissaries — officers, "explorers," doctors "studying plague" — were beginning to swarm. In February, 1900, a small Russian gunboat anchored off Bunder Abbas. The Commander asked for coal, and three hundred tons were ordered from Bombay. When it arrived, he declared that he could not take it all on board, and proposed to land a portion. It occurred to the Governor, however, that it would need Russian guards, who might stay; and, when a British cruiser arrived, he plucked up courage to refuse permission. Thus the attempt was foiled to create a nucleus store from which a coaling station might develop. During the next three years, Russian warships toured the Gulf; but no further attempts were made to acquire a footing. Consulates were, nevertheless, established at Basra, Bushire and Bunder Abbas, though no Russian nationals were to be found there and little trade, despite the visits of four ships a year belonging to a subsidised Company formed at Odessa in 1901. The termination of the Boer War had restored to Great Britain her freedom of action; and, on May 15th, 1903, Lord Lansdowne made the most momentous declaration of British policy since Sir Edward Grey's pronouncement in 1895. "Firstly, we should protect and promote British trade in the Gulf. Secondly, we should not exclude the legitimate trade of others. Thirdly, we should regard the THE PERSIAN GULF 321 establishment of a naval base or a fortified port in the Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it by all the means at our disposal." The announcement, he added, was made in no minatory spirit, because he knew of no such proposal. This emphatic warning was reinforced by Lord Curzon's demonstration in the Gulf in November, 1903. It was the first visit of a Viceroy during his term of office, and no such assemblage of warships had ever been seen on its quiet waters. After touching at Muscat, an independent Arab State under British influ- ence, the squadron entered the Gulf, and a Durbar was held on board the Argonaut at Shargah, where the Chiefs of the Arab coast in treaty relations with us were addressed by the Viceroy in a speech of sonorous eloquence1. He reminded his hearers of the steps by which the British Government became, with their own consent, their overlords and protectors and the guardians of intertribal peace. Why should Great Britain continue to exercise these powers? The history of your States and of your families, and the present condition of the Gulf, are the answer. We were here before any other Power, in modern times, had shown its face in these waters. We found strife, and we have created order. It was our commerce as well as your security that was threatened and called for protection. At every port along these coasts the subjects of the King of England still reside and trade. We saved you from extinction at the hands of your neighbours. We opened these seas to the ships of all nations, and enabled their flags to fly in peace. We have not seized nor held your territory. We have not destroyed your independence, but preserved it The peace of these waters must still be maintained; your independence will continue to be upheld; and the influence of the British Government must remain supreme. The Sovereign of the British Empire lives so far away that none of you has ever seen or will ever see his face; but his orders are carried out everywhere throughout his vast dominions, and it is as his representative in India, who is responsible to him for your welfare, that I am here today to exchange greetings with you, to renew old assurances, and to wish you prosperity in the future. British prestige was enhanced by the journey, which proclaimed, not only to those who saw the squadron and heard the voice of the Viceroy, but to listeners far away in Teheran, Petrograd and Berlin, the determination of Great Britain to defend her position in the Gulf from challenge or attack. The struggle against Russian encroachments was waged, not only in Manchuria and Persia, but on the lofty plateaus of Tibet, where 1 Reprinted in Lord Curzon in India, pp. 500-503. Cf. Lovat Fraser, India under Lord Curzon, pp. 78-115. w.&g.iii 21 322 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 the priestly hierarchy which governed the country under the shadowy suzerainty of China had done its utmost to close the gates against approach from the south. Warren Hastings sent envoys to Tibet; but their work bore no lasting fruit. A hundred years later a Mission to Lhasa was organised in 1886 but countermanded ; and the Tibetans took advantage of the collapse of the project to invade Sikkim in 1887. They were expelled in the following year, but received no punishment for their offence. In 1890, the senior of the two Chinese Ambans who represent the Suzerain at Lhasa journeyed to Calcutta, and signed a Treaty fixing the boundary between Tibet and Sikkim (over which China recognised a British Protectorate), reserving for a joint Commission questions of trade, pasturage and communication. The Tibetans refused to recognise the boundary, and a second Agreement, signed in 1893, proved equally worthless1. A mart was established at Yatung ; but the Tibetans built a wall to prevent their own traders from approaching it, levied an unauthorised duty on Indian goods, and overthrew the boundary pillars erected by British and Chinese Representatives. In March, 1899, Lord Curzon de- scribed the situation to the Secretary of State. " We seem to be moving in a vicious circle. If we apply to Tibet, we either receive no reply or are referred to the Chinese Resident. If we apply to the latter, he excuses his failure by his inability to put any pressure on Tibet." Lord Salisbury was consulted and advised that, since the Tibetans argued that China had no authority to act for them, the Government of India should try to negotiate directly with Lhasa. The advice was followed; but a letter from the Viceroy to the Dalai Lama in 1900 was returned unopened, no one having dared to forward it to the capital. In the following year the Viceroy wrote again, adding that discourtesy would be followed by steps to enforce the Treaty. The letter was delivered to the Dalai Lama, who returned it unopened, on the ground that he could not correspond with foreign Govern- ments without the consent of the Ambans. The exasperation provoked by this studied insolence was inten- sified by the simultaneous reception at Petrograd, in September, 1900, of a mysterious emissary named Dorjieff, a Siberian Buddhist, who had resided for many years at Lhasa, where he had gained influence as tutor to the Dalai Lama. A year later, he reappeared in Russia as the head of a Mission, the political character of which was 1 See Papers relating to Tibet, 1904, Cd. 1920, Cd. 2054 and 2370; and 1910 Cd. 5240; and Younghusband, India and Tibet. RUSSIAN INTRIGUES IN TIBET 323 emphasised by the Russian Press. " Tibet has heard of the taking of Peking," wrote the Novoye Vremya, "and perhaps also of the valiant resistance of the Boers. A rapprochement with Russia must seem to the Lama the most natural step, as Russia is the only Power able to counteract the intrigues of Great Britain, who has so long been trying to obtain admission and only awaits the opportunity to force an entrance." The Foreign Minister, naturally, told the British Am- bassador a very different story. "The conclusion of certain Russian papers that Tibetans have any diplomatic or political mission is ridiculous and unfounded. Dorjieff comes to Russia occasionally to collect for his Order from Russian Buddhists, and has no official character whatever." After the Mission had been received by the Tsar, de Witte and Lamsdorff himself, and announced in the official journal as "Envoys Extraordinary of the Dalai Lama," the British Ambassador again visited the Foreign Secretary, who reiterated that the Mission had no political character. The Dalai Lama, he explained, was a Buddhist Pontiff, and the mission was of the kind which the Pope was accustomed to send to Catholics in other lands. Lord Lansdowne, hereupon, instructed the Ambassador to tell Lamsdorff that his assurances had been received with satisfaction, and to add that the British Government could not regard with indifference any pro- ceedings that might have a tendency to alter or disturb the existing status of Tibet. Dorjieffs journeys had taught Tibet to look to Russia for pro- tection and Russia to regard Tibet as a pawn in her world-wide game against Great Britain. Lord Curzon's patience was wearing thin, and on July 28th, 1 901, he proposed coercion if a third attempt to communicate with the Dalai Lama broke down ; but the Boer War was still in progress, and Lord George Hamilton deprecated strong measures. When, however, the third attempt proved equally fruitless, the Viceroy suggested that the Political Officer for Sikkim should set up pillars where the Tibetans had encroached, and that, if these pillars were overthrown, we should occupy the Chumbi valley. The time seems to us to have arrived when we should decline any longer to allow our boundary to be transgressed, our trade to be strangled, and the rights secured to us by treaty defied. It is the most extraordinary anachronism of the twentieth century that there should exist within less than three hundred miles of the borders of British India a State and a Government with whom political relations do not exist and with whom it is impossible even to exchange a written communication. 21 — 2 324 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 The approval of the Cabinet having been secured, the Political Officer proceeded, in the summer of 1902, to the north of Sikkim and ordered the Tibetans inside the frontier to withdraw ; and on January 18th, 1903, the Government of India proposed an expedition to Lhasa, where we should meet Chinese Representatives, and negotiate a treaty, to be signed both by the Chinese and the Tibetans, a British Representative being hereupon installed in the capital. The suggestion leaked out; and, before the Cabinet had time to consider the proposal of the Indian Government, a Memorandum was presented by Count Benckendorff. "A British military expedition to Tibet has been reported. Such an expedition would produce a situation of con- siderable gravity, and might oblige Russia to take measures to protect her interests in those regions." The British Foreign Secretary replied that this Note was unusual and almost minatory, and that the rumour was baseless. "Russia," retorted the Ambassador, "has no designs at Tibet, and I presume you have not." A week later, Lord Lansdowne informed him that he learned from apparently trustworthy sources, of Russia having lately concluded an agreement for a Pro- tectorate over Tibet and intending to appoint Agents, or Consular Officers at Lhasa. "I believe there is no foundation for the report/* replied the Ambassador, "but I will enquire." "As we are much more closely interested in Tibet than Russia," rejoined the Foreign Secretary, "if Russia displays activity, we must reply by a greater display. We are simply trying to get the Tibetans to fulfil the Treaty of 1890, and it is no use trying through China." Sparks had already begun to fly; and, on February 27th, the Secretary of State for India, Lord George Hamilton, sent a cautious reply to the despatch of January 8th. The Cabinet recognised the importance of the problem, and feared that Tibet under Russian influence might press Nepal into her orbit. But it could not sanction armed intervention, which might lead to permanent occupation or a Protectorate. The Russian Ambassador informed Lord Lansdowne that no Russian Agents were in Tibet ; that there was no intention to send any ; and that Count LamsdorrT was astounded to find we could believe it. Russia, on the other hand, was not indifferent to any seri- ous disturbance of the status quo. Lord Lansdowne explained in reply that, where an uncivilised country adjoined a civilised, a certain local predominance was inevitable, but that this did not involve designs on its independence. Now that the diplomatic situation had been to some extent INDIA AND TIBET 325 simplified, the Indian Government proposed that Chinese and Tibetan Representatives should negotiate at Khamba Jong, the first village across the frontier, with a British Representative, who should be accompanied by an armed escort of two hundred men, with reserves in Sikkim, which would enable him to reach Lhasa if the negotiators should not arrive. The Cabinet sanctioned the parley at Khamba Jong, but vetoed an advance to Lhasa. On June 3rd, the Viceroy informed the Senior Amban that Colonel Younghusband had been selected as the British Commissioner, and would accompany the Political Officer at Sikkim to Khamba Jong in July. But, though the rendezvous had been chosen with China's consent and accepted by the Dalai Lama, the Chinese Delegates were of a rank too low to nego- tiate, while the Tibetan Delegates, after the first meeting, refused to hold further conversations or to convey messages to Lhasa. Lord Lans- downe at once informed Benckendorff that the Mission would advance to Gyantse, owing to the outrageous conduct of the Tibetans, but that we had no intention to annex or permanently occupy Tibetan territory. The Russian Ambassador having observed that the project involved a grave disturbance of the Central Asian situation, Lord Lansdowne retorted that he was greatly surprised at the excitement of Russia, who would not herself have shown such forbearance and who had never hesitated to encroach on her neighbours — witness Man- churia and Persia. "May I say that you advanced reluctantly," re- joined the Ambassador, "with the sole object to obtain satisfaction for affronts? " The Foreign Secretary replied that he might, and added that the Mission had been ordered not to fight unless attacked. Since the Ambassador continued to express at intervals the hope that we should not alter our policy, Lord Lansdowne informed him in writing, on June 2nd, 1904, that, "so long as no other Power tried to intervene in the affairs of Tibet, Great Britain would not annex it, or proclaim a Protectorate, or control its internal administration. " To critics at home who enquired why we could not leave Tibet in peace, the Foreign Secretary replied1 that we merely wanted a neighbourly agreement, demarcating the frontier and granting facilities for trade. Since the Tibetans believed that they were backed by Russia, a final settlement was necessary. Almost at the same moment, the Viceroy restated the principles of British policy in his Budget speech of March 30th, employing a simile which was to become famous. 1 In the debate on the Address, February 2nd, 1904, and on February 26th, in a debate raised by Lord Reay. 326 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 India is like a fortress with the vast moat of the sea on two of her faces, and with mountains for her walls on the remainder. But beyond those walls extends a glacis of varying breadth and dimensions. We do not want to occupy it; but we cannot afford to see it occupied by our foes. He would be a short-sighted commander who merely manned his ramparts in India and did not look out beyond1. In December, 1904, the Mission entered the Chumbi valley, and Gyantse was reached on April nth, 1905. The camp was attacked; but, when reinforcements arrived under General Macdonald, the fort was taken. On July 8th, the Cabinet at length sanctioned the march to the capital, and the Mission reached the Forbidden City on August 3rd, to find that the Dalai Lama had fled. Meanwhile, the terms to be imposed on Tibet were being anxiously discussed between Simla and Whitehall2. In a despatch, of June 30th, the Government of India urged the establishment of a permanent Mission, preferably at Lhasa, to watch trade interests and guard against foreign influence, the retention of the Chumbi valley, and the construction of a road to facilitate trade. The terms should include trade-marts at Gyantse, Shigatse and Lhasa (if a Resident was to be settled there), an in- demnity, the razing of the forts, and a veto on the manufacture and import of arms. If an Agent at Lhasa were not desired, he should reside at Gyantse, with the right of proceeding to the capital for dis- cussion with the Amban or the Dalai Lama's officials. We should also inform Tibet that, unless she abstained from intercourse with any other European Power, we should appoint an Agent at the capital. Finally, we should obtain both from Tibet and China a formal recognition of our exclusive political influence in Tibet, and an engagement that they would not admit the Representative of any other Power, or cede territory, or enter into relations with any other Power, without our consent. While the despatch was on its way, Mr Brodrick, who had succeeded Lord George Hamilton as Secretary of State, telegraphed the policy of the Cabinet on July 6th. A Political Resident at Lhasa or with access to Lhasa was disallowed. The indemnity should not be beyond the power of Tibet to pay, and might be spread over three years. The Chumbi valley was to be occupied till the indemnity was paid or till trade-marts had been opened for three years, "whichever is the latest." A despatch, ampli- fying the telegram, was sent on August 5th. 1 Lord Curzon in India, p. 408. 2 Lord Curzon had returned home after his first term on April 30th, leaving Lord Ampthill as Acting Viceroy. THE MISSION TO LHASA 327 Colonel Younghusband was in a difficult position; for, though Jthe was in possession of a draft Convention sent him by the Indian "Government and had been informed of the Cabinet telegram, the despatch in which the policy was explained only reached him after the Treaty was signed. Moreover, the military orders to leave Lhasa in the early autumn compelled him, as he believed, to purchase a Treaty, willingly and promptly signed, at the cost of some departure from his Instructions. Tibet undertook to observe the Treaty of 1890, to erect boundajxjaillax&r to open marts at three places, to maintain an agent at each in order to forward communications, to keep open the roads leading to them, and to raze all forts on the routes to the capital. The Ninth (and last) Article was designed to terminate the Russian menace. Tibet engaged that, without the previous consent of the British Government, no portion of Tibetan territory should be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation to any Foreign Power; no such Power should be permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs ; no Representatives or Agents of any Foreign Power should be admitted; no concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights should be granted to any Foreign Power or the subject of any Foreign Power; but, if they were, similar or equi- valent concessions should be granted to Great Britain; and finally, no Tibetan revenues should be pledged or assigned to any Foreign Power or the subject of any Foreign Power. Having thus secured all his political and economic demands, Colonel Younghusband accepted the request that the indemnity, which had been fixed at £500,000, should be paid at the rate of one lakh annually for seventy-five years — a_change which involved the occupation of the Chumbi valley during a similarperiod. With this important modification, the Treaty was signed on September 7th in the presence of the Amban, who undertook to sign when permission had been obtained from Peking. Seals were affixed by the Acting Regent, the Council, the three great monasteries and the National Assembly. On the same day, a separate Agreement was signed em- powering the British Trade Agent at Gyantse to visit Lhasa to discuss trade affairs. A week later, a telegram arrived stating that the Secretary of State had asked the Government of India whether the period for the pay- ment of the indemnity could not be reduced ; but the Mission took its departure without further negotiation. In subsequent Memoranda and later, in his book India and Tibet, its leader stoutly defended his 328 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 conduct. If he had refused the Tibetan proposal, the Regent might have fled and the Convention been lost. In any case, Tibet would^' have been left to nourish angry feelings. She had accepted everything else, and General Macdonald had advised that the return journey should begin not later than September 15th. He had, therefore, departed after signing the Treaty, as he had promised to do. If he had immediately asked for an alteration, he would have forfeited the confidence of the Tibetans, without persuading them to accept the change; whereas he had left the country much friendlier in feeling than when he entered it. The real object of the Mission, the establishment of goodwill, had been secured. Lord Curzon was now back in India, _and the Govern- ment of India, in a despatch to the Secretary of State, approved his conduct in not trying to amend the newly-signed Treaty. He had ] established more friendly relations than could have Seen expected, and he ought not to be condemned for one error of judgment, however ' serious. The circumstances demanded generous concTonation. Mr Brodrick, however, refused to be mollified. As regards the indemnity, he declared, the Convention was signed in defiance of express Instruc- tions thatjt wastt) be a sum payable in three years. "We cannot accept the situatjon^^rgatecl for us Ej^ojj^^presentatiyej disobedi- ^ence to orders." When the Convention came to be ratified, it must, therefore, be amended in this sense. Tibet was also to be informed that the Special Agreement^ allowing the Trade^^entto proceed to Lhasa was- regardecTas needless and therefore was to be cancelled. The British Cabinet had given repeated assurances to Russia that no lengthy occupation of territory and no intervention in internal affairs was sought ; and the Cabinet alone could decide matters of policy. Despite the wrath of the Secretary of State, the twofold object of the Mission appeared to have been attained. In the first place, the monks had learned that the British arm was long enough to reach the Forbidden City, and on the outstanding questions of boundary, trade and- communications, our demands had been accepted. Secondly, in Mr Brocfrick's words, the risk of Tibet having political relations with other States had been removed. The settlement was ratified by the Suzerain Power on April 27th, 1906, Great Britain undertaking not to annex territory nor to interfere in internal affairs, while China promised to prevent any other Power from doing so, and agreed to be responsible for the indemnity and to pay it in three years. After the Russian menace on the northern section of the glacis AFGHANISTAN 329 had been warded off, there remained the danger on the north-west1. In setting up AJidnr Rahmaqin 1880 we transformed Afghanistan into a buffer State. For practical purposes the country was closed; but, though the Ameer throttled trade, intrigued with the hill tribes and resented our refusal to receive a Representative at St James', he never made serious advances to Russia. The agreement with Abdur Rah- man was purely personal; but his son, Habibulla, who succeeded in 1901, argued that the engagements still existed and therefore needed no renewal. He did not, however, draw the subsidy and declined invitations to India. The Japanese victories had a disturbing effect in Cabul, where the Ameer boasted that he was as powerful as the Mikado. Early in 1904, the Government of India suggested the despatch of Sir Louis Dane, the Foreign Secretary, to discuss the situation, and Habibulla agreed to receive him. He reached the capital on December 12th, expecting to stay two weeks; but the fort- night lengthened into three months. Though he was courteously treated at personal interviews, and the Ameer and his chiefs for the first time ate with infidels, the negotiations were chiefly conducted by letter, and the official correspondence was frankly insolent. All Cabul knew that the Ameer nad declined to visit India, and that India had come to visit him. While the Government of India desired a fresh engagement on the old lines, the Ameerjwjsiiedio continue the arrange- ments concluded with his father, thus_tran$forming an individual into a dynastic pact. His terms j^ere virtually accepted, and though Sir Louis Dane claimed success, the Treaty was considered in some quarters to have lowered British prestige. That the Cabinet was by no means reassured, was proved by a pointed warning in the Prime-Minister's speech of May nth, 1905, on Imperial Defence, Russia, he declared, was making steady pro- gress towards Afghanistan, and railways were under construction which could only be strategic. War was improbable ; but these factors altered the position. India could not be taken by surprise and assault. A war on the North-west Frontier would be chiefly a problem of transport and supply. We must, therefore, allow nothing to be done to facilitate transport. Any attempt to make a railway in Afghanistan in connexion with the Russian strategic railways should be regarded as an act of direct aggression against us. "I have, however," he said, "not the smallest ground to believe that Russia intends to build such a railway. If ever attempted, it would be the heaviest conceivable 1 See Lovat Fraser, India under Curzon, pp. 63^77. 330 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 blow at our Indian Empire. As long as we say resolutely that railways in Afghanistan should only be made in time of war, we can make India absolutely secure. But if, through blindness or cowardice, we permit the slow absorption of the country, if strategic railways are allowed to creep close to our frontier, we shall have to maintain a much larger army." Friction in Persia, Tibet and Afghanistan had increased the traditional tension between Great Britain and Russia; and the out- break of war in the Far East opened a period of dangerous strain. Since the Dual Alliance did not extend to Asia, France was not com- pelled to join her Ally ; but in time of war benevolent neutrality may at any moment stiffen into belligerency. British opinion openly favoured Japan; but the Cabinet observed strict neutrality, and, on February 12th, Lord Lansdowne denied the foolish rumour that Japan had been permitted to use Wei-Hai-Wei as a base. A struggle which required ships no less than soldiers was certain to raise the question of the Straits. In 1896, a plan was approved by the Tsar for seizing the Bosphorus and settling, once for all, the question of free passage for the Black Sea fleet ; and the audacious project was only dropped owing to the combined opposition of Witte and Pobiedonostseff1, Russia's aspiration for the free disposal of her naval forces remained ; and, in the autumn of 1902, she obtained permission for four destroyers to pass the Straits. On January 6th, 1903, Sir Nicholas O'Conor presented a formal protest to the Porte, and announced that we should not hesitate to use the precedent for British ships in case of war. During the opening months of the Japanese conflict the Black Sea fleet remained tranquil; but trouble began in July, when the Smolensk and the Petersburg, two cruisers of the Volunteer fleet, which had been founded at the time of the Penjdeh crisis, and which was permitted to pass the Straits under a commercial flag, assumed the character of warships, and stopped British and German ships in the Red Sea2. The P. & O. Malacca was searched, despite the assur- ance that she carried ammunition for the British fleet at Hong-Kong and a general cargo for Yokohama. The Russian captain demanded to see the latter, and, since it could not be reached without endangering the stability of the vessel, a prize crew was placed on board and the ship ordered back to Suez, whence she was to sail to Libau to a 1 See Dillon, The Eclipse of Russia, pp. 231-44. 2 The juridical character of the Volunteer fleet is explained in Sutherland Edwards, Sir William White, ch. 20. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 331 Russian Prize-Court. Almost at the same time, the Ardova, a British ship carrying explosives from the Government of the United States to Manila, and the Formosa were seized. Russian ships of war were justified in searching neutrals for contraband, but converted cruisers had no such right. The British Ambassador lodged an emphatic protest, demanding the release of the Malacca on the ground that the status of the Petersburg was irregular, and that the ammunition was for the British navy and bore the British Government mark. The reply was conciliatory. The Malacca was not to go to a Prize- Court, and no such incident should occur again ; but, " as a matter of form," her cargo would be examined at a neutral port. Since this appeared to maintain the claim of volunteer cruisers to be ships of war, the Mediterranean squadron was sent to Alexandria, and a cruiser was ordered to Suez to anchor close to the Ardova. At the same moment the Knight Commander, bound from New York to Yokohama with an American-owned cargo, was sunk by the Vladivostock squadron on suspicion of contraband, and because the ship could not spare a prize crew to take her to port. When announcing this outrage, the Prime-Minister and Foreign Secretary added that Russia had given orders that seizures by the volunteer ships should not be recognised, and had withdrawn these from the Red Sea. A strong protest had been made against the sinking of the Knight Commander, and the release of the crew had been demanded. On August 8th, the Prime-Minister announced that the Malacca had been released after a purely formal examination, and that the ships of the Volunteer fleet would no longer act as cruisers. Three days later, Lord Lansdowne declared that we could not admit Russia's claim to settle what was contraband or to destroy a neutral vessel with contraband on board, but added that the destruction of neutrals was not likely to recur. In making the same announcement in the House of Commons, Mr Balfour added that ports should not be used as bases nor should neutrals supply coal — a gentle hint to both France and Germany, whose efforts to assist Russia were unre- mitting. Despite Russian assurances, the Smolensk and the Petersburg resumed their activity off the Cape, and, on August 21st, the Comedian was boarded near Port Elizabeth. The shock was diminished by the Prime-Minister's announcement that, at Russia's request, British cruisers had been sent to bid the vessels stop their activity, as they had not received orders. They were found at Zanzibar, and no British vessel was interfered with during the remainder of the War. 332 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 The Baltic fleet was now ordered to the Far East. Emerging from the Belt, Admiral Rojdestvensky mistook some Norwegian vessels for Japanese destroyers, and fired several shots without reaching them. On the afternoon of October 21st the Kamchatka fell behind on account of engine trouble. Towards evening, she met and fired on a Swedish vessel and others unknown, and informed the Admiral by wireless that she was attacked on all sides by torpedo-boats. The Admiral, therefore, signalled to the fleet to redouble its vigilance. Just after midnight a green rocket was fired, and the anxious watchers on the flagship, believing that they saw a suspicious vessel, gave orders to fire. The Gamecock fleet of about thirty steam-trawlers from Hull was on the Dogger Bank that night, with about fourteen trawlers of another fleet, and it was by them that the rocket had been fired as a fishing signal. All carried their regulation lights, and some had powerful lamps on deck to facilitate the cleaning of the fish. Five warships passed north-west of them, followed by four to the south- west of them and partly moving actually among them, which fired shell and quick-firers. Some of the trawlers were only 350 yards away. One was sunk (with two men killed and all the crew wounded but one) ; another, though also hit, sent a boat to the sinking vessel and rescued the wounded. Two others were sunk, and the hospital ship was damaged. The firing lasted nearly half an hour. A steamer, thought to be Russian, was seen at dawn. The trawlers at once returned to Hull, which they reached on the following evening. Lord Rosebery spoke for the nation in denouncing the "unspeak- able outrage," and public anger rose to fever pitch. A deputation of the fishermen visited the Foreign Office, and BenckendorfT was hooted in his carriage. Preliminary orders for mutual support were sent to the Home fleet at Cromarty, to the Channel fleet at Gibraltar, and to the Mediterranean fleet at Pola, while four battleships were ordered to Portland and submarines were despatched to Dover. The offence, however, was generally ascribed to drink or nerves, and the two Governments kept their heads. The Tsar sent a message that, in the absence of news, he could only explain the incident as a regrettable misunderstanding, adding that he sincerely regretted the loss of life, and that he would afford complete satisfaction to the sufferers so soon as the mystery was solved. The favourable impression produced by this message, however, was weakened by an impenitent report from Rojdestvensky, telegraphed from Vigo. THE DOGGER BANK INCIDENT 333 The incident, he declared, was provoked by two torpedo-boats which advanced to attack without lights. The Kamchatka, a transport, signalled that she was attacked on all sides and Russian searchlights revealed several vessels like fishing steamers, which the Russian gunners endeavoured to spare. Fire ceased when the torpedo-boats were out of sight. The vessel referred to in the English Press as remaining till the morning must have been one of these torpedo-boats searching for its companion. The "small steam vessels" which were hit were not assisted, as they were suspected of complicity owing to their persistence in cutting the warships' line of advance, while some showed no lights. If fishermen were there, he ex- pressed sincere regret for the unfortunate victims of circumstances in which no warships, even in time of peace, could have acted otherwise. The Cabinet met on October 28th, and on the same evening the Prime-Minister addressed a meeting at Southampton. In Rojdest- vensky's story, he declared, there was much romance. The Russians were out of their course, and they knew that the Dogger Bank was frequented by fishermen. To suggest that torpedo-boats were waiting there implied that we were furnishing a base. In scathing terms he denounced the Admiral's claim to fire on neutral ships, adding that a fleet animated by such sentiments deserved to be hunted out of existence. Happily, the Russian Government had expressed its regret ; the Tsar had promised liberal compensation ; the officers and material witnesses would stop at Vigo ; an enquiry would be held by an Inter- national Commission; the guilty would be tried and punished, and Russia would issue Instructions to prevent a recurrence of the offence. In a word, the Russian Government had shown an enlight- ened desire that truth and justice should prevail. Though certain Conservative organs pronounced the speech a_ weak compromise, public opinion was profoundly relieved, and the Opposition leaders commended the moderation of the Government. The departure of the Russian fleet from Vigo, leaving only four officers of inferior rank, revived the smouldering fires for a moment; but with the signature of a Convention at Petrograd on November 25th the crisis was over. The settlement had been facilitated by the mediation of M. Delcasse. The Commission was to consist of a British, a Russian, a French and an American itaval officer, a fifth to be coopted, or, if necessary, to be appointed by the Emperor Francis Joseph ; and the decision was to be by majority. The Commission met at Paris on December 22nd, under the chairmanship of Admiral Fournier, and by February 25th, 1905, the work was done1. The report implicitly, 1 See Memoir of Sir Edward Fry (British Legal Assessor), pp. 180-91. 334 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 if not explicitly, dismissed the Russian case. The trawlers had com- mitted no hostile act; the Kamchatka had been deceived, for no Japanese torpedo-boats were in the vicinity, and the firing was there- fore unjustifiable. There were, however, extenuating circumstances. The Admiral did his best to prevent the trawlers, when recognised as such, being fired on, and the uncertainty as to the danger explained the decision not to aid the injured crews. The majority added an expression of their regret that the Admiral did not inform the authorities as he passed the Straits of Dover that the trawlers needed aid. These findings, concluded the Commissioners, did not throw any discredit on the valour or humanity of the Russian fleet. It was a discreet Report, conveying censure in a form which it was possible for a Great Power to accept. The sailing of the Russian fleet involved a danger of war not only with Russia but with Germany, whose sympathies with Russia were unconcealed. The Central Powers informed the Tsar that he might safely leave his western frontier undefended ; and Germany supplied the coal without which the Baltic squadron could never have reached its destination. On August 25th, Lord Lansdowne warned the Ger- man Ambassador that if Japan were to become involved in war with Germany, Great Britain would, at her request, recognise the casus foederis1. The Kaiser naturally complained to Petrograd of the threat, and proposed a scheme for meeting the common danger. "It is not impossible," he telegraphed to the Tsar on September 27th, "that the Japanese and the British Governments may launch joint protests against our coaling your ships, coupled with a summons to stop. The result of such a threat of war would be the inability of your fleet to proceed for want of fuel. This new danger would have to be faced by Russia and Germany together, who would both have to remind your ally France of her obligations. ... In this way a powerful combination of the three Continental Powers would be formed, and the Anglo-Saxon group would think twice before attacking it." "I agree fully with your complaints about England's behaviour concerning the coaling of our ships by German steamers," replied the Tsar. "Whereas she under- stands the rules of keeping neutrality in her own fashion, it is cer- tainly high time to put a stop to this. The only way, as you say, would be that Germany, Russia and France should at once unite upon arrangements to abolish English and Japanese arrogance and 1 This was revealed by the German Government in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung in September, 1917. KAISER AND TSAR 335 insolence. Would you like to frame the outlines of such a treaty?" The Kaiser and Bulow promptly forwarded the following draft for the Tsar's approval. Their Majesties, in order to localise the War, have laid down the fol- lowing articles of a defensive alliance. I. If one_[of the Allies] is attacked by a European Power, its Ally wilf I helpjrhe two allies, in case^f need, will a]so act in concert so as to remind j France of her obligationsjander the Franco- Russian treaty. II. No separate peace shall be concluded. III. The promise of help includes the case where acts, such as the delivery of coal to a belligerent, should give rise after the War to complaints by a third Power as to pretended violations of the rights of neutrals1. The Tsar approved the draft but desired, before signing it, that France should see it — a proposal to which the Kaiser was utterly opposed. On December 3rd it was announced that a German ship had been stopped under the Foreign Enlistment Act from coaling at Cardiff, because its cargo was believed to be destined for the Russian fleet; and the Kaiser at once renewed his pressure at Petrograd. " It is far from my intention to hurry you in your answer about our treaty ; but you will, I am sure, be fully alive to the fact that I must now have absolutely positive guarantees whether you intend leaving me unaided in case England and Japan should declare war against me on account of the coaling of the Russian fleet. Should you be unable to guarantee me that in such a war you will loyally fight shoulder to shoulder with me, then I regret I must immediately forbid German steamers to continue to coal your fleet." Instead of signing .the treaty, the Tsar forwarded Admiral Rojdestvensky's complaint that two Ham- burg-American coaling ships had not received orders to follow the fleet beyond Madagascar; and the Kaiser replied that he could give no Instructions, and had told Ballin that he must act on his own responsibility and at his own risk. The project of a treaty now slumbered for several months. Early in 1905, after the fall of Port Arthur, President Roosevelt, unofficially but in vain, advised Russia to make peace; but on May 31st, after the crowning victory of Tsushima, Japan secretly asked the President to invite the belligerents to negotiate. The Tsar agreed in principle; and, on June 8th, Roosevelt telegraphed an identic 1 The story of Bjorko is summarised by Fay, "The Kaiser's Secret Negotiations with the Tsar, 1904-1905," American Historical Review, October, 1918. 336 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 invitation, offering to arrange time and place. As France and Ger- many were already urging Russia to make peace, the President sug- gested that Lord Lansdowne should exert pressure on Japan. The Foreign Secretary declined; and, when the belligerents met at Ports- mouth, he was not in a position to second the President's heroic efforts to avoid a rupture. ''The English Government has been foolishly reluctant to advise Japan to be reasonable," he wrote on August 23rd; and on September nth, when the Treaty was signed, he told Whitelaw Reid that the Kaiser had stood by him "like a trump1." But, although the British Government declined to press its victorious Ally, it had taken a step which contributed to make her accept somewhat less than she had demanded. Though the Treaty oT 1902 was concluded for five yearsTa new Compact, of wider scope, was signed in London, on August 12th, 1905, for ten years. The objects of the two Powers, the Preamble declared, were (i) the main- tenance of peace in Eastern Asia and India ; (ii) the preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independ- ence and integrity of the Chinese empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations ; (iii) the maintenance of the territorial rights and the defence of the special interests of the signatories in Eastern Asia and India. These interests were set forth in Articles III and IV: "Japan, possessing paramount political, military and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognises her right to take such measures of guidance, control and protection in Korea as she may deem necessary, provided that they are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the com- merce and industry of all nations. Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognises her right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian posses- sions." Article II provided that, if either party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, the other should come to its assistance. The new Treaty, in addition to handing over Korea to Japan, introduced two principles of vital moment to Great Britain. In the first place, the scope of the agreement was extended to embrace India, thus correcting what was generally re- garded as the inequality of advantage under the Pact of 1902. In the second, each was to come to the assistance of the other, if attacked 1 Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, vol. I. chs. 31-2. THE TREATY OF BjORKO 337 by a single Power — a stipulation which not only increased our liabilities, but involved for us the obligation, in certain circumstances, to intervene in a struggle between our Ally and the United States. Lord Lansdowne instructed Sir Charles Hardinge to communicate to the Russian Government the text of the new Compact, "which has a purely pacific purpose and tends to protect rights and interests of incontestible security. " Lamsdorff observed that everyone, from the Tsar downwards, regarded the Treaty as directed against Russia. The Ambassador rejoined that only the mention of India could have justified such a notion, and that the Treaty was purely defensive. These assurances exercised no effect on the Tsar, who, on July 24th, had signed at Bjorko the Treaty with Germany which had been dis- cussed in the previous autumn. I. If any European State shall attack either Power the other would aid with all its forces. II. Neither would conclude a separate peace. III. The Treaty should come into force on the conclusion of peace with Japan, and might only be cancelled at a year's notice. IV. Russia would make its terms known to France and invite her to sign it as an ally. The Kaiser returned home delighted with his handiwork. "The Alliance," he asserted, "will be of great use to Russia, as it will restore quiet in the minds of the people and confidence in the main- tenance of peace in Europe, and encourage financial circles in foreign countries to place funds in enterprises to open up Russia. In times to come, even Japan may feel inclined to join it. This would cool down English self-assertion and impertinence. July 24th is a corner-stone in European politics and turns over a new leaf in the history of the world." But, while the Kaiser was dreaming of the Dual and Triple Alliance leagued against perfidious Albion, the unwary Tsar, on the other hand, was oppressed by his guilty secret. On his return from Bjorko he appeared to Lamsdorff to be embarrassed; and, when he at length produced the Treaty, the Foreign Minister was appalled. No action, however, was taken till the return of Witte from America; and the opposition of the two Ministers was strengthened by the reply of the Russian Ambassador at Paris, who, on being ordered to sound the French Government, replied that it was useless, since France would never join a German league nor recognise the settlement of 1871. The Tsar now plucked up courage to write to the Kaiser that it was impossible to carry out the Pact; and the Russian Ambassador in w.&g.iii 22 338 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 Berlin was instructed to add that it must remain inoperative till Russia, Germany and France could agree, since the adhesion of France was at present impossible. The Treaty of Bjorko, treacher- ously extorted and quickly denounced, was the prelude to a new orientation of Russian policy. IV. The Conference of Algeciras, 1 904-1 906 After receiving the imprimatur of Great Britain on her work in Morocco, France turned with new zeal to the task of reform in that country1. At the close of 1904 M. Delcasse drew up his Instructions for Saint-Rene Taillandier, who was selected for the Mission to Fez. On reaching the Moorish capital in February, 1905, the Envoy reported the Sultan as saying that, while most of the suggested changes were practicable, some were very difficult to accept and must be discussed with the Maghzen. But, before the discussions were concluded, a third party intervened, and the problem of Moroccan reform brought Europe within sight of war. The attitude of official Germany towards the Anglo-French Treaty had at first been friendly. "We have no cause to imagine that it has a point against any other Power," declared the Chancellor. "As to Morocco, we have commercial interests which we must and shall protect. We have, however, no ground to fear that they will be overlooked or inf ringed. " It was natural that the Pan- Germans should grumble at the Chancellor's self-effacement; but the Kaiser informed King Edward, on his visit to Kiel in June, that he had no objection to the Treaty, and that Morocco had never interested him2. The despatch of the French Envoy to Fez with a comprehensive programme of reforms was the signal for a change of front at Berlin. Holstein suggested that the Kaiser should visit Tangier, and the Chancellor approved the plan3. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung issued a warning that the French negotiations at Fez did not square with the avowed policy of maintaining the status quo ; and the object of the coming demonstration was explained by the Chancellor in the Reichstag on March 29th. "No one who has no aggressive aim in view can find cause for apprehension. We have economic interests; and in Morocco, as in China, it is our interest to keep the open door. 1 See Affaires du Maroc, 1901-1905; Tardieu, La Conference d'Algiciras\ and Morel, Morocco in Diplomacy. 2 Eckardstein, Erinnerungen, ill. 88. 3 Hammann, Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges, ch. 8. THE KAISER AT TANGIER 339 We merely ask that our economic interests are not endangered." On March 3 1 st, the Kaiser landed from his yacht at Tangier and addressed the German colony1 : I am happy to salute the devoted pioneers of German industry and commerce who aid me in my task of maintaining the interests of the Fatherland in a free country. The Empire has great and growing interests in Morocco. Commerce can only progress if all the Powers are considered to have equal rights under the sovereignty of the Sultan and compatible with the independence of the country. My visit is the recognition of this independence. The theme was developed in a speech to the Sultan's uncle and Plenipotentiary. My visit is to show my resolve to do all in my power to safeguard German interests in Morocco. Considering the Sultan as absolutely free, I wish to discuss with him the means to secure these interests. As for the reforms which he contemplates, it seems to me that he should proceed with great caution and consider the religious sentiments of the people, so that public order is not troubled. The reason for this dramatic change in Germany's attitude commonly given in France and Great Britain was that the Kaiser took advantage of the collapse of Russia in the Far East to coerce her Ally. The motive was frankly avowed by the Pan-German Press, but it was not the main one. The French Press spoke openly of setting up a second Tunis, and Germany believed that, unless she entered an emphatic protest, Morocco would be swallowed up before her eyes. Moreover, the apprehensions aroused by French ambitions were confirmed by the discovery of Secret Treaties. A Treaty had been signed by Lord Lansdowne and M.Paul Cambon on April 8th, 1904, at the same time as the documents published to the world. The Mediterranean coast from Melilla to the Sebu river, whenever the Sultan ceased to exercise authority over it, was to come within the sphere of influence of Spain and be administered by her, she, on her part, pledging herself to commercial liberty and under- taking to abstain from fortifying the straits or from alienating any part of the territory. When Spain adhered to the Anglo-French Declaration in the following September, and declared herself "firmly attached to the integrity of the Moorish empire under the sovereignty of the Sultan," a similar Franco- Spanish Convention was signed, which frankly contemplated partition2: tl He yielded with reluctance to the Chancellor's desire for a political demonstra- 1. Schon, Memoirs of an Ambassador, pp. 19-23. 2 See Morocco, No. 4 (191 1). 22—2 340 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 In case the continuance of the political status of Morocco should become impossible, or if, owing to the weakness of the Government or to its continued inability to uphold law and order, or to any other cause the existence of which is acknowledged by both parties, the status quo can no longer be maintained, Spain may freely exercise"her right of action in the territory which henceforward constitutes her sphere of influence. Each Power promised to inform the other if obliged to undertake military action, and French and Spanish rights in their respective spheres were to be respected. The Pact was communicated to Lord Lansdowne with the request to keep it secret. The two Secret Treaties were not published till 191 1 ; but they were quickly known at Berlin1. Germany's case was that, if she did not act, she would one day wake up to find Morocco closed to her commerce. The root of the trouble lay in the fact that M. Delcasse had not purchased Germany's assent in advance. The goodwill of Italy had been bought by recognition of her claims to Tripoli, that of Great Britain by assent to her position in Egypt, that of Spain by the hypothetical reversion of the northern littoral. Germany, it is true, was not a Mediterranean Power; but her commerce was rapidly developing and her pride was morbidly sensitive. ''With incredible blindness," wrote M. Rene Millet, "the Government took precautions with everybody except the only one of its neighbours whom it had serious 1 cause to fear2." M. Delcasse, echoed M. Hanotaux, offered Germany, a pretext for conflict, and chose the moment when Russia was locked in deadly conflict in the Far East3. In England, Mr Gibson Bowrles had foretold that Germany would send in her bill. It is regrettable that the British Cabinet did not perceive — or at any rate did not help France to perceive — the wisdom of securing German consent by a solatium. Though the Secret Treaties of 1904 reserved no share for Great Britain in the contingent partition of Morocco, and though it has been argued4 that it was reasonable for the contracting parties to make alternative arrangements in the event of Morocco collapsing from internal weakness, our share in a transaction which suggested double-dealing involves the British Government in partial responsi- bility for the crises of 1905 and 191 1. 1 Valentin, Deutschlands Aussenpolitik, p. 54. 2 Notre Politique exterieure, p. 224. 3 lb. Introduction. 4 Gilbert Murray, The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey, pp. 55-6. When the secret clauses were revealed, the criticism was renewed. Baron d'Estournelles de Constant condemned them as a double game, and statesmen so far apart as Ribot and Jaures denounced the contradiction between public professions and private THE FALL OF M. DELCASSfi 341 Despite the provocation to which it was a reply, the Tangier demonstration was a colossal blunder; for its first effect was to strengthen the entente cordiale, and to turn a limited obligation into a general defensive understanding against aggression or dictation. It was promptly announced that a British squadron would visit Brest, that a French squadron would return the visit at Portsmouth, and that King Edward would stop at Paris in May on his way to join the Queen at Marseilles. Yet, though France was angered by the peremp- tory tones of the Tangier manifesto, there was a widespread con- viction that the Foreign Minister had led France into danger. On April 19th he was attacked in the Chamber not only by Jaures and de Pressense, but by M. Deschanel and other Imperialists. M. Rouvier offered a lukewarm defence of his colleague, whose policy he detested, and the days of the Minister were numbered. The French Envoy had been busily engaged at Fez since February, and on April nth he reported that the Sultan consented to his troops being organised on French models at Tangier, Rabat, Casablanca and Ujda. But the atmosphere rapidly changed when a German Envoy, Count Tattenbach, reached Fez on May 13th, and on May 28th Abdul Aziz rejected the French proposals. A day or two later, a British Mission reached the capital, but was unable to reverse the decision. Abdul Aziz explained that he could only accept the French proposals if ratified by the Powers ; and on May 30th he invited the Signatories of the Treaty of 1880 to meet at Tangier. Though Germany alone among the Powers desired a conference, the peace of Europe hung on France's reply to the invitation. In this emergency, the Kaiser turned to President Roosevelt, and on April 5th, Speck presented a Memorandum, in which his master declared that he must insist on a conference1. He believed that the attitude of Great Britain would depend on that of the United States, and asked the President to tell the British Government that he thought a conference should be held. Roosevelt, who was away hunting bears, began to be alarmed. " I am sincerely anxious to bring about a better state of feeling between England and Germany/ ' he wrote to Mr Taft on April 20th. "Each nation is working itself up to a condition of desperate hatred of the other — each from fear the other is going to attack." On returning to Washington at the end of May, he found the French and German Ambassadors apprehensive of war. " Durand was bitter about Germany, and so far as he represented the 1 Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt , vol. i. chs. 26-7. 342 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 British Government it would appear they were anxious to see Ger- many humiliated by France's refusal of a conference and quite willing to face war. I desired to do anything I could for France because I thought her in the right." On June 5th, Mr Whitelaw Reid, the American Ambassador in London, telegraphed that Lord Lansdowne regarded the proposal for a conference as unfortunate and as, possibly, designed to embarrass France. Strengthened by the support of Great Britain and Russia and by the assurance of Austria that she would side with the majority, M. Delcasse held out stubbornly against a Conference. But the game he was playing appeared to his colleagues to be fraught with danger. Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck visited Paris — where he was a familiar figure at the end of the Second Empire — and had interviews with the Premier and some of his colleagues. The air was thick with rumours ot a ^German ultimatum and talk of the unpre- paredness of the Army. The decisive Cabinet was held on June 6th. President Loubet remained faithful to the Foreign Minister; but all his colleagues, unwilling either to bluff or to fight, were hostile. M. Delcasse argued that France could not take part in a conference without humiliation, and asserted that Great Britain was ready to back her up to the very end, and would mobilise the fleet and land 100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein. The Premier replied that the acceptance of the British offer would mean war, and that it was necessary to accept the conference. His colleagues supported him; and the Foreign Minister, after warning them that their pusillanimity would encourage German insolence, withdrew and resigned1. " The British offer," on the strength of which M. Delcasse was pre- pared to risk a war, existed only in his imagination. In the middle of May, the French Ambassador complained to jLord Lansdowne -of_tbe general attitude of the GermanGovernment, which was seeking in all ^paits~Ttf_tne"'world to "sow discord between France and Great Britain2. He stated that M. Delcasse regarded the situation not as pro- foundly dangerous, but as sufficiently serious to occasion him much preoccupation. Lord Lansdowne replied that the moral seemed to be that each Government should continue to treat the other with the most absolute mutual confidence, should keep it fully informed of everything which came to their knowledge, and should, so far as 1 The story was told by Stephane Lauzanne in he Matin, October 6th, 7th, 8th, 1905. MeVil, De la paix de Francfort a la Conference d'Algdctras, chs. 4 and 5, contains Delcass£'s apologia. 2 This paragraph is based on information kindly supplied by the Foreign Office. "THE BRITISH OFFER" 343 possible, discuss in advance any contingencies by which they might in the course of events find themselves confronted. In a conversation with Sir Frank Lascelles on June 10th, Prince Biilow, speaking in the strictest confidence, said that information had reached him that Great Britain had made an offer to France to enter into an offensive and defensive Alliance with her against Germany. France had refused; but the fact that the offer had been made was a proof of unfriendliness against Germany. Sir Frank could only say that he was astonished to hear that such an offer had been made, and was strongly inclined to doubt the accuracy of the news. Prince Biilow said that the in- formation was not official, but that it came from a source which made it impossible for him to doubt its accuracy. Hereupon, Lord Lans- downe sent for the German Ambassador and told him that he could scarcely believe that the assertion as to an alleged offensive and defensive Alliance was seriously made or that the story was worth contradicting. If, however, the Ambassador thought a contradiction would serve a useful purpose, he was glad to assure him that no offensive and defensive Alliance had ever been offered or even dis- cussed on either side. According to Hammann, he added that he must leave it open whether public opinion, which saw in the theatrical Tangier journey an unfriendly act against Great Britain as well as against France, might not force the Government to aid France if she were attacked1. Such a warning against aggression was very different from a solemn engagement to engage in hostilities; and the "offer" is rightly characterised by M. Poincare as a formula of entente even less definite than the Franco- Russian Pact of 1891. How little weight was attached to it in Downing Street, is revealed by the fact that in his retrospect of August 3rd, 19 14, Sir Edward Grey made no reference to the incident. M. Delcasse's mistaken interpretation of the British official attitude was doubtless due to the obiter dicta of certain highly- placed personages, who expressed their individual convictions as to what was likely to occur2. On the fall of M. Delcasse, M. Rouvier took over the Foreign Office, and on July 8th he and the German Ambassador made a joint Declaration defining the conditions on which France accepted the con- ference, while the Ambassador formally declared that Germany did not contest the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904. On July 12th, the British 1 Hammann, Der missverstandene Bismarck, p. 120. 2 On his way from Biarritz to London King Edward told French Ministers that in case of need Great Britain would intervene on their side. Eckardstein, in. 105. 344 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 Government also agreed to the conference. The Premier expressed his hope that, in Count Radolin's words, there would be "ni vainqueur ni vaincu " ; and the accord signed by M. Rouvier and the Ambassador on September 28th seemed to put this aspiration into words. The organisation of the police, except on the Algerian frontier, was to be international. A State-bank was to supply credits for the police, the troops and public works. Morocco was not to alienate any public service to the profit of particular interests, and the principle of adjudication without distinction of nationality was to be adopted for public works. The Conference was to be held at Algeciras, and both fissions were to return from Fez. At this moment the Balfour Government was tottering to its fall ; but in a speech on October 20th Sir Edward Grey declared that the accession to power of a Liberal Government would involve no change in our Foreign Policy, since the Liberals would accept the three cardinal features now distinguishing it — friendship with the United States, the Japanese Alliance and friendship with France. The roots of estrangement from Russia lay solely in the past, and both Govern- ments should encourage mutual confidence. Our relations with Germany were more delicate. If there is a desire for the improvement of relations — the relations of the Governments are quite correct — between the Press and public opinion, it will meet with no obstacle here, provided it be clearly understood that nothing we do is in any way to impair our existing good relations with France. In other words, it must be a condition of any improvement that the relations of Germany with France on all matters which come under the French Agreement should be fair and good also. The speech aroused wide attention, for it was known that Sir Edward might succeed Lord Lansdowne at any moment. On the resignation of Mr Balfour on December 4th, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman formed a Liberal Ministry, and explained its policy at a meeting at the Albert Hall on December 22nd1. The references to Foreign Affairs were brief, but clear. I wish emphatically to reaffirm my adhesion to the policy of the Entente cordiale. Even more important than any actual amicable instrument is the real friendship developed between the two peoples ; and one of the objects of our policy will be to maintain that spirit of friendship unimpaired. As regards Russia, we have nothing but good feelings towards that great people. In the case of Germany, also, I see no cause whatever of estrange- ment in any of the interests of either people, and we welcome the unofficial 1 This speech is reprinted in his Speeches, p. 179. ANGLO-FRENCH MILITARY CONVERSATIONS 345 demonstrations of friendship which have lately been passing between the two countries. With other European Powers our relations are most friendly. Our relations with Japan are sufficiently known to the world by the recent Treaty; and with the United States we are bound by the closest ties of race, tradition and fellowship. This is a most pleasing outlook, which I trust will not be marred by any events that can occur. Our general foreign policy will be opposed to aggression and to adventure, and will be animated by a desire to be on the best terms with all nationalities. The new Ministry was well received abroad. Baron Richthofen ex- pressed to Baron Greindl, the Belgian Minister, his satisfaction at the change, which, he declared, had produced a certain ditente. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, he added, had a reputation for sincerity and loyalty which inspired confidence. The love of the new Premier for France was well known in Paris. A few days after this reassuring survey, the Military Correspondent of The Times wrote an article on the hostility of Germany to France, ending with a warning to Berlin that a war might unchain animosities in unexpected quarters. On the following day, December 28th, Major Huguet, the French Military Attache, in discussing the article, remarked that the French Embassy was anxious because the new Foreign Secretary had not renewed the assurances given by Lord Lansdowne. The Ambassador was on leave, and the Algeciras Con- ference was to meet on January 16th. Colonel Repington asked why one of the staff of the Embassy did not make enquiry at the Foreign Office. Major Huguet replied that, in the absence of the Ambassador, it was impossible to gain information there ; but, if Sir Edward would broach the subject at the next diplomatic reception, the Embassy would be greatly relieved. The French Navy, he added, was prepared, and reservists were coming to barracks to ask for orders; for Germany might probably attack through Belgium. Colonel Repington reported the conversation to the Foreign Secretary, who was engaged in his constituency, and who replied that he had not receded from anything Lord Lansdowne had said1. Meanwhile, the Ambassador, who had returned from his holiday, visited the Foreign Secretary on January 10th, 1906, and, after in- forming him2 that the French Government considered the danger to be real, asked whether Great Britain would think she had so much at stake as to be willing to join in resisting an unprovoked attack. If this were even a possible attitude, conversations would be desirable 1 Repington, The First World War, vol. I. ch. i. 2 See Lord Haldane, Before the War, pp. 29-30. 346 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 between the General Staffs as to the form of cooperation in the northern portion of France. The French Army was not so large as that of Germany. Could we, then, reconsider our military organisa- tion, so that, if we ever thought it necessary, we could rapidly despatch, say, 100,000 men, not to invade Belgium, which no one thought of doing, but to guard the French frontier of Belgium, in case the German Army sought to enter France that way? If the German attack were made further south, where the fortresses rendered the defensive position strong, the French Army, set free from the difficulty of mustering in full strength opposite the Belgian boundary, would be able to guard the southern frontier. The Foreign Secretary replied that he could promise nothing to any foreign Power, unless it was subsequently to receive the whole- hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose1. I said, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France on the question of Morocco, public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France. I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during the crisis to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador. I made no promise, and I used no threats. That position was accepted by the French Government; but they said to me at the time, and I think very reasonably: "If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain, should a sudden crisis arise, justifies you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts." There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorised those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military or naval experts should bind either Govern- ment or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose. I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell- Bannerman, the Prime-Minister; I consulted Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War; and the present Prime-Minister (Mr Asquith), who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the most I could do, and they authorised that on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose. The War Minister visited Campbell- Bannerman on January 14th, and obtained leave for Sir Neville Lyttelton and General Grierson to concert cooperation. The Premier, adds Colonel Repington, was very firm and clear that we should be prepared for all emergencies, but that the conversations should not bind the Governments. On 1 See his speech of August 3rd, 1914. ANGLO-BELGIAN MILITARY CONVERSATIONS 347 January 17th Grierson began his talks with Huguet, and they signed a declaration that the conversations should not bind either Govern- ment. 0 I summoned the heads of the British General Staff," adds Lord Haldane, " and saw Colonel Huguet. I became aware at once that there was a new army problem. It was how to mobilise and concentrate opposite the Belgian frontier a force calculated as adequate (with the assistance of Russian pressure in the East) to make up for the inadequacy of the French armies for their great task of defending the entire French frontier from Dunkirk to Belfort, or even further south if Italy should join the Triple Alliance in an attack." The conversations thus begun continued without interruption till 19141. Almost at the same moment that military conversations began with French experts, Colonel Barnardiston, our Military Attache in Brussels, initiated similar discussions with General Ducarne, Chief of the Belgian General Staff. According to the latter's Report to the Belgian Minister of War, dated April 10th, 1906, the Colonel spoke of the preoccupation of the British General Staff with the possibilities 1 "I only told Buckle," records Colonel Repington (The First World War, vol. 1. ch. 1). But what was known to the Editor of The Times was unknown to the majority of the Cabinet. " The fact that conversations between military and naval experts took place," declared the Foreign Secretary in 1914, "was later on — I think much later on, because that crisis passed and the thing ceased to be of im- portance— brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet." The neglect to consult the Cabinet was a grave offence against the theory and practice of Ministerial solidarity. "Sir Edward's phraseology," writes Lord Loreburn, "rather conveys that his selection of confidants was casual; but Mr Asquith and Lord Haldane were with him Vice-Presidents of the Liberal League. There was no difficulty whatever in summoning the Cabinet during the election to consider so grave a matter. A good many Members were in London or within an hour of it, while those whom he consulted were at a distance. And there are railways and post offices in Great Britain. The weekly meetings of the Cabinet were regular in December, and were held on January 3rd and January 31st. From February 1st they were again regular. The Cabinet might have been told within a very short time of the conversations between the military experts and of the statement made to the two Ambassadors. The reason apparently given for not informing the Cabinet as soon as it did meet (January 31st) is 'that the crisis passed and the thing ceased to be of importance.' On the contrary : events have unhappily proved that it was of the utmost importance. It was the first recorded communication pointing to our making war on behalf of France if she should come to blows with Germany. The thing of which Sir Edward made light proved to be the parting of the ways in our relations with France. Enmity had already given place to goodwill ; but we had not yet espoused the quarrel of France or held out the prospect of fighting by her side. In the beginning of 1906 her statesmen learned that even this was possible. The concealment from the Cabinet was protracted and must have been deliberate. Parliament knew nothing of it till August 3rd, 1 9 14. Some of those who were in close confidential com- munication with the Prime Minister at that time will not believe that he understood the scope and significance of what was in fact done, unless some evidence is given" (How the War Came, pp. 80-81). 348 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 of war, declared that we should send about 100,000 men, who would disembark between Dunkirk and Calais, and asked whether Belgium could defend herself during the ten days required for their transport. The General replied that Namur and Liege were safe against a surprise attack, and that the Belgian Army of 100,000 men would be ready to take the field in four days. After expressing his satisfaction at the information, the Colonel declared that the conversation was absolutely confidential ; that it was in no way binding on his Govern- ment ; that his Minister and the British General Staff were the only persons aware of the matter ; and that he did not know whether his Sovereign had been consulted. In succeeding interviews British assistance and Belgian cooperation were discussed in detail. A mar- ginal note on the dossier stated that "the entry of the English into Belgium would only take place after the violation of her neutrality by Germany." No convention was suggested on either side, and these conversations, unlike those with France, were purely unofficial1. At the Conference of Algeciras, which was attended by twelve States in addition to Morocco and opened on January 16th, Great Britain was represented by Sir Arthur Nicolson; and King Edward remarked to M. Cambon, " Tell us what you wish on each point, and we will support you without restriction or reserves." The two main questions of the Police and a State-bank were reached early in 1 See Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to the Outbreak of War, pp. 350-67. When General Ducarne's report was published in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung on October 3rd, 19 14, the Foreign Office addressed a Circular Telegram to British Ministers abroad, denying the existence of an Anglo-Belgian agreement. " In view of the solemn guarantee to protect the neutrality of Belgium against violation from any side, some academic discussions may have taken place as to what assistance the British army might be able to afford, should one of her neigh- bours violate that neutrality." When Bethmann-Hollweg in 191 5, on the strength of this document, charged Great Britain and Belgium with conspiring against Germany, Sir Edward published a reply in The Times of August 26th. "The con- versation of which most use has been made was never reported to the Foreign Office, nor, as far as records show, to the War Office. But it bears on its face that the entry of the British into Belgium would take place only after the violation of Belgian territory by Germany, and that it did not commit the British Government." "We were among the guarantors of Belgian neutrality," echoes Lord Haldane, "and it was of course conceivable that, if she called on us to do so, we might have to defend her. It would be part of the duty of our Military Attache to remember this, and, if opportunity offered, to ascertain in informal conversation the view of the Belgian General Staff as to what form of help they would be likely to ask for. This he doubtless did. But even so, the conversation must have been very informal, for in the account by the Chief of the Belgian Staff there are errors about the composition of the possible British force which indicate that either he took no notes or that Colonel Barnardiston had not thought it an occasion which required him to obtain details from London." Lord Haldane himself only learned of the conversations from the German publication in 19 14 (Before the War, pp. 18 1-2). THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS 349 February1. France's demand for the Police mandate and her revised offer to share it with Spain were rejected by Germany, who first proposed that the Sultan should select officers from the minor Powers, and later that she should choose from "foreign" nations. These suggestions were in turn rejected by France and Spain, and at the same moment discussions on the State-bank reached a deadlock. A rupture was generally expected ; but pacific influences were at work behind the scenes. In urging France to accept the Conference, President Roosevelt had promised her fair play; and, in the middle of February, he intervened on her behalf in secret negotiations with the Kaiser2. A Franco- Spanish mandate under a Swiss Inspector- General was at last accepted, at the end of March. The main difficulty having been overcome, the delegates were anxious to be gone. "They are throwing concessions at each other's heads," wrote Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace in his diary on March 29th ; and on April 7th the Act was signed. Though both sides pretended to be satisfied with the results of the wrestling-match, the Conference of Algeciras proved not more than a breathing-space between the rounds. Its main result was the tightening of the bonds between Great Britain and France ; for the maintenance of the Balance of Power involved that we should throw our weight now into this scale, now into that, but always against any Power aspiring — or believed by us to be aspiring — to a European dictatorship. The process which Germans describe as encirclement, and Englishmen as insurance, had begun3. V. The Second Hague Conference, 1906-1908 The detente following the Algeciras Conference was employed by the newly-installed British Cabinet to strive for a reduction of armaments. On April 3rd, 1906, Benckendorff informed Sir Edward Grey that, in convoking the Second Hague Conference for July, Russia desired to secure improvements in the working of the Court and additions to the Rules of War by land and sea, but did not propose to discuss the Limitation of Armaments. The Foreign Secretary 1 See Protocoles et Comptes Rendus de la Conference dy Algiciras \ Tardieu, La Conference d' Algeciras ; Morocco, No. i (1906). I have here been able to use a MSS. Diary of Sir D. Mackenzie Wallace, who represented The Times during the Con- ference. 2 Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, 1. 489-505. 3 In La France conquise, published in 1906, M. Flourens, the ex- Foreign Minister, bitterly complained that King Edward reigned in London and governed in Paris; but his was a voice crying in the wilderness. 35o CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 replied that, as he gathered, Russia did not desire to exclude dis- cussion of the subject, and that it was the wish of the British Govern- ment to see it included1. The Conference was postponed till the following year; but, as evidence of our good faith, it was announced in July that one of the four battleships of the Cawdor programme would be omitted, with corresponding reduction in destroyers and submarines. If any expectation existed that this step might evoke a response from Berlin, it was quickly disappointed; and the Kaiser observed to Sir Frank Lascelles that, if disarmament were to be brought up at the Conference, he should decline to be represented2. Every State must decide for itself what forces it required. In August, King Edward visited Cronberg, where the Kaiser remarked to Sir Charles Hardinge that the approaching Hague Conference was great nonsense. That his attitude was not dictated by hostility to Great Britain was shown by his cordiality to the British War Minister at the September manoeuvres. " I was invited," writes Lord Haldane3, " to examine for myself the organ- isation of the German War Office, which I wished to study for the purposes of reform at home, and this I did in some detail, in company with Colonel Ellison, an expert adviser. The authorities explained to us the general nature of the organisation for rapid mobilisation developed under Moltke and subsequently carried further. Of course, I neither tried to obtain nor did obtain any information not available to the general public there. I was everywhere cordially welcomed I do not think that my impression was wrong that even the responsible heads of the Army were then looking almost entirely to peaceful penetration." The Morocco crisis had proved too much for Billow's strength, and it was not till November 14th, 1906, that he reappeared in the Reichstag and surveyed the European situation. We have no idea of disturbing the Franco-English friendship Good relations between Germany and Russia have not damaged the Franco- Russian Alliance, and good relations between Germany and England are not incompatible with the Entente, if it pursues peaceful aims. The Entente without good relations of its members to Germany would be a danger to peace. A policy aiming at encircling Germany, forming a ring of Powers in order to isolate her, would indeed be dangerous.. . .We have no idea of building a fleet as strong as the English, and we shall never break the peace. Time and patience are needed. The barometer has moved from Rain and Wind to Changeable. To point to Fair, both sides must avoid irritations. 1 Correspondence concerning the Second Peace Conference, 1908, Cd. 3857. 2 Sir E. T. Cook, How Britain strove for Peace. 3 Before the War, pp. 23-26. THE PROBLEM OF ARMAMENTS 351 Undeterred by the hostility of the Kaiser to a discussion of armaments, the British Prime-Minister, in the first number of The Nation, published on March 7th, 1907, in an article entitled "The Hague Conference and the Limitation of Armaments," made an impressive appeal to Europe. "The disposition shown by certain Powers, of whom Great Britain is one, to raise the question of the limitation of armaments at the approaching Conference has evoked some objections. I wish to indicate my reasons for holding them to be baseless. The first Conference was convened for this very question. The hope was not fulfilled, but I never heard it suggested that the discussion left behind it any injurious consequences. It was desirable in 1898; and to day the burden has enormously increased. I know of no special circumstances which would make the discussion a matter of international misgiving. Since 1899 the points of disagree- ment between the Powers have become not more but less acute ; they are confined to a far smaller field ; the sentiment of peace has become incomparably stronger and more constant ; and the idea of arbitration has attained a practical potency and a moral authority undreamt of in 1898. We have already given earnest of our sincerity by consider- able reductions in our naval and military expenditure, as well as by the understanding that we are prepared to go further if we find a similar disposition in other quarters. Our delegates will not therefore go to the Conference empty-handed. It has, however, been suggested that our example will count for nothing, because our preponderant naval position will remain unimpaired. I do not believe it. The sea power of this country implies no challenge to any State or group of States. . . . Our known adhesion to these two dominant principles — the independence of nationalities and the freedom of trade — entitles us, of itself, to claim that, if our fleets be invulnerable, they carry with them no menace across the waters of the world, but a message of the most cordial goodwill, based on the belief in the community of interests between the nations." The article was discussed through- out Europe, and the writer's sincerity was confirmed by a Navy programme of three capital ships and a promise to drop one of them, if other Powers would do the same. The offer was communicated officially to seven Powers; but, on April 30th, Biilow, to whom the invitation was virtually addressed, announced in the Reichstag that the German Government could not participate in a discussion which they believed to be unpractical, if not actually dangerous. Russia and Austria, also, expressed a wish to postpone the question. 352 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 On April 7th Benckendorff reported that Great Britain, the United States and Spain desired a discussion on Armaments at the Hague; and, on June 12th, the Foreign Secretary signed elaborate Instructions to Sir Edward Fry, who was accompanied by Sir E. Satow, Lord Reay, and Sir H. Howard, British Minister at the Hague, with General Elles and Captain Ottley, Director of Naval Intelligence, as experts1 : The Government, in accepting the invitation, reserves the right of suggesting the discussion of other questions. Foremost among them is that of expenditure upon armaments.. . .They felt it was better to have a discussion, even if it did not lead to a satisfactory conclusion. Discussion without results would at any rate have kept the door open for continuing negotiations on the subject ; whereas to put the question aside would seem like an admission that it was hopeless and had receded since the First Conference, of which it was the prime object. But, after the apparently final declaration of the German Government, that under no circumstances would they take part in such a discussion, it is doubtful how far it would be expedient to proceed with it. The position of Germany both as a military and as a naval Power is such that it is difficult to regard as serious any discussion in which she does not take part. The Government would be most reluctant that anything should take place at the Conference, summoned as it is in the interests of peace, that would be of a nature to cause friction or ill-feeling. You will therefore consult with the United States and Spanish Delegates and consider what line to take. Should it be decided that the subject shall be discussed and a practical proposal be invited, the Government would agree that the Great Powers should communicate in advance their programmes of naval construction.. . .The Government are aware that this would not necessarily lead directly to any reduction in expenditure; but they are hopeful that the mere fact of communication would provide opportunities for negotiation that do not now exist and would tend to alleviate the burden or retard its increase. A discussion was initiated by Sir Edward Fry on August 17th, at the fourth Plenary Meeting of the Conference2. He began by quoting MuraviefFs Circular of 1898, and pronounced its true and eloquent words to be more opportune than ever. The charges of Europe, the United States and Japan had risen from 251 to 320 millions. Such is the expenditure which might serve better objects; such is the burden under which our peoples groan ; such is the Christian peace of the civilised world in the twentieth century. I know you will agree with me that the realisation of the wish expressed in 1899 would be a great blessing for the whole of humanity. Is this hope capable of realisation? I cannot 1 Count Wolff- Metternich in vain advised his chiefs not to decline discussion. 2 Protocols of the Eleven Plenary Meetings, 1908, pp. 27-31, Cd. 4081. SIR EDWARD FRY'S APPEAL 353 give a categorical reply. I can only say that my Government is a convinced adherent of these lofty aspirations, and that it charges me to invite you to cooperate in realising this noble object.. . .Today, the sentiment of solidarity of the human race is more than ever spread. It is this sentiment which has rendered possible this Conference, and it is in its name that I beg you not to separate without asking the Governments to devote them- selves very seriously to the question The British Government, recog- nising that several Governments desire to restrict their military expenses, and that this can be realised by the independent action of each Power, would be ready to communicate yearly to the Powers who would do the same the programme of new ships of war and the expenditure this would entail.... In conclusion, I propose the following resolution: "The Con- ference confirms the resolution adopted in 18991, and, seeing that the charges have considerably increased in almost all countries since that year, the Conference declares that it is highly desirable to see all Governments resume the serious study of this question." This eloquent appeal was supported by the spokesmen of the United States, France and Spain; and the session of the Conference was closed by a brief address from the President. In 1899, declared M. NelidofT, the discussions had been so lively that they threatened to wreck the Conference. The Russian Government had therefore not put it on the programme, since it was no topic for fruitful discussion, and decided not to take part in debating it. It would be best to reaffirm the voeu of 1899. The resolution was put to the meeting, and the President declared that the unanimity of the applause rendered a vote unnecessary. While the British Government had thus to watch the frustration of their hopes, in another field they were themselves the obstacle to a change eagerly desired in many parts of the world and not without its champions in this country. One of the grounds on which large Navies, and above all a large German Navy, were demanded was the necessity of defending commerce in time of war; from which it seemed logically to follow that, if this danger were removed, one of the excuses for naval armaments would disappear. The case for abolition was cogently stated by the Lord Chancellor (Lord Lore- burn); but the Admiralty declined to dispense with a powerful weapon in their armoury, and the Foreign Secretary explained to Sir Edward Fry, that the surrender could only be contemplated in return for concessions of equal value. It is probable that a proposal will be brought forward to sanction the principle of the immunity of enemies' merchantships and private property 1 "That the limitation of military charges which weigh on the world is highly desirable for increasing the material and moral well-being of humanity." w.&g.iii 23 354 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 from capture at sea in time of war. If carried to its logical conclusion, the principle must entail the abolition of the right of commercial blockade. During recent years the proportion between the British Army and the great Continental Armies has come to be such that the British Army, if operating alone, could not be regarded as a means of offence against the mainland of a Great Continental Power. For her ability to bring pressure to bear upon her enemies in war Great Britain has therefore to rely on the Navy alone. The Government cannot agree to any resolution which would diminish the effective means which the navy has of bringing pressure to bear upon an enemy. You should, however, raise no objection to the discussion, nor need you necessarily take the initiative in opposing a resolution. If, at some future date, the great Continental Armies were to be diminished, and if such a change could be brought about by immunity from capture and was dependent upon it, the Government might feel that the risks they would run would be outweighed by the general gain and relief. But, at present, they cannot accept a resolution which might so limit the prospective liability of war as to remove some of the considerations which now restrain public opinion from contemplating it and might, after the outbreak of war, tend to prolong it. When the United States proposed the abolition of the capture of private property, except when running a blockade, Germany and other Powers supported the proposal with reserves; but though it was carried in the Committee1, the project failed, owing to the opposition of Great Britain and other leading Sea Powers. The Conventions incorporated in the Final Act represented but a slender harvest for the labours of four months2. The machinery established in 1899 for the pacific regulation of disputes was amended. The Drago doctrine that force should not be employed for the recovery of debts was adopted ; but it was not to apply, if the debtor State refused Arbitration or repudiated an Arbitral decision. A formal Declaration of War was to precede hostilities. Neutral territory was declared inviolable, and the rights of neutrals defined. Belligerent merchantmen at sea or in enemy ports when hostilities broke out were to be immune from capture. The British proposal to forbid the conversion at sea of merchantmen into warships was whittled down to a definition designed to exclude privateering. In like manner, the British proposal to forbid floating mines, thus limiting them to the territorial waters of the belligerent and to the defence of fortified places, was opposed by Russia, Germany and Austria; but Germany proposed to forbid floating mines altogether for four years. The Con- vention finally forbade unanchored automatic control mines which do 1 Committee Four, on Juridical Questions of Naval War. 2 Final Act, 1908, Cd. 1175. RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE 355 not become innocuous after one hour, and anchored mines which do not become innocuous on breaking loose. The British Delegation, while accepting the instalment, stated that "an act will not be re- garded as lawful merely because the Convention permits it." Naval bombardment of places undefended or defended only by mines was forbidden; but military works might be destroyed after notice. The Geneva Convention was extended to naval war. Fishing-boats, scientific and mission vessels, and mails (except to or from a block- aded port) were excluded from capture. Among the reforms in the laws of naval war approved at the Hague, however, none compared in importance with the creation of a Prize-Court. Germany desired a special tribunal to be created after the outbreak of hostilities, consisting of an admiral and a civilian representing each belligerent, with a coopted member, which would hear appeals from belligerent Prize-Courts. Great Britain, on the other hand, argued for a permanent Court, to which every Signatory whose mercantile shipping exceeded 800,000 tons should appoint a jurist, but to which only neutrals might appeal. A com- promise was reached, allowing appeals from neutrals or private persons and, in certain cases, from belligerents. The Court was to sit at the Hague, and to consist of fifteen judges, eight permanently representing the Great Powers of Europe, the rest supplied by the Minor States in rotation. This Convention was not to be ratified till June, 1909, a year later than the rest; for an international Court required an international code. Early in 1908, Great Britain issued invitations to a Conference in London for discussing the unsettled points of maritime law on which the Court would have to adjudicate. "The results are less than might have been looked for," reported Sir Edward Fry to the Foreign Secretary at the close of the Con- ference, "but perhaps as great as could reasonably be expected." The bitter disappointment of idealists was freely expressed when Parliament met in January, 1908. Mr Asquith spoke of the Prize- Court as a very solid and fruitful achievement; but Mr Balfour complained that to create a Court before determining the law it should administer was to put the cart before the horse. To no one was the slender harvest a source of keener regret than to Sir H. Campbell- Bannerman. Though the President had laid the foundation stone of Carnegie's Palace of Peace, few members of the Second Conference left the Hague without heightened forebodings for the security of a lightly-poised civilisation. 23—2 356 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 VI. The Entente with Russia, 1 905-1 907 During the long-drawn discussions at Algeciras the Anglo-French Entente, to adopt the expressive phrase of M. TardieuJj)asl5edjfrom the static to the dynamic stage; but the Conference also witnessed the beginning of a widerassociation. While Great Britain and Russia scowled at one another across Europe and Asia, the new friendship might be strained at any moment; and it was to the termination of the ancient feud that the statesmen of both countries now directed their attention. On his way home from Portsmouth (U.S.) in 1905, Count de Witte broke his journey in Paris, whither the First Secretary of the Russian Embassy in London brought an invitation from King Edward to pay him a visit1. I could not accept it without my monarch's express permission, which I failed to obtain. At the same time, our Ambassador in Paris submitted to me a project of an agreement with Great Britain, substantially identical with the one later concluded. I asked Poklevski-Koziell to inform the King that, should I assume power, I would use all my influence to establish friendly relations with Great Britain. I added, however, that I was decidedly opposed to the idea of concluding the Treaty sketched to me by Izvolsky, because it was best for us not to tie ourselves down. On reaching home, he discovered that in his absence his master had actually tied Russia down; and he promptly proceeded to cut the knot. Soon after the repudiation of the Pact of Bjorko the Tsar began to discuss the questions at issue with Sir Charles Hardinge, the British Ambassador. Sir Edward Grey entered warmly into the plan of a rapprochement ; and the Conference of Algeciras provided a welcome opportunity for cooperation and common counsel. Our Delegate, Sir Arthur Nicolson, was already converted, and his con- versations with M. Cassini, the Russian Delegate, were assisted by Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, Foreign Editor of The Times, a leading British authority on Russia and a persona grata at the Russian Court. British opinion had sympathised with the reform movement of 1905 ; and the opening of the Duma in May, 1906, was anticipated with disinterested satisfaction. The governing classes in Russia, however, could hold the Duma at bay so long as they could obtain money from abroad, and a large loan was needed to tide the country over the financial crisis of the Japanese War. When Count de Witte became Prime-Minister on October 20th, 1905, he at once began negotiations 1 Witte, Memoirs, pp. 432-3. THE RAPPROCHEMENT WITH RUSSIA 357 for an international loan, and the contract was signed in Paris on April 3rd, 19061. British finance participated for the first time since the Crimean War in such an operation, and the warnings uttered not only in London but in Paris and Petrograd rendered its participa- tion all the more significant. "Opposition organs," wrote the Petro- grad Correspondent of The Times on April 9th, "continue their campaign against a foreign loan before the Duma meets. They fear that the Government, having secured a large sum, will try to terrorise the Duma." Their apprehensions were only too wellfounded. The Duma opened on May 9th, only to be dissolved on July 22nd. The news reached London on the eve of the meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union; and Campbell-Bannerman added to his inaugural address a resonant warning to the Russian Government and a message of hope to the Russian people. "La Douma est morte. Vive la Doutna!" The discussions between the two Governments proceeded without regard to the internal politics of Russia. The Secretary of State for India was as anxious for a settlement as Sir Edward Grey, and rendered effective help. " It would have been unreasonable," writes Lord Morley, " to expect the Government of India to approach the proposal of a change of policy at ance with a friendly mind. Russia had for most of a century been the disturber of peace in Central Asia. There was, therefore, nothing to surprise us in the frowns of incredulity, suspicion and dislike with which the idea (of an Anglo- Russian Agreement, dealing with Afghanistan, Persia and 1 Tibet, was greeted at Simla. The duty of the India Office, and it did not J prove too easy, was to moderate these apprehensions, while conveying the arguments to the Foreign Office." " Suppose you were coming to some sort of understanding with Russia," he wrote to Lord Minto, "and suppose we hold the upper hand in the negotiation, what would be the terms that you would exact from Russia as essential to the bargain? I mean, what, from military, strategic and political points of view, are the things that she is to undertake to do or not to do?" The Viceroy replied that if we were to conclude an entente, we should bargain elsewhere than in Central Asia; to which the Secretary of State rejoined that an entente omitting Central Asia would be a sorry trophy2. The views of the Viceroy and the Commander-in- Chief were maturely considered in Whitehall; while Sir Arthur Nicolson, who was sent to Petrograd in the early summer, quickly won the confidence of his hosts. In May, 1907, The Times hinted that an agreement was on the point of being signed. 1 Witte, Memoirs, ch. n. 2 Recollections, II. 177-8. 358 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 " It does not exist," replied the Foreign Secretary on May 24th, " but I must add that there is a growing te"^enry ir> both countries to occupy themselvesjn 3 friendly manner with questions of common interest as they arise. This tendency has recently led the two Governments to Cooperate on more than one occasion. It is a tendency which we shall be happy to encourage, and which, if it continues, will naturally involve the progressive settlement of questions and the strengthening of friendly relations between them." On August 31st, 1907, Sir Arthur Nicolson and M. Izvolsky signed a Convention at Petrograd1. While the Anglo-French Treaty of 1904 included the world in its embrace, the Anglo-Russian Treaty was confined to Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet, for it was in the Middle East alone that friction remained. Lord Salisbury's famous declara- tion that in the Near East we had put our money on the wrong horse had terminated the tension in Europe; while the Anglo- Japanese Alliance and the defeat of Russia by Japan removed all apprehensions regarding the Far East. Thus the Pact of 1907, though more limited in scope than that of 1904, achieved a similar result by cleaning off the slate the causes of antagonism between the two historic rivals. The first of the three Agreements concerned Persia : The Governments of Great Britain and Russia, having mutually en- gaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and sincerely desiring the preservation of order throughout that country and its peaceful development, as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the trade and industry of all other nations; considering that each of them has, for geographical and economic reasons, a special interest in the maintenance of peace and order in certain provinces of Persia adjoining, or in the neighbourhood of, the Russian frontier on the one hand, and the frontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the other hand; and being desirous of avoiding all cause of conflict between their respective interests in the above-mentioned provinces ; have agreed on the following terms : I. Great Britain engages not to seek any concessions of a political or commercial nature beyond a line from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through Bagdad and including Ispahan and Yezd, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose demands for similar concessions in this region supported by the Russian Government. II. Russia engages not to seek concessions beyond a line from the Afghan frontier, through and including Gazik, Birjand, Kerman and ending at Bunder Abbas, and not to oppose demands for concessions in this region supported by the British Government. 1 See the White Paper, The Anglo-Russian Convention. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF 359 III. Russia and Great Britain engage not to oppose, without previous arrangement, any concessions to British or Russian subjects in the regions between the lines mentioned in Articles I and II. All concessions existing at present in the regions indicated in Articles I and II are maintained. A letter from Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson, dated August 29th, explained why the Persian Gulf formed no part of the Con- vention : The arrangement respecting Persia is limited to the regions of that country touching the respective frontiers of Great Britain and Russia in Asia, and the Persian Gulf is not part of those regions, and is only partly in Persian territory. It has not therefore been considered appropriate to introduce into the Convention a positive declaration respecting special interests possessed by Great Britain in the Gulf, the result of British action in those waters for more than a hundred years. His Majesty's Government have reason to believe that this question will not give rise to difficulties between the two Governments, should developments arise which make further discussion affecting British interests in the Gulf necessary. For the Russian Government have, in the course of the negotiations leading up to the conclusion of this arrangement, explicitly stated that they do not deny the special interests of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf — a statement of which His Majesty's Government have formally taken note. In order to make it quite clear that the present arrangement is not intended to affect the position in the Gulf, and does not imply any change of policy respecting it on the part of Great Britain, His Majesty's Government think it desirable to draw attention to previous declarations of British policy, and to reaffirm generally previous statements as to British interests in the Persian Gulf and the importance of maintaining them. His Majesty's Government will continue to direct all their efforts to the preservation of the status quo in the Gulf and the maintenance of British trade; in doing so, they have no desire to exclude the legitimate trade of any other Power. The second agreement concerned Afghanistan : The High Contracting Parties, in order to ensure perfect security on their respective frontiers in Central Asia and to maintain in these regions a solid and lasting peace, have concluded the following Convention: I. The British Government declare that they have no intention of changing the political status of Afghanistan. They further engage to exercise their influence only in a pacific sense, and they will not themselves take, nor encourage Afghanistan to take, any measures threatening Russia. The Russian Government, on their part, declare that they recognise Afghanistan as outside the sphere of Russian influence, and they engage that all their political relations with Afghanistan shall be conducted through the inter- mediary of the British Government. They further engage not to send any Agents into the country. II. The British Government having declared in the Treaty signed at Kabul on March 21st, 1905, that they recognise the agreement and the 360 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 engagements concluded with the late Amir Abdurrahman, and that they have no intention of interfering in the internal government of Afghan territory, Great Britain engages neither to annex nor to occupy in contra- vention of that Treaty any portion of Afghanistan or to interfere in the internal administration of the country, provided that the Amir fulfils his engagements under the above-mentioned Treaty. III. The Russian and Afghan authorities, specially designated for the purpose or in the frontier provinces, may establish direct relations with each other for the settlement of local questions of a non-political character. IV. The British and Russian Governments affirm their adherence to the principle of equality of commercial opportunity in Afghanistan, and they agree that any facilities which may have been, or shall be hereafter, obtained for British and British-Indian trade and traders, shall be equally enjoyed by Russian trade and traders. Should the progress of trade necessitate Commercial Agents, the two Governments will agree as to what measures shall be taken, due regard, of course, being had to the Amir's sovereign rights. V. The present arrangements will only come into force when the British Government shall have notified to the Russian Government the consent of the Amir to the terms stipulated above. The third agreement related to Tibet. The Governments of Great Britain and Russia, recognising the suzerain rights of China in Tibet, and considering the fact that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical frontier, has a special interest in the maintenance of the status quo in the external relations of Tibet, have made the following arrangement : I. The two High Contracting Parties engage to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet* and to abstain from all interference in its internal ad- ministration. II. In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Tibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. This engagement does not exclude the direct relations between British Commercial Agents and the Tibetan authorities provided for in the Conventions of 1904 and 1906. It is clearly understood that Buddhists, subjects of Great Britain or of Russia, may enter into direct relations on strictly religious matters with the Dalai Lama and other representatives of Buddhism in Tibet. The Governments of Great Britain and Russia engage not to allow these relations to infringe the stipulations of the present arrangement. III. The British and Russian Governments respectively engage not to send Representatives to Lhasa. IV. The High Contracting Parties engage neither to seek nor to obtain any concessions for railways, roads and telegraphs, and mines or other rights in Tibet. AFGHANISTAN AND TIBET 361 V. The two Governments agree that no part of the revenues of Tibet shall be pledged or assigned to Great Britain or Russia or to any of their subjects. In an Annex Great Britain reaffirmed the Declaration appended to the ratification of the Convention of September 7th, 1904, to the effect that the occupation of the Chumbi valley should cease after the payment of three annual instalments of indemnity, provided that the trade-marts had been effectively opened for three years, and that in the meantime the Tibetan authorities had faithfully complied with the terms of the Convention. If the occupation had, for any reason, not been terminated at the time anticipated in the above Declaration, the British and Russian Governments would enter on a friendly exchange of views. At the suggestion of the British Government, identic Notes were exchanged, by which the Governments undertook to forbid the entry of any scientific mission into Tibet for three years except by mutual consent, and to invite China to accept a similar obligation. On September 10th, the Viceroy wrote to inform the Ameer of the Convention ; and on September 29th Habibulla replied that he was away, but would consider the matter on his return. In Russia the Treaty was received with mixed feelings. To Witte it appeared a triumph of British diplomacy, making it impossible for Russia to annex Persia. The British Parliament had risen before the signature of the Treaty, and the expert analysis had to be deferred till the new session. The attack was opened on February 6th, 1908, by Lord Curzon, who found little to praise in what *he described as the most important Treaty concluded in the last half-century by a British Government. The conception was right, but its execution was faulty. The Persian Clauses amounted to surrender. The Russian sphere included Ispahan, where there was scarcely any Russian trade, and Yezd, where there were no Russian interests. The Preamble declared that each Power possessed a special interest in peace and order in the territories adjoining or in the neighbourhood of their frontiers ; but these cities were hundreds of miles away from Russia. Eleven of the twelve cities of 30,000 inhabitants, and seven of the eleven trade routes by which commerce entered the country, were included in the Russian zone. Every argument for bringing Russia to Ispahan and Yezd applied to bringing our own sphere up to these points. In the south, where we were supreme, we were to have no more rights than Russia, Germany or the latest comer. The British sphere contained only Kerman and a single trade route. It was half 362 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 the size of the Russian zone, empty, and mainly desert. Our interests in Persia were not merely strategical, but also political and com- mercial. Everything had been sacrificed to Seistan. Why did not Russia state her position concerning the Gulf in her own words, and why did we not include the Persian shore in the agreement? If we had made great and needless sacrifices in Persia, we had gained nothing in Afghanistan, and had not even secured the Ameer's consent to the Treaty. We pledged ourselves not to threaten or encourage Afghanistan to threaten Russia. Why did not Russia give a similar pledge? Russia had forts and troops on the northern frontier, and there was not a word about their withdrawal. Her recognition of Afghanistan as outside her sphere merely repeated an engagement eleven times renewed since 1869. The Tibetan Clauses were an absolute surrender, and the promise to consult Russia as to the evacuation of the Chumbi valley was almost a humiliation. The criticisms of Lord Lansdowne, another ex- Viceroy, were in refreshing contrast to this shrill denunciation. The neutral zone in Persia, he foretold, would be virtually Russian, since the Russian Government was willing to spend money freely, and we were not. Our position in the Gulf should have been explicitly recognised in an exchange of notes. The value of the Treaty would depend on Russia's conduct in such matters as the Buddhist pilgrims to Lhasa and the Russian Agents in Afghanistan ; but he had confidence in her loyalty. While Lord Curzon spoke of her as of an enemy still to be watched, the Leader of the Opposition was clearly prepared to regard her as a friend. The official reply by Lord Fitzmaurice, the experienced Under- Secretary for Foreign Affairs, was mainly devoted to Persia. Perhaps the British zone was more important from the strategical than from the commercial point of view; but in 1903 a Departmental Committee unanimously agreed that a triangle of territory, including Seistan, Kerman and Bunder Abbas, was essential to British security. This line, which would prevent Russia from building a railway to Bunder Abbas or eastward, had now been followed. Lord Curzon had complained that Russia had secured the Bagdad-Khanikin-Teheran route; but she would have broken off negotiations had we refused it. The Imperial Bank in Teheran had approved the Treaty. It was right to exclude the Gulf, which was partly Turkish, and as to which our policy had been defined in 1903. As regards Afghanistan, Russia had for the first time renounced in a treaty all claim to interfere; and, THE TREATY AND ITS CRITICS 363 since we had no desire to intervene in Tibet, we had surrendered nothing in that quarter. The official defence was reinforced by the Earl (now Marquess) of Crewe, who justified the allotment of the lion's share of Persia to Russia by the logic of facts. She had constructed three fine roads from her frontier; she had built the Trans-Caspian railway and a line in Caucasia to Julfa on the border of Persia. The Cossack Brigade was officered by Russians, and her trade was ex- tending in the south. As regards the Gulf, M. Izvolsky had handed to our Ambassador a statement that Russia did not deny our special interests. The weightiest defence of the Treaty, however, came from the veteran Lord Sanderson, who had entered the Foreign Office under Palmerston and had risen to the post of Permanent Under- Secretary. It would have been impossible, he argued, to secure more than had been won; and our trophies were of real value. Positive and permanent engagements had been given concerning Persia and Afghanistan in place of the rather fluid assurances which were all that Russia had previously been willing to offer. The zones of influ- ence in Persia were not exclusive, for both Powers promised equal opportunities for trade to all nations, and all existing concessions were maintained. It was impossible to define British interests in the Gulf, real though they were, and he did not envy the draftsman who attempted to set them forth in the precise language required in a treaty. Dealing with the argument that the British frontier was nearer Tibet than the Russian, he reminded his hearers that Russia was quite near enough to exert influence ; and it was therefore desir- able to neutralise the country. In the House of Commons, Earl Percy opened the attack with the complaint that the Treaty sacrificed British interests and, unlike the Pact of 1904, failed to remove all the causes of friction. While Lord Curzon's hostility to Russia reappeared in the speech of the ex- Under- Secretary, Mr Balfour followed the moderate line of Lord Lansdowne. The exclusion of Russian influence from Seistan was a real addition to the security of India ; but the price was higher than necessary. The Agreement as a whole, though not a great diplomatic success, brought substantial advantages. To these criticisms, and to the more formidable attack in the Upper House, the Foreign Secretary made a spirited reply. Conditions in Persia, he argued, rendered some agreement necessary if we were to avoid friction. The governing consideration was not commercial, but strategical. It was the strategical >osition which made the Agreement essential; and the key to the 364 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 strategical problem was Seistan. The traditional anxiety lest Russia should push into Seistan and reach the Indian Ocean was at an end. Lord Curzon argued that the Agreement threw away a hundred years of diplomacy and trade ; but he seemed to have forgotten the facts. In the last twenty years Russian influence had extended to the south, and subsidised steamers sailed the Gulf. Consuls were stationed in Ispahan, Bushire, Bunder Abbas, and even in Seistan, into which she had pushed the telegraph line. The Customs were under a foreign control favourable to Russia. And behind all there was the shadow of the Russian forces. " In this Agreement we have given up nothing that was not lost before. All that we have sacrificed in Persia are some possibilities — exceedingly remote — of trading. In Tibet and Afghani- stan we have sacrificed nothing at all." At the conclusion of his speech Sir Edward turned to answer Liberal and Labour critics who feared that the mere fact of a Treaty would strengthen the Russian autocracy and lead to new loans. I have received many resolutions protesting against an agreement with Russia during the Constitutional crisis; but interference merely irritates. Our relations with Russia have improved greatly in the last two or three years; but without some agreement they must have grown worse. There comes a turning-point in the relations between nations, and if you pass it by you may not have it again. In 1907, as in 1904, the Government and their expert advisers secured as much, and at as low a price, as the situation permitted; but the later balance-sheet, if regarded purely as a business trans- action, was the least successful. The character of the bargain was determined when Lord Kitchener, the Commander-in-Chief in India, on being asked how much of Persia he could defend, replied that he could only be responsible for the south-east. For this reason, we confined our zone to Seistan, the larger part of the province of Kerman, and Persian Mekran, and insisted on a neutral zone against the wishes of Izvolsky. It was of the utmost importance that hence- forth Russia could no longer threaten the approaches to India; but we tacitly surrendered our preferential position not only in the south, but in the Gulf, where it had been unchallenged for a century. No answer was given by the spokesmen for the Government to the criticism that Russia's recognition of our position in the Gulf was not explicitly stated in her own words and over her own signature. In defending the Afghan Clauses, the Secretary of State for India anticipated the Ameer's assent, which was the necessary condition of THE TIBET QUESTION SETTLED 365 the stipulations coming into force; but his confidence proved to be misplaced. The Ameer had visited India in the early months of 1907; and though political discussion was barred on the ground that the Dane Treaty rendered it needless, the journey improved the relations of Simla and Cabul. This new friendliness, however, was rudely interrupted by the news of the Treaty. He had handed over the control of external relations ; but he had never surrendered the right to be consulted. The argument that consultation would have involved interminable delay and held up the whole Treaty, though sound enough in the meridian of Greenwich, appeared less convincing at Cabul. Though Great Britain and Russia regarded the Afghan Articles as operative, they had no binding force, and the Ameer re- mained a bad neighbour. The Tibet Clauses were naturally judged with severity by the sponsors of the expedition to Lhasa, who argued that its results had been completely surrendered. This criticism left the Government indifferent, since the Liberal leaders had never approved the Tibetan policy of their predecessors; and on January 2nd, 1908, Mr Morley proposed the evacuation of the Chumbi valley immediately after the third instalment of the indemnity was paid, without waiting till the elaborate commercial negotiations, held over from 1904, had been concluded at Calcutta. Sir Edward Grey approved, but informed China that we should expect in return that our wishes in the negotia- tions would be met. The final cheque was paid on January 27th, 1908, and orders were at once despatched for the evacuation. On April 20th the trade regulations were signed by Great Britain, Tibet and China. When, in 19 10, the Dalai Lama was deposed by China and fled to India, he was told that we could not interfere. China was at the same time informed that we could not allow any change in Tibet to affect the integrity of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, with the last named of which we had recently signed a Treaty giving us control of foreign relations ; and it was hinted that no Chinese troops should be stationed near the frontier. But with the payment of the indemnity and the evacuation of the Chumbi valley, Tibet passed out of the range of British politics. The Russian danger was at an end, and the strengthening of China's grip over her distant province was no con- cern of ours. If the Anglo-Russian Convention was open to criticism as a busi- ness transaction, its political success was to prove beyond cavil. Lord Lansdowne had truly observed that a final judgment of the Treaty 366 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 was impossible till we knew how Russia would conduct herself; and Russia was in a position which made the goodwill and confidence of the British Government a necessity. She had undergone a spectacular humiliation in the Far East, and she could only regain her position as a Great Power by adding British friendship to the French Alliance. Great Britain, for her part, having definitely sided with France, required the assurance of Russian support in face of the growing danger from Germany. Thus the removal of local friction was followed, as had been the case with France, by diplomatic cooperation in various fields. The Anglo-French Entente and the Dual Alliance broadened into the Triple Entente, which confronted the Triple Alliance on the European chess-board. Though we were allied to no Power except Portugal and Japan, and in theory retained perfect liberty of action, we had now half unwittingly, but not the less irrevocably, thrown in our lot with France and Russia. It was this novel system of attachments which was to govern our policy in the coming years, and to determine its course in Persia, the Balkans and Morocco. VII. The Congo, 1891-19071 In addition to revising our relations with the Great Powers, the British Government was called upon during the opening years of the century to grapple with two difficult and thankless tasks — the rescue of the Congo natives from the misrule of King Leopold II, and the mitigation of the tragic lot of the Christians in Macedonia. In both cases we were under Treaty responsibilities; but the old strain of idealism in British policy, inherited from Canning, Russell and Gladstone, was the driving force. The Congo Free State had commenced its career with the sym- pathy of the world ; but it changed its character when its vast wealth in rubber and ivory was revealed. In 189 1, a Secret Decree reserved to the State the monopoly of rubber and ivory in "vacant lands,'* which were interpreted to include all except those on which the natives lived and "effectively cultivated." State agents were instructed to supervise their collection, and natives were commanded to sell their produce to the State. The Government hereby asserted its claim to almost the whole country, and transformed itself into a 1 The Despatches and Consular Reports, on which this section is based, fill a long series of Blue-books. The most recent and impartial book on the subject is A. B. Keith, The Belgian Congo and the Berlin Act (1919). KING LEOPOLD'S MISRULE 367 monopolist trading concern. Extensive districts were leased to Com- panies, with exclusive right to the produce of the soil; but the State retained a financial interest in the success of the concessionaires. Another Secret Decree, of 1896, created the Domaine de la Couronne, a territory of over 100,000 square miles containing the richest rubber districts, which was regarded as the personal property of the King. In 1898 the example and advice of Leopold induced the French Government to parcel out the French Congo among concessionaire companies, in which Belgian capitalists held a large number of shares ; and Paris was thus bound to Brussels by the ties of common interest. It was impossible to keep secret the sinister transformation in the Free State, for British traders and missionaries were scattered over the country. In 1896, the Aborigines Protection Society called the attention of the Government to the plight of the natives, and its Secretary, Mr Fox Bourne, published an arresting volume on the natives of the Congo. A preface was contributed by Sir Charles Dilke, who in 1897 vainly suggested in Parliament that the Govern- ment should convene an international conference on the African natives. These champions of oppressed races were joined by Mr E. D. Morel, who was soon to become the soul of the struggle against the system of King Leopold1. He had entered the office of the Elder Dempster Line at Liverpool in 1890, and the business of the firm often took him to Brussels and Antwerp, where his suspicions were aroused. When his chief declined to take the matter up, he resigned his post and threw himself into the task of reform. The movement arose from humanitarian motives alone ; but the infringement of the Treaty rights of British traders was no less flagrant than the exploitation of the natives. John Holt, the head of one of the firms injuriously affected, brought the matter before the Liverpool Chamber of Com- merce. The example of Liverpool was followed, and nine Chambers sent a joint Memorial to the Government in 1901, protesting against trade monopolies in the Congo basin as contrary to the Berlin Act. A British Consul was appointed to reside permanently in the Free State ; but his time was too much taken up with the complaints of British subjects to allow him to travel in the interior. In 1903, the British Government was compelled by accumulating evidence and by the restiveness of public opinion to define its attitude. The year opened with the testimony of an experienced observer. 1 See Cocks, E. D. Morel, pp. 50-169. 368 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 "I have visited the Belgian stations of Kiro and Lado," wrote Lord Cromer to Lord Lansdowne, " in the course of a voyage south of Khartum. In the Sudan there are numerous villages and the people run along the banks, making signs for the steamer to stop. They flock into the settle- ments to work. The contrast when once Congolese territory is entered is remarkable. For eighty miles from the frontier to Gondokoro, the left bank is Belgian, the right under the Sudan or Uganda Government. Whereas there were numerous huts and villages on the eastern bank and the islands, on the Belgian side not a sign of a village existed. I do not think any one of our party saw a single human being in Belgian territory except the Belgian officers and their families. The reason is obvious. The Belgians are disliked. The people fly from them, and no wonder, for I am informed that the soldiers are allowed full liberty to plunder and that payments are rarely made for supplies. The British officers wander practically alone over most part of the country. I understand that no Belgian officer can move outside the settlements without a strong guard. The Government, so far as I can judge, is conducted almost exclusively on commercial principles." On May 20th, 1903, the first debate took place in the House of Commons, when Mr (now Sir) Herbert Samuel moved "That the Government of the Congo Free State having at its inception guaranteed to the Powers that its native subjects should be governed with humanity, and that no trading monopoly or privilege should be permitted within its dominions, this House requests the Government to confer with the other Powers, signatories of the Berlin Act, by virtue of which the Congo Free State exists, in order that measures may be adopted to abate the evils." The motion was accepted by the Prime- Minister and carried without a division. Before the Government proceeded to carry out the commands of the House, the British Minister at Brussels asked the Belgian Government to supply the documents relating to the Commission for the Protection of Natives instituted in 1896. The Commission had been ordered to suppress cannibalism, human sacrifices, the slave-trade and other abomina- tions ; but, as its members dwelt far apart and seldom met, its result was small. After considering the documents furnished by the Belgian Govern- ment and all other material at his disposal, Lord Lansdowne drew up a weighty despatch, dated August 8th, 1903, which was forwarded to our diplomatic Representatives abroad. The attention of H.M. Government has in recent years been repeatedly called to alleged cases of ill-treatment of natives and to the existence of trade monopolies, by philanthropic societies, commercial bodies, the Press and despatches from British Consuls. LORD LANSDOWNE'S PROTESTS 369 In the debate it was alleged that the object of the Administration was not so much the care and government of the natives as the collection of revenue ; that this object was pursued by a system of forced labour differing only in name from slavery ; that the demands on each village were exacted with a strictness which constantly degenerated into great cruelty; and that the men composing the armed force of the State were in many cases recruited from the most warlike and savage tribes, who not unfrequently terrorised their own officers and maltreated the natives. It is reported that no efforts are made to fit the native by training for industrial pursuits ; that the method of obtaining men for labour or military service is often but little different from that formerly employed to obtain slaves, and that constant compulsion has to be exercised to exact the collection of the amount of forest produce allotted to each village. H.M. Government do not know precisely to what extent these accusations may be true, but they have been so repeatedly made, and have received such wide credence, that it is no longer possible to ignore them; and the question has now arisen whether the Congo State can be considered to have fulfilled the special pledges given under the Berlin Act to watch over the preservation of the native tribes and to care for their moral and material advancement In these circumstances H.M. Government are of opinion that it is incumbent on the parties to the Berlin Act to confer together and to consider whether the obligations undertaken by the Congo State in regard to the natives have been fulfilled ; and, if not, whether the Signatory Powers are not bound to make such representations as may secure the due observance of the provisions. H.M. Government also wish to bring to the notice of the Powers the question which has arisen in regard to rights to trade in the basin of the Congo ; and in particular whether the system of making grants of vast areas is permissible under the Act. This important question might perhaps constitute, in whole or part, the subject of a reference to the Tribunal at the Hague. None of the Powers except Turkey responded to this impressive appeal; while the reply of the Congo Government denied that the Berlin Act had been broken and added that, as no evidence accom- panied the charges, it did not propose to take action. Evidence, however, was soon forthcoming which even the Congo State was unable to ignore. The Foreign Secretary had instructed Consul Case- ment to visit the interior of the Congo during the summer, and his Report was dated December nth, 1903. Returning to districts which he had known in 1887, he noticed a great reduction in the number of inhabitants, only part of which was due to sleeping-sickness. While fully recognising the energy of the Government in opening up the country by railways and steamers, he described the operation and results of commercial exploitation. It was a calm and unemotional record of things seen ; and Lord Lansdowne,in forwarding it to Brussels W.&G. Ill 24 37© CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 in February, 1904, described it as a grave indictment, showing that in extensive regions the treaty pledges were not fulfilled. The Report was also circulated to all the Signatories of the Berlin Act, with a request for a reply to the despatch of August 8th, 1903. The publica- tion of Casement's Report strengthened the hands of the British friends of the natives ; and in April the Congo Reform Association was founded, with Mr E. D. Morel as Honorary Secretary. The Congo Government declared that the Consul had only made a hasty visit; but it consented to investigate the charges, and for that purpose asked for a copy of the complete report, including the names of the witnesses. Lord Lansdowne promised to furnish it in return for an undertaking that the witnesses should not suffer, and suggested that the enquiry would carry more weight if at any rate some of its members were unconnected with the Congo. The Congo Government finally announced that the Commission would consist of a Belgian official, a Boma judge and a Swiss jurist. It added that, though it was im- possible to guarantee witnesses against hostility, any such manifesta- tions would be punished. Meanwhile, on June 9th, 1904, the House of Commons debated the matter a second time. Sir Charles Dilke opened the attack, urging that the Government should take stronger action than writing despatches. Sir John Gorst described the Congo problem as the one subject on which they were all agreed. Sir Edward Grey argued that the Congo State must become responsible to the Belgian Parliament, and expressed a wish for a conference to revise the Berlin Act. Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice pleaded for Consular Courts, and even hinted that Boma might be occupied. In replying for the Government, Earl Percy scouted as simply ridiculous the idea that we were actuated by any selfish motive, though we were quite aware that these phil- anthropic crusades did not contribute to our popularity abroad. He refused to adopt the suggestion of claiming exterritorial jurisdiction. We had a right to it, but it would not benefit the natives. We did not claim any special responsibility or right to intervention. Wishing the protest to be international, we had first appealed to the other Signatories of the Berlin Act, and we had also communicated the Casement Report to the United States. Lord Lansdowne 's efforts were now directed to making the Com- mission effective. The Commissioners, he observed to the Congo Government, were good names and would doubtless be impartial. He hoped that the enquiry would not be hurried, that missionaries SIR EDWARD GREY'S PROTESTS 371 would be allowed to give evidence, that the sessions would be held in public, and that a British Representative would be allowed to watch their proceedings. The Congo Government rejoined by publishing the Instructions to the Commission to "devote all their efforts to eliciting the whole truth " ; but it declined the request for public sittings. Lord Lansdowne tartly retorted that the Congo Govern- ment must not be surprised if this decision destroyed in advance the moral authority of the Commission. The British Government handed over the names, places and dates suppressed in the published copy of the Casement Report; and the Commission reached the Congo State in October, ascending the river so far as Stanleyville and leaving the country in February, 1905. Lord Lansdowne 's persistency was ultimately rewarded by the permission to hold public sittings and to send a British Consul to watch ; but the Consul was only in time to attend the closing sittings. The Report was published in November, without the evidence for which the British Government pressed ; but copies were obtained from the British and American missionaries of their own evidence and of that of the natives, which was published by the Congo Reform Association. In enclosing a copy of the Report on November 7th, 1905, the British Minister at Brussels expressed his satisfaction at the result of the enquiry. Sir Edward Grey, who succeeded Lord Lansdowne at the Foreign Office in November, and fully shared his detestation of the Congo scandals, forwarded his observations on the Report in a long despatch, dated January 9th, 1906. The Commission, he declared, had confirmed the statements of Consul Casement on the condition of the natives ; but he was surprised at the verdict that a tax on labour was beneficial to natives and essential to the development of the country. Compulsory service was admissible for a period when the interests of the citizens were directly concerned ; but in the Congo the " tax " was for the commercial benefit of the State or the Company, not for that of the natives — " a form of servitude differing in essence but little from actual slavery.' ' The Report urged the Companies to surrender all administrative power; but it should equally have con- demned the association of trade and administration by the State. The despatch concluded with the hope that the Committee which had been appointed after the publication of the Report would introduce without delay that large measure of reform which it had shown to be absolutely indispensable for the welfare of the natives. While the Committee on reform was sitting at Brussels, im- 24 — 2 372 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 patience and indignation were steadily increasing in Great Britain. A citizens' protest meeting was summoned by the Lord Mayor of Liverpool in January, 1906, and his example was followed by most of the great cities. To Sir Edward's enquiry when the Committee would report, the Secretary of the Congo State replied that it would meet for the last time on February 29th. When the question was repeated, he was informed that it would be needless to publish the recommendations, since the Congo Government was already drafting decrees to give effect to them. On June 3rd King Leopold signed twenty-four Decrees, presumably embodying the recommendations of the Reforms Commission in relation to land, taxation, justice, police and other branches of the administration, and accompanied them by a provocative Declaration, which aroused the anger of British reformers. I sanction the measures you propose to me. Our duty is to neglect nothing which may develop the property of the Congo, ameliorate the lot of the natives, and put in good order a country which Belgium may one day possess. You must correct the false juridical notions whenever you meet them. All the responsibilities and all the expenses were left to me. The Congo was a personal work; and there is no more legitimate or respectable right than that of an author to the fruits of his labour. Not one of the Powers was called on to share in my efforts, and therefore not one of them has the right to intervene. They have recognised the independence of the Congo. The Berlin Act made provisions for the Conventional Basin of the Congo, applying equally to all the States; and they alone restrict sovereign rights. My rights over the Congo cannot be snared; they are the fruits of my labour and my expenditure. If I watch over them, it is from patriotism. The creation of the State has been pacific, legitimately accomplished with the assent of the natives, and without cooperation from foreign States. The Decrees were regarded by the British reformers as wholly inadequate; and the British Consul and Vice-Consuls in the Congo were instructed to watch how they were carried out. Their Reports proved the persistence of the old evils. The people were overworked and underfed, taxation was crushing, and the rubber was being wantonly used up. It was obvious alike to British and to Belgian critics that there was no chance of improvement while the State remained the private property of the King, and reformers proceeded to urge that Belgium should enter on her inheritance without further delay. By a will drawn up in 1889, the King had bequeathed the State to his country; and in 1890, in return for a loan without interest, the State of Belgium obtained the option of annexation after ten years. It TURKISH MISRULE IN MACEDONIA 373 was not, however, till the Free State had become a crying scandal that the country began to claim its inheritance. In 1907, the Belgian Premier announced that negotiations with the Congo State with a view to annexation would begin. The first stage of the long campaign had been won by the British reformers, aided by a little band of Belgian comrades. VIII. Macedonia, 1901-1907 The endeavours of the British Government to secure tolerable conditions in Macedonia were not less arduous and not less disin- terested than their efforts in the Congo basin, and met with equally little success. For the misrule of the Turk not only produced chronic exasperation among its victims, but encouraged the neighbouring Christian States to peg out claims for the future by armed propaganda and organised massacre. Early in 1901, Lord Lansdowne, in reply to complaints from Athens, instructed the British Ministers at Sofia and Constantinople to call attention to the activities of Bulgarian bands1. The Bulgarian Government replied that it had no control over the Revolutionary Committee in Macedonia, while the Porte rejoined that it had in vain urged Bulgaria to control the movements of the bands. The year passed in fruitless protests and recriminations, Greece complaining of Bulgaria and Servia of Albanian outrages in the vilayet of Kossovo, while the Sultan looked idly on, and the British Foreign Secretary watched the boiling cauldron of Balkan politics with growing impatience and disgust. In June, 1902, Turkey invited the Powers to press Bulgaria to dissolve the Macedonian Committee; but Russia and Austria, who had covenanted in 1897 to cooperate in the Balkans, informed Abdul Hamid that the first move lay withhim. The Sultan, therefore, promised a Commission to propose reforms; but the two Powers warned him that, unless grievances were redressed, an insurrection in Macedonia and Albania in the spring was probable, and might involve European intervention. The Turkish plan, announced in December, promised reforms in administration, justice and education, to be carried out by an Inspector-General. Hilmi Pasha, who was appointed to the post, had a creditable record in the Yemen; but Sir Nicolas O'Conor, like other experienced observers on the Bosphorus, described the scheme as palpably insufficient. Lord Lansdowne 's sole desire was 1 The despatches and consular reports fill a long series of Blue-books. The best books on Macedonia are Brailsford, Macedonia; The Balkan Question, edited by L. Villari, and Sir C. Eliot, Turkey in Europe. 374 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 the reform of Macedonia, and he cared little who received the credit. On January 16th, 1903, he informed the Austrian Ambassador that he was watching Austro-Russian efforts with close attention. The British Government recognised that these two Powers were specially interested in the problem and in a specially advantageous position for dealing with it; but the Ambassador would understand the im- mense importance we attached to the question. Three days later, he outlined a far-reaching programme of reform in a despatch to Sir Nicolas O'Conor. " In our opinion the condition of the population in Macedonia has become almost intolerable. The appointment of one or more Christians on the Commission of Enquiry at Constanti- nople and on the Committee of Inspection in Macedonia would be valuable; but enquiry is not enough. We need the appointment of European Inspectors in the Departments of Justice and Finance, and European officers to reorganise the Gendarmerie and Police. Without arrangements for payment of salaries no reforms are possible." On February 17th the Austrian and Russian Ambassadors handed to the Foreign Secretary an outline of the reform scheme drawn up by Counts Lamsdorff and Goluchowsky, and asked him to support it. The Inspector- General was to be irremovable for a term of years except by agreement with the Powers. Foreign experts were to reorganise the Police and Gendarmerie, the latter to consist of Christians and Mussulmans. Amnesty was to be granted to all accused or con- demned for political offences in the three vilayets in connexion with recent disturbances. A Budget was to be drawn up for each vilayet, and local revenues, checked by the Ottoman Bank, were to be assigned in the first place to the needs of the local administration. Finally, the collection of tithe was no longer to be farmed out. The Foreign Secretary accepted the scheme in principle and undertook to recom- mend it to the Sultan; but he significantly reserved the right to recommend alterations after closer examination. Sir Nicolas O'Conor, accordingly, informed the Grand- Vizier that Great Britain supported the programme and hoped that it would be carried out without delay. Similar representations having been made by the other Powers, the Sultan accepted the scheme, and undertook to apply it not only to Macedonia but to the three other European vilayets of Turkey. To ensure that Turkey should have no pretext for inaction, Count Lamsdorff had visited Sofia and Belgrade and persuaded the several Governments to suppress revolutionary agitations. Despite the Sultan's acceptance of the reform scheme and the THE INSURRECTION OF 1903 375 readiness of Bulgaria to hold her hand, the Balkan sky remained dark with clouds. Sarafoff, the leader of the militant Macedonian Bulgars, announced his refusal to lay down his arms, adding that the Christians of Macedonia were prepared to sell their lives dearly and to make Europe shudder. These gloomy prognostications were promptly realised. On March 30th a bridge was blown up shortly before the arrival of the Orient Express, and the Russian Consul at Mitrovitza was shot by an Albanian, while Albanian tribesmen attacked Turkish troops in Old Serbia. The Russian and Austrian Ambassadors sharply ordered the Sultan to repress Albanian lawlessness and to carry out the reforms, and invited Great Britain to support their representa- tions. At this moment, however, an attack on a bank at Salonica by Bulgarians enabled the Grand- Vizier to renew his complaints of Bulgarian bands and to threaten hostilities. Bulgaria, in turn, urged the Powers to warn Turkey not to concentrate troops on her frontier but to push on with the reforms. Lord Lansdowne, however, declined to take action, as Turkey denied aggressive intentions. Turkey required her troops elsewhere ; for in July the anticipated explosion occurred in Macedonia. "The insurrection is so formid- able," reported Sir Nicolas O'Conor on August 10th, "that Turkey will need all her forces for its repression; and the insurgents' acts will probably provoke reprisals, which will compel European inter- vention, as is their aim. I suggest that Military Attaches should accompany the troops." The insurgents stood no chance against the regulars, and on August 31st Bulgaria appealed to the Powers. Austria and Russia proposed a warning from the Powers to Turkey and Bulgaria, that neither could count on support if they resisted the Austro-Russian programme ; but Lord Lansdowne replied that the time had come for the stronger measures which he had from the first held himself free to propose. No Mussulman could now secure the con- fidence of the population as Inspector- General, and Military Attaches should accompany the troops. Turkey should be informed that the February programme was the minimum, that its execution was lamentably inadequate, and that far prompter and more effective measures were needed. The Powers should join in these representa- tions; and, if Bulgaria was told that such action was being taken, this might calm her. Without waiting for joint action, Lord Lansdowne warned Sofia against aggressive action, and reminded the Porte of the inevitable effect of the "quite inexcusable" acts of the Turkish armies on European opinion. 376 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 The rebellion was over by the end of September ; and the Foreign Secretary now forwarded suggestions to Vienna, where Counts Lams- dorff and Goluchowski were engaged on a fresh scheme of reform. A Christian Governor, unconnected with the Balkans or the Great Powers, or a Mussulman, assisted by European Assessors, selected by Austria and Russia, was to be appointed, and European officers, in adequate numbers, were to reorganise the Gendarmerie. Turkey was to withdraw her troops from the Bulgarian frontier, and Austria and Russia would guarantee that Bulgaria would not send troops or allow bands across the frontier. The Austrian and Russian Govern- ments thanked the British Minister for his suggestions, adding that they were in accord with decisions reached at Murzsteg before they were received. Lord Lansdowne replied that he hoped they would not be content with promises, and that the withdrawal of irregulars, the appointment of European officers to accompany the troops, and the organisation of relief need not wait. When the Turkish Ambassador urged him to forbid relief through private channels, since it would encourage agitators, he sharply replied that he was shocked beyond measure that the Turkish Government wished to deny such assistance to the thousands rendered homeless mainly by the conduct of Turkish troops, and expected the Turkish authorities to render every facility for supplying it. On October 24th the Austrian and Russian Ambassadors brought the Murzsteg programme to Downing Street. 1 . Civil Agents of Austria and Russia were to accompany the Inspector- General, call his attention to the needs of Christians and the misdoings of the local authorities, watch the introduction of reforms and the pacification of the country, and report to their respective Governments. 2. A foreign General, with foreign officers, should be appointed to the gendarmerie, dividing up the country for supervision, instruction and organisation. 3. After the pacification of the country, Turkey should modify the boundaries of the administrative units, with a view to the more regular grouping of the nationalities. 4. The administrative and judicial institutions should be reorganised, and Christians be admitted to the public service. 5. Mixed Committees, with an equal number of Christians and Mohammedans, should enquire into the crimes committed during the recent troubles. 'i 6. Turkey should pay for the repatriation of Christian refugees, and the rebuilding of houses, churches and schools destroyed by Turks. The THE MURZSTEG PROGRAMME 377 money should be distributed by Committees on which Christian notables would sit, under the supervision of Austrian and Russian Consuls. 7. A year's taxes should be remitted to Christians in the burnt villages. 8. Turkey should undertake to introduce the reforms of the February and the Miirzsteg programmes without delay. 9. The irregulars should be disbanded. Five days later, the Austrian Ambassador called to ask for the Foreign Secretary's comments and impressions. Lord Lansdowne replied that it would be better to dispense with Hilmi Pasha, and that the reorgan- isation of the Administration and Judiciary should not be deferred till after pacification. He regretted the absence of any reference to finance, which lay at the root of all Macedonian reforms. Count MensdorfT explained that finance had been dealt with in the February programme ; and the interview closed with a promise that the British Government would support the scheme, reserving the right to make further recom- mendations. At the same moment Lord Lansdowne instructed Sir N.O'Conor to tell the Porte, if it asked for the British view,that the new programme was an improvement on that of February, and to advise its acceptance in principle and the discussion of its details in a con- ciliatory spirit. The Porte turned a deaf ear to this appeal, declaring that the Assessors were needless, that the Gendarmerie required no foreign General, that the foreign officers must not interfere with the troops, that the February programme was being carried out, and that nothing more was necessary. But, after a peremptory warning from Austria and Russia, supported by Germany, the Miirzsteg programme was accepted by the Sultan in principle. An Austrian and a Russian Assessor were appointed, and General di Giorgis was selected for the Gendarmerie, with headquarters at Salonica. Colonel Fairholme, Military Attache at Vienna, was chosen as the British Staff Officer for the Gendarmerie, and Lord Lansdowne in- sisted that he should be paid by Great Britain and wear British uniform. An attempt to prevent the appointment of subordinate officers brought a sharp rebuke from Downing Street, and, after a warning from Petrograd and Vienna, Turkey consented to twenty-five officers, of whom Great Britain chose five. Macedonia was divided into zones, Great Britain undertaking Drama. Germany undertook no zone, but supplied a Director for the Gendarmerie school at Salonica. An agree- ment between Turkey and Bulgaria in April removed the fear of another rising. The Civil Agents reported the presentation of hundreds of petitions, and, by the summer, thirty-eight foreign officers were at 378 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 work. The experienced British Consul, Mr R. W. Graves, reported from Salonica a temporary improvement, but added that it would not last unless finance and the judiciary were reformed. Lord Lansdowne, in acknowledging and approving the reports of the Civil Agents, ex- pressed a hope that Russia and Austria would prepare and press a scheme for regular budgets, control over expenditure and adequate salaries for the Judiciary. At the end of the year, the Sultan, after repeated refusals, consented to accept twenty- three more officers for the Gendarmerie, on condition that no further increase should be demanded. Lord Lansdowne, whose heart was in his work, never believed in the adequacy of the Austro- Russian programmes, and on January nth, 1905, he outlined bolder measures in a despatch. Disquieting reports of murders and of armed bands crossing the frontiers pointed to an outbreak in the spring. The Turkish forces in or near Macedonia numbered 130,000 and were increasing, while Bulgaria was com- pleting her military preparations. No part of the reform scheme had been carried out except the organisation of the Gendarmerie, in which the European officers were still too few. The first demand to be pressed was the immediate reduction of the troops in and near Macedonia to the number required for internal order, while Bulgaria was to make a corresponding reduction and prevent the organisation of bands. The second was for the appointment of a Commission of Delegates, nominated by the Powers and under the presidency of the Inspector- General, possessing administrative and executive powers. Financial reforms should include the commutation of the tithes, and provide for a fixed payment to the Porte by each vilayet, the balance remaining for local purposes. The Inspector- General, assisted by the Commission, might command the troops. This scheme should include some districts, especially the vilayet of Adrianople, to which the Murzsteg programme did not apply, but which the Porte held to be included in the February programme of 1903. Meanwhile, Russia and Austria presented a financial reform scheme according to which all Macedonian revenues should pass through the local branches of the Ottoman Bank, which should control its expenditure under the supervision of the Inspector-General and the Civil Agents. Moreover, if the money was earmarked for Macedonian reforms and compensation to the Christian victims of 1903, the two Powers were willing to agree to the raising of the customs from eight to ten per cent. Turkey's reply was a rival scheme THE FINANCIAL COMMISSION 379 of financial reform without foreign control; but Lord Lansdowne refused to accept either the one or the other. Before he consented to the raising of the customs, he must ask why the deficit could not be diminished by reducing the troops and must obtain a guarantee that the proceeds would go, not to the Ottoman Bank, which was unequal to the task, but to some competent authority which would apply them to the Macedonian reforms. Russia and Austria consented that the other Powers should send Delegates to cooperate with their Civil Agents in the supervision of finance. The appointment of Financial Delegates now became the official policy of the Powers, and, in August, the six Ambassadors urged Turkey to allow them to exercise their functions in cooperation with the Civil Agents. When she refused, the Powers announced that their Delegates would proceed to join the Civil Agents at Uskub. In view of Turkish recalcitrance, Lord Lansdowne suggested a naval demonstration and urged that it should be utilised for a purpose beyond that of merely securing assent to the Financial Commission. A Collective Note accordingly demanded the extension of the mandates of the Inspector-General, the Civil Agents and the Gendarmerie for two years longer, the recognition of the four Financial Delegates, and the acceptance of the Reglement of the Financial Commission, which was to consist of the Inspector- General, the Austrian and Russian Civil Agents, and a Delegate from each of the four other Powers, with headquarters at Salonica. After a demonstration at Mitylene by ships of all the Powers, except Germany, and the occupation of the custom-house and telegraph office, the Sultan yielded to necessity. At this very time, however, Lord Lans- downe left the Foreign Office, having placed Great Britain at the head of the European Concert and secured at least partial control of the finances of Macedonia, in which he had always discerned the true key to reform. Sir Edward Grey, finding the Concert " exhausted by the effort it had made," was reluctantly compelled for a time to play a watching game. But, while the Macedonian question slumbered, a new cause of conflict arose through an attempt by the Turks to extend their authority on the Egyptian frontier1. Under the firman issued on the accession of the Khedive Abbas in 1892, the administration of the Sinai Peninsula was recognised as belonging to Egypt ; for a telegram from Lord Cromer, defining the frontier by a line from El Arish to the head of the Gulf of Akaba was, without objection from the Porte, 1 Correspondence respecting the Tut co-Egyptian Frontier, 1906, Cd. 3006. 380 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 annexed to the firman and formed part of it. In 1905, owing to the lawlessness of the nomads, a British official was sent to report, and was subsequently appointed Commandant and Inspector of the Peninsula. He was provided with a small force and proceeded to construct a rest-house, barracks and a mosque at Nekhl. The task of the Mission was purely administrative; but the Turks, suspecting interference with the Hedjaz railway and intrigues with the Yemen rebels, occupied Tabah, a post within the line of 1892. On January 12th, 1906, the Sultan complained to Sir N. O'Conor that a British officer and Egyptian troops were camped close to Akaba and had announced their intention to erect guard-houses there and at other points within the Turkish territory, and asked for their withdrawal. A similar complaint was made to the Khedive, who denied the charge of trespass and suggested a discussion between a Turkish and an Egyptian Commissioner. The Porte haughtily replied that no question of frontier was involved, since Egypt formed part of Turkey. Turkish troops now occupied other posts within the line of 1892, and it was discovered that boundary-posts at the Mediterranean end of the peninsula had been overthrown. On March 31st, Mukhtar Pasha, the Turkish Commissioner in Egypt, formally claimed Tabah as within the Akaba district, and demanded that the boundary-line should be drawn from El Rafeh to Suez and from Suez to Akaba. The Khedive appealed to the firman of 1892, and again offered a Delimitation Commission. Lord Cromer, already rendered anxious by the Pan- Islamic ferment in Egypt, now perceived that he was confronted with a deliberate attempt to carry the Turkish frontier and strategic railways to the Canal. On May 2nd the British Ambassador informed the Grand- Vizier that the Turkish troops must evacuate Tabah within ten days, or the position would become grave. The French, Russian and German Ambassadors advised the Sultan to yield, and part of the Mediterranean fleet was sent to Phalerum. At the eleventh hour the Sultan yielded, and consented to a joint Commission on the frontier line. The posts were replaced, and the frontier line fixed in 1892 was confirmed; but the brief crisis left its mark in the increase of the British troops in Egypt. Meanwhile, Turkey passively obstructed the working of the re- form machinery in Macedonia, and the Financial Commission com- plained that the funds for the deficits on the Macedonian budget were not forthcoming. The brightest feature in the landscape was the Gendarmerie ; but the condition of the hapless country went from THE GENDARMERIE AND THE BANDS 381 bad to worse. Hideous lists were sent home every month by British Consuls, tabulating the savage outrages committed by the rival bands. The Government at Sofia seemed to Sir Edward to be doing its best, and the Greeks now won the unenviable distinction of being the chief offenders. On January 9th, 1907, Sir Edward informed the Austrian and Russian Ambassadors that something would have to be done in the year that was opening. The most urgent needs, he pro- ceeded, were the enlargement of the powers of the Financial Com- mission, and the entrusting of the foreign officers in the Gendarmerie with some form of executive authority. At this moment, General Giorgis visited Constantinople, and discussed with Sir Nicolas O'Conor the lessons of his three years' work. Despite obstruction from civil and military authorities, he declared, the corps had been radically reformed. He did not desire to raise the question of executive powers for the officers, which Lord Lansdowne had vainly endeavoured to secure in 1904. Sir Nicolas therefore contented himself with urging the Sultan to accept the demands which the General proceeded to make. The British Representative on the Financial Commission, H. P. (afterwards Sir H. P.) Harvey, reported hopefully on its work, and paid a tribute to Hilmi Pasha's courtesy and helpfulness ; and in April, 1907, Sir Edward Grey, in view of the recurring deficits, agreed to the raising of the customs duties by three per cent., to take effect in July. At the same moment, he informed Benckendorff that, though the administration was improved, the Powers must in his opinion make a much more serious effort to stop the bands. The Greek bands are at the root of the whole problem. The Greek Government must be sharply warned, as they are helped by Greek officers, recruited in Greek territory, and supported by money from outside. It is too bad that the efforts of the Powers to improve things in Macedonia, which would have been successful but for the bands, should be destroyed and defied in this way. The attitude of the Foreign Secretary was explained to a deputation from the Balkan Committee on July 9th, which complained of what appeared to be a policy of drift. The reforms, he declared, had had considerable success, and the Financial Commission and the increased customs funds could not but do good. But the intervention of the Powers had set up the expectation of partition, and the bands were busy pegging out claims. The plan of a Governor of Macedonia appointed by the Powers, suggested by Lord Lansdowne in 1903 and 382 CONTINENTAL AGREEMENTS, 1902-1907 approved by the deputation, could not be proposed by us alone, and would offend certain Powers. We were not the whole conscience of Europe. We should concentrate on the suppression of the bands and on judicial reform. We would do our utmost to maintain the Concert and render it effective ; but Powers nearer the centre of disturbance possessed a special interest. The emphatic refusal to take the initiative chilled the deputation, and conveyed a misleading impression of the deep interest which Sir Edward Grey felt in the problem. In consequence of British pressure, the Austrian and Russian Governments addressed a joint Note on September 30th to Greece, Bulgaria and Servia. The bands, it was suggested, were now fighting each other, partly owing to a misunderstanding of Article III of the Miirzsteg programme. The Committees apparently thought that, if they enlarged the area of their nationality, it would serve as the basis for delimitation. The Austrian and Russian Governments now stated that changes in the delimitation of national limits might be recom- mended to Turkey after the disappearance of the bands. Article III had been wrongly interpreted as conveying the intention to divide the country into national spheres. Only relatively unimportant changes, to facilitate the work of local authorities, were contemplated. Any delimitation would ignore the regrouping of nationalities brought about by the activities of the bands. This being so, the Greek, Bul- garian and Servian Governments must try to stop the bands receiving support. The Austro-Russian Note was supported by the Ministers of the other Powers; but not one of the Balkan States admitted Article III to be a cause of the trouble. Bulgaria rejoined that she had never wished to partition or annex Macedonia. Servia pointed out that Bulgarian bands began in the summer of 1903 before the Miirzsteg programme, and that the first Servian band was only formed in 1904 to defend Servian villages against Bulgarian attacks. The Sultan, moreover, was as stubborn as ever, and it was only after weeks of pressure and menace that he gave way and renewed all the mandates till 19 14. BOOK VI BEFORE AND IN THE WORLD WAR, 1907-1919 SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS December, July, October, Sir Edward Grey, Bart, (afterwards Viscount Grey of Fallodon). 1916: Right Hon. Arthur James (afterwards Earl of) Balfour. 1918 : Right Hon. Lord Robert Cecil (Assistant Secretary of State till January 1919). 1919 : Earl (afterwards Marquis) Curzon of Kedleston. UNDER-SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS Louis (afterwards Right Hon. Sir Louis) Mallet (Assistant). Walter L. F. G. (afterwards Sir Walter) Langley (Assistant). Thomas (afterwards Right Hon. Thomas) McKinnon Wood (Parliamentary) . Right Hon. Sir Arthur Nicolson, Bart, (afterwards Lord Carnock) (Permanent). Francis (afterwards Right Hon. Francis) Dyke Acland (Par- liamentary). Sir Eyre Crowe (Assistant). Sir Ralph S. Paget (afterwards Right Hon.) (Assistant). Hon. Neil J. A. Primrose (Parliamentary). : Right Hon. Lord Robert Cecil (Parliamentary, afterwards As- sistant Secretary of State). : Lord Hardinge of Penshurst. : Sir Ronald W. Graham (Assistant). : Commander the Right Hon. Frederick Leverton Harris (As- sistant). : Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, Bart. (Additional Parliamentary). : Right Hon. Sir Laming Worthington Evans, Bart. (Par- liamentary). : Sir William G. Tyrrell (Assistant). : Colonel Sir Hamar Greenwood, Bart. (Additional Parliamentary). May, July, October, 1907: 1908: November, 1910: October, 1911: January, October, February, May, 1912: 1913: 1915: June, November, January, 1916: 1917: October, July, 1918: October, July, 1919: CHAPTER VI TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE, 1907-1914 I. The German Danger, 1907- 1908 THE signature of the Anglo-Russian Convention was not imme- diately followed by a diplomatic partnership, and nobody interpreted it as precluding friendly relations with Germany. The invitation to the Kaiser to visit Windsor in the autumn of 1907, and his decision to spend a brief holiday in the mild air of the Solent, filled the friends of peace in both countries with satisfaction. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung pronounced the visit a fitting com- plement to the meeting of the Sovereigns at Wilhelmshohe in the summer; and The Times hailed the imperial guest as "a personality whose many characteristic qualities are universally admired, and nowhere more than here." At the Guildhall banquet, the Prime- Minister announced that " a most cordial welcome is assured to him " ; and Sir John Fisher, in replying for the Navy, assured his country- men that there was no ground for the nightmare of invasions, and that they might sleep quiet in their beds. On November nth the Hohenzollern steamed into Portsmouth harbour; and in reply to an address by the Mayor of Windsor the Emperor remarked, "It seems like coming home again; I am always glad to be here." His party included Freiherr von Schon, the Foreign Secretary, and von Einem, the War Minister. At the banquet on November 12th, he testified to his profound respect for his Grand- mother, and recalled the happy memories of his childhood. "I am so glad to be here again," he wrote to his friend, Bishop Boyd Carpenter, "and am most touched and grateful for all the kindness shewn me by everybody1." The climax of the visit was the ceremony at the Guildhall. " When I addressed Sir Joseph Savory from this place sixteen years ago, I said that my aim was above all the maintenance of peace. History, I venture to hope, will do me the justice that I have pursued this aim un- swervingly ever since. The main prop and base for the peace of the world is the maintenance of good relations between our two countries, and I shall further strengthen them as far as lies in my power. Blood is thicker than water. The German nation's wishes coincide with mine." 1 W. Boyd Carpenter, Further Pages of My Life, pp. 163-194. w.&G. in 25 386 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE "Sir Edward Grey, who sat next me," records Baron von Schon, the German Foreign Secretary, " was visibly moved, and we promised with a warm handshake to do our utmost in the sense of the Kaiser's speech." On arriving at Windsor, Schon had declared to an interviewer that there was no intention to discuss concrete political questions. The Emperor, however, was temperamentally incapable of excluding high politics from his conversation. No project was nearer his heart than the Bagdad Railway; and, finding the British War Minister among the guests, he broached the subject of British cooperation. " The first eveningof my visit," relates Lord Haldane, " the Emperor took me aside and said he was sorry that there was a good deal of friction over the Bagdad Railway, and that he did not know what we wanted as a basis for cooperation1. I said that I could not answer for the Foreign Office, but that, speaking as War Minister, one thing I knew we wanted was a 'gate' to protect India from troops coming down the new railway. He asked me what I meant by a 'gate,' and I said that meant the control of the section which would come near to the Persian Gulf. ' I will give you the gate,' replied the Emperor. Next morning, about 7.30 o'clock, a helmeted guardsman knocked loudly at the door and came into my bedroom, and said that he had a message from the Emperor. It was that he did mean what he had said the night before. I at once got up and caught a train for London. There I saw the Foreign Secretary, who, after taking time to think things over, gave me a Memorandum he had drawn up. The sub- stance of it was that the British Government would be very glad to discuss the Emperor's suggestion, but that it would be necessary, before making a settlement, to bring into the discussion France and Russia, whose interests also were involved. I was requested to sound the Emperor further2. After telling King Edward of what was happening, I had another conversation in Windsor Castle with the Emperor, who said that he feared that the bringing in of Russia, not to speak of France, would cause difficulty ; but he asked me to come that night to his apartments, to a meeting to which he would summon the Ministers he had brought with him. He took the Memorandum which I had brought from London, a copy of which I had made for him in my own handwriting, so as to present it as the informal document it was intended to be. Just before dinner, Baron von Schon spoke to me, and told me that he had heard from the Emperor what had happened, and that the Emperor was wrong in thinking that the attempt to bring in Russia would lead to difficulty, because he, Baron von Schon, when he was Ambassador to Russia, had already discussed the 1 Before the War, pp. 48-52. 2 Sir Edward Grey informed the Russian Government of the conversations and received the thanks of Izvolsky. Siebert, Diplomatische Aktenstucke zur Geschichte der Ententepolitikj pp. 319-20. THE KAISER AT WINDSOR 387 general question with its Government, and had virtually come to an under- standing. At the meeting that night we could therefore go on to negotiate. I attended the Emperor in his State rooms at the Castle at one o'clock in the morning, and sat smoking with him and his Ministers for over two hours. His Foreign Minister, and Count Metternich and the War Minister, von Einem, were present Count Metternich did not like what I sug- gested, that there should be a conference in Berlin on the subject between England, France, Russia and Germany. In the end, but not until after much keen argument, the idea was accepted; and the Emperor directed Schon to go next morning to London and make an official proposal to Sir Edward Grey. This was carried out, and the preliminary details were discussed between him and Sir Edward at the Foreign Office. Some weeks afterwards difficulties were raised from Berlin. Germany said that she was ready to discuss with the British Government the question of the terminal portion of the railway ; but she did not desire to bring the other two Powers into that discussion, because the conference would probably fail and accentuate the differences between her and the other Powers. The matter thus came to an end. It was, I think, a great pity I came to the conclusion afterwards that it was probably owing to the views of Prince Biilow that the proposal had come to an untimely end. Whether he did not wish for an expanded entente; whether the feeling was strong in Germany that the Bagdad Railway had become a specially German concern and should not be shared ; or what other reason he may have had, I do not know; but it was from Berlin, after the Emperor's return, that the negotiations were finally blocked." The veto of Prince Biilow on a Four Power conference in Berlin ended the brief period during which reconciliation was in the air1. For a few weeks Anglo- German relations had breathed a cordiality which they had not known since the Kruger telegram, and which they were never to know again. Under the mellowing influence of a warm popular welcome, the Emperor's instinctive dislike for British ideas and institutions momentarily yielded to a revival of family associations and a desire to resume the political intimacy of the early years of his reign. If the British refusal of cooperation in 1903 was an error, the German refusal of British conditions in 1907 was a calamity. The King's Speech at the opening of the Session of 1908 began with a warmly-phrased reference to the Kaiser's visit, and Schon's proposal for a pact guaranteeing the status quo in the North Sea was accepted; but the sky was quickly filled with driving clouds. 1 Schon defends the veto on the ground that Germany would have been one against three; that the interests of France and Russia were smaller; and that Sir Edward perhaps desired a certain recognition of the new grouping of the Powers. Memoirs, pp. 62-3. 25—2 388 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE " It was in the last weeks of February," writes Colonel Repington1, " that I learnt that the Kaiser had addressed a letter to Lord Tweedmouth on naval policy. This letter appeared to me an insidious attempt to in- fluence, in German interests, a British First Lord, and at a most critical juncture, namely, just before the estimates were coming on in Parliament. ... It seemed to me a public duty to expose this proceeding in order to prevent its recurrence ; and this seemed all the more necessary, considering the weakening of our Government at a moment when firmness was absolutely indispensable." Accordingly The Times published a brief letter from its Military Correspondent on March 6th with the title "Under which King?" The Kaiser had addressed a letter to Lord Tweedmouth on British and German naval policy, and a reply had been despatched. Both letter and reply should be laid before Parliament without delay. The letter was accompanied by a shrill leader, suggesting that the Emperor had tried to cut down British shipbuilding, in order to steal a march on our naval supremacy. "It was a purely private and personal communication," declared the Prime-Minister on March 6th, "conceived in an entirely friendly spirit. The answer was equally private and informal, and neither the letter nor the answer was communicated to the Cabinet. Before the letter arrived, the Cabinet had come to a formal decision with regard to the Navy estimates." A little further information was supplied on March 9th by Lord Tweedmouth. "The letter came by the ordinary post. It was private and personal, very friendly in its tone and quite informal. I shewed it to Sir Edward Grey, who agreed that it should be treated as a private and not an official one ; and on February 20th I replied in a friendly and informal manner." Lord Lansdowne followed with a few sensible words. The letter appeared to be very much what a Sovereign and a British Minister would say in con- versation without its being thought improper; and the Opposition would not press for publication. Such communications, however, were irregular, and should only be made in cases of real necessity. Lord Rosebery concluded the brief debate with a few sentences which were warmly appreciated in Berlin. My only apprehension is that we may be making ourselves quite ridiculous by the fuss which has been made. We have seen a whole world of absolutely insane inferences drawn. There is a section of the Press in both countries which seeks to create bad blood. Those sections take up 1 Vestigia, ch. 21. Schon, to whom the Kaiser showed it, saw no reason for vetoing the despatch of the letter. Memoirs, p. 101. THE TWEEDMOUTH LETTER 389 every trivial incident — this is a trivial incident — to excite morbid suspicions between the two nations which is gradually developing into a danger to European peace. There is no earthly reason that I know why our friendship with France should necessarily entail a hostile attitude to Germany. Prince Bulow dealt with his own critics in a similar manner. I cannot publish the letter because it is private. I wish I could. It could be signed by any of us, by any sincere friend of good relations. Every Sovereign has a right to address other statesmen. It is a gross libel to suggest that it is an attempt to influence the Minister in the interest of Germany, or a secret interference in the domestic affairs of Great Britain. In view of the excitement worked up by the Press, the Cabinet would have been wise to ask the Kaiser's permission to reveal the correspondence. The letter, like many other of his pronouncements, was susceptible of two interpretations. To one class of mind it seems a Machiavellian attempt to overtake the British lead in capital ships by allaying suspicion of German designs. To another, it appears as an effort, tactless indeed, but made in good faith, to improve the relations between the two peoples1. The Navy Estimates for 1908-9, providing for only two Dread- noughts, although in March the German programme was enlarged, testified to the conciliatory spirit of the British Cabinet. The pro- motion of Mr Asquith to the Premiership in 1908 brought Mr Lloyd George to the Exchequer, and Mr Churchill into the Cabinet ; and for the next three years these two men led a crusade for social reform and a reduction of armaments. At a meeting under the auspices of the Peace Society at the Queen's Hall on July 28th, the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated the German case for armaments. "Men have not got the imagination to project themselves into the position of the other party. Look at the position of Germany. Her Army is to her what our Navy is to us — her sole defence against invasion. She has not got a two-Power standard. She is between two Powers who, in combination, could pour in a vastly greater number of troops than she has I want our friends who think, because Germany is a little frightened, she really means mischief to us, to remember that she is frightened for a reason which would frighten us under the same circumstances. Why should there not be an Anglo- German Entente? We have done it with France, we have done it with Russia, we have done it with the United States." A week or two later, on August 15th, Mr Churchill sounded a similar note. 1 The letter was published in The Morning Post, October 30th, 19 14, and is ited in Repington's Vestigia. 390 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE "There is no collision of primary interests between Great Britain and Germany in any quarter of the globe, no real cause of difference. They have nothing to fight about, no prize to fight for, and no place to fight in. We honour that strong, patient, industrious German people, who have been for so many centuries divided, a prey to European intrigue. We wish them well from the bottom of our hearts." The aspirations, if not the confidence, of the Left wing were shared by the Right; and the Cabinet determined to utilise King Edward's visit to the Kaiser at Cronberg, on his way to Marienbad, for opening negotiations1. Sir Charles Hardinge explained the causes of British anxiety, and urged that a friendly discussion of armaments should take place between the Governments. The Kaiser renewed the assurance of his friendliness, but impulsively declared that no pressure from a foreign Government could be tolerated, and that he would rather go to war than submit to it. The personal aspects of the visit were pleasant enough. "Uncle Bertie was all sunshine at Cronberg and in very good humour," reported the Kaiser to the Tsar on August 1 8th. "He intends visiting Berlin officially with Aunt Alix next year." King Edward proceeded from Cronberg to Ischl to congratulate Francis Joseph on his diamond jubilee. " It was not an official visit," writes the biographer of Aehrenthal; "but the King tried to give it that character. In the course of a walk with the Emperor, he brought up the topic of the German Fleet, explained the resentment it aroused in England, and asked his host to persuade Germany to limit her shipbuilding. Francis Joseph refused. The parting was friendly; but the conversation was a landmark2." The King had no other purpose than to diminish the tension which was beginning to threaten peace, and Sir Edward Grey could truthfully aver that we had carefully avoided anything likely to make mischief between Germany and Austria. But the Emperor remarked that his guest had gone away dissatisfied, and to suspicious eyes his action came to appear as another link in the chain of his machinations against the Central Powers. The Chancellor of the Exchequer left home soon after the King to study the German system of Old Age Pensions and, incidentally, to discuss the problem of armaments. Bethmann-Hollweg, the 1 Cook, How Britain strove for Peace. The Kaiser reported the interview in two telegrams to the Chancellor, printed by Hammann, Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit, pp. 141-144. 2 Molden, Graf Aehrenthal, p. 56. THE DAILY TELEGRAPH INTERVIEW 391 Minister of the Interior, travelled to Berlin to do him honour, and Mr Lloyd George returned home impressed with the wealth, the energy and the friendliness of the German people. The German Chancellor professed himself equally eager to dissipate the cloud of mistrust. "That the present mutual suspicion has lost little of its strength is a deep grief to Prince Bulow," wrote Sidney Whitman in The Standard1 after a visit to Norderney. "He regards it as a sort of popular madness. As to our fear of an attack by sea, he says the apprehension would be more excusable for Germany.' ' A few days later, the Chancellor opened the fifteenth Inter-Parliamentary Con- ference, which was held in the Reichstag building, with a few words of welcome. "Taught by history, which for three hundred years has not spared her the hardest experiences, Germany must and will be strong enough to defend her independence. She does not and will not misuse her strength." At a garden-party at the Chancellor's palace Lord Weardale thanked the Prince for his interview with Sidney Whitman, and added that ninety-nine out of every hundred English- men desired the very best relations. The Chancellor replied in English, on behalf of the Kaiser and the German people, that their only aim was to have the very best relations, and expressing the hope that his visitors had convinced themselves of this good feeling. While the relations of the two countries were being eagerly dis- cussed by Ministers and the Press, the publication of an undated and anonymous interview with the Kaiser in The Daily Telegraph, on October 28th, let loose a hurricane2. Its dominant theme was his friendship for Great Britain, as evinced both openly and secretly during the Boer War, and steadily maintained, though neither shared by his own people nor recognised by the object of his affections. While The Daily Telegraph informed its readers that the interview was the work of a retired diplomatist, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung issued a statement that the Emperor had received from an English gentleman the manuscript of an article collating a series of conversations at various times and with various personages, with a request to sanction its publication in the interests of good relations. The Emperor forwarded it to Bulow at Norderney, who sent it to 1 September 14th, 1908. 2 The Kaiser read the interview before it appeared and corrected one or two words so that his meaning should be made clearer. It is reprinted in the Appendix to D. J. Hill, Impressions of the Kaiser. The most authoritative accounts of the incident are given by Spickernagel, Fiirst Biilozv, ch. 5 ; Schon, Memoirs, pp. 102-8 ; Hammann, Um den Kaiser, ch. 6; and William II, Memoirs, ch. 4. 392 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE the Foreign Office at Berlin for revision. As the Foreign Office raised no objection, it was published. The interview, like the letter to Lord Tweedmouth, however well-intentioned, increased the malaise which it was intended to dispel. When the Kaiser confessed that his subjects as a whole were unfriendly to England, he was generally believed; but when he affirmed his own undeviating goodwill, he failed to carry conviction. Moreover, the rashness of his language deepened the impression already prevalent throughout Europe that his personality was an explosive element in world-politics. While Cabinet Ministers expressed their confidence in the good- will of Germany, a growing number of observers came to regard a collision as probable, if not inevitable. On July 20th, 1908, Lord Cromer warned the Government in the House of Lords that "their main duty was to make provision betimes for the European conflict which might not improbably be forced upon us before many years." Powerful French voices struck the same note. During his cure at Marienbad in the same year King Edward received a visit from Clemenceau, the French Premier, who spoke of another war as prob- able. If war broke out between Germany and England, the German armies would invade France by way of Belgium, and seek in France an indemnity for losses at sea. To destroy the German Fleet would not save Paris. A hundred thousand men in Belgium would not be of much use ; but two hundred and fifty thousand or five hundred thousand would change the course of the struggle. Our Territorial Army was a plaything, and the position of France would be one of extreme danger until Great Britain had a National Army. " If France were smashed for want of timely help, England would have to incur vastly greater obligations than any now requisite, or would have to bend her neck to the victor." On November 23rd, Lord Roberts delivered a weighty speech in the House of Lords, which succeeded in making compulsory service a living issue. " Hitherto," he began, " I have failed to wake people up to my warnings against a danger that is all too obvious. If you, who ought to realise that our naval supremacy is being disputed, neglect to place this country in such a state of defence as would make even the most powerful nation hesitate to attack it, I cannot help feeling that a terrible awakening may be in store for us at no very distant period The Navy is not enough. The Territorial Army is too small and too untrained to cope with highly trained troops There lies in front of us one of the strangest spectacles ever witnessed. Within a few hours' steaming of our coasts, there is a LORD ROBERTS URGES CONSCRIPTION 393 people numbering over sixty millions, our most active rivals in commerce and the greatest military Power in the world, adding to an overwhelming military strength a naval force which she is resolutely and rapidly increasing ; while we are taking no military precautions in response. Germany cannot justly be blamed for the situation; rather, she should be praised and her example followed, for her people, by their industry, their perseverance, their sound system of education, and the military training which every able-bodied man receives, have made her a great nation. Words cannot express the responsibility which lies on the members of the Legislature. We are trustees for the future of the Empire. It is my absolute belief that, without a military organisation more adequate to the certain perils of the future, our Empire will fall from us and our power will pass away." Lord Crewe replied, for the Government, that Lord Roberts's scheme would cost twenty millions a year, and that, as the people believed the Fleet to offer practical immunity, it would dissipate belief in the necessity of a supreme Navy. It was true that we needed a consider- able force, so that the enemy would require large numbers for the attempt; but we were not prepared to revolutionise our theory and practice not only of military but of naval defence. It was impossible to accept the motion1, because it could not be dissociated from the speech, with its demand for a million men, and because it suggested that the Army, not the Navy, was the real defence against invasion. Lord Lansdowne, while admitting Lord Roberts's contention that circumstances had changed since 1905 to our disadvantage, also declined to accept his remedy ; but the motion was carried by 72 to 32. While the official leaders of both parties thus clung to the voluntary system, the debate left an abiding impression; and the principle of compulsory service was accepted by an ever-growing number of Conservatives within and without the Legislature2. 1 "That the defence of these islands necessitates the immediate provision of an army so strong in numbers and so efficient in quality that the most formidable nation would hesitate to attempt a landing on these shores." 2 While Lord Roberts was proclaiming his fears and propounding his remedies, Sir John Fisher secretly proposed to avert the menace by very different means. As far back as 1905, on his appointment to office, the First Sea Lord in a written Memorandum predicted an Anglo-German war in August, 1914; and on March 14th, 1908, he wrote to King Edward, "that we have eventually to fight Germany is just as sure as anything can be." " Early in 1908," he writes, " I had a long secret conversation with the King, in which I urged that we should 'Copenhagen' the German fleet at Kiel a la Nelson, and I lamented that we possessed neither a Pitt nor a Bismarck to give the order." The criminal design of seizing the Fleet of a foreign Power in time of peace, without even Canning's excuse in 1807, was never communicated to Ministers ; for the reception of the plan by those to whom it was confided did not encourage its author to enlarge the circle of initiates. Memoirs, pp. 18-19, 64> 183. 394 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE The tension was recognised and deplored by no one more than by the German Ambassador in London, Count WolfT-Metternich, who complained in 1908 that the provocative methods by which the German Fleet was boomed were affecting British nerves. It was now clear that there was only one path back to confidence and cordiality ; and this the Kaiser and Bulow stubbornly refused to take. "I am asked why we oppose limitations, " declared the Chancellor in the Reichstag on December 10th, 1908. " The technical difficulties are very great Besides we are in the middle of Europe, in the most strategically unfavourable position on the world map Our position would be bad indeed, and peace would be imperilled if we reduced our armaments below the level demanded by our position in Europe. Finally, the growth of our fleet is determined by a law, the sole object of which is to assure the defence of our coasts and our commerce." When he added that no definite proposals for the limitation of armaments had reached the German Government, his statement was only formally true; and the British Government replied that no definite proposals had been made at the Hague in 1907 or at Cronberg in 1908, because Germany had refused to engage in discussions. Meanwhile, the construction of a mighty Fleet was pressed steadily forward, to the noisy accompaniment of the Pan- German orchestra. II. Macedonian Reform, 1 907-1 908 While the German challenge to our naval security constituted the main anxiety of the Government, the problem of Macedonian reforms continued to demand unremitting attention, and at the end of 1907 Sir Edward Grey boldly resumed the initiative1. " The situation has become so unsatisfactory," he declared in a Memo- randum of December 18th, "as to claim the immediate attention of the Powers The gradual extermination of the Christian inhabitants is being tolerated in Macedonia, where the Ottoman authorities have displayed an utter incapacity to maintain public tranquillity. The experience of the last four years would tend to shew that, by its very constitution, the gendarmerie is not capable of remedying the chief evil from which Macedonia is suffering — the absence of public security. It is quite unfitted by numbers and organ- isation to cope with the bands, and H.M. Government are profoundly convinced that the time has now arrived when General de Giorgis and the foreign Staff Officers should be entrusted with a full measure of executive control, and when the force under his command should be properly qualified for effective action by a substantial increase in numbers and an adequate equipment. In these circumstances they would strongly urge 1 See Turkey, No. 1 and Turkey, No. 2, 1908. THE NOVIBAZAR RAILWAY PROJECT 395 that the Powers should represent to the Sublime Porte that the heavy charges on the Macedonian Budget for the maintenance of Turkish troops are out of all proportion to the services which they render in the mainten- ance of public security, and that the only effective means of suppressing the bands lies in the increase upon a large scale of the gendarmerie, the formation of mobile columns of gendarmes, and in granting executive power to the officers in command. The savings effected by the reduction of the troops would provide funds for their increase and adequate equip- ment." This vigorous call fell on deaf ears ; for none of the other Powers cared for the sufferings of the Macedonian peasant. Well might Lord Newton exclaim that Great Britain was the only sentimental country in the world ! While pleas for inaction were trickling in to Downing Street, a deadly blow was struck at the waning prestige of the Concert. On January 27th, 1908, Baron Aehrenthal, the masterful diplomat who succeeded the pliant Goluchowski at the Ballplatz in 1906, announced that he had obtained from the Sultan permission to survey the route for a railway through the sanjak of Novibazar, connecting the Bosnian system with the Turkish terminus at Mitrovitza1. Article XXV of the Treaty of Berlin empowered Austria to construct military and commercial roads through the sanjak ; and, though railways were not specifically mentioned, nobody argued that the Austrian Minister was exceeding his Treaty rights. On March 24th, Prince Biilow spoke with sympathy of the Austrian project, "though we neither gave nor were asked our advice." "I was informed of the intention," echoed Tittoni in the Italian Chamber, "but I could not dispute the right. There is no danger to the Concert or to peace if all the Powers regard railways as an item in the reforms of Macedonia." Very different was the reception of the news in Russia. Izvolsky complained that it was a gross violation of the spirit of the Miirzsteg Agreement ; and the cooperation in the Balkans inaugurated in 1897 came suddenly to an end. The wound was far too deep to be healed by Aehrenthal's subsequent acceptance of the project of a railway from the Danube at the junction of Servia and Roumania to San Giovanni di Medua in northern Albania. Sir Edward Grey's references to Austria's action were polite, but unambiguous. " Our attitude towards these railway projects," he declared on February 28th, " is one of benevolent neutrality. But this latest project has undoubtedly 1 See Molden, Graf Aehrenthal, pp. 32-8. 396 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE been the occasion of very marked comment. That this special moment should be chosen for promoting a large railway scheme which requires the Sultan's consent was sure to excite apprehension lest individual Powers should be turning their attention to objects specially adapted to their interests. Any impression of that kind must produce a most unfortunate effect on public opinion in the Balkans, at Constantinople and on the Concert itself. I should regret exceedingly that any such impression should gain ground, because I wish to see the Concert maintained for Macedonian reforms Moreover, in discussing the Macedonian question you are never far from the Turkish question, which has more than once led to a European war. As long as the Concert exists you have a certain guarantee that the question will not lead to war. Once they lose touch with one another, you cannot tell what misunderstandings may creep in and how far they may go. Has then the launching of a railway scheme really affected the Concert adversely? I trust not; but I do feel that it is incumbent on the Powers, after all that has passed, to make it clear that there is no ground for such an apprehension." The Foreign Secretary proceeded to repeat the demands, the acceptance of which by the Powers he had been privately endeavouring to secure throughout the winter, and added that it might be necessary to go further. " If a Turkish Governor were appointed for a fixed term of years — a man whose character and capacity were accepted and recognised by the Powers — and if he had a free hand and his position were secure, I believe that the whole Macedonian question might be solved. Under secure and effective administration the Financial Commission and the gendarmerie would have the fullest use made of them, and the country, I am convinced, would be swept of bands and pacified. I am not putting that forward as a definite proposal to which we ourselves are pledged. We have no amour propre in the matter. We are perfectly ready to abandon any proposal of our own, if any of the Powers will come forward with any other proposal likely to be as effective or more effective and which recommends itself more to the Concert as a whole. For I am convinced that the Macedonian problem can be settled if the Concert will only seriously take it in hand. Tinkering at the Miirzsteg programme will not improve the situation. Anything less than a real remedy can be little better than a farce. We are rapidly arriving at that point when the Concert must either justify itself or stultify itself. Macedonia, if it continues to be neglected, must sooner or later provoke a catastrophe." Sir Edward Grey had recovered the unfaltering accents of Lord Lansdowne. Aehrenthal complained to the British Ambassador that, according to this argument, Austria was prevented from doing anything to promote her interests in the Balkans, lest she should thereby encourage AN INDEPENDENT GOVERNOR DEMANDED 397 Turkish resistance to reform. The Austrian Press, led by the Fremden- blatt, roundly declared that an independent Governor was impossible without coercing Turkey ; and comment in the other capitals was no more encouraging. Undeterred by the hostile reception of his speech, Sir Edward Grey embodied its substance in a vigorous despatch to the Great Powers. The Government, he declared, had received the replies on his Gendarmerie proposal with great regret ; and no alter- native scheme had been proposed. " If the note on judicial reforms is not presented, and if it is understood that the Powers have dropped this project without putting forward any other proposal of reform, the effect will be most deplorable. The situation is not beyond remedy ; but it cannot be remedied by half-measures. Were a Governor of Macedonia to be appointed who would be given a free hand and be irremovable for a term of years except with the consent of the Powers, and were an adequate force of gendarmerie and of European officers placed at his disposal, the Government are convinced that the country might be cleared of bands and pacified in a short time. The Governor would be a Turkish subject, and might be a Christian or a Mussulman. The Government believe that, if all the Powers make it known that they are equally in earnest and resolved, they can secure the acceptance of any proposal which does not involve a disintegration of Ottoman territory. If the Powers are not prepared to assume this attitude, the Concert, as an instrument for securing reforms, has ceased to exist." The prompt response of the Russian Government, which since the sanjak coup was now free to pursue its own line, manifested a welcome advance towards the British standpoint. While still unable to accept the proposed reduction of Turkish troops, it supported the increase of the numbers and powers of the Gendarmerie. If the appointment of a Governor for Macedonia had no chance of being adopted unanimously by the Powers or accepted by the Sultan, the same object could be attained by making the Inspector- General irre- moveable for a term of years. At the same time, judicial reform should be seriously pressed. Sir Edward, delighted by the reply, virtually accepted the proposal that the Inspector-General should be raised to the rank of Vizier, confirmed for a term of years and super- seded only with the consent of the Powers. There seemed at last to be some prospect of advance. If further progress was to be made it could only come from the growing intimacy of Great Britain and Russia ; and it was to foster the spirit of confidence and cooperation that King Edward accepted the invitation to visit the Tsar at Reval in June. The first visit ever paid by a British Sovereign to Russia aroused 398 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE unusual interest both at home and abroad. Radical and Labour circles in England deplored the step at a time when the struggle between the Tsar and his people was at its height, and Nicholas dared not welcome his guest in his own capital. Grim stories of " Stolypin's necktie," of prisons crowded with untried prisoners, of a torture-chamber at Riga, of exiles rotting in Siberia, had filtered through to the West. The Conservative Press, on the other hand, pointedly recalled the King's journey to Paris in 1903. The visit was sharply challenged by the Labour party in the debate on the Foreign Office vote on June 4th, and warmly defended by Sir Edward Grey on grounds of high policy. The King's visits abroad, he began, had been uniformly beneficial. No negotiations were on foot for any new treaty or convention with Russia, and none would be initiated during the visit. But it would emphasise the fact that the relations between the two countries were of a friendly character. The Convention of 1907 and the Reval visit were parts of the same policy. " I am for a loyal understanding between the countries, working together where their interests touch. I stand by that, and if the House rejects it or makes it impossible I fall with it. That is a policy of peace. The other policy urged on us leads in the direction of war." The visit, moreover, was long overdue, and could not be postponed without marked dis- courtesy. We might as well tear up the Convention, and to continue the discussion of Macedonian reforms would be fruitless. The internal condition of Russia was irrelevant to the issue, and we had no Treaty rights to justify interference. " You think you are simply advocating a breach between two Governments," concluded the Foreign Secretary. "You are advocating something which in the long run is bound to make bad blood between the two peoples." If it was too late to cancel the visit, replied Keir Hardie on behalf of the Labour party, let it be of a private character. " For the King to pay an official visit is to condone the atrocities for which the Tsar's Government and the Tsar personally must be held responsible." Mr Balfour supported the official policy, which was approved by 225 to 59; but the large number of abstentions in a crowded House was symptomatic of a widespread repugnance to intimate relations with the Russian Government. King Edward was perplexed and annoyed at the outburst of resentment. " The visit." writes Sir Sidney Lee, " followed his cruises round the other northern capitals, and he regarded as overdue the personal civility to the KING EDWARD AT REVAL 399 Tsar, who was nephew to his wife, and to whom he was deeply attached. The unrest in Russia was no concern of his, and only awoke in him sym- pathy with the ruler whose life it oppressed. He was hardly conscious of the deep-seated feeling which the alleged tyranny of the Russian Govern- ment had excited in many quarters in England1." On June 10th, the King and Queen, accompanied by Sir John Fisher, Sir John French and Sir Charles Hardinge, reached Reval. 11 1 am confident," declared the Tsar, " that this meeting will strengthen the numerous and powerful ties which unite our Houses, and will have a happy result of bringing our countries closer together, and of maintaining the peace of the world. During the past year several questions of great importance for Russia and Great Britain have been settled satisfactorily. I am certain that Your Majesty appreciates as much as myself the value of these agreements, for, despite their limited scope, they can only aid in spreading between our countries the sentiments of goodwill and mutual confidence." " I can cordially subscribe to the words of Your Majesty on the Con- vention recently concluded," replied the King. "I believe it will serve to strengthen the ties which unite our peoples, and I am certain it will lead to a satisfactory settlement of some important matters in the future. I am convinced that it will also greatly aid to maintain the peace of the world." Izvolsky and Sir Charles Hardinge also issued a communique stating that they were in complete agreement on all points. "The two Ministers have convinced themselves anew of the desire of Russia and Great Britain to maintain the best relations with all the other Powers, and to give none of them reasons for disquietude as to the object of the special agreements between the two countries or of their general policy." These soothing assurances merely stimulated speculation, and far-reaching designs were confidently attributed to the actors in the drama. In Germany and Austria, fantastic legends were current. "The assumption at the time," wrote Reventlow in 1915, "and later proved correct, was that the monarchs arranged to launch a war of annihilation against Germany and Austria, in association with France and the Balkan States, as soon as Russia had reorganised her army. The Russian experts calculated that this would require from six to eight years." Prince Biilow displayed his anxiety by pointed enquiries; and Izvolsky assured him that "no open or secret Anglo-Russian Conventions existed which could be directed against German interests." That apprehension was felt in still higher quarters, as was revealed by a speech of the Kaiser to his officers during an inspection 1 Dictionary of National Biography y Edward VII. 4oo TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE at Doberitz. "It seems they wish to encircle and provoke us. We shall be able to support it. The German has never fought better than when he has had to defend him on all sides." A few days later he was greeted at the Hamburg regatta with unusual enthusiasm and by Die Wacht am Rhein. "When I asked myself what this outburst meant," he declared, "our old German song burst forth. Then I knew. Gentlemen, I thank you and I have understood you." Germany was mistaken in attributing to the chief actors at Reval designs against her security or welfare ; but she was justified in the belief that the visit had tightened the bonds between the two Powers. In a letter to BenckendorfF, written on June 18th, Izvolsky reported that the general impression of the visit was extremely favourable1, and that the King had openly expressed his satisfaction, referring with special pleasure to the happy trend in Russia's domestic affairs and Stolypin's activities. He had had long conversations with Hardinge on the European situation. The latter did not think that Anglo-German relations would grow worse just at present; but, if Germany continued to build at her present pace, in seven or eight years an extremely disquieting situation would arise. Then, doubtless, Russia would be the arbiter. It was, therefore, the wish of Great Britain, in the interest of peace and the Balance of Power, that she should be as strong as possible by land and sea. Sir Charles Hardinge spoke warmly of the result of the Convention of 1907, and declared the Cabinet to be resolved on cooperation in Persia. Macedonian reforms were fully discussed, and the British proposals were reduced to dimen- sions which Izvolsky hoped would be accepted by the Powers. Nowhere was the Reval visit more anxiously canvassed than in certain secret conventicles both within and without the dominions of the Sultan. Young Turk exiles in Western Europe had long planned and plotted for a republic and a Constitution, and a network of committees was formed in European and Asiatic Turkey, with their headquarters at Salonika2. Fearing discovery, the Committee of Union and Progress planned a rising for September ; but the meeting at Reval determined it to forestall by immediate action the inter- vention which it appeared to foreshadow. On July 3rd, Niazi Bey raised the flag of revolt at his native village of Resna, and, on July 23rd, the Constitution of 1876 was proclaimed. On the following day, Abdul Hamid, confronted by the Young Turk ultimatum, "Sur- 1 Siebert, Diplomatische Aktenstuche, pp. 777-9. 2 See Moore, The Orient Express, ch. 21 : "The Young Turks." THE YOUNG TURK REVOLUTION 401 render, or we march on Stambul," granted the Constitution. The revolution was hailed with delight throughout the Ottoman dominions, and the murdering bands disappeared as if by magic. Opinion in this country greeted the revolution with enthusiastic and almost unanimous approval, though a few of the older Glad- stonians grumbled that nothing good could come out of Turkey. The sentiment of relief was shared to the full by the British Diplomatic and Consular Representatives and by the Foreign Secretary himself1. Sir Edward Grey instructed our Charge d'affaires to congratulate the new Grand-Vizier, Kiamil Pasha, the Grand Old Man of Turkey, on his accession to office and the promulgation of a Constitution. "His Highness should be assured that the warmest sympathy has been called forth by this event in England, in which country the welfare of Turkey is earnestly desired by means of a regeneration of the Administra- tion As far as H.M.'s Government are concerned, the Macedonian question and others of a similar character will entirely disappear, once good government throughout the Turkish dominions is established. You may assure his Highness that any changes or genuine efforts on such lines will not be embarrassed by us, but will receive our fullest sympathy." On the same day, Petrograd was informed of the opinion of the British Government that "any representations for the creation of a mobile force should be suspended." Izvolsky agreed that it was "essential that Great Britain and Russia should avoid placing themselves in antagonism to a Mussulman movement productive of genuine re- forms, and that a fair chance of showing what good it could bring about should be afforded to that movement.' ' Thus ended the five years' wearisome struggle, waged almost single-handed by Lord Lansdowne and Sir Edward Grey, for the relief of the suffering peasantry of Macedonia. In the course of the summer the whole machinery of control — the Gendarmerie, the Financial Commission and the Civil Agents — was scrapped. If it was in some measure an act of necessity, it was, in scarcely less degree, an act of faith. The disinterested sympathy of Great Britain was warmly appre- ciated at Constantinople. "A deputation visited the British Embassy at Pera to-day," reported Mr G. H. Barclay, "and said that they entertained the most friendly feelings to England as the country which was the champion of liberty. Englishmen have been the recipients of many expressions of friendliness from Turks, who feel that their aspirations to Constitutional liberty cannot lack the moral support of Great Britain." 1 Turkey, No. i, 1909. Correspondence respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey. w.&c.m 26 402 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE The new Ambassador, Sir Gerald Lowther, in presenting his cre- dentials to the Sultan on August 7th, informed him that his wise action in granting the Constitution had made an excellent impression in England. " In reply, he twice assured me that he was firmly resolved to act in future in accordance with the principles of the Constitution, and stated that he depended on H.M.'s Government giving him material and moral support. Along the entire route from Yildiz to the Sublime Porte and from there to the Embassy, a distance of about four miles, large crowds made me an enthusiastic and spontaneous demonstration." In a cordial interview with the Turkish Ambassador on July 31st, Sir Edward Grey asserted that our quarrels had never been with the Turkish people, but only with that particular form of government which the Turks themselves had now overthrown. III. The Bosnian Crisis, 1 908-1 909 While this country was still ringing with praises of the Young Turk revolution and of the almost miraculous restoration of tran- quillity in the bloodstained valleys of Macedonia, the harmony of the European Chanceries was rudely disturbed by a proclamation of the Emperor Francis Joseph, announcing the formal incorporation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in his dominions, on the ground that annexa- tion was the essential preliminary to the grant of a Constitution1. Aehrenthal had secured the concession for the sanjak Railway without consulting Russia ; but he never dreamed of annexing Bosnia without a previous understanding. The sanjak controversy left Izvolsky angry and suspicious ; but the mood passed, and in April, 1908, he expressed his desire that the entente of the two Powers should be renewed. In a Memorandum, dated June 19th, he accepted the sanjak Railway and announced his readiness, should the maintenance of the status quo prove impossible, to discuss changes, among them the annexation by Austria of Bosnia, Herzegovina and the sanjak, in return for the opening of the Straits to Russian warships. The intimation that Austria might annex Bosnia was a delightful surprise to Aehrenthal ; and, once assured of Russia's conditional assent, he determined to carry out the project with the least possible delay. The statesmen met at Buchlau, Berchtold's castle in Bohemia, on September 15th. It was agreed that Aehrenthal should give his colleague notice before 1 See the Austrian Red-book, Diplomatische Aktenstucke betreffend Bosnien und die Hercegovtna; Friedjung, Das Zeitcdter des Imperialiances , II. 165-284; Molden, Graf Aehrenthal, pp. 39-110; Conrad von Hotzendorff, Aus meiner Dienstzeit, vol. 1. THE ANNEXATION OF BOSNIA 403 taking action ; but they afterwards differed as to the date when such action was expected1. The German and Italian Ministers were in- formed of the impending annexation, but not of its exact date. After completing his cure at Carlsbad, the Russian Minister crossed the Alps, intending to discuss coming events with Italy, France and Great Britain. The Austrian Minister, on the contrary, returned to Vienna resolved to act, and arranged with Ferdinand that he should simultaneously proclaim Bulgaria's independence of the Sultan. On October 1st, the Austrian Ambassadors to France and Italy, Great Britain and Germany, were despatched from Budapest with autograph letters from their Sovereign which they were ordered to deliver on October 5th. When he reached Paris on October 3rd, Izvolsky found a letter awaiting him from Aehrenthal, announcing that annexation would take place on October 7th. Since, however, President Fallieres was to be away on October 5th, the audience of Count Khevenhuller was fixed for October 3rd; and on that day the letter of Francis Joseph was presented. "This letter," commented the President, "announces the annexation of Bosnia. What of the independence of Bulgaria?" "It is all arranged," was the prompt, but indiscreet, reply. "Bulgaria will anticipate us by a day." When Count Mensdorff presented the Emperor's autograph letter, King Edward made no attempt to conceal his displeasure, and the Ambassador afterwards complained that he had been "turned out2." Lord Redesdale, who was staying at Balmoral when the news arrived, has described the anger of his royal friend. The King's autograph reply expressed his regret at the action taken by Austria, and reminded the Emperor of the Pact of 1871. The monarch's indignation was shared by the Press, The Times leading the hue and cry with resonant denunciations. In a speech to his constituents on October 7th, Sir Edward Grey declared that any modification of the Treaty of Berlin must be approved by another European Congress, just as Russia's repudiation of the Black Sea Clauses of 1856 had to be ratified at the London Conference of 1871, in which Austria had taken part, and which decreed that "no Power can free itself from the engagements undertaken by treaty nor modify its stipulations without consent of the Contracting Parties." "We cannot recognise the right of any State to alter any international treaty without consent, and we cannot Izvolsky 's story was told in The Fortnightly Review, September, 1909. irenthal's reply appeared in the November issue. Man hat mich fortgejagt. 26—2 4o4 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE recognise the result of any such action till the other Powers, Turkey included, have been consulted." The actual change involved in the proceedings of Austria and Bulgaria was not great ; but the manner was irregular and abrupt, and the incident was particularly deplorable at a time when Turkey was setting her house in order. " Our relations with the Government of Turkey have changed from friction and remonstrance to very deep sympathy Hatred, strife and oppression have been swept away, and have been replaced by fair-play, peace and goodwill. Never in history has there been, I think, a change more sudden and so beneficent." The British Government wished the Young Turks to have a fair chance. Any slighting of the new regime must give a military direction to a movement entirely peaceful, and plunge Macedonia and Armenia back into the deplorable state from which they had recently emerged. Turkey might rest assured that, in any revision of the Treaty of Berlin which freed Austria or Bulgaria from their obligations, her status and interests would receive full consideration. The British, French and Russian Ambassadors at Constantinople were instructed to tell the Porte that all changes in the Treaty of Berlin required the assent of all its Signatories ; and a British squadron was sent to the Aegean as a symbol of sympathy and support. On October 12th, Lord Lansdowne asked the Government for information, adding that there was a feeling of the utmost dismay in the country. Lord Fitzmaurice replied that no definite arrangements for a Conference had yet been made, and expressed a hope that the aggrieved States would indulge in no hasty action. On the following day, however, an official communique announced that the British and Russian Ministers had agreed to demand a Conference. Izvolsky had thus secured the first item of his programme ; but the second and far more important of his demands — compensation for Russia — had been refused. The Russian Minister had agreed in advance to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in return for Austrian support for the opening of the Straits. The British statesman, on the other hand, had known nothing of the conspiracy against the Treaty of Berlin; and, after denouncing its breach by Austria, he could hardly support the proposal for a further encroachment on Turkish sove- reignty. On the day of Izvolsky's arrival, The Times had roughly warned Russia "not to join in the undignified scramble, which would alienate Turkey and forfeit the goodwill of Powers with which she was on the best of possible terms." The Foreign Secretary made it GREAT BRITAIN PROTESTS 405 plain to his visitor that the question of the Straits must not be raised at the Conference ; but he accompanied his decision with a written assurance, approved by the Cabinet, that he sympathised with the object and that the veto was only temporary. On October 16th, a Foreign Office communique summarised the result of the week's discussions. A Conference was necessary, but it should be limited to questions arising out of the violation of the Treaty of Berlin. Its primary object would be to provide com- pensation for Turkey, and means might perhaps be found to meet the reasonable wishes of the smaller Balkan States, though not at Turkey's expense. " There is no intention of submitting the question of the Straits to the Conference. It is a question in which Russia and Turkey are primarily concerned, and there is no desire on Russia's part in any sense hostile to Turkey or to seek for it as compensation ; for Russia enters the Conference as one of the disinterested Powers." On the same day a semi-official Anglo-French-Russian programme for the projected Conference was issued in Paris, and Pichon expressed the hope that Europe would assert her moral unity. Of such unity, however, there were few signs. Miliukoff expressed the opinion of his countrymen when he complained that a Conference would be useless, unless it secured compensation for the Slavs. On October 13th, Biilow informed the British Government that Austria was opposed to a Conference and that Germany must support her; but, on October 22nd, Aehrenthal explained to the Delegations that Austria had no objection to a meeting, if the programme was settled in accordance with her views, and the annexation sanctioned but not discussed. At the Guildhall on November 9th, the Prime-Minister appeared in the role of "honest broker." It was a matter of indifference to Great Britain in what way a settlement was reached. "We shall urge on all parties moderation and restraint. We are entirely disinterested in the Near East. We ask nothing for ourselves. Our sole objects are to maintain the public law of Europe, to secure a fair chance for the new regime in Turkey, and to promote the adjustment of con- flicting interests." Ten days later, the Foreign Secretary reiterated the policy of the Government, and once again paid a generous tribute to the Young Turks. "A few months ago, I should have summed up the relations of Europe and Turkey by the word Despair. It has been one of the most wonderful and beneficent changes in history." We had no territorial ambitions, he added, no past injuries to rankle, no 406 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE scores to pay off. On November 23rd, MensdorfT reported a con- versation with the Foreign Secretary which revealed an approximation to the Austrian standpoint ; for, though a discussion of the annexation at the Conference could not be ruled out, an understanding might be reached before it began. He added that, if Austria reached an agreement with Turkey, Russia and Italy, Great Britain, Germany and France might accept it. If the annexation came as a shock to Great Britain, it was a staggering blow to Montenegro and Servia, who at once began to make military preparations. "My country/' lamented Milovanovich, the Servian Foreign Minister, to a Vienna journalist, "feels it almost like physical pain, so that the very soul of the people cries out." Since the accession of Peter Karageorgevich in 1903 the hope of ultimately detaching the Jugoslav provinces from the Habsburg empire by Russian aid had taken root in the country. Milovanovich, well aware that the annexation could not be reversed, set forth on a round of visits to the Chanceries to ask for a corridor to the Adriatic as a consolation prize. " Yesterday afternoon," he reported from London on October 16th1, " I was first received by Hardinge, with whom I remained for half an hour. I then accompanied him to Grey, with whom we conferred more than an hour. Both listened to me very attentively, and exhibited a very lively and sympathetic interest. As regards territorial compensation, they are doubtful of success, as Austria positively refuses assent. Are we to hold a Con- ference, observed Grey, with the prospect that Austria stands by the annexation and at the same time retains the Sanjak? I replied that they need not fear to leave this question open, for Austria would not dare to permit the present tension to continue for long. We must stick to this demand to the end, and so long as Great Britain did not abandon us, the prospect of success still remained. Great Britain's attitude will likewise encourage Turkey, who is not inclined to yield anything further. 'We must,' I exclaimed, 'prepare for the war which is inevitable in the near future, if they refuse us this compensation.' In reply, Grey and Hardinge promised that they would persist in supporting our territorial compensation demand so long as Russia should give it her support. The entire Press sympathises greatly with Servia." An even warmer welcome awaited Prince George and Pasitch at Petrograd. "The Tsar," reported the latter, "expressed great sym- pathy for Servia, but advised a quiet line of conduct, as our cause was just but our preparations were weak." 1 Bogitshevich, Causes of the War, p. no. EXCITEMENT IN SERVIA 407 Autumn passed into winter with Europe in turmoil, though no State cared or dared to challenge Austria to ordeal by battle1. The hysterics of Belgrade aroused the contemptuous anger of Vienna, and the fiery Chief of the Staff, Conrad von Hotzendorff, urged summary chastisement. When the new year dawned, the idea of a conference was already fading away. Austria declined to attend without a pre- liminary agreement and unless a discussion of the annexation were ruled out; and, if her actions were to be condoned in advance, it seemed futile to bring the Powers together in solemn conclave. There were, however, three urgent problems to be liquidated — the relations of Austria to Turkey, the relations of Bulgaria to Turkey, and the relations of Servia to Austria; and all three were solved without bloodshed before Easter. Aehrenthal had argued that the withdrawal of the garrisons from the sanjak formed an adequate compensation to Turkey for the loss of her shadowy rights over Bosnia and Herzegovina ; but the Turkish boycott of Austrian goods and the desire to diminish the number of his opponents finally persuaded him to add a financial solatium. The news that Austria would pay two-and-a-half millions for the loss of Crown property in the annexed provinces was hailed by Sir Edward Grey as "the first blue sky." British sympathy with the Turkish reformers, he added, was unabated, and the wisdom of Kiamil received the tribute that it deserved. The relief was increased when Bulgaria's offence against Turkish sovereignty was purged by a covenant to pay five millions for her share of the Oriental railways ; and the transaction was arranged by Russia's redeeming the Turkish indemnity of 1878 by a similar amount. In Aehrenthal's opinion, the Suzerain's acceptance of the annexa- tion ought to carry the assent of less directly interested States ; but this view was not shared by Servia. The Powers, however, endeavoured to build a bridge for her retreat2. Sir Edward Grey promised the Russian Government diplomatic aid in securing compensation for Servia and Montenegro, adding that Servia's claims must in the interest of peace be reduced to a minimum. "The British Govern- ment," telegraphed Benckendorff on February 24th, "quite realises the danger of the situation. Despite the earnest wish to help Servia, it is aware that without war it is impossible to procure more than 1 In private, Izvolsky freely vented his anger. "Aehrenthal is not a gentleman," he cried. Szilassy, Der Untergang der Donaumonarckie , p. 194. 2 See Siebert, Diplomatische Aktenstticke, ch. 1. 4o8 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE economic concessions." This cautious realism was shared by the French Government; and the pressure of London and Paris was reflected in Izvolsky's advice to Belgrade. Servia replied that she demanded from Austria no territorial, political or economic com- pensations. If, however, the Powers were to deal with the questions arising from the new situation, she would explain her standpoint before their tribunal. She was ready to cancel her military prepara- tions, if Austria would do the same, or if the Powers would guarantee her against attack. This reply satisfied Izvolsky, subject to the omission of the reference to military preparations and other minor changes; and Sir Edward Grey promptly approved his alterations, which Belgrade was advised to incorporate in her forthcoming Circular Note to the Powers. Meanwhile, on March 5th, the situation was complicated by a Note from Aehrenthal requiring from Servia a direct assurance of a change of attitude, and a recognition of the annexation. " No Serbian Government could accept this," telegraphed Izvolsky to Bencken- dorff ; and Sir Edward Grey agreed that Servia could not recognise the annexation before the Powers. The Servian reply to the demarche of the Powers, when it came on March 10th, was less satisfactory than had been expected. " Servia, considering that her juridical relation to Austria remains normal, has no desire to provoke a war nor to modify her legal relations, continuing to fulfil, on the basis of reciprocity, her duties as a good neighbour. Assuming the Bosnian question to be a European question, and that it belongs to the Signatories of the Treaty of Berlin to settle the question and to decide the new version of Article XXV, Servia, confiding in the wisdom and equity of the Powers, remits her cause to them without reserve, and claims no territorial, political or economic compensation." Aehrenthal replied that this was not an answer to his Note of March 5th, though it indicated improvement. Sir Edward Grey confided to MensdorfT that the Note to the Powers was approved by none of them. Servia, he added, could have replied that she would recognise any modification of the Berlin Treaty sanctioned by the Powers, would maintain neighbourly relations with Austria, would not encourage disturbances on Austrian territory, and was ready to discuss a com- mercial treaty. Sir F. Cartwright informed Aehrenthal that the British Government disapproved the reply, and that our Minister in Belgrade was instructed to support Russian attempts to persuade Servia to yield, and to present a formula like that suggested to MensdorfT. Aehrenthal replied that such a formula was insufficient GERMAN PRESSURE AT PETROGRAD 409 without a reference to disarmament. The Ambassador, accordingly, asked him to suggest a formula, and on March 19th it was ready: "Servia recognises that her rights have not been infringed. She abandons the attitude of protest and engages to change the direction of her policy towards Austria and to live on neighbourly terms. In conformity with her pacific declarations, she will reduce her army to the standard of the spring of 1908." Having persuaded Aehrenthal to accept some minor changes, Cartwright undertook to propose that the Powers should assure Austria in writing that they would sanction the Constantinople Protocol at the forthcoming Conference. With Aehrenthal and Cartwright in agreement, the solution of the crisis seemed within grasp ; but it was not to end without a final alarm. On March 17th, the German Ambassador informed Izvolsky that Biilow was ready to suggest that Aehrenthal should acquaint the Powers with Turkey's sanction of the annexation; and, if Russia approved, Germany, perhaps in association with Russia, would propose to the Powers to recognise it in an exchange of Notes, thus fulfilling Russia's wish for a European sanction. Izvolsky thanked Pourtales for his friendly communication, but remarked that it appeared to negative a Conference, to deliver Servia into Austrian hands, and to relieve Austria of the necessity of solving the other problems. He promptly telegraphed the news to London and Paris, adding that he might accept the offer in principle, with a guarantee for the meeting of the Conference. Sir Edward Grey replied that the proposal was obviously inspired by Vienna ; that the Conference was by implication shelved ; that, if Russia was willing to dispense with a Conference, Great Britain would content herself with an exchange of Notes; and that Russia ought to postpone her reply till the latest Austro- Servian crisis was ended. On March 23 rd, after six days had elapsed without a response to the German proposal, Biilow applied what he asserted to be gentle pressure, but what was regarded throughout the world as something closely resembling an ultimatum1. 11 The German Government is glad to note that the Russian Government recognises the friendly spirit of Germany's step, and that the Powers seem 1 Schon declares the story of an ultimatum to be a legend. " It was not an ultimatum but a proposal for mediation," echoes Jagow, "which Izvolsky welcomed as an escape from a cul-de-sac. His assistant, Tcharikoff, observed that Germany had rendered Russia a great service," p. 17. Kiderlen-Wachter, however, then Acting Foreign Minister, boasted to Take Jonescu that he alone framed the ultimatum. " I knew Russia was not ready for war. Schon would never have dared to do it." Take Jonescu, Personal Impressions, p. 58. 410 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE inclined to accept the proposal. It is ready to suggest to the Vienna Cabinet to invite the Powers, while notifying them of the Austro-Turkish Agreement, to assent formally to the cancelling of Article XXV of the Berlin Treaty. Before doing so, however, it wishes to be sure that the Russian Cabinet is ready to accept the Austrian proposal and to give its unconditional consent. It expects a precise answer, Yes or No, and any ambiguous reply would be regarded as a refusal. We should then withdraw and allow things to take their course. The responsibility for subsequent events would rest exclusively on Izvolsky1." After consulting the Tsar, Izvolsky replied that, if Austria invited the Powers to assent to the cancelling of Article XXV, the Russian Government would declare its formal and unconditional acceptance. In reporting the incident to London and Paris, Izvolsky explained that refusal was impossible, since it would have involved an Austrian invasion of Servia. Biilow promptly instructed his Ambassadors to invite Rome, Paris and London to follow the example of Petrograd. Italy at once accepted. France replied that she would accept, but hoped that Austria would postpone her request till the Austro- Servian conflict was ended. Downing Street was more intractable. Sir Arthur Nicolson had informed Pourtales of its being by no means certain that the British Government would follow the Russian lead, and he complained to Izvolsky that he had yielded without consulting his friends. On March 25th, WolfT-Metternich expressed the hope that Sir Edward Grey would follow the example of Russia. The Foreign Secretary was angered by the threat from Petrograd, and scented a similar menace in the enquiry. He replied that the Servian question must be settled by discussion, refused to give the required assurance, and handed to the Ambassador a Memorandum embodying this reply. Wolff-Metternich rejoined that his answer created a very serious situation, and that Great Britain alone stood out. Sir Edward replied that he was not aware that all the Powers had assented, and that the recognition of annexation must follow, not precede, an Austro-Servian settlement. The Foreign Secretary went calmly on with his search for a formula. He had accepted the Cartwright- Aehrenthal formula with modifications, which Aehrenthal rejected; and Aehrenthal in turn made some trifling changes. On March 27th, he approved the Note in its final form, and announced that when Servia had despatched it and Austria had accepted it, he would 1 This important despatch is printed in Hammann, Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit, pp. 155-156. THE TSAR AT CO WES 411 recognise the abrogation of Article XXV, if invited to do so. If Servia refused, he would none the less assent, if all the Signatories would do the same. This undertaking was conditional on the execution of Aehrenthal's verbal assurances that he would accept modifications of Article XXIX of the Treaty of Berlin concerning Montenegro. On March 3 1 st, the Servian Minister brought to the Ballplatz his country's formal surrender. The Triple Entente now complied with a request to accept the abrogation of Article XXV, Austria for her part sur- rendering the right to police Montenegrin waters. The course pursued by the British Government in the Bosnian crisis was sharply challenged by Sir Charles Dilke on the Foreign Office vote1. The title of Great Britain and Russia to remonstrate, he argued, was singularly weak. The Treaty of Berlin had been violated over and over again, by Turkey no less than by the Powers. The nominal reservation of Turkish sovereignty should not be taken too seriously in the case> of Bosnia, any more than those of Cyprus and the Sudan ; and the annexation of Eastern Roumelia by Bulgaria had won our approval and support. Nobody imagined that Austria was entrusted with a purely temporary occupation of the provinces, which she had actually taken over on the proposal of Great Britain herself. Moreover, we were not sufficiently interested to make it wise for us to play a leading part in the game, or to allow Russia to force us too far in the direction of an interference certain to encounter resistance and doomed to failure. Sir Edward Grey rejoined that the best way to keep peace was to stand by public engagements. We held to the Declaration of 1871, and we should have raised the same protest against any other Power. Austria's action had been against the public law of Europe, and struck a damaging blow at the prestige of Turkey. Our intervention had been far from fruitless. Was it certain that, if we had taken a less decided line, the compensation for Turkey would have been so peacefully arranged? Partly as the result of our action, patience, restraint and commonsense had prevailed and a peaceful settlement was secured. After this debate Anglo- Austrian relations gradually resumed their traditional friendliness. A meeting between the monarchs at Ischl was frustrated by Aehrenthal; but during King Edward's last visit to Marienbad in August, 1909, courteous telegraphic greetings were exchanged. The close association of British and Russian policy throughout the Bosnian crisis had not diminished the hostility of Radical and Labour 1 July 22nd, 1909. 412 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE circles to the Tsarist autocracy; and the Chairman of the Labour Party seized the opportunity to protest against the Tsar's approaching visit to Cowes. " It is a policy repulsive to multitudes of our people," declared Mr Henderson. "Thirteen months ago we were told that the visit to Reval would exercise a salutary influence on official Russia. There is no sign of any such improvement. We are not interfering in Russia's internal affairs ; we are concerned with the attitude of our own Government." The Foreign Secretary replied that his critic placed the Government in an impossible position. "He reads out certain statements about the internal condition of a foreign country in regard to which we have no treaty rights or obligations, and he challenges the Government to disprove them. It is not our business to know what passes in other countries, and even if we do know we cannot discuss it. I am asked to prove that the visit to Reval had a beneficial effect on internal affairs in Russia. If it were the case, I would not say so. I do not accept the figures. All I have seen goes to show that his account is not true or fair. I ask the House to drop dealing with the internal affairs of foreign countries; but if they insist, they should bring out the whole of the case. We have lately had an unofficial visit of members of the Duma. The Tsar who is going to pay us a visit will be remembered in history as the Sovereign who granted Constitutional Government. On behalf of the Government we welcome him as the head of a great State with whom and with whose people we desire to be on friendly terms. What the two Governments have done is beginning to have a most bene- ficial influence on the feelings of the two peoples. I am sure the House will not by an act of marked discourtesy undo the good work which has been done." The confidence of the Foreign Secretary was justified ; for, whenever the Left wing of the ministerial majority became restive at the conduct of Foreign Affairs, the Opposition rallied to his support. IV. Persia, 1906-1911 The growing intimacy between the British and Russian Govern- ments aroused disapprobation in certain circles — not only on account of "the Terror," as it was styled by Prince Kropotkin in a widely- read booklet, but because it appeared to range Great Britain against the cause of Persian nationalism. Sir Edward Grey was by no means without sympathy for the aspirations of Persia; but the governing principle of his Persian policy was the necessity of retaining the friendship of Russia, on which he relied in an increasing degree as the tension with Germany grew. PERSIA RECEIVES A CONSTITUTION 413 The history of Persia since the accession of MozafTer-ed-Din in 1890 is one of increasing degradation, which in turn led to the awakening of national self-consciousness1. The Shah squandered his country's slender resources in costly journeys to Europe, and the gradual mortgaging of the country to Russia gave rise to great indignation. In 1906 about 13,000 citizens of Teheran took "bast" in the grounds of the British Legation in support of the demand for a Mejliss or Parliament, which the Shah reluctantly granted. From the beginning, the Russian colony in Persia looked askance at the Constitutional movement, while the sympathies of the British Repre- sentative were openly avowed. When Mohammed Ali, who succeeded his father soon after the grant of a Constitution, struggled against the financial reforms of the Mejliss and the abolition of sinecures, Mr Spring- Rice bluntly told him that he was surrounded by evil influ- ences, and that he must come to an amicable arrangement with the reformers. While the Mejliss was hewing its way through the jungle of corruption, news of the Anglo-Russian Convention reached the capital. The Treaty was viewed with apprehension by the Persian Nationalists, whose feelings were depicted in a cartoon in Punch , in which the British lion and the Russian bear are mauling a Persian cat. The lion remarks, "You can play with his head, and I can play with his tail, and we can both stroke the small of his back." The cat moans: "I don't remember having been consulted about this." Though Teheran had not been consulted, Sir Edward Grey instructed Mr Spring-Rice to propose to his Russian colleague an identic com- munication in the following terms. " Desiring to avoid any cause of conflict between their respective interests in regions, on the one hand, contiguous with or in the neighbourhood of the Russian frontier, and, on the other, of the frontier of Beluchistan and Afghanistan, the Governments of Great Britain and Russia have signed a friendly Agreement. The two Governments mutually agree to the strict independence and integrity of Persia, and testify that they sincerely desire, not only the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the industry and commerce of all nations, but also the pacific development of that country. Each binds itself to seek no concession in regions conterminous with or in the neighbourhood of the frontier of the other. The above- mentioned regions are clearly defined, in order that future misunder- standings may be avoided, and to avoid a state of things which might 1 This section is based on the Blue-books, which are very numerous. Cf. Professor E. G. Browne, The Persian Revolution; and David Fraser, Persia and Turkey in Revolt. 4H TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE embarrass the Persian Government. The two States, in signing the Agree- ment, steadfastly kept the fundamental principle in view that the inde- pendence and integrity of Persia should be respected absolutely. The sole object of the arrangement is the avoidance of any cause of misunderstanding between the contracting Powers. The Shah's Government will be con- vinced that the Agreement cannot fail to promote the prosperity, security and ulterior development of Persia in the most efficacious manner." The Memorandum, with a few minor changes, was presented by the British and Russian Ministers on September nth1. In addition to the official communication, the British Minister wrote a reassuring letter to the Persian Foreign Minister on Septem- ber 5th2. "Information has reached me that it is rumoured in Persia that an Agreement has been concluded between England and Russia which will result in the intervention of these two Powers in Persia, and the partition of that country between them. Your Excellency is well aware that the negotiations between Russia and England are of a wholly different char- acter They have no sort of intention of attacking Persia's independence, which it is their object in concluding this Agreement to ensure for ever. Not only do they not seek a pretext for intervention ; but their aim in these friendly negotiations is not to permit one another to intervene in Persia on the pretext of safeguarding their own interests. The two Powers hope that in the future Persia will be for ever delivered from the fear of foreign intervention, and will enjoy complete freedom to manage her affairs in her own way." For some time the two Powers loyally fulfilled their pledges ; but the Shah smarted at the loss of his authority, and feared the activity of the Anjumans, or political secret societies. "There is now in Persia an intense feeling of patriotism," reported Mr Spring- Rice on September 13th, 1907. The first conflict arose in December, when, in reply to a demand by the Mejliss for the dismissal of his reactionary advisers, the Shah arrested his Ministers. The news was brought to the British Legation by a servant of the Premier, Nasr-ul-Mulk. The Oriental Secretary of the British Legation, Mr H. L. Churchill, galloped to the palace to save their lives; and the Shah, professing that they were never in danger, liberated his prisoners. The timid Nasr-ul-Mulk hurried off on the following morning towards Europe, shepherded by guards from the British Legation; but the Shah's nerve failed him, and after five days, during which the Parliament 1 Published as a White Paper, Persia, No. i, 1912. 2 Abridged. The letter was published on September 14th in a Teheran news- paper and may be read in Browne, pp. 90-2. It does not appear in the Blue-books, and remained unknown to Sir Edward Grey till 191 1. THE SHAH'S COUP D'tiTAT 415 House was defended by National Volunteers, he promised to dismiss his counsellors. The British and Russian Ministers asked him to declare that he had no hostile designs against the Constitution; and the monarch obediently replied that he had none. The failure of the coup was hailed with satisfaction both in London and Petrograd. "At the New Year's reception," reported Sir Arthur Nicolson, " I told the Tsar that the British Government were much gratified by the cordial cooperation during the crisis; to which the Tsar rejoined, 'I too'." The brief crisis intensified the enmity between the Shah and the reformers, and shortly afterwards a bomb was thrown at his motor- car. The Constitutionalists affirmed that the outrage was staged by the reactionaries; and, on June 1st, 1908, the Mejliss secured the eviction of six more reactionary courtiers. Next day the Russian Minister and the British Charge d'affaires visited the Foreign Minister, to warn him of the consequences if anything happened to the Shah. "His life is in danger," declared Hartwig, the Russian Minister, "the Nationalists wish to depose him. This we cannot allow. If it occurs, Russia will intervene with British approval." The warning having been endorsed by the British Charge d'affaires, the Foreign Minister reported the conversation to the President of the Mejliss. Early on the following morning, the Shah, guarded by Colonel Liakhoff and the Cossack brigade, fled to his country palace. Russian sympathies, at both Petrograd and Teheran, were now openly on the side of the Shah, and it was commonly believed that on this occasion it was the hand of Hartwig which had pulled the strings. But Sir Edward Grey declined to accept the Russian proposal of a joint declaration to maintain the dynasty. "Tell Izvolsky," he telegraphed to Sir A. Nicolson, " that I strongly deprecate any action which might have the appearance of intervening in internal affairs. I am convinced the best course is to limit our action; otherwise we may become burdened with the responsibility of maintaining an unpopular Government." A few days later, the Parliament House and the chief Mosque were bombarded by Liakhoff, who was appointed Military Governor of Teheran. In reply to his critics, Sir Edward Grey observed that Liakhoff was in the Persian service, and that Russia was not responsible for his actions. When Sir A. Nicolson suggested that these officers should be withdrawn for a time, Izvolsky answered that this would be hazardous ; but he added that Liakhoff had acted without the knowledge and approval of the Russian Government. The Mejliss had committed errors, for it was necessarily inex- 416 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE perienced ; but it had begun to reform the finances, and had produced the first budget that Persia had ever seen. "A large proportion, probably a majority of the members," declares Professor Browne, "were animated by patriotic and public spirit." Even Mr Donald Fraser, who thinks the Mejliss on the whole a failure, admits that the Constitutional movement had attracted all the best men. The news- papers, which had sprung up to the number of about one hundred, disappeared. The Constitutional leaders who were not caught took "bast" at the British Legation, which was promptly invested by the Government troops. When the Shah telegraphed to King Edward to protest against his Representative inviting the rebels to take "bast," the King denied the accusation and peremptorily ordered the with- drawal of the troops. On September ist an Anglo-Russian Note urged the Shah to con- vene the Mejliss in November; but he replied that it was impossible till order was restored in Tabriz. A week or two later, he promised a Constitution, though he had no intention of again putting his neck under the yoke. " Anglo- Russian exhortations were useless," writes Mr Fraser, " because the Russian Minister gave one counsel to the Shah in public and a totally different one in private. Jointly and publicly the two Representatives urged conciliation, singly and secretly Hartwig advised obstruction. In December, 1907, the Shah acted alone; in June, 1908, he succeeded because he had Russian support. The real victor was Hartwig, the vanquished were the British. He could not conceal his satisfaction, and his manners became insufferably patronising. It was with his cognisance that the Legation was picketed, and British prestige fell to zero." Hartwig's performances were too much for Izvolsky, who recalled him to Petrograd, though he retained the title of Minister till another post became vacant, and his family remained in the Legation. His place was taken by M. Sablin as Charge d'affaires, who worked loyally with Sir George Barclay, the new British Minister. At this dark moment in the fortunes of Persia, the Persia Committee was founded by British friends of the reformers, led by Professor E. G. Browne and Mr H. F. B. Lynch. Though the Shah was triumphant in Teheran, the Constitu- tionalists held their ground in Tabriz, the second city in the country. Neither side showed much fight; but, early in February, 1909, after seven months, the city was completely isolated. Russian troops were held in readiness at Julfa, on the frontier, and Petrograd desired to meet the Shah's wish for a loan. OVERTHROW OF THE SHAH 417 " I should prefer to stand aloof, "answered Sir Edward Grey on February 3rd, "and let the chaos go on till the strongest wins. But, if Russia differs, I will cooperate. If a Constitution is granted, tranquillity will be restored over the whole country. The Shah should therefore be urged to fulfil his promises by a certain date. We should not consent to a loan till an elected Mejliss has approved it; for at the present time it would be a demonstration against the Constitutionalists." The two statesmen continued to differ. Izvolsky complained to Sir A. Nicolson that he could not understand our objection to providing a fund for starting a workable Government, or our insistence on the consent of the Mejliss, for Persia was now penniless. "If Russia likes to advance her half of the loan now," rejoined Sir Edward, "we will give ours when the whole loan is sanctioned." As the spring advanced, the British Government became alarmed for the safety of the Europeans in Tabriz, and on March 26th Russian troops marched in from Julfa and raised the siege. By a curious irony, the complete triumph of the Royalist cause had been frustrated at the eleventh hour by the action of Russia; and Sir Edward Grey resolved to profit by the situation. At his suggestion, the British and Russian Ministers urged the Shah to dismiss his reactionary advisers, restore the Constitution, appoint a new Cabinet, proclaim an amnesty, and fix dates for the elections and the opening of a new Mejliss. When these steps had been taken, Russia might lend £100,000 and Great Britain might follow suit later. The Shah obediently fixed the date of the elections and accepted a Cabinet constructed with Anglo- Russian advice, whereupon Sir Edward announced that if the Nation- alists were not satisfied with this surrender he could make no further efforts on their behalf. They had, however, no confidence in their ruler, and hardly was the ink of the new proclamation dry when the Baktiari chiefs began to march north. During the siege of Tabriz the Nationalists in Ispahan, aided by Baktiari chiefs, had overthrown the hated Governor, expelled the garrison, and convened a local assembly. Resht now followed suit in the north. The Royalist Governor was killed, and the Sipahdar, who had changed sides, assumed nominal control, though the moving spirit was the Armenian soldier, Ephrem. The advance on the capital from north and south proceeded simul- taneously, the Sipahdar marching to Kazvin, ninety miles from Teheran. " Intervention must be avoided," telegraphed Sir Edward to Sir George Barclay, "but efforts should be made to persuade Sardar Assad to abandon his advance, and you should explain to him the reforms proposed by the two Governments." The warnings w.&g. in 27 4i 8 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE produced no effect, and the Russians began to become restless. " I told Benckendorff today," telegraphed Sir Edward to Petrograd on June 30th, "that the less interference the better. If a Russian force occu- pied Teheran, all Persians would consider that the Shah depended on Russian support alone, and all the rest of the country would disown his Government and break it up. Any great disaster can, I think, be prevented by the Persian Cossacks." Russia accordingly despatched troops to Kazvin, with orders not to enter the capital unless foreigners were in danger. Sardar Assad, the Baktiari leader, and the Sipahdar met outside the capital, and after a skirmish entered Teheran on July 13th. The Shah sought refuge in the Russian Legation, the Sipahdar became Minister of War, and the valiant Ephrem was appointed Chief of Police. The Nationalist leaders and the members of the Mejliss met to depose the Shah, and chose his son, a lad of twelve, under a Regency. The ex-Shah left for Odessa, his pension being fixed at £ 16,000, which was to lapse if the British and Russian Representatives in Persia were convinced that he was intriguing against the Govern- ment. The new Mejliss opened in November, and the newspapers reappeared. The Government found a guide, philosopher and friend in Sir George Barclay, who was loyally supported by Sablin. When the Shah had been happily overthrown, Sir Edward Grey turned his attention to the Russian troops, of which 4000 were in Teheran, 1700 in Kazvin, and a smaller number in Ardebil. He had repeatedly warned Benckendorff and Izvolsky not to make Russia unpopular in Persia or at Westminster by what looked like a per- manent occupation, and he renewed his advice when the Russian Foreign Minister accompanied the Tsar to Cowes1. Izvolsky replied that he was anxious to withdraw them, but that it was difficult to remove the troops from Tabriz till security was guaranteed, or from Kazvin while the situation at Teheran was so uncertain. The Tabriz force, however, was shortly halved; but the garrison remained at Kazvin, though Sir George Barclay reported the road to the coast safe and the capital quiet. The British Government had taken no similar steps in the south. In March, gunboats were sent to Bushire and Bunder Abbas to protect foreigners in the event of disturbances, and, in July, after an attack on the British Representative, the Con- sular Guard at Shiraz was reinforced. British trade, however, suffered from the increasing anarchy. After waiting with exemplary and un- 1 Siebert, Diplomatische Aktenstucke, pp. 169-70. MR SHUSTER ARRIVES 419 rewarded patience for the restored Government to assert itself, Sir Edward sent an ultimatum to Teheran on October 14th, 19 10, on the state of the southern roads. Unless within three months order was restored on the road from Bushire to Ispahan, Great Britain would police it. The threat, however, was never carried out, and we loyally supported the Swedish gendarmerie, to whom the task of restoring order was committed by the Persian Government. The root of Persia's maladies lay in finance ; and on December 25th, 1910, President Taft was asked to select a Treasurer-General, with four assistants, for three years. Neither the British nor the Russian Government raised any objection, though the latter dis- approved the step, and on May 12th, 191 1, Mr Shuster entered Teheran1. The Regent, Nasr-ul-Mulk, an Oxford graduate, now returned from Europe, and the Russian troops were at length with- drawn from Kazvin. It seemed as if at last a brighter day was to dawn. Mr Shuster perceived from the outset that he must take a firm line against native and foreign enemies of reform, and, on June 13th, he obtained full powers over finance from the Mejliss. " Shuster has apparently created a great impression on the Persians," reported Sir George Barclay, "and the unanimity with which all parties have given him the full powers for which he has asked proves that they repose the utmost confidence in him. He has let it be widely known that if he finds obstacles placed in his way by any person or persons, he will denounce them to the Mejliss, and if he cannot remove their obstruction he will return. " Mr Shuster had, on his voyage across the Altantic, read the Blue- books and the writings of Professor Browne, and he knew that he would have to meet the hostility of Russia. The first round of the match was not long delayed. For collecting the revenue a Treasury Gendarmerie was required ; and in Major Stokes, now near the end of his four years' service as Military Attache, he found the man whom he needed. Sir George Barclay, on being consulted, replied that the Major would have to resign his commission in the Indian army. Sir Edward Grey referred the matter to Petrograd before replying, and Sir George Buchanan reported the result. The Acting-Minister (Neratoff) did not object to the gendarmerie; but it must be under one officer, preferably the subject of a smaller Power I pointed out that it might be very difficult to secure the right man, and that Stokes seemed eminently qualified; to which Neratoff rejoined, "A Swede would do." 1 Mr Shuster has told his own story in The Strangling of Persia (191 2). 27 — 2 420 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE Sir Edward, accordingly, telegraphed to Teheran on July 13th, " Would a Swedish officer do to command the Treasury gendarmerie ?" Mr Shuster replied that Stokes was the best man, and that a Swede would have to spend a year or more before he could be any real use. Sir Edward Grey was convinced, and, on July 21st, he telegraphed to Teheran: "Before Stokes accepts command, he must resign his commission in the Indian army." The Russian partner in the firm took a very different view of the matter. " Benckendorff ," reported Sir Edward Grey to Sir George Buchanan, "spoke with great anxiety lest Stokes might take part in military operations, when perhaps Russian officers might be on the other side. I agreed that it was undesirable he should do so." The Foreign Secretary informed Teheran that Major Stokes had been appointed without consulting Great Britain; that his employment in the North might involve political difficulties, and that he could not deprecate Russian objections to it. Sir George Buchanan reported that the Russian Press was now thoroughly excited. "We cannot prevent Stokes serving Persia," replied Sir Edward Grey, "but Russia is entitled to object to his employ in the North." The Foreign Secretary had now completely adopted the Russian standpoint. "Warn Persia to drop Stokes unless they intend not to employ him in the North," he telegraphed to Teheran. A few days later, the Persian Government was informed that we could not accept Stokes' resignation of his rank in the Indian army. While the Stokes crisis was running its course, a formidable danger threatened the Constitutional regime in Persia. In January, 191 1, Sir Francis Bertie, the British Ambassador at Paris, was informed by his Persian colleague that the ex-Shah had been there, and that he would probably attempt to regain the Throne. Sir Edward promptly warned SazonofT, but no precautions were taken, and on July 18th the ex- Shah landed in North Persia from a Russian steamer. Sir Edward Grey was for once thoroughly roused. "I do not see how we or Russia can acquiesce in his return," he telegraphed to Sir G. Buchanan. "Ask if she will notify him that under no circumstances can his return be allowed. We will gladly join." Neratoff replied that there was now a new situation. The ex- Shah had burnt his boats and must pursue his enterprise to the bitter end. It was useless to make any communication to him, as he would take no notice. The British proposal of a joint veto was finally whittled down to a colour- less communication. "As the ex-Shah has returned, contrary to advice repeatedly given by the British and Russian Governments to MR SHUSTER EXPELLED 421 abstain from any intrigue in Persia, they recognise that he has for- feited his pension. Since, however, he is in Persian territory, they cannot interfere." On August nth the Russian Minister declared that the ex-Shah would soon be in Teheran; but the situation was saved at the eleventh hour by Ephrem, who defeated the rebels forty miles from the capital. No sooner was this danger over than a new crisis arose. The estates of a brother of the ex-Shah having been confiscated by the Government, Mr Shuster was ordered to transfer the property to the Treasury. On proceeding to seize the palace in Teheran, his agents were driven off by officers of the Russian Consulate and armed Cossacks. "I therefore told the Russian Minister," relates Mr Shuster, "that I should send next day to take possession, and my assistant did so with one hundred gendarmes. A lying report was sent to Petrograd by the Consul." At the same time, Russia protested against the despatch of Mr LecofTre, a British subject, to Tabriz to inspect the finances, though he had long worked in Teheran, which was also in the Russian sphere of influence. Mr Shuster could no longer control his indignation, and in interviews taxed the Russian and British Governments with unfriendliness to reform. When The Times declared the charge unfounded, he drew up an Open Letter, which was printed in that journal on November 10th and nth. Russia's opportunity had now come. The Russian Minister demanded the withdrawal of the Treasury gendarmes from the park of the ex-Shah's brother and an apology for the "insult" to the Consul. Sir Edward Grey advised Teheran to tender the required apology, for these incidents had convinced him that Mr Shuster must go. He informed Petrograd that he would not oppose a demand for his dismissal, adding that he had given him endless trouble by his appointment of British subjects. On November 18th, the Russian Legation announced the rupture of diplomatic relations, since the demands had not been accepted. The Persian Cabinet now ordered Mr Shuster to withdraw his gendarmes, and the Foreign Minister apologised to the Russian Minister "for the affront to the Consular officers." The drama in Teheran was witnessed with indignation by the British friends of Persian reform. It had been the policy of Russia, cried Mr Dillon, to make the government of Persia impossible, so as to have an excuse to come in ; and Great Britain had condoned every step she had taken. Russian actions made the regeneration of Persia 422 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE almost impossible, echoed Lord Ronaldshay from the Conservative benches. Persia ought to have a fair chance. The Foreign Secretary opened his reply by reminding his hearers of the Anglo- Russian Convention. " Its object was to prevent the two nations mining and countermining against each other, and to end the constant friction; and it has done so. Both have loyally observed the bond. If it were upset, we should have large problems in place of these small problems. I am quite certain that Mr Sinister set about his task with ability and good intentions. He had no political axe to grind, and he was quite innocent of any political intrigue. But he took no account of the peculiar political considerations which underlie the Anglo-Russian Agreement.. . .How can I, with the best intentions in the world, promote a settlement when there is an official publicly making attacks on the Russian Government? The independence of Persia must take account of the interests of her neighbours, and her hostility to Russia is unjustified by facts. If the Russian officers in Teheran had intervened on behalf of the ex-Shah, he would never have been turned out. But the Persian Government, having got rid of the Shah, determined to get rid of Russian influence in Persia. That was a perfectly hopeless policy to adopt Having got rid of the Shah, Persia ought at once to have assumed a friendly spirit towards Russia, and, had they done so, I believe things would have worked well. Without the Anglo- Russian Agree- ment the independence of Persia would have been infinitely more threatened than today, and the relations of England and Russia imperilled." On November 29th, two days after this debate, Russia launched a second ultimatum, demanding within forty-eight hours the dis- missal of Mr Shuster and Mr Lecoffre; a pledge to engage no foreigners without the consent of the Russian and British Legations ; and payment for the troops now on the march. Mr Shuster was consulted and advised submission. The Cabinet yielded; but the Mejliss, helpless though it was, unanimously refused, and was dis- solved. The eight months of Mr Shuster's Mission were at an end; and when he drove northwards to the Caspian Persia lost the best friend she possessed. " I am very glad that M. Neratoff approves my speech," wrote Sir Edward Grey on December 1st. " But I am much concerned at the new development in Persia. There are apparently to be new demands. If Russia were compelled to apply force to secure acceptance of the three new demands, it would be a great pity." Next day, BenckendorfT visited the Foreign Office, and found the Foreign Secretary in very serious mood1. He regretted the new demands, especially that for compensation. If cooperation in Persia 1 Siebert, Diplomatische Aktenstiicke, pp. 239-44. BRITISH POLICY IN PERSIA 423 ceased, he argued, it would mean the breach of the entente and a new orientation of British policy, which would occur on the day when he informed Parliament that complete agreement no longer existed. In that case he must resign, as he could not strike out the new line of policy which would become inevitable. The Ambassador reported that he had never seen the Foreign Secretary so disturbed, a verdict that was confirmed by the French Ambassador. " To main- tain the Entente in England," added Benckendorff, "we must assure him that we will observe the Convention ; otherwise it is certain that he will resign." When the debate was resumed on December 14th, the situation was easier, and the Foreign Secretary defined his attitude to the new demands. He could not object to the dismissal of Mr Shuster. " I quite admit his ability and his good intentions ; but you cannot have the spirit of the Anglo- Russian Agreement upset and two great nations embroiled by the action of any individual." Nor could he object to the demand that the British and Russian Legations should be consulted in the appointment of foreign advisers. The demand for the indemnity, on the other hand, would doubtless be withdrawn. His own Persian policy was summarised in six points which he had presented to Russia: 1. A Government that will conform to the principles of 1907. 2. The exclusion of the ex-Shah. 3. The selection of a financial adviser acceptable to both Powers 4. A loan to restore order. 5. An indemnity not to be pressed. 6. Russian troops to withdraw when Russian demands are com- plied with and order restored in the North. Sir Edward Grey's Persian policy from beginning to end was non-intervention and friendship with Russia; and, if the two objects clashed, the former had to yield. "If the Persian question was mis- managed," he argued, "the Persian question might disappear, and bigger issues would arise." It was this conviction which governed his action in the Shuster crisis, and it was this subordination of purely Persian interests to the demands of the European situation which divided him from his critics. "The Foreign Secretary," complained Mr Ponsonby bitterly, "always seemed to consider what Russia thought and to disregard the feelings of Persia. I, too, am for observing the spirit of the Convention of 1907; but Russia has broken it. Sir Edward does not sufficiently take into account 424 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE that Persia is trying to work out her own salvation. We are playing second riddle to Russia. We complain of Agadir, but not of Fez, Tripoli or Kazvin." As a matter of fact he did complain of Kazvin ; but Petrograd was never afraid of British protests. "The English, " wrote SazonofF in a revealing letter to the Russian Minister in Teheran on October 8th, 1 9 10, "pursuing as they do vital aims in Europe, will if necessary sacrifice certain interests in Asia in order to maintain the Convention with us. These circumstances we can naturally turn to our own advantage, for instance in our Persian policy V When Mr Shuster had gone, Anglo-Russian harmony was not again disturbed, for Persia ceased to struggle against the chains which bound her to her two formidable guardians. V. The Congo Again, 1907-19 13 Among the lesser, though not less difficult, tasks of the Cabinet was the campaign for reform in the Congo Free State2. British opinion had demanded its cession to Belgium; but the Fondation de la Couronne was maintained with all its privileges intact and its profits secured to the Royal Family, and the acquired rights of third parties were likewise preserved. The Draft Treaty of November 18th, 1907, aroused astonishment within and without Belgium. "My Government are fully aware of the great anxiety felt with regard to the treatment of natives ": so ran the King's Speech at Westminster on January 29th, 1908. " Their sole desire is to see the Government of that State humanely admin- istered in accordance with the spirit of the Berlin Act, and I trust that the negotiations between the Sovereign of the Congo State and the Belgian Government will secure that object.' ' The Lord Mayor presided at a meeting at the Queen's Hall on February 21st, which resolved that no annexation could be recognised which did not restore to the natives their rights in land and trade. On February 24th, the House of Lords gave free vent to the indignation of British reformers, and Lord Cromer declared that he had never seen or heard of any- thing comparable to these abuses. The gravity of the situation was fully recognised by Lord Fitzmaurice, who announced the appoint- ment of a third Vice- Consul, and expressed approval of an Inter- national River Commission. Of much greater importance was the fact 1 Siebert, p. 206. 2 This section is based on the Blue-books, which continue to be very numerous. THE ABUSES CONTINUE 425 that the Ministers of the United States and the United Kingdom were now cooperating in Brussels. "The Government," he con- cluded, "view the present situation with anxiety. These debates cannot go on for ever with no result. We could not accept any arrangement which did not secure the vindication of treaty rights and the claims of humanity." "The position," echoed Lord Lans- downe from the Opposition benches, "is intolerable. We all favour a transfer; but it must be complete I hope this debate will con- vince the Government and people of Belgium that the Government and people of Great Britain are determined that an end shall be put to a condition of things they have long regarded with feelings of abhorrence and shame." Two days later, the House of Commons gave vent to similar indignation. Mr Leif Jones, who opened the discussion, reminded his hearers that this was the ninth debate on the subject in five years. The Consular reports were terrible. The natives spent about twenty days in the month collecting rubber. The population dwindled, and the resources of the country — rubber, stock, food — were decreasing. It was the murder of a race. Belgium, replied the Foreign Secretary, had no responsibility for these horrors, and she would feel as strongly as ourselves when she knew the facts. " I do not believe Belgium will accept responsibility without full control. Given real Parliamentary control, the results we desire will follow. We cannot intervene officially in the present discussion. When the Belgian Government proposes its scheme, we can speak. I welcome more than I can say the cooperation of the United States. The American Consul- general's Report confirms that the State has morally forfeited every right to international recognition." These vigorous speeches were hotly resented by King Leopold, who bade us mind our own business. On March 27th, the Foreign Secretary submitted views for the friendly consideration of the Belgian Government. "We have every confidence in the earnest desire of the Belgian Govern- ment to introduce far-reaching reforms, and are anxious to abstain from interference; but we must in fairness say that the existing administration has not fulfilled the Treaties, and therefore requires changes, including the relief of natives from excessive taxation, the grant to them of sufficient land to obtain the food they require and sufficient produce to buy and sell, and the possibility for traders to acquire land for factories, so as to establish direct trade relations with the inhabitants. We are surprised at the intention to maintain the rights of the Concessionaire Companies, which cover three-fifths of the State, and thereby to prevent freedom of trade 426 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE and the amelioration of the lot of the natives. We therefore advise the introduction of a currency as a proper standard of value, the abolition of compulsory labour without pay, and a large increase of the land allotted to natives." The Belgian Government replied that it was no less anxious to improve the lot of the natives. A currency would be introduced as soon as possible, taxation reduced, labour remunerated, and natives established on land which would belong to them. New arrangements would be made with the Concessionaire Companies, and the Govern- ment promised an immediate amelioration in the moral and material conditions of the natives and the extension, as rapidly as possible, of economic freedom. Sir Edward promptly expressed his liveliest satisfaction at these assurances. Throughout the negotiations, he added, the most friendly sentiments had been entertained towards the Belgian Government and people. The Foreign Secretary was soon to learn that he had been a little too sanguine in differentiating so sharply between the King and the Belgian Government ; for, with the exception of Le Peuple, the official organ of the Socialists, one Catholic and one Liberal paper, the Belgian Press was hostile to the British reform movement, arguing that Belgium was her own mistress. Though the clauses in the Treaty maintaining the Fondation de la Couronne were annulled, the King was amply compensated for its surrender ; and Belgium agreed to respect the concessions included in the Fondation granted to Com- panies in which the Congo State had large holdings. On November 14th, 1908, the Congo State ceased to exist, and its administration was vested in the newly-created Ministry of the Colonies. The transfer was promptly recognised by Germany and France; but a further struggle was necessary before the British Government would relax its frown. When the decisive step had been taken, the Foreign Secretary stated his attitude in a firm despatch dated November 1st. He reiterated the right of Great Britain to guarantees that the new Administration should not repeat the fatal errors of the old, and demanded that the grievances should be remedied within a reasonable time. A despatch from the Government of the United States, dated January nth, 1909, reiterated the British demands. King Leopold, however, was still on the Throne, and the passive resistance of the two Powers was treated with indifference. A Blue-book, presented to Parliament in January, 1909, containing the Consular Reports of 1908, RECOGNITION OF ANNEXATION DEFERRED 427 revealed the continuance of illegal methods and the cutting down of rubber trees. The Belgian reply to the British despatch of November 1 st, 1908, dated March 15th, 1909, renewed conciliatory assurances, pointed out that in four months little could be done, and asked for sympathy and confidence. On June nth, Sir Edward Grey replied that he was anxious to recognise annexation, but that he must first be satisfied that the abuses of taxation and forced labour had ceased. On the occasion of the Whitsuntide adjournment, the British re- formers loudly expressed their disappointment. We had been over- cautious, declared Sir Charles Dilke, and the position was the same as five years ago. No fear of European complications need affect our policy. Our difficulties were increased by annexation, echoed another angry member. We had been bluffed. Belgium did not care whether we recognised the annexation or not. We ought to send a gunboat to blockade the Congo, and occupy the custom-house at Boma. The impatience of his critics had the usual effect of cooling instead of heating the blood of the Foreign Secretary. "If this question is rashly handled," he replied, "it might grow into a European question compared to which those we have recently had to deal with (Bosnia) might be child's play. We are now drawing up a reply to the Belgian reply, which was satisfactory in principle but vague in details." Two months later, on the Foreign Office vote on July 22nd, the critics returned to the charge. Sir Charles Dilke detected signs of weakening in the British attitude, caused by an undue terror of the risks. The Belgians treated us with lofty scorn in their debates and despatches, and they had suggested that annexation released them from inter- national obligations. Sir George White asked what had brought about our change of attitude. There was no weakening, replied the Foreign Secretary. Indeed, the Belgian Government had complained that the strong language published by our Government was impairing good relations. " Sir Arthur Hardinge, on my orders, said it was our habit to publish facts, and that criticism of things before the annexation should not harm our relations. We only desired the Government should have a fair start. I said to the Belgian Minister that the Government was not responsible for the Congo Reform Association, but that it represented very deep feeling which would remain till reform was accomplished. We do not forego our rights to take action; but we say the Belgian Government should have more time to make their intentions clear. Their Colonial Minister is now in the Congo, and they and we must wait for his proposals. 10 have stepped in now and said we would wait no longer would be generally 428 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE regarded as premature. But, till the system of forced labour ends, we cannot recognise annexation. There are British subjects with their treaty rights to trade in the Congo; and a most serious impasse would arise if some question concerning them cropped up. To defer recognition is a serious embarrassment to Belgium and to ourselves. I am most anxious to see the question settled not only on humanitarian grounds, but to preserve friendly relations.' ' On the return of the Colonial Minister from Africa the Belgian Government, on March 22nd, 19 10, issued a Decree abolishing forced labour and restoring the right to the natives of collecting and selling the produce of the soil in three zones, to be opened successively in July, 1910, 191 1 and 1912. At last, the end seemed in sight. A Con- sular Report in October recorded improvement. "Missionaries and traders say the natives are better treated since the Reform Decrees came into force on July 1st. The former regime is undergoing a radical change. Taxes are often paid in money, and natives may sell their produce. I cannot see why forced labour should not be abolished everywhere in 191 1 — were it not for the budget." The British Minister at Brussels gently suggested the shortening of the three stages before complete freedom of trade was attained, but received the reply that the previous system could not be abolished at a blow. Early in 191 1 , Sir Edward Grey announced that, where the old system was discarded, the improvement was so rapid that we would recognise annexation as soon as the whole area was opened to trade. The death of King Leopold II at the end of 1910 removed an obstacle, and in the same year the abolition of the Concessionaire system in the French Congo revealed that the old regime was passing away. In forwarding a Report on the year 191 1, Consul Lamont em- phasised "the very different standard of policy from the commercialism hitherto encouraged.' ' Systematic brutality had disappeared; but there were still dangers from the quasi-commercial character of the administration; many of the old officials were still in control, and contract labour on the plantations was largely "impressed." In February, 19 12, the Belgian Government expressed the hope that Great Britain would at last recognise annexation, as in July Free Trade would prevail throughout the country. From another quarter, Sir Edward Grey was adjured not to hurry. The Baptist Missionary Society put forth a warning against recognition till the rights of natives to dispose freely of their labour and produce should have been guaranteed, the reforms made irrevocable, and the rights of missions secured. The Congo Reform Association added that, in regard to RECOGNITION OF ANNEXATION 429 native rights in the land, the position remained as insecure as ever. The Edicts of 189 1-2 were unrepealed, and the natives only possessed land within the village boundaries, and could not develop their industries. Access to land was the main need, and it must be secured before recognition. Sir Edward proceeded to enquire at Brussels, and received the reply that, if the natives asked for land to cultivate for profit, they might obtain it without payment. By May, 19 13, the execrable system of King Leopold had van- ished. The Concessionaire Companies had disappeared or lost their privileges. The tax on rubber had been abolished, and Free Trade prevailed over the greater part of the Congo, the fortunes of which were now in the hands of the Belgian nation. Mr Morel now an- nounced that, "in view of the immense and steady improvement/' the Congo Reform Association would no longer oppose recognition. With such a certificate from the chief guardian of native interests, Sir Edward hesitated no longer, and, on May 29th, he announced British recognition of the transfer of sovereignty effected five years earlier. A final meeting of the Congo Reform Association was held at the Westminster Palace Hotel, and the story of a long campaign ended with tributes to the Liverpool clerk who had rescued millions of African natives from a cruel and degrading servitude. VI. The German Fleet, i 909-19 11 British relations with Germany in the earlier stages of the Bosnian crisis were less strained than with Austria, since, as every one was aware, she had to stand by her Ally. The inevitable friction was eased by the official journey of the King and Queen to Berlin in February, 1909, the novel feature of which was the King's visit to the Rathaus, where he spoke gratefully of his "splendid reception" by the municipality. "He made a specially favourable impression on the City Fathers," testifies Mr Hill, the American Ambassador. "His simplicity, his good humour, and his straightforwardness were remarked upon. Socially, the visit was a pleasant event ; but, politically, it may be doubted if it was of the slightest value1." Controversial topics were studiously avoided. " Hardinge tells me," reported the Russian Charge in London to Izvolsky, "that the reception by the Kaiser and the people was very warm, and the few political conversations he had with Bulow and Schon were friendly. They were, however, quite general, and therefore the visit has not led to 1 D. J. Hill, Impressions of the Kaiser, pp. 105-7. 430 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE any concrete results. The Fleet and Bagdad were not mentioned. Biilow blamed Aehrenthal's methods, and lamented Germany's obligation to support her Ally even when she could not agree. He expressed pleasure at the Morocco Agreement and emphasised German peacefulness. England is satisfied that Germany is pacific." The Report was confirmed by the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, who learned from Schon that there was no word of politics between the Kaiser and the King, and that the conversation of Billow and Hardinge dealt mainly with the Balkans1. The King's Speech on the opening of Parliament declared that he was much impressed and gratified by the warmth of his reception by all classes of the com- munity. " In its extremely harmonious course," echoed the Chancellor, " it was a happy event. The warm welcome they received here and the King's words of sincere love of peace and friendship — repeated in the King's Speech and in the debate on the Address — have shewn once again to both peoples how much cause they have to respect each other and to cooperate in peaceful work. Germany is England's best customer, and England is ours." A few days before German pressure at Petrograd ended the Bosnian crisis, British nerves received an unexpected shock. The Navy Law of 1908, reducing the life of capital ships from 25 to 20 years, conformed to the general practice and excited no alarm in Whitehall ; but, in the autumn, the Admiralty learned that the German naval programme of 1909-10 was being anticipated. The Admiralty's proposal for meeting the new German Navy Bill was, accordingly, to lay down six Dreadnoughts in 1909-10, and a similar number in the two succeeding years. A battle raged within and without the Cabinet, Mr Lloyd George and Mr Churchill fighting for four capital ships; but Mr McKenna emerged victorious, for his defeat would have involved the resignation of the Foreign Secretary. The Estimates were indeed for four, but it was added that the Govern- ment "might find it necessary to make preparations for the rapid construction of four more large armoured ships." Thus, the Ad- miralty, in the guise of a compromise, obtained power to build two more than they originally proposed. Mysterious whispers of coming trouble had filled the lobbies during the opening weeks of the session ; but few were prepared for the dramatic scene when the First Lord of the Admiralty rose on March 16th, 1909. For the first time, the Estimates were defended by selecting Germany as the standard by Siebert, Diplomatische Aktenstiicke, pp. 723-7. THE NAVY SCARE OF 1909 431 which to measure our requirements ; and British and German Dread- noughts were balanced against each other down the vista of the coming years. Germany might have 13 in 1911 to our 16; and, if she again accelerated her programme, she might have 17 to our 16 in April, 1912, and would, in any case, have 17 in the autumn of 19 1 2. The Government, therefore, asked for power to build four extra ships if the suspected acceleration took place, thus providing us with 20 to 17 in March, 1912. Mr Balfour made his hearers' flesh creep by suggesting that our rival might possess 25 ships in 19 12. The Prime-Minister, while rejecting the exaggerations of the Leader of the Opposition, confessed that 17 ships in April, 19 12, were a possibility, and 13 a certainty. "The effect produced by these speeches on the House of Commons," writes a witness of the scene, "was simply overwhelming1. When Mr Asquith sat down, no one rose to speak, and the vote would have been put from the Chair without further discussion, had not a well-known "crank" caught the Speaker's eye. Mr McKenna had indeed secured the safe passage of his Estimates, including the four contingent Dreadnoughts; but he had proved almost too much, and had created a first-class naval scare." A wave of panic swept over the country. Men began to speak openly of war as possible and even probable, and the legend of stealthy acceleration seemed proof positive of a fell design to wrest the trident from Britannia's hands. A few days later, the Prime-Minister felt it his duty to pour oil on the troubled waters, and rebuked the Opposi- tion for "an artificial and manufactured anxiety"; but the panic was due far more to the figures and foreboding of himself and his lieu- tenant than to the dirges of unofficial critics. When the dragon's teeth had been sown, Sir Edward Grey accepted the explanations and assurances — "some vouchsafed before March 16th, but more precisely after it" — that there had been no acceleration in the date for the completion of the German vessels. But the public continued to believe that Germany had tried to steal a march on her rival. The political result of the crisis was deplorable; but the British Navy profited by the panic, for six of the eight vessels of our 1909-10 programme were super-Dreadnoughts, with 13-5 inch instead of 12 inch guns. This smart stroke delayed the construc- tion of the German vessels that had already been laid down, and, when the danger-point of the spring of 19 12 was reached, Germany possessed, not the thirteen monsters which Mr Asquith had foretold 1 Roch, Mr Lloyd George and the War, p. 28. 432 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE as a certainty, but nine. Mr McKenna, on the other hand, followed up his eight Dreadnoughts by five in each of the two succeeding years, thus completing in his three years of office the programme of eighteen which he had originally proposed. On the day on which Biilow was disclaiming acceleration, Mr Arthur (now Lord) Lee moved a Vote of Censure on the Government for not at once laying down eight Dreadnoughts. In a weighty speech, the Foreign Secretary replied that he was not sure that the four extra ships would be required, and that, in any case, they need not be ordered before July, as they could not be completed any sooner. But he made no attempt to disguise the serious nature of the problem. "A new situation in this country is created by the German programme, whether it is carried out quickly or slowly. When it is completed, Germany will have a fleet of 33 Dreadnoughts — the most powerful the world has ever seen. That imposes on us the necessity, of which we are now at the beginning — except so far as we have Dreadnoughts already — of rebuilding the whole of our fleet." Passing to the political aspect of the problem, he spoke calmly and hopefully. Algeciras was a period of tension; but, since then, diplo- matic relations had proceeded perfectly smoothly, and the new Agreement between Germany and France had removed the fear that the Morocco barrier might be reerected. "As regards our future, I see a wide space in which both of us may walk in peace and amity. Two things would produce conflict. One is an attempt by us to isolate Germany. The other is the isolation of England attempted by any Great Continental Power so as to dominate and dictate the policy of the Continent." There was no reason to apprehend either the one or the other. The naval rivalry was the only obstacle to confidence. There had been frank and informal discussions. We had told Ger- many that the Navy was to us what the Army was to her. " The German view of their programme is that it is made for their own needs and has no reference to ours; that, if we build fifty or a hundred, they will not build more, and, if we cease building, they will not build less. Our view is that our expenditure is and must be dependent upon the German, though the German is not dependent upon ours. It is essential that we should keep a position of superiority. ... If I was asked to name the one thing which would most reassure Europe with regard to the prospects of peace, I think it would be that the naval expenditure in Germany would be diminished and that ours was following suit." The speech concluded with the sensible suggestion that future panics should be obviated by the Admiralties exchanging information and BETHMANN-HOLLWEG SUCCEEDS BOLOW 433 providing facilities for inspection by Naval Attaches; but the pro- posal was declined by the German Government. Despite a bitter outcry from Mr Churchill, in a published letter to his constituents on April 15th, denying the existence of danger in view of "our tremendous margins of safety," it was announced in July that the four contingent Dreadnoughts would be laid down; and the decision was received almost without protest. In vain did the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with his heart in his Land Values Budget, protest against the prevailing excitement. "I predict that, even if the Budget goes through, another concerted effort will be made to rouse a fresh naval and military panic, so as to rush the Government into the criminal extravagance of unnecessary armaments by land and sea. There will be the usual crop of rumours about German plans and preparations. We know how little foundation existed for the last scare. In the light of established facts the fright which shook Britain and convulsed the Colonies looks rather foolish1." The protest was unavailing. "Armaments are increasing," declared Lord Rosebery in an impressive speech at a banquet to Colonial journalists on July 9th; "this calm before the storm is terrifying." The rejection by the House of Lords of the Declaration of London, which had been drawn up during the winter by naval experts to assist the projected Appeal Prize-Court at the Hague, was due to the growing apprehension in Conservative circles that Great Britain might before long find herself at war, and should not surrender any bel- ligerent rights. Though Bethmann-Hollweg was powerless to alter the course of the ship when he succeeded Blilow in July, 1909, a more accommo- dating spirit entered the Wilhelmstrasse. The new Chancellor was convinced of the goodwill of the British Government, and determined on a frank interchange of views. He declares that he found no obstacle in the highest quarter. "As we could not dissolve the Franco-Russian partnership, we could only obviate its danger by an understanding with England. Not only did the Kaiser agree with this view, but he repeatedly indicated it to me as the only possible policy. In the opening days of August I began discussions on the fleet with Sir E. Goschen. I found him rather sceptical, and never at any time zealous for a rapprochement. At any rate, he was much cooler than his predecessor, who was a convinced champion of an understanding. The negotiations led to no result, as the London Cabinet hardly showed interest in their success, and no formula was found to satisfy the Admiralties2. 1 The Nation, October 30th, 1909. - Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege, vol. 1. ch. 2. W.&G. ill 28 434 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE " The Chancellor sent for the British Ambassador," relates Sir E. Cook, "to whom he said that he perceived that the naval question was regarded by Great Britain as the chief obstacle to really cordial relations between the two countries ; that the German Government were now ready to make proposals for a naval arrangement, but that discussion on that subject could profitably be undertaken only as part of a general understanding based on a conviction that neither country had hostile or aggressive designs against the other1. The British Government were naturally much gratified by the Chancellor's messages, and met his overtures cordially. The naval question was the dominant one for them; but they were ready to consider with the utmost sympathy any proposals for a general understanding so long as these were not inconsistent with Britain's existing obligations to other foreign Powers. The naval proposals made by Bethmann-Hollweg were somewhat vague. There could be no question, it was explained, of any departure from the German Navy Law as a whole, since any such would meet with insuperable opposition in the Reichstag ; but the German Government were willing to discuss the question of ' retarding the rate ' of building new ships. Precise explanation of this formula was not forth- coming. What was understood to be meant was that the total number of ships to be completed by 1918 would not be reduced, but that the number of capital ships might be reduced in the earlier years and equivalently raised in the later. There was, it will be seen, to be no ultimate reduction of expenditure, and no definite reduction of the total German programme. The basis of naval negotiation suggested by the Chancellor was thus undefined, slender, shadowy. The quid pro quo which he required for it was positive and substantial. Great Britain was to be a party to an agree- ment declaring that (1) neither country had any idea of aggression, and that neither in fact would attack the other; and (2) that, in the event of an attack made on either Power by a third Power or group of Powers, the Power not attacked should stand aside. To the first condition there was and could be no objection; to the second the objection from the British point of view was serious. If Great Britain accepted the German condition, it became practically certain, owing to the general position of the European Powers, that she would be bound to stand aside from any Continental struggle. In any such struggle Germany could arrange without difficulty that the formal inception of hostilities should rest with Austria. If Austria and Russia were at war, Germany was pledged to support Austria; while, as soon as Russia was attacked by two Powers, France was bound to come to her assistance. The giving of the pledge proposed by the German Government would, therefore, prevent Great Britain from supporting France, no matter what the reasons of the conflict or its results might be. Thus French trust and goodwill would be forfeited, since Great Britain could be of no assistance to France, should Germany determine to press to the ultimate issue of war any demands she might choose to make. It could not be overlooked by Ministers acting as trustees for their country's future that the period of forced British neutrality, involved in the Chan- 1 How Britain strove for Peace. NAVAL DISCUSSIONS 435 ccllor's proposals, might be used by Germany strenuously to consolidate her supremacy in Continental Europe. Great Britain would be a paralysed spectator until Germany were free to devote undivided strength to re- ducing her. Moreover, the German proposal involved, in the second place, a repudiation in certain events of Great Britain's treaty obligations to Belgium. Suppose Germany in a war with France were to invade Belgium, Great Britain would have been prevented by this proposed agreement with Germany from vindicating Belgium's neutrality. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the autumn of 1909 the British Government declined the German Government's proposal. Politically, it was open to the gravest objections, and on the naval side it offered no substantial reduction of expenditure." In May, 19 10, the Kaiser came to London for King Edward's funeral, and his manifest sympathy was warmly appreciated. Nego- tiations were resumed in the summer, the course of which was subsequently described by Sir Edward Cook. "Speaking in Parliament in July, 1910, Mr Asquith said: 'We have approached the German Government. They have found themselves unable to do anything. They cannot, without an Act of Parliament, repeal their Naval Law. They tell us, and no doubt with great truth, they would not have the support of public opinion in Germany to a modified programme/ The German Chancellor replied to this speech that the German Govern- ment had not opposed a non possumus to the British approaches; they could not agree to reduce naval construction, but they were ready to discuss temporary retardation. The precise meaning of this proposal was, again, not defined; but the British Government at once responded to the overtures, and in August, abandoning their previous contention that any naval agreement must be based upon a reduction of the existing German naval programme, they intimated their readiness (1) to discuss the sug- gestion of ' temporary retardation ' ; (2) to negotiate a naval agreement on the basis that the existing German programme should not be increased, and that information should be exchanged with regard to the actual pro- gress of ship-building in each country; (3) with regard to a political under- standing, to give assurances that in any agreement between themselves and any other Power there was nothing directed against Germany, and that they themselves had no hostile intentions respecting her. The reply of the German Government was received in October and negotiations continued till the spring of 191 1. (1) With regard to 'temporary retardation,' this proposal, upon which the German Chancellor had relied to justify his denial of a non possumus attitude, was withdrawn in May, 191 1 — a withdrawal which was strange, since the reason given (namely, the importance of feeding the shipbuilding industry with a definite quantity of Government orders) would have been equally cogent against the offer when first made. (2) With regard to the negotiation of a naval agreement on the basis of no increase in the German programme and of exchange of information, 28—2 436 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE the German Government agreed to discuss the latter subject. Negotiations continued for many months, and the final British Memorandum, accepting the German conditions on all essential points, was communicated at the end of January, 191 1. As for the basis of no increase in the German programme, the German Government in October, 19 10, asked what equivalent engagement would be made by Great Britain. The British Government were considering their reply, when the German Emperor informed the British Ambassador that he would on no account ever consent to any agreement binding Germany not to enlarge her naval programme. The discrepancy thus apparent between the attitude of the Emperor and the Chancellor respectively was not cleared up ; but in May, 191 1, the German Government intimated their readiness to examine any proposals for a mutual reduction of expenditure on armaments not involving a departure from the requirements of the Navy Law. The withdrawal at the same time of the offer of temporary retardation did not inspire con- fidence; and the professed readiness of the German Government to negotiate a naval agreement on a fresh basis had been preceded by a very uncompromising official declaration in the Reichstag. On March 13th, 191 1, Sir Edward Grey made a speech in Parliament indicating between the lines the course of negotiations with Germany, defining the limits within which alone those negotiations could hopefully proceed, and declaring it to be a paradox that while sentiments of friendship were sincere armaments should increase. This speech met with a favourable reception in the German Press; but, on the subject coming up in the Reichstag, the Chancellor took occasion to apply cold water. ' I consider/ he said, 'any control as absolutely impracticable, and every attempt in that direction would lead to nothing but continual mutual distrust and perpetual friction. Who would be content to weaken his means of defence without the absolute certainty that his neighbour was not secretly exceeding the proportion allowed to him in the disarmament agreement? No, gentle- men, anyone who seriously considers the question of universal disarmament must inevitably come to the conclusion that it is insoluble so long as men are men and States are States/ (3) While Germany was thus alternately coming forward and drawing back on the naval side of the negotiations with England, the German Government continued to attach great importance to a political under- standing. They laid emphasis on this point in their reply of October, 19 10; and when negotiations were resumed after the General Election in this country, the British Government assented to the German view that some wider agreement of a political nature should be a condition precedent to a naval arrangement, and submitted suggestions as a basis for discussing such a political agreement. An arrangement, as foreshadowed by the Imperial Chancellor, embodying a general political formula, might be considered more comprehensive, far-reaching, and intimate than any Arrangement, short of actual alliance, that England had concluded with any other Power; and such an arrangement, therefore, might cause mis- understanding in France and Russia. The British Agreements with France NAVAL DISCUSSIONS 437 and with Russia were not based on a general political formula; they were settlements of specific questions; and the settlements had transformed relations of friction and pinpricks into friendship. There was nothing exclusive in those friendships, and the British Government had seen with satisfaction the settlement of some questions between France and Germany, and between Russia and Germany. Why should not something of the same kind be attempted between England and Germany? The reply of the German Government (May, 191 1) to these suggestions seemed not unfavourable, though the withdrawal of the previous naval offer was dis- couraging. The German Government declared that the British suggestions might form a suitable basis for an agreement, though they repeated their preference for a general political formula." The underlying difference between the standpoint of the two nations was revealed in Sir Edward Grey's ready welcome to President Taft's arbitration proposals. " He has sketched a step in advance more momentous than any practical statesman in his position has ventured to make before, for he is willing to refer questions of national honour. Suppose two of the greatest nations made it clear that by such an agreement they would under no circumstances go to war again. It would probably lead to an agreement to join each other if a third Power refused arbitration. Great risks would require, not only the signature of both Governments, but the deliberate sanction of Parliament. The great nations are in increasing bondage to their armies and navies." The speech created world-wide interest, but was regarded in Germany as purely Utopian. While the diplomatic barometer thus remained unsteady, the Cabinet quietly continued to prepare the country to meet a possible attack. In January, 191 1 , at the instigation of Mr (now Lord) Haldane, whose reorganisation of the Army was then almost complete, the Prime- Minister appointed a Standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence for "the coordination of Departmental Action on the outbreak of war1." A "War-Book" was compiled, in which each Department had its own chapter arranged on an identical plan in sections, each dealing severally with a phase of the transition from peace to war. By constant revision these details were carried to a high degree of precision. All necessary papers, Orders in Council and Proclamations were printed or set up in type; and so far was the system carried that the King never moved without those which re- quired his immediate signature. A further precaution was taken, in 1912, in the decision to supply Cromarty and Scapa Flow with 1 See Sir J. Corbett, Naval Operations, I. 18-22. 438 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE defences, Rosyth having become inadequate for the reception and defence of the Fleet. Despite the failure to abate the naval rivalry, the Anglo-German tension seemed to be growing less acute. " Our relations are decidedly better," proclaimed Professor Schiemann in March, 191 1. "The supposed plan of annihilating the German fleet may be regarded as non-existent. " The Anglo-German Friendship Committee, founded in 1905, was merged in the Anglo-German Friendship Society at a meeting in the Mansion House on May 15th, 191 1. Its chief pro- moters were its Chairman, Sir Frank Lascelles, for thirteen years British Ambassador at Berlin, and its President, Lord Avebury. Among its Vice-Presidents were a host of civil and ecclesiastical dignitaries, Generals and Admirals. A similar society was founded in Germany, largely owing to the efforts of Professor Sieper of Munich, with the ex- Ambassador, T. von Holleben, as President. In May the Kaiser accepted King George's invitation to attend the unveiling of the Memorial to Queen Victoria, and was received with the usual cordiality. " I observed with my own eyes/' reported Count Lalaing, the Belgian Minister, "that the welcome of the public became warmer from day to day. The death of King Edward seems to have brought about a slight detente in Anglo-German relations1." Shortly after- wards, the Crown Prince attended the coronation of George V, and paid a round of visits to the nobility. But at this moment a rash resolve in the Foreign Office at Berlin sundered the two nations once again, and plunged Europe into a crisis even more acute than that of 1908. VII. The Agadir Crisis, 1907-1911 The Conference of Algeciras was followed by improvement neither in the relations between France and Germany nor in the internal conditions of Morocco2. In 1907, France entrenched herself at Ujda on the Algerian frontier and at Casablanca on the Atlantic; and, in 1908, a dispute about deserters from the Foreign Legion brought the countries to the verge of war. The controversy was 1 May 22nd, 191 1. Schwertfeger, Zur Europdischen Politik, ill. 245-6. 2 See Affaires du Maroc, 1906-1912, 4 vols.; Caillaux, Agadir ; Tardieu, La Conference d' Algeciras (edition of 1909); and Le Mystere d Agadir; Louis Maurice (Bompard), La Politique Marocaine de VAllemagne', Morel, Morocco in Diplomacy; Un Livre Noir, vol. 1. The speeches of the Chancellor and the German Foreign Secretary are translated in the White Papers, Morocco, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 191 1. Cf. Hammann, Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit. 83-94 and 156-159. FEZ AND AGADIR 439 referred to the Hague Tribunal; and early in 1909 an Agreement was signed by which Germany recognised "the special political interests" of France, and France undertook "not to obstruct German commercial and industrial interests." This economic partnership, which created high hopes in both countries, led to endless friction. Meanwhile, Morocco drifted towards anarchy; and, in April, 191 1, the French Government announced an expedition to Fez, on the ground that the Sultan was powerless to defend himself or the Euro- pean residents against insurgent tribes, and in spite of reiterated warnings from Berlin that the occupation of the capital would reopen the whole Moroccan problem. While Germany and Spain regarded the march to Fez as the death-knell of the Algeciras Settlement, and the latter proceeded to occupy the zone assigned to her by the Secret Treaty of 1904, Sir Edward Grey accepted the assurances of Paris without question. On May 2nd, in answer to an enquiry whether he had been consulted concerning the military measures in Morocco and whether he approved the attack on its independence, he announced that France had informed the British Government, like the others, of the measures to succour the Europeans there. Her action, he added, did not aim at changing the political status of Morocco, and he saw no objection to it. He made the same reply to an enquiry by the German Am- bassador. It was not only the right but the duty of France to succour the Europeans, and French intervention would be of benefit to the world1. Not content with thus publicly approving the action of France, he instructed the British Ambassador at Madrid to call the attention of the Government to the danger of Spanish action in Morocco, and invited it to announce that, if order continued in El-Kasr, the troops would be withdrawn to Larache, since France had declared that her troops would quit Fez as soon as possible. Kiderlen-Wachter's wish, according to his friend Reventlow, had long been to wipe Morocco off the slate. He considered that Billow's policy had been a failure, and he determined to meet French wishes Morocco in return for colonial compensation. The expedition to ■ez provided the opportunity for which he had waited, and he seized it with both hands. On July 1st, the German Ambassador at Paris informed the French Foreign Minister, de Selves, that the Panther had been sent to Agadir. In presenting the Note, he added that the Act of Algeciras was dead, and that Germany desired to eliminate 1 Siebert, Diplomatische Aktenstiicke, p. 417. 440 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE the Morocco question by friendly discussion. A despatch was com- municated to all the Signatories of the Act of Algeciras. " Some German firms established in the south of Morocco, notably at Agadir and in the vicinity, have been alarmed by a certain ferment among the local tribes, due, it seems, to recent occurrences in other parts of the country. These firms have applied to the Imperial Government for pro- tection for their lives and property. At their request, the Government have decided to send a warship to Agadir to lend help in case of need to their subjects and proteges as well as to the considerable German interests in that territory. As soon as the state of affairs has resumed its normal tranquillity the ship will leave." The news of the Panther's spring was received with even greater indignation and surprise in Downing Street than at the Quai d'Orsay ; for the British Government was resolved, at all costs, to prevent Germany from securing a naval base in Morocco1, and appears to have known little of the repeated warnings from Berlin when the troops set forth for Fez. "You are violating the Act of Algeciras," observed Sir Arthur Nicolson, who in the absence of the Foreign Secretary received the Ambassador. "That has already lost its validity," was the prompt reply. In communicating the Aide-memoire to the British Government, Count Wolff-Metternich was furnished with an explanatory Memorandum. " Though our information as to the position of the Europeans at Fez did not tally with that of the French, no objection was raised to the advance. A situation had meanwhile gradually arisen which rendered the Algeciras Act illusory. Whilst, for instance, a limited cooperation in the establish- ment of police under international control was granted to France and Spain in the open ports, similar institutions were now growing up under the direction of French officers at the most important points of the interior. It might appear questionable whether it would be possible to return to the status quo of 1906. We were therefore prepared, if it became necessary, to seek, in conjunction with France, some means, which would be compatible with the interests of the other Signatory Powers, of arriving at a definite understanding on the Morocco question. Direct negotiations could hardly meet with insuperable difficulties in view of the good relations between us and France." Sir Edward Grey regarded the voyage of the Panther as an un- provoked attack on the status quo. "The official communication," he declared on November 27th, "was accompanied by an explanation given to us at the same time, which seemed to me much more important than the actual communication of the sending 1 Sir Francis Bertie, the British Ambassador in Paris, believed that Germany intended to seize a port. Un Livre Noir, I. 104. ANXIETY OF SIR EDWARD GREY 441 of the ship It made it clear that the German Government regarded a return to the status quo in Morocco as doubtful, if not impossible, and that what they contemplated was a definite solution of the Moroccan question between Germany, France, and Spain. The whole question, or at least the kernel of the question, after that communication was received, was : What was the definite solution of the Moroccan question which Germany con- templated? Was it to be the partition of Morocco? The communication was made to the Foreign Office on the Saturday. On the next Monday, July 3rd, I asked the German Ambassador to come and see me. I informed him I had seen the Prime-Minister, and that we considered the situation created by the despatch of the Panther to Agadir as so important that it must be discussed in a meeting of the Cabinet. The next day, I asked the German Ambassador to come and see me again, and said that I must tell him that our attitude could not be a disinterested one with regard to Morocco. We must take into consideration our Treaty obligations to France and our own interests in Morocco. We were of opinion that a new situation had been created by the despatch of a German ship to Agadir. Future developments might affect British interests more directly than they had hitherto been affected, and, therefore, we could not recognise any new arrangements that might be come to without us. I made it quite clear to the Ambassador that this communication, and the exact words which I used, were those of his Majesty's Government sitting in Cabinet." The Ambassador replied that his Government had absolutely no wish to exclude England from the new arrangement of things, or to prevent any possible safeguarding of British interests in Morocco. The Foreign Secretary made a simultaneous declaration to the French Ambassador. "The British Government deems a discussion necessary between France, Germany, Spain and England. But before it opens the British Government must know what the French Government desires. For instance, the solution might be a return to the status quo, Germany retiring from Agadir, Spain from El-Kasr and Larache, and France from Fez and the interior. Or there might be a new arrangement consolidating the position of France, securing the assent of Germany by certain compensations. In that case, Great Britain would have to see what conditions were required in her own interests." The Ambassador replied that the French had already left Fez, that the French Military Mission, dating from before Algeciras, did not constitute occupation, and that the posts in the interior were merely to supply the troops. Next day, the French Premier telegraphed that his Ministry would examine the solution to be proposed by Great Britain and ask her support for it in the discussions to which Germany invited them. "I must, however, make clear at once to the British 442 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE Government the impossibility of compensations in Morocco. Since Germany asks us to talk, she must tell us her wishes." After thus sounding France, the Prime-Minister stated the attitude of Great Britain, in reply to Mr Balfour on July 6th. Recent events were the subject of negotiation between the Powers most interested, and he wished it clearly to be understood that the Government considered that a new situation had arisen in Morocco, in which it was possible that future developments might affect British interests more directly than had been the case. He was confident that diplomatic discussion would find a solution, and in the part we should take in it we should have due regard to the promotion of those interests and to the fulfil- ment of our treaty obligations to France, which were well known to the House. On July 9th, Kiderlen-Wachter and Jules Cambon began the conversations, which were to continue for four months. The German Foreign Minister declared himself ready to renounce territorial claims in Morocco, and asked for compensation in the Congo. It would be impossible, he added, to admit a third party to the dis- cussions without inviting all the Signatories of the Treaty of Algeciras. The Ambassador did not demur, but remarked that France must keep her friends and allies informed. While these conversations were proceeding in Berlin, the British Government were waiting for news. Sir Edward Grey regarded his communication of July 4th as a request for information; but it had not been couched in an interrogatory form. "The declaration that Agadir created a new situation," declared the German Chancellor on December 5th, "did not appear to us an enquiry necessitating an answer." Both parties were, no doubt* to blame — Sir Edward Grey in not definitely asking for ex- planations, the German Government in failing to volunteer a re- assuring statement. In the absence of direct communication suspicion was inevitable. "After July 4th," declared the Foreign Secretary on November 27th, " there was a period of silence. The German Ambassador was not instructed to make any comment to me with regard to my communication, and we received no information from the German Government as to what their aims or desires were, or as to what they had in mind when they spoke of a definite solution of the Moroccan problem. Some information reached us from other quarters, leading us to apprehend that the settlement con- templated by the German Government might be a partition of Morocco, arrived at by negotiations to which it was not intended we should be a party. It is obvious, if the Moroccan' question was to be reopened and a FRANCO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS 443 new settlement made, unless we were consulted,. . .the strategic and economic conditions stipulated for between ourselves, France and Spain in 1904 might be upset. On July 12th, the British Ambassador in Berlin had occasion to see the German Foreign Secretary on some minor matters, and took the opportunity to say that there had been at one time some mention of a conversation a trois between Germany, France and Spain, the inference being that we were to be excluded from it. The German Foreign Secretary told our Ambassador to inform us that there never had been any idea of such a conversation; and, except for this negative com- munication, we had no further information from the German Government of their views. A little later, it appeared in the Press — and indeed it was the case — that the German Government had made demands with regard to the French Congo of an extent to which it was obvious to everybody who thought of it that neither the French Government nor the French Chamber could agree. That at once made me anxious as to the development of the situation." Sir Edward Grey here speaks as if he had been unaware that the French Government were in agreement with the German in excluding other Powers from their conversations, on condition that France re- served her right to inform her friends and allies of their course. When Spain asked the German Government to be allowed to take part, she was informed that Spanish interests would not be affected and that the sole object of the discussions was to remove Franco- German friction. A partition of Morocco, again, which haunted his mind, was never suggested by the German Government ; for the French Govern- ment had made it clear from the outset that it could not be con- sidered. A more legitimate source of apprehension was the extent of the German demands in the Congo. On July 20th, the British Am- bassador asked the French Foreign Minister as to his opinion of a conference in the event of a rupture of negotiations. The negotiations of France and Germany about French equatorial Africa, replied de Selves, would probably last for some time. If they failed, France would not object to Great Britain inviting a Conference of the Signatories of the Act of Algeciras. The cession of Moroccan territory to Germany, however, would be contrary to the pacts of 1904 and 1909. On the same day Jules Cambon reported a heated interview in which Kiderlen loudly complained of indiscretions in the French Press, and censured de Selves for saying to Schon that he could not take Germany's excessive demands seriously. "In such a grave affair I only utter serious words," added the Foreign Minister. "We must both observe discretion. If conversation is rendered impossible, we shall resume our liberty of action, and demand the integral application 444 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE of the Act of Algeciras, and if necessary we will go jusqu'au bout." " I understand your menace," rejoined the Ambassador with dignity, "and your wish to go far, and we are equally willing." The extent of the demands in the Congo filled Sir Edward Grey with alarm. He was, moreover, afraid that the German Government might suddenly yield to the widespread demand in the German Press for a portion of Morocco. " I therefore asked the German Ambassador to see me again on July 21st, " he informed the House of Commons on November 27th. "I said to him, I wished it to be understood that our silence, in the absence of any com- munication from the German Government, must not be interpreted as meaning that we were not taking in the Moroccan question the interest which had been indicated by our statement of the 4th of that month. I had been made anxious by the news which appeared the day before as to the demands which the German Government had made on the French Govern- ment— demands which were in effect not a rectification of the frontier, but a cession of the French Congo, which it was obviously impossible for the French Government to concede. I heard that negotiations were still pro- ceeding, and I still hoped that they might lead to a satisfactory result ; but it must be understood that, if they were unsuccessful, a very embarrassing situation would arise. I pointed out that the Germans were in the closed port of Agadir; that according to native rumours they were landing and negotiating with the tribes, so that, for all we knew, they might be acquiring concessions there and that it might even be that the German flag had been hoisted at Agadir, which was the most suitable port on that coast for a naval base. The longer the Germans remained at Agadir the greater the risk of a state of affairs which would make it more difficult for them to withdraw and more necessary for us to take some steps to protect British interests. The German Ambassador was still not in a position to make any communication to me from the German Government." The account of the conversation given by Kiderlen-Wachter on November 17th, on the basis of the German Ambassador's Report, fills in the outline of the picture. "If the Franco-German negotiations failed," observed the Foreign Secretary, " which in view of our demands appeared by no means unlikely, the Agadir question, in which British interests were also involved, would at once come into the foreground. Therefore, he believed that the time had come when England also should take part in the negotiations." The Ambassador refused to admit that our demands were inacceptable ; and he knew nothing of an intention to establish a naval base. "We had not the slightest intention of injuring English rights and interests, and he could not admit that this had been done by the despatch of a warship. A European Power was justified in undertaking the protection of her interests in a semi-barbaric country. Germany was bound by the THE MANSION HOUSE SPEECH 445 Act of 1906 and the Treaty of 1909, not by the Anglo- French Convention of 1904. After the occupation of the Shawia and the recent conquering march no one could seriously maintain that Moroccan territory had not been violated or that its Sultan was still independent. Owing to those events, we were now compelled to come to an understanding with France on the Morocco question. If France desired that we, like England, should step into the background in Morocco, she must offer some compensation, as England had offered compensation in Egypt. Sir Edward appeared to have two standards, one for France, another for Germany. If he attached so much importance to the inviolability of Morocco territory, he should apply first to France for explanations, as the occupations of the Shawia and the spreading of a French army over the interior constituted a far more active intervention." Sir Edward Grey replied that " he would in no way obstruct an extension of German colonies in the heart of Africa; but English interests might be most seriously affected by the Moroccan question itself. He had therefore honestly hoped for an under- standing between France and Germany, as he had welcomed that of 1909. The situation would become less acute if an exchange of views took place between us before fresh events occurred at Agadir which would compel England to take up a definite attitude." The two men had spoken plainly, though the interview was per- fectly amicable. The Ambassador's telegraphic report reached Berlin the next day, and a reassuring message was at once despatched. It would have been well had Downing Street waited for that reply, and it would also have been well if the German Government had explained its views before instead of after the conversation. A few hours after the interview, a declaration of British policy introduced new elements of danger into a delicate situation. "In the course of that day, July 21st," related the Foreign Secretary, " the Chancellor of the Exchequer told me that he had to make a speech on an occasion of importance at the Mansion House the same evening. He consulted the Prime-Minister and me as to what should be said. It was fourteen days since the last public statement about Morocco had been made here, and that had been only the very short statement made by the Prime-Minister in the House. We were anxious as to the way in which lings were developing, and we all three felt that for a Cabinet Minister of first-rate importance to make a speech on a formal occasion and to say no word about Foreign Affairs after the interview would be misleading to mblic opinion here and everywhere." " I am bound to say this," declared Mr Lloyd George, " that I believe it is sential in the higher interests not merely of this country but of the world, lat Britain should at all hazards maintain her place and her prestige longst the great Powers of the world. If a situation were to be forced on is in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great 446 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievements, by allowing Britain to be treated, where her interests were vitally affected, as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of Nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure." The significance of the declaration was emphasised by a strident leader in The Times. "Mr Lloyd George's clear, decisive and statesmanlike reference to the European situation created by the German demands in West Africa will be endorsed without distinction of party by all his countrymen. In making public the amazing character of these demands on Thursday last, we called attention to the extreme gravity of the claim which they imply. Europe has nothing to lose by revelations which shew the true pretensions of its greatest military Power, even though the diplomacy of that Power may prefer to move, as Dick Turpin preferred to move, in the dark. The purport of such demands as were outlined in Berlin last week is nothing less than a claim for absolute European predominance. Neither France nor Great Britain could have entertained them for a moment without confessing themselves overborne by German power. That is not the intention of our French neighbours, nor is it our own. Mr Lloyd George made that per- fectly clear last night." The date of the Chancellor's speech had long been fixed ; and it was keenly resented by more than one of his colleagues that a step of such importance should have been taken on the spur of the moment without reference to the Cabinet. The Foreign Secretary, who must bear the chief responsibility, seems to have been unaware that he was launching a high explosive, and he defended his action in his historic speech of November 27th. He claimed no preeminence, no predominance for us in international affairs. [The utterance] contained no menace, such as the saying of "Hands off!" to anyone anywhere. "It did not say that there was any particular demand or claim on the part of Germany that was inconsistent with British interests. Its purport and its point was that where British interests were affected, we must not be treated as if we were of no account. If the time ever comes when this cannot be said by a Minister speaking in the position the Chancellor of the Exchequer was in then, we shall have ceased to exist as a great nation." It was precisely the same claim to be considered that the Kaiser had championed at Tangier in 1905, and it provoked the same explosion in Germany as the Tangier declaration had provoked in England1. The German people saw France and Germany engaged in discussing 1 There were not wanting, however, German verdicts of a different character; for men so different as Tirpitz and Bernstein have blamed their Government for leaving Sir Edward Grey in the dark. THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT COMPLAINS 447 the Moroccan Question, and no French statesman had raised the alarm. Suddenly a contingent declaration of war was flung across the North Sea by the leader of the British Radicals. It was regarded in Germany as a wanton interference in a matter which concerned France and Germany alone, and as convincing evidence that Great Britain was as eager to thwart the colonial and commercial ambitions of Germany as she was to encourage those of France. The reply of the German Government to Sir Edward Grey's queries in the interview of July 21st had been despatched before the text of the Chancellor's speech reached Berlin; but orders were at once sent to Count Wolff-Metternich, in presenting the reply, to complain of the Mansion House declaration. "On July 24th, three days after the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the German Ambassador came to see me. He informed me that the German intention in sending a ship to Agadir had not changed. Not a man had been landed there. The German Government regretted the credence which was given to the insinuations as to the intentions of Germany that came from hostile quarters. Germany had never thought of creating a naval port on the coast of Morocco, and never would think of it. Such ideas were hallucinations. As to the negotiations with France, if the German demands were rather high, his Government were ready to make concessions in Morocco as well as in colonial matters; but the chauvinistic tone of the French Press and a part of the British Press, menacing Germany with the interference of the friends of France, did not tend towards a settlement. I said that I was likely to be asked in Parliament what was happening at Agadir, and I should like to know whether I might say that the German Government had informed me that not a man had been landed. The Ambassador asked me to make no public statement with regard to this communication until he had had time to communicate with his Government. The next day, July 25th, he came to see me again, and told me that the information that he had given me on the previous day was confidential, and that the German Government could not consent to its being used in Parliament, in view of the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He then made to me in regard to that speech a communication which has now been published by the German Government, and which I need not read in full to the House, because it has been in the Press here already, except to say about it that that communication was a strong criticism upon the effect of the speech upon the Press rather than upon the substance of the speech itself. The communication, however, was exceedingly stiff in tone, and I felt it necessary to say at once that as the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer seemed to me to give no cause for complaint, the fact that it had created surprise in Germany was in itself a justification of the speech, for it could not have created surprise unless there had been some tendency to think that we might be disregarded. The speech had not claimed anything except that we were entitled to be 448 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE considered as one of the great nations. It had claimed no preeminence, and it had not even indicated that there was a crisis. It dealt in general terms with remote contingencies. The German Government had said that it was not consistent with their dignity, after the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to give explanations as to what was taking place at Agadir. I said to the Ambassador that the tone of their communication made it inconsistent with our dignity to give explanations as to the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I said that it was not intended, by anything that had been said, or would be said here, to embroil the negotia- tions between Germany and France. On the contrary, we sincerely desired that they should succeed." Further light was shed on these momentous conversations by the German Foreign Minister on November 17th. " The Ambassador was instructed to point out that the speech had given rise to violent attacks against Germany by a large portion of the English and the whole of the French Press. It might remain an open question how far the Minister had intended to produce this effect. If England desired to express her wishes, it was open to her to convey them through the usual diplomatic channel. If, instead of doing so, the Government conveyed public declarations by one of its members which could be interpreted at least as a warning to us, and which were in fact interpreted by English and French papers as a warning bordering on a threat, the friendly under- standing between Germany and France, which they professed to desire, would not be advanced thereby. If they had intended to complicate and embroil the political situation and to bring about a violent explosion, they would certainly have chosen no better means than the Chancellor's speech, which took so little into account the dignity of a Great Power which was claimed by him for England. We had never intended to dispose of English interests or rights. Threatening warnings would only have the effect of encouraging Germany to uphold her rights." After the interview of July 25th the clouds quickly dispersed, and on July 26th Sir Edward Grey was authorised to communicate to the House the reassuring message of July 24th. "On the 27th the German Ambassador came to me again and made another communication from his Government, in conversation, so that I took down the words. ' We trust that Sir Edward Grey, by our very open and candid communication, has gathered the conviction that our pour- parlers with France at the moment do not touch British interests. We trust to the Minister's great loyalty, that he has so often shown, that he will find it possible to state this fact in Parliament, without, however, giving any details of our confidential communication. We acknowledge with pleasure that the Minister has stated that he desires an agreement between Germany and France, and feel quite convinced that this will prove most helpful to the progress of the negotiations. But, having in view the wish expressed by Sir Edward, we cannot quite see how he can, END OF THE CRISIS 449 in the present state of the pourparlers, describe our demands as obviously impossible, without knowing what we on our side have the intention to offer to France in the political and colonial field. It is not possible in regard of the formal pledge of secrecy we have given to go into details; but, as the territories to be eventually exchanged are exclusively German and French, we do not believe that special English interests could be touched, and it seems advisable to leave it to the two Parties immediately concerned to form an estimation of the value of the objects to be eventually exchanged. Adverse criticism from the English side must obviously render the negotiations more difficult. On the other hand, a public statement that England would be pleased to see a successful conclusion of the Franco- German pourparlers would have a most beneficial influence on an auspicious result, for which we most earnestly hope. We most seriously wish to diminish any points of friction we have with France in the Colonial sphere, especially in Africa, and hope it may eventually be possible to make them disappear entirely. We could not look forward, even if this was done, to establishing intimate relations with France; but we believed that it would do away with a cause of frequently recurring tension. If the wishes of England are in the same direction, the best way to help to bring about this result would be by having a calming influence on public opinion in France, which just now, by half-truths and inaccurate statements, has been brought to considerable excitement.' I at once expressed appreciation of the friendly tone in which the com- munication was couched. The Ambassador and myself then had some further conversation of a general and informal kind, in the course of which he expressed some regret at the way in which our public opinion had been misled to adverse conclusions as to German action. I asked what else could have been expected, when the German Government suddenly sent a ship to Morocco, to a closed port, which was said to be the most suitable place on the west coast of Morocco for a naval base. Of course, this action had mobilised British public opinion. I also pointed out that, after I had made to him on July 4th a declaration on behalf of the British Government, we had had no communication from the German Government until July 24th, and even then their denial of any intention to establish a naval base had been in a form which I could not use to allay the suspicions which had been roused here. I expressed the hope that this latest German com- munication might be taken as a new point of departure, and that we need not go back upon things which might lead to mutual recriminations. From that date onwards there were no further difficulties between the German Government and ourselves about the Moroccan negotiations." On the same day, the Prime-Minister made a reassuring com- munication to the House : "It is obvious that this Moroccan question has reached the point at which it will become increasingly difficult, embarrassing and anxious, unless a solution be found. Too close an analysis, at the present moment, of the causes and antecedents might provoke in more than one quarter w. &g. in 29 450 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE recrimination and retorts which it is on every ground desirable to avoid. I propose simply to state to the House what is the actual situation today. Conversations are proceeding between France and Germany; we are not a party to those conversations; the subject-matter of them may not affect British interests. On that point, until we know the ultimate result, we cannot express a final opinion. But it is our desire that those conversations should issue in a settlement honourable and satisfactory to both the parties and of which His Majesty's Government can cordially say that it in no way prejudices British interests. We believe that to be quite possible. We earnestly and sincerely desire to see it accomplished. The question of Morocco itself bristles with difficulties; but, outside Morocco, in other parts of West Africa we should not think of attempting to interfere with territorial arrangements considered reasonable by those who are more directly interested. Any statements that we have so interfered to prejudice negotiations between France and Germany are mischievous inventions without the faintest foundation in fact. But we have thought it right from the beginning to make it quite clear that, failing a settlement such as I have indicated, we must become an active party in discussion of the situa- tion. That would be our right as a signatory to the Treaty of Algeciras ; it might be our obligation under the terms of our agreement of 1904 with France ; it might be our duty in defence of British interests directly affected by further developments. There have been times when we were not sure how far this was fully understood. I am glad to say we are now quite satisfied that that is not the case. The statement which I made here at this table more than three weeks ago, and the speech since made elsewhere by my right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, have, I hope and believe, made it perfectly clear that we claim, not any predominant or preeminent position, but that of one party interested in possible develop- ments and in seeing a solution of the present difficulties. In our judgment, it would have been a grave mistake to let such a situation drift until an assertion of our interest in it might, owing to our previous silence, cause surprise and resentment at the moment when this assertion became most necessary and imperative. That, I trust, we have sufficiently guarded against by the statements already made. I repeat that we earnestly desire a successful issue of the conversations now in progress, and I would venture in the general interest to make a strong appeal to the House not, on the pre- sent occasion, to enter into further details or open up controversial ground." The Mansion House speech, while inflaming German opinion, modified German demands. "Kiderlen demanded the Congo from the coast to the Sangha," writes Reventlow, "and he told Cambon, No haggling ; take it or leave it ! Then came the speech, and he drew back." "Yesterday's conversation was very different from the last," reported the French Ambassador on July 24th. The danger, however, was not yet over. " Opinion is excited," reported Cambon on August 20th. " If the negotiations fail, Germany will probably refuse a Con- THE LATER NEGOTIATIONS 451 ference and occupy the Sus. The internal situation affects the external. The elections approach, and the parties compete in patriotism. I hope our apprehensions may be groundless, but it would be levity not to see the possibility of conflict. " The Ambassador's apprehen- sions were shared in Downing Street. "lam not quite satisfied about the negotiations," observed Sir Edward Grey to Benckendorff1. " This unnatural delay does not please me. Much will depend in Berlin on its view of Russia's attitude. What would you do in case of com- plications?" "There is the alliance," replied the Ambassador. "If there is war between Germany and France, England will have to take part. If Russia is involved, it would be no longer a Franco-German duel but universal war. I do not think the Kaiser desired war when this began, and I do not believe he wants war today. It seems impossible that he would decide on war for such a question, if he realises the fearful consequences." On August 23rd, the Defence Com- mittee considered the contingency of sending troops to France ; but no decision was reached, and the question was not discussed by the Cabinet. Returning from his holiday on August 17th, the French Premier, Caillaux, took the helm from the hands of his inexperienced Foreign Minister, summoning the brothers Cambon from Berlin and London and Barrere from Rome to assist the Cabinet with their counsel. An appeal to Sir Edward Grey to renew his warning to Germany against the occupation of Agadir brought the response that if negotiations broke down he would propose a conference. On August 30th Jules Cambon left Paris for Berlin with two sets of Instructions, one for Morocco, the other for the Congo. The concessions in the latter were only to be discussed when France had definitely obtained the Pro- tectorate of the former. On September 4th, when the conversations were renewed, Kiderlen-Wachter virtually accepted the Morocco proposals, but demanded larger compensation than was offered by France. The situation was reported to Sir Edward Grey, who remarked to Cambon that the Protectorate of Morocco was worth large conces- sions. The sky darkened again when, on September 8th, the German Foreign Secretary proposed a rival scheme for Morocco, which its author defended as merely designed to prevent the expulsion of German industry, but which was scouted by the Ambassador as an attempt by Germany, under cover of economic guarantees, to retain her position in Morocco. The critical stage reached in the negotiations became known, and a financial panic ensued. German stocks fell, 1 Siebert, Diplomatische Aktenstiicke, pp. 434-5. 29 — 2 452 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE there was a run on the banks, and the bankers declared that Germany was not financially prepared for war. The Kaiser and the Chancellor were throughout opposed to war; and, after this revelation of economic weakness Kiderlen-Wachter showed himself more accom- modating. The Morocco Accord was signed on October nth, and the covering letters on October 14th. On the following day the Congo discussions were resumed, and the German negotiator remarked : " If you wish them to succeed, you must give us access to the Congo." The thorny question was on the verge of settlement when, on October 27th, he suddenly raised the question of the French preemption of the Congo. His tone suggested a rupture, and the Ambassador accompanied his report with the words, "We must not yield." The incident was promptly reported to London and Petrograd, with a request for communication of their views. Russia suggested that "any change of sovereignty in the Con- ventional basin must be discussed by all the Signatories of the Berlin Act." The formula was approved by Great Britain, and accepted by France and Germany. The Congo Treaty was signed on November 3rd, and the Joint Treaty on November 4th. The exhausting debate of four months, in which Kiderlen and Jules Cambon had had over one hundred interviews, was at an end, and the French Ambassador was satisfied with the result. Nowhere was the feeling of relief caused by the settlement stronger than in London. "Tell M. Caillaux," said Mr Asquith, "that he returns from Berlin, like Lord Beaconsfield, bringing peace with honour." Sir Edward Grey expressed to the French Charge d'affaires his great satisfaction. He noted the renewed guarantee of economic equality in Morocco ; but in Article I Germany consented to French measures of reorganisation of control and financial guar- antees on condition that such action did not infringe the economic equality of the two nations. He presumed this did not mean that Germans would have superior rights to British subjects. He also reiterated, in the presence of the Diplomatic Corps and the Municipal and Sanitary Institutions, the importance Great Britain attached to the preservation of the exceptional character belonging to Tangier. He was sure France would agree to placing the town and district under international control. On November 27th, Sir Edward Grey reviewed the crisis and replied to his British and German critics. The Treaty was signed; but the sea was still rough. SIR EDWARD GREY AND HIS CRITICS 453 11 So much suspicion and gossip have collected that it is exciting men's minds and corroding their tempers to a greater extent than ever before. Some people take delight in suggesting how near we were to war. It is as if the world were indulging in a fit of political alcoholism. The German Foreign Minister now declared that there was never any intention of appropriating any port of Morocco. If, after my communication of July 4th, that intention had been confided to us as definitely as that, a good deal of misunderstanding would have been avoided. Captain Faber's speech had intensified the bitterness of feeling. Of course, there was considerable anxiety, not constant but intermittent, as to how the negotia- tions between France and Germany would find a solution. If either had broken off negotiations — and once or twice late in the summer it looked as if they must reach a deadlock — it is very difficult to see what the next move would have been. We knew France would not break them off abruptly. We did not believe Germany would, either; but there was a possibility, though I never thought a probability. If a deadlock arose we had in mind to propose a Conference. But when I had proposed it hypo- thetically in July, Germany, while not actually refusing, suggested it might not prove acceptable It was a period of tension, not as to what was going to happen in the next twenty-four hours, but anxiety as to what might take place." The speech closed with a vigorous defence of the methods adopted. " There is another foreign policy which would be simply disastrous — that we should give it to be understood that in no circumstances, however wantonly a friend of ours was attacked, would we give any assistance. That would be an attempt to revert to a policy of splendid isolation. It would deprive us of the possibility of having a friend in Europe, and it would result in the other nations of Europe, either by choice or necessity, being brought into the orbit of a single diplomacy from which we should be excluded. In a few years, we should be building warships not against a Two-Power standard but probably against the united navies of Europe. Such an attitude would not even gain us the friendship of Germany. One does not make new friendships worth having by deserting old ones. Is that policy necessarily a bar to good relations with Germany? I do not believe it is. They say in Germany that it is part of our policy always to stand in Germany's way and object to her expansion. It is unfortunate that the Morocco question has come up so often ; but that is a special case, here we have a special Agreement. If Germany has friendly arrangements negotiate in Africa with other Powers, we are not anxious to stand in heir way. We cannot at this moment force the pace in improving relations. The Chancellor's speech is friendly, and, though the breeze is at present anything but favourable, in some ways one can see the horizon is already brightening. He said the Treaty also cleaned the slate in respect of German relations with England. Its effect must be to relax the tension and remove a great obstacle from the path of European diplomacy." : 454 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE The debate which followed was highly critical of the Government. Mr Bonar Law, on behalf of the Opposition, pronounced the Govern- ment policy to be right, but censured the intervention of Mr Lloyd George on the ground that important declarations on Foreign Affairs should be made by the Prime-Minister or by the Foreign Secretary in Parliament. Mr Ramsay Macdonald condemned the Mansion House speech, as he had condemned it on July 27th. Mr Dillon denounced the French policy in Morocco, and denied the danger at Fez, which had been engineered as a plausible excuse for tearing up the Treaty of Algeciras. Mr Noel Buxton asked why Sir Edward Grey did not tell the German Ambassador on July 4th that an early response was desired, or ask the British Ambassador in Berlin to find out when it was expected. From several benches came expressions of regret that the references to Germany were not warmer. The most searching criticism came from Lord Courtney in the House of Lords on the following day. Our Foreign Office, he complained, had always paid less attention to the Act of Algeciras than to our obligation under the Treaty of 1904. We should have pointed out to our friends in France that interference with the integrity and independence of Morocco would provoke complaints from other signatories; but we had allowed the matter to drift and only woke up when the Panther anchored at Agadir. The Chancellor replied in the Reichstag on December 5th. He would follow Sir Edward Grey's good example and avoid recrimina- tions ; but the tension could have been avoided if greater confidence had been placed in the German declarations and if the Chancellor of the Exchequer had not intervened. The root of all the trouble was the disposal of Morocco in 1904 by France and England without con- sideration for German interests. "From this arose the necessity for us to go to Algeciras, and then to Agadir, to safeguard our economic interests and to shew the world that we are firmly resolved not to allow ourselves to be elbowed aside." This was now at an end. " The English Ministers have unanimously expressed a desire for better relations with us, and I associate myself entirely with this desire. But it can only come if the British Government is prepared to give in her policy positive expression to her need for such relations." Among the repercussions of the Agadir crisis was the seizure of Tripoli by Italy, who had long cast greedy eyes on the African coast1. In June, 191 1, San Giuliano informed Aehrenthal that Italy might 1 See Sir Thomas Barclay, The Turco-Italian War and its Problems. THE TRIPOLI WAR 455 have to annex the country, and when Jagow announced the voyage of the Panther he remarked : " Tripoli's hour is nigh." An ultimatum was issued on September 26th, and war was declared on September 29th. The complaints as to ill-treatment of her nationals and opposition to her trade were mere pretexts. British opinion was hostile; but no word of rebuke was heard from the Minister who had so sharply condemned the annexation of Bosnia. British interests were affected in two ways — first, by the change in ownership, and, secondly, by the proximity of Egypt to Tripoli. It was a relief to the British Government that the last piece of Turkish territory on the African coast should fall into the hands of a friendly Power; and Mr Maxse, in the National Review, welcomed the War as a means of preventing Germany from seizing Tobruk and establishing a naval base in the Mediterranean. The British occupation of the theoretically Turkish province of Egypt gave rise to no difficulties ; for the Sultan did not ask leave to send troops across the Nile, nor did he request the service of Egyptian troops, as in the Crimea and in the War of 1877. Egypt was declared neutral, and the Italian Consuls remained at their posts. The only friction occurred when the opportunity was taken to clear up the question of the Egyptian frontier. Turkey and Italy had been informed in November, 1904, that Egypt included Solium1; but, in notifying the blockade of Turkish Africa, Italy adopted the boundary claimed by Turkey. The Egyptian Government accordingly sent troops to Solium, and the eastern frontier of Tripoli was thus definitely drawn to the west of the bay. " Italy is unpopular," reported Benckendorff on November 6th, "but the Government will not endanger good relations." This passive attitude was sharply challenged on November 27th by Mr D. M. Mason, who moved "that this House protests against the unwarrantable seizure of Tripoli by Italy and desires to express its horror and detestation at the recent massacre of Arabs, and urges the Government to protest against this outrage on humanity." "His speech puts me in an absolutely impossible position," replied the Foreign Secretary. "He assumes that I have official information confirming his reports. I have not. I have no means of investigating all the statements. A neutral Government cannot collect and publish information about the War. We have adopted neutrality, and we could only depart from it under circumstances gravely concerning British interests." The Foreign Secretary was less pro-Italian than 1 This fact was revealed by the Foreign Office, December 19th, 191 1. 456 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE his critics imagined, and he had to think of the damage to British trade. He twice invited the Great Powers to address a joint warning to Italy not to tamper with the Dardanelles; but his appeal was in vain. Aehrenthal handed the second invitation to the Italian Am- bassador, remarking: "This may amuse you; I shall not answer it1." Though the War involved Great Britain in no direct controversy with Turkey, its result was to accentuate the estrangement which had begun with the overthrow of Kiamil early in 1909, and had been intensified by the hideous massacre of Armenians in Adana and by the ruthless policy of Ottomanisation pursued by the Young Turks. VIII. Lord Haldane's Mission, 1912 The spectacle of Great Britain standing in shining armour beside France produced its inevitable result beyond the Rhine. "I went to Berlin in the autumn," writes Tirpitz, "and represented to the Chan- cellor that we had suffered a diplomatic check, and must salve it by a Supplementary Naval Bill." The Kaiser agreed, and the Chancellor was instructed to work the Supplementary Bill into the Budget of 19 1 2. But while Tirpitz was striving 'for an increase of the Fleet, wiser heads resolved on a fresh attempt to relieve the tension which had threatened the Peace of the World. At the beginning of December, the Kaiser approved a suggested sounding of British statesmen, and shortly before Christmas Count Wolff-Metternich had a promising dis- cussion with Sir Edward Grey2. At the same time, a Memorandum was drawn up by Mr Lloyd George and Mr Churchill. Germany was to recognise British superiority at sea, not to increase her Navy programme, and possibly to reduce it. Great Britain, on her side, was not to impede German Colonial expansion. Both Powers were to declare that they would take no part in aggressive plans or in com- binations against each other. With the approval of the Foreign Minister, this Memorandum was entrusted to Sir Ernest Cassel, who in January, 19 12, was about to pay one of his periodical visits to Berlin, for presentation to the Kaiser3. Sir Ernest Cassel returned with an answer that all steps towards better relations would be wel- come. The German Government assented to the Memorandum, with the important reservation that its standpoint in the Navy problem 1 Seton-Watson, Europe in the Melting-Pot, p. 94. 2 Bethmann-Hollweg, Betrachtungen, 1. 48-50. 3 Since 1908 Sir Ernest Cassel and Ballin had engaged in semi-official discussions on naval rivalry, reporting the results to their respective Governments. See Huldermann, Albert Ballin. ch. 8. MR CHURCHILL ON THE "LUXURY FLEET" 457 was the Navy Law plus the Novelle or Supplementary Law then ready for production. The Kaiser suggested a direct exchange of views between the Governments, and an early visit from Sir Edward Grey was proposed. Shortly afterwards, the German Government was informed of his readiness to come to Berlin, if the conclusion of an agreement appeared assured; but, meanwhile, Lord Haldane would be sent on a private Mission. Sir Edward Goschen travelled to London to make arrangements for the forthcoming visit; and Lord Haldane arrived in Berlin on February 8th. On the day after Lord Haldane reached Berlin, the First Lord of the Admiralty delivered a speech at Glasgow which was scarcely calculated to facilitate the pacific efforts of his colleague. " The purposes of British naval power are essentially defensive. We have no thoughts, and we have never had any thoughts, of aggression, and we attribute no such thoughts to other Great Powers. There is, however, this difference between British naval power and that of the great friendly empire of Germany. The British Navy is to us a necessity, and from some points of view the German Navy is to them more in the nature of a luxury. It is existence to us ; and it is expansion to them. The whole fortunes of our race and empire, the whole treasure accumulated during so many centuries of sacrifice and achievement, would perish if our naval supremacy were to be impaired. It is the British Navy which makes Great Britain a Great Power. But Germany was a Great Power, respected and honoured all over the world, before she had a single ship. The Prime-Minister and his colleagues without exception are resolved to maintain the naval supremacy which this country enjoys; and the country was never more united in its resolve to see the supremacy of the Navy maintained. We learn that there are prospects of further naval increases among the Powers of the Continent. Whatever may happen abroad, there will be no whining here; no signals of distress will be hoisted, no cries for help or succour will go up.... We should be the first Power to welcome any retardation or slackening of aval rivalry. We should meet it not by words but by deeds. But, if there e to be increases on the Continent, we shall have no difficulty in meeting em. We shall make it clear that other naval Powers, instead of over- ing us by additional efforts, will only be more outdistanced. I say, build your great dock, build it long and build it deep, and above all build it wide. We will provide you with no lack of great vessels to fill it; and you will know that your citizens are aiding the British Navy, which enables us to pursue our path through the world, seeking no quarrel and fearing none." The reference to the "luxury fleet," though not inaccurate, was singularly tactless, and strengthened the suspicions with which Tirpitz and his friends regarded the olive-branch carried by Lord Haldane. S11UI r 458 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE " My first interview," relates the Envoy, " was with the Imperial Chan- cellor1. We met in the British Embassy, and the conversation, which was quite informal, was a full and agreeable one. My impression, and I still retain it, was that he was then as sincerely desirous of avoiding war as I was myself. I told him of certain dangers quite frankly, and he listened and replied with what seemed to me to be a full understanding of our position. I said that the increasing action of Germany in piling up mag- nificent armaments was, of course, within the unfettered rights of the German people. But the policy had an inevitable consequence in the drawing together of other nations in the interests of their own security. This was what was happening. I told him frankly that we had made naval and military preparations, but only such as defence required, and as would be considered in Germany matter of routine. I went on to observe that our faces were set against aggression by any nation, and I told him, what seemed to relieve his mind, that we had no secret military treaties. But, I added, if France were attacked and an attempt made to occupy her territory, our neutrality must not be reckoned on by Germany. For one thing, it was obvious that our position as an island protected by the sea would be affected seriously, if Germany had possession of the Channel ports on the northern shores of France. Again, we were under treaty obligation to come to the aid of Belgium in case of invasion, just as we were bound to defend Portugal and Japan in certain eventualities. In the third place, owing to our dependence on freedom of sea-communications for food and raw materials, we could not sit still if Germany elected to develop her fleet to such an extent as to imperil our naval protection. She might build more ships, but we should in that case lay down two keels for each one she laid down. The Chancellor said that he did not take my observations at all in bad part; but I must understand that his Admirals and Generals were pretty difficult. I replied that the difficulty would be felt at least as much with the Admirals and Generals in my own country. ... I left the Chancellor with the sense that I had been talking with an honest man struggling somewhat with adversity. Next day I was summoned to luncheon with the Emperor and Empress at the Schloss, and afterwards had a long interview with the Emperor and Admiral von Tirpitz in the Emperor's Cabinet room My reception by the Emperor was very agreeable; that by Tirpitz seemed to me a little strained The Emperor handed me a confidential copy of the draft of the proposed new Fleet Law, with an intimation that he had no objection to my communicating it privately to my colleagues. I was careful to abstain even from looking at it then, for I saw that, from its complexity and bulk, it would require careful study. So I simply put it in my pocket. But I repeated what I had said to the Chancellor, that the necessity for secure sea-communications rendered it vital for us to be able to protect ourselves on the seas. Germany was quite free to do as she pleased; but so were we, and we should probably lay down two keels for every one which she added to her programme. The initiative in slackening competition was 1 Haldane, Before the War, pp. 57-70. LORD HALDANE'S REPORT 459 really not with us, but with Germany. Any agreement for settling our differences and introducing a new spirit into the relations of the two nations would be bones without flesh, if Germany began by fresh ship- building, and so forced us to do twice as much. Indeed, the world would laugh at such an agreement, and our people would think that we had been fooled. I did not myself take that view, because I thought that the mere fact of an agreement was valuable. But the Emperor would see that the public would attach very little importance to his action, unless the agreement largely modified what it believed to be his shipbuilding pro- gramme. We then discussed the proposal of the German Admiralty for the new programme. Admiral von Tirpitz struggled for it. I insisted that funda- mental modification was essential, if better relations were to ensue. The tone was friendly ; but I felt that I was up against the crucial part of my task. The Admiral wanted us to enter into some understanding about our own shipbuilding. He thought the Two-Power standard a hard one for Germany, and, indeed, Germany could not make any admission about it. The idea then occurred to us that, as we should never agree about it, we should avoid trying to define a standard proportion in any general agree- ment that we might come to, and, indeed, say nothing in it about ship- building; but that the Emperor should announce to the German public that the agreement on general questions, if we should have concluded one, had entirely modified his wish for the new Fleet Law, as originally con- ceived, and that it should be delayed, and future shipbuilding should at least be spread over a longer period. The Emperor thought such an agree- ment would certainly make a great difference, and he informed me that his Chancellor would propose to me a formula as a basis for it. I said that I would see the Chancellor and discuss a possible formula, as well as terri- torial and other questions with him, and would then return to London and report to the King (from whom I had brought him a special and friendly message) and to my colleagues the good disposition I had found, and leave the difficulties about shipbuilding and indeed all other matters to their judgment. For I had come to Berlin, not to make an active agree- ment, but only to explore the ground for one with the Emperor and his Ministers. I had been struck with the friendly disposition in Berlin, and a not less friendly disposition would be found in London. At my final meeting with the German Chancellor, I pressed on him how important it was for public opinion and the Peace of the World that Germany should not force us into a shipbuilding competition with her — a competition in which it was certain that we should have to spare no effort to preserve our margin of safety by greater increases. He did not controvert my suggestion. I could see that personally he was of the same mind. But he said that the forces he had to contend with were almost insuperable. The question of a retardation of building under the proposed Fleet Law was not susceptible of being treated apart from that of the formula of which he and the Emperor had both spoken. He suggested that we might agree on the following formula : 460 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE I. The High Contracting Powers assure each other mutually of their desire for peace and friendship. II. They will not, either of them, make any combination, or join in any combination, which is directed against the other. They expressly declare that they are not bound by any such combination. III. If either of the High Contracting Parties become entangled in a war with one or more other Powers, the other of the High Contracting Parties will at least observe toward the Power so entangled a benevolent neutrality, and use its utmost endeavour for the localisation of the conflict. IV. The duty of neutrality which arises from the preceding Article has no application in so far as it may not be reconcilable with existing agree- ments which the High Contracting Parties have already made. The making of new agreements which make it impossible for either of the Contracting Parties to observe neutrality toward the other beyond what is provided by the preceding limitations is excluded in conformity with the provisions contained in Article II. Anxious as I was to agree with the Chancellor, who seemed as keen as I was to meet me with expressions which I might take back to England for friendly considerations, I was unable to hold out to him the least prospect that we could accept the draft formula which he had just proposed. Under Article III, for example, we should find ourselves, were it accepted, pre- cluded from coming to the assistance of France should Germany attack her and aim at getting possession of such ports as Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne, a friendly occupation of which was so important for our island security. Difficulties might also arise which would hamper us in the discharge of our existing treaty obligations to Belgium, Portugal, and Japan. The most hopeful way out was to revise the draft fundamentally by confining its terms to an undertaking by each Power not to make any unprovoked attack upon the other, or join in any combination or design against the other for purposes of aggression, or become party to any plan or naval or military combination, alone or in conjunction with any other Power, directed to such an end. He and I then sat down and redrafted what he had prepared, on this basis, but without his committing himself to the view that it would be sufficient. We also had a satisfactory conversa- tion about the Bagdad Railway and other things in Turkey connected with the Persian Gulf, and we discussed possibilities of the rearrangement of certain interests of both Powers in Africa. He said to me that he was not there to make any immediate bargain; but that we should look at the African question on both sides from a high point of view, and that, if we had any difficulties we should tell him, and he would see whether he could get round them for us. I replied that I, also, was not there to make a bargain, but only to explore the ground, and that I much appreciated the tone of his conversation with me, and the good feeling he had shewn I entertain no doubt that the German Chancellor was sincerely in earnest in what he said to me on these occasions, and in his desire to improve relations with us and keep the peace. So I think was the Emperor; but he was pulled at by his naval and military advisers, and by the powerful, if THE CHANCELLOR AND TIRPITZ 461 then small, chauvinist party in Germany. But still there was the possibility of an explosion ; and, when I returned to London, although I was full of hope that relations between the two countries were going to be improved, and told my colleagues so, I also reported that there were three matters about which I was uneasy. The first was my strong impression that the new Fleet Law would be insisted on. The second was the possibility that Tirpitz might be made Chancellor in place of Bethmann-Hollweg. The third was the want of continuity in the supreme direction of German policy. " Lord Haldane's picture of the friendliness and frankness of the conversations is confirmed by the Memoirs of . Bethmann-Hollweg, who adds one or two details1. " In private conversation Lord Haldane expressed himself as extra- ordinarily pleased with his impressions and hopeful as to the success of the line of action here begun. In the discussion of Colonial questions he made far-reaching offers in return for German concessions* in the Bagdad Railway. In addition to the extension of German South- West Africa on the basis of an understanding as to Angola, he also threw out the possibility of the cession of Zanzibar and Pemba to Germany." The naval discussion with the Kaiser and Tirpitz, adds the Chan- cellor, was, also, not unsatisfactory. "Haldane admitted to me that we must have a novelle and a third squadron. The latter would compel England to keep a larger North Sea fleet, but that was a matter of indifference to her. His chief point was that she should not be compelled to reply to new German Dreadnoughts with double the number. He recognised that it would meet English wishes for the postponement of the three Dreadnoughts if they were laid down in 1913, 1916, 1919. He then asked if we could not drop all additions for the next three years. If we reached a political agreement, our relations would be so good that an addition at a later period would do no harm." Tirpitz's narrative, as might be expected, is written in a spirit of undisguised hostility both to the Chancellor and to the guest2. " The audience (with the Kaiser) was preceded by a lunch at which the Chancellor was present. No politics were talked during the lunch; but the atmosphere was pretty tense. During the succeeding audience I really only played the part of a witness, as the Emperor led the conversation himself. Haldane began to open up to us the prospect of a big African empire, not only of Portuguese but of Belgian and French territories as well. The extravagance of this offer of colonial possessions which did not belong to the English suited the Emperor's temperament. It made a painful im- pression upon me, because the method was too crude and the design too obvious. I admired Haldane, when he claimed with simple modesty 'only' 1 Betrachtungen, I. 50-4. 2 Memoirs, vol. 1. 218-224. TheKaiser shares Tirpitz's viewof the visit,#ttf. ch. 5. 462 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE the Cape to Cairo Railway. I began by declaring that I should welcome an understanding. He politely declined a 2 : 3 proportion — which Lloyd George in 1908 and later Churchill proposed — and maintained the Two- Power Standard. He next proposed a delay in the building of the three ships. I tried to make clear the difficulties which a further change in the Bill would involve, as we had already reduced our programme considerably out of regard for England. But, when he proposed we should retard the rate of our increase, and, 'in order to lubricate the negotiations,' should at least cancel the first of the three ships, I sacrificed the ship against my real principles and without any return. I would have sacrificed the whole Bill for a really solid agreement of neutrality, as I had told the Kaiser. After he had pocketed this concession, he cautiously touched on the question whether the Navy Bill itself must be carried out ; but here the Kaiser inter- vened, and he withdrew his feeler. I felt certain that the real desires of the English were not directed against the bagatelle of the three supple- mentary ships, but against the Bill itself. Though the later negotiations came to nothing, I kept to the sacrifice of the ship so as to leave no doubt about our goodwill. As we left the Castle, Haldane expressed himself satisfied with the conversation. I had gathered : 1. That the real object was to cripple the development of our Fleet. 2. That the naval offer was not three to two but two keels to one. 3. That Bethmann's neutrality formula was not considered. 4. That our naval subjection was to be rewarded solely by reversions in Africa. Haldane was not ready to sugar our subjection if we entered into vassalage. He offered us nothing, but skilfully sowed discord among us. If he had made a reasonable offer I was prepared to say, When we get the 2 : 3 proportion and a solid friendship, we will discuss the reduction of the Navy Bill." The visit gave genuine pleasure to friends of peace in both countries. The Tsar privately expressed his satisfaction with the result of the mission. Lord Haldane 's business in Berlin was defined by M. Jules Cambon as " a detente, not an entente "and it was welcomed as such by M. Poincare; though military circles in France feared that a naval agreement would allow Germany to spend more on her Army. When Parliament met, on February 14th, the leaders of both parties expressed their goodwill to Germany and their desire for cordial relations. " Last summer," observed Lord Lansdowne, "we were on the eve of a serious quarrel with the Power with which every right-thinking Englishman desires not only to live at peace but to cooperate. It is lamentable that such misunderstandings and apprehensions should exist, and it is the duty of all right-thinking persons to dispel them. If Lord Haldane has come back with an olive-branch in his buttonhole, we shall congratulate him on this side of the House as warmly as on his own." THE NEUTRALITY NEGOTIATIONS 463 In his first conversation with the German Ambassador after Lord Haldane's return, Sir Edward Grey declared himself "immensely impressed " with his colleague's report of his conversations with the Chancellor, and declared with the greatest emphasis his determination to carry on the work thus begun. He hoped it would be possible gradually to disperse the war-cloud. Everything depended on a detailed examination of the German suggestions1. But when the Novelle was studied by the Admiralty, it was discovered to involve a sensational increase in the size and striking power of the Fleet. If it became law, declared the Admiralty, Great Britain would have to spend eighteen millions a year more on her Navy. "The British mistrust of the plans of the German naval authorities," writes Bethmann-Hollweg, " was as obvious as the apprehension in German naval circles that our naval armament might be paralysed. I was resolved to work for the utmost concessions in the Navy question if I could secure compensation in a political arrangement. But that was refused by England." The negotiations began with the presentation and rejection of the neutrality formula which the Chancellor had outlined to Lord Haldane in Berlin. Count Metternich upon this pressed for counter-proposals, which he stated would be without prejudice and not binding unless we were satisfied that our wishes were met on the naval question2. On this understanding, Sir Edward Grey, on March 14th, 19 12, gave Count Metternich the following draft formula, which had been approved by the Cabinet : "England will make no unprovoked attack upon Germany, and pursue no aggressive policy towards her. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object." Count Metternich thought this formula inadequate, and suggested two alternative additional clauses : "England will therefore observe at least a benevolent neutrality, should war be forced upon Germany; or England will therefore, as a matter of course, remain neutral if a war is forced upon Germany. This," he added, "would not be binding unless our wishes were met with regard to the naval programme." Sir Edward Grey considered that the British proposals were sufficient. He explained that, if Germany desired to crush France, England might not be able to sit still, though, if France were aggressive or attacked Germany, no support would be given by His Majesty's Government or approved by 1 Bethmann-Hollweg, I. 54-5. 2 This official account of the negotiations was issued by the Foreign Office in 1915. 464 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE England. " It is obvious that the real object of the German proposal was to obtain the neutrality of England in all eventualities, since, should a war break out, Germany would certainly contend that it had been forced upon her, and would claim that England should remain neutral." Sir Edward Grey eventually proposed the following formula : " The two Powers being mutually desirous of securing peace and friend- ship between them, England declares that she will neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part of any treaty, understanding, or com- bination to which England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object." Sir Edward Grey, when he handed this formula to Count Metternich, said that the use of the word "neutrality" would convey the impression that more was meant than was warranted by the text; he suggested that the substance of what was required would be obtained and more accurately expressed by the words "will neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked attack." Count Metternich thereupon received Instructions to make it quite clear that the Chancellor could recommend the Emperor to give up the essential parts of the Novelle (the Bill then pending for the increase of the German Navy) only if we could conclude an agreement guaranteeing neutrality of a far-reaching character and leaving no doubt as to any interpretation. He admitted that the Chancellor's wish amounted to a guarantee of absolute neutrality, failing which the Novelle must proceed. Count Metternich stated that there was no chance of the withdrawal of the Novelle, but said that it might be modified ; it would be disappointing to the Chancellor if we did not go beyond the formula we had suggested. Sir Edward Grey said that he could understand that there would be disappointment if His Majesty's Government were to state that the carrying out of the Novelle would put an end to the negotiations and form an insurmountable obstacle to better relations. His Majesty's Government did not say this, and they hoped the formula which they had suggested might be considered in connexion with the discussion of territorial arrangements, even if it did not prove effective in preventing the increase of naval expenditure. Sir Edward Grey added that, if some arrangement could be made between the two Governments, it would have a favourable though indirect effect upon naval expenditure as time went on; it would have, moreover, a favourable and direct effect upon public opinion in both countries. A few days afterwards Count Metternich communicated to Sir Edward Grey the substance of a letter from the Chancellor, in which the latter said that, as the formula suggested by His Majesty's Government was from the German point of view insufficient, and as His Majesty's Government could not agree to the larger formula for which he had asked, the Novelle must proceed on the lines on which it had been presented to the Federal Council. The negotiations then came to an end, and with them the hope of a mutual reduction in the expenditure of the two countries. MARSCHALL VON BIEBERSTEIN 465 The negotiations failed because each side suspected the other of entertaining unavowed designs. 11 Grey only offered us neutrality in an unprovoked attack," complained the Chancellor, " and refused our addition ' if a war is forced on Germany/ so as not to endanger English relations with France and Russia. Why should such a strictly limited neutrality formula hurt the feelings of England's friends? It would merely have shewn them that they could not rely on her help in an anti-German policy. Ever since 1909, Grey had told me on every occasion of his primary obligation to the Dual Alliance; but in return for his neutrality formula I could not surrender the Novelle. England's effort of reconciliation was sincere; but perhaps we were wrong in under-estimating her intimacy with France and Russia." The Chancellor offered his resignation ; and his enemies were filled with satisfaction. "The neutrality discussions were a waste of breath," comments Reventlow with his usual acrimony. "England had no intention of promising it, or, if she did so, of keeping her promise." "The negotiations," echoes Tirpitz, "shewed that Eng- land was only concerned with extracting concessions in the construc- tion of our Fleet, while giving nothing in return." The termination of the neutrality negotiations was followed by the recall of Count Wolff- Metternich, who observed to Benckendorff that he bequeathed to his successor a better situation than had existed for a long time1. He was followed by Marschall von Bieberstein, the best horse in Germany's diplomatic stable. His seven years' tenure of the Foreign Office after the fall of Bismarck and his commanding position at Constantinople had given him the knowledge and habit of affairs, and his towering figure set off his qualities of mind and will. Though the author of the Kruger telegram had never been reckoned an Anglophil, he took his new task very seriously. "I have long wanted to be Ambassador to England," he remarked to his old friend Sir Edwin Pears, "because, as you know, for years I have considered it a misfortune to the world that our two countries are not really in harmony. I consider that I am here as a man with a mission, my mission being to bring about a real understanding between the two nations2." The burning question, as he was well aware, was the Fleet. " He immediately began to study seriously the preparations of the two Navies," writes Tirpitz, " without a knowledge of which it was impossible to undertake any real negotiations with England. He came to see me shortly before his departure, and we agreed as to our naval policy. His appearance 1 Benckendorff to Sazonoff, May 18th. Siebert, p. 767. 2 Forty Years in Constantinople, p. 330. w.&g. in 30 466 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE in London stopped for a time the German method of kow-towing to the English. He knew that the Briton becomes more respectful, the more resolutely his competitor maintains his own standpoint. He declared that Germany could not carry out her economic policy without possessing sea power that avoided the necessity of yielding to England at every turn. When he presented his credentials at Buckingham Palace in July, 191 2, the King honoured him with an address in German. On this occasion he complained that he saw his reception, otherwise so favourable and promising, compromised by the English Press in consequence of another Navy scare speech by Churchill. If things went on in this strain, he felt he would be exerting himself in vain. Our Naval Attache, an eye-witness, said the effect of this firm and dignified manner was very marked." The Ambassador quickly learned to appreciate the high qualities of Sir Edward Grey; but the few weeks of his residence in London before his sudden death during a summer holiday were too short to achieve political results. On the failure of the attempt to limit the naval rivalry, the British Government proceeded to consider its reply to the Novelle. In May, the Prime-Minister and Mr Churchill met Lord Kitchener, now Agent- General in Egypt, at Malta to discuss the problem of the Mediterranean1; and the decisions of the Cabinet were announced by the First Lord of the Admiralty in the House of Commons on July 22nd, on introducing a Supplementary Estimate. The speech opened with the first detailed account of the Novelle which had been given to the British nation. The main feature, he declared, was the increase not in capital ships, but in the striking force of all classes always available. The seventeen battleships in the active Battle-fleet were raised to twenty-five, the four battle cruisers to eight, the twelve small cruisers to eighteen. Out of 144 torpedo-boats ninety-nine would be ready instead of sixty-six. Four-fifths of the entire Navy would be in full permanent commission — a proportion unknown elsewhere. The personnel would increase by 15,000, which would make a total in 1920 of 100,000. Two battleships and two small cruisers were added to the programme. When completed in 1920 there would be forty-one battleships, twenty battle cruisers, forty small cruisers. The aspect and scale of this Fleet were extremely formidable. It aroused no opposition, and the only criticisms were of its inadequacy. "We ought to learn from our neighbours, whose policy marches unswervingly towards its goal across the lifetime of a whole generation/ ' The increased fighting power of the German 1 Arthur, Life of Lord Kitchener, 11. 336-7. THE GREY-CAMBON LETTERS 467 fleet, added Mr Churchill, involved a considerable reorganisation of the British fleet to maintain the margin of safety. The full-commis- sioned battleships in home waters would be raised from sixteen to twenty-four. The Mediterranean was quite safe, for neither Austria nor Italy possessed a Dreadnought. The British and French fleets were superior to any possible combination. Mr Balfour, following the First Lord in debate, declared the speech calculated to cause even graver anxiety than that of the Foreign Secretary in 1909. The best hope for the preservation of peace lay in the system of alliances, which enabled one Power to restrain a colleague within its own group from precipitate action. Three days later, the Prime-Minister, in opening a debate on the Committee of Imperial Defence, made a reassuring statement. "We cultivate with great and growing cordiality our special friendships; but they are in no sense exclusive. Our relations with the great German empire are at this moment — and I feel sure are likely to remain — relations of amity and good will.' ' The concentration of our naval forces was facilitated by the fact that France had to face the prospect of dealing with the combined fleets of Austria and Italy, and therefore desired to focus her whole Battle-fleet in the Mediterranean1. This involved exposing the Atlantic and Channel coasts to attack ; but it was anticipated that the British fleet would fill the vacuum. In the early autumn, accordingly, it was announced that the Third French Battle Squadron, based on Brest, was to join the First and Second in the Mediterranean; and, in the spring of 1913, the whole of the Atlantic defence flotillas were de- mobilised and the defence of the ports was handed over to the army. There only remained at the northern bases six old armoured cruisers, and the flotillas which were to cooperate in the defence of the Channel. These momentous changes appeared to necessitate a closer political understanding. " The British and French General Staffs," writes M. Poincare2, " had ex- amined a hypothetical programme of defence ; but even if we were the victims of an unjustifiable attack, the British Government had entered into no engagement towards us. We could not abandon the safeguarding of the Channel and our Atlantic coasts without being assured that in case of danger discussions would take place on the attitude, and if necessary the practical measures, to be taken. Accordingly M. Cambon, with my approval, proposed to the British Ministry to record in an exchange of letters the mutual assurance that, if the peace of Europe was threatened, 1 See Sir J. Corbett, Naval Operations, I. 7-9. 2 Poincar£, Les Origines de la Guerre, pp. 79-81. 30 — 2 468 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE the two Governments would at once examine the situation. Mr Asquith and Sir Edward Grey accepted in principle this idea which I had sub- mitted to the French Government; and on October 30th the British Cabinet adopted a text suggested by M. Cambon, declaring that if war appeared inevitable the two Governments would put into operation the military and naval conventions prepared by the Staffs." Three weeks later, on October 22nd, the nature of the entente was defined in an exchange of letters between Sir Edward Grey and the French Ambassador. " From time to time in recent years," wrote the Foreign Secretary, " the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British Fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to cooperate in war. You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other. I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immedi- ately discuss with the other, whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common." To this communication the Ambassador replied by a letter in similar terms. "The formula," comments M. Poincare, "was purely hypothetical and involved no definite obligation of reciprocal aid. The situation was only very slightly modified. The Cabinet did not feel able to contract a positive engagement without the authority of Parliament. But, in default of an Alliance, the friendship of Great Britain gave to our foreign policy more authority, and during the crises which followed one another since 1905 we stood shoulder to shoulder with England, united with her at least as closely as with Russia. In Balkan affairs we consulted her first. For several years the two Governments consulted each other day by day, hour by hour, and not once did either take an isolated initiative." The Grey-Cambon formula1 left the British Government in theory with its hands free; but M. Poincare's comments show that it understated the intimacy of the relationship which had grown up in eight years of diplomatic cooperation. 1 It became known to the German Government in March, 191 3. ANGLO-BELGIAN CONVERSATIONS 469 11 To make plans with one Power," writes Lord Loreburn/'for a common war against another Power, should necessity arise, is a serious matter; and whatever reservations may be expressed as to preserving freedom of action, the attitude of the one country towards the other will be indelibly affected by such an intimate cooperation. It does not create, but it portends, a future alliance, and indeed makes such a conclusion almost unavoid- able1." The freedom of the British Government continued to be solemnly reiterated at intervals by the Prime-Minister and the Foreign Secre- tary; but, from 191 1 onwards, every Frenchman regarded Great Britain as bound in honour to come to the assistance of France if attacked by Germany. The problem was further complicated by the fact that France was allied to Russia, whom she was bound to aid if attacked. It was not deemed necessary to embody our relations to the great Slavonic Power in a written formula; yet the action of Russia might concern the fortunes of Great Britain very closely, since an attack on Russia would involve an attack on France. We were thus conditionally involved in the quarrels and ambitions of a distant Power over whose policy we exercised no control. " In effect," writes Lord Loreburn bluntly, "it left the peace of Great Britain at the mercy of the Russian Court." The statement is too sweeping to be literally accurate, for no British Government would have lifted a finger in support of unprovoked aggression. Yet it contains an ele- ment of truth ; for wars usually arise from such a complex of claims and recriminations that both sides are able to maintain with a certain plausibility that they are the victims, not the authors, of the attack which sets the world aflame. In April 191 2, the discussions between British and Belgian experts, commenced in 1906, were revived. As a European War appeared to become more probable, the part which Belgium and the Scheldt might be forced to play became an object of increasing interest to her neighbours. Colonel Bridges, the British Military Attache, conversed with General Jungbluth, head of the Belgian General Staff, on the technicalities of military cooperation ; but, on receiving the General's Report, the Belgian Government took no steps to continue the conversations. No convention was concluded or even discussed. Indeed, when General Jungbluth was invited to attend the British manoeuvres in 19 12, the invitation was declined in order to afford no foundation for the rumour of an entente. But 1 How the War Came, pp. 78-9. 470 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE though no common action was taken, both countries proceeded to prepare for the expected storm. Belgium introduced compulsory service in 1913, and elaborate surveys of Belgian roads and railways were undertaken by the British War Office. IX. The Last Years of Peace, 1912-1914 "When the neutrality negotiations were on the eve of failure," writes Bethmann-Hollweg, " Grey told WolfT-Metternich that, even if no agreement were realised, he hoped that Lord Haldane's visit and the free exchange of views would form the foundation of more trustful intercourse." The hope was fulfilled when concrete problems were taken in hand. The Treaty of 1898, defining British and German spheres of influence in the Portuguese Colonies, was taken out of its pigeon-hole and reexamined ; while the more difficult problem of the Bagdad Railway was attacked with a determination to reach an agree- ment. These negotiations, however, were only beginning when war broke out in the Balkans in October, 19 12; and their story must be postponed till the date when this agitating interlude, which occupied the Chanceries of Europe for nearly a year, was at an end. The year 19 12 opened with dark clouds on the eastern horizon. The death of Count Aehrenthal, once the stormy petrel of European politics, was regretted; for he had championed the cause of peace since 1909 against the bellicose Chief of the Staff, Conrad von Hotzendorff, and his successor, Count Berchtold, was headstrong and incapable. A Military Convention between Servia and Bulgaria was signed in April, determining the conditions of mutual aid in the event of attack by Turkey, Roumania and Austria, or of an attack on Turkey. A Graeco- Bulgarian Military Convention followed in Septem- ber, and a verbal understanding was reached with Montenegro. In the same month, Austria enquired whether the Great Powers would join in "recommending to Turkey the adoption of a policy of pro- gressive decentralisation, which would secure to the Christian nationalities their legitimate guarantees, and in urging the Balkan States to await peacefully the results of their policy." The Powers approved; but Berchtold seemed in no hurry to follow up his sug- gestion, and on October 8th Montenegro gave the signal for the Balkan War by attacking her ancient foe. Though Turkey at once concluded peace with Italy, and though her population was nearly double that of her four enemies, her armies THE BALKAN WARS 471 were rolled back by their impetuous onslaught, and within a month the campaign was decided. British opinion was almost unanimously on the side of the Christian States ; but the Foreign Secretary watched the struggle with a critical eye1. When visiting Balmoral on the eve of war, Sazonoff found him opposed to the coercion of Turkey by the Powers. 11 The action of England," he reported to the Tsar, " is now governed by a resolve not to arouse Moslem hostility, especially in India. Thence arises the apparent indifference to the fate of the Turkish Christians. Moreover, he does not wish to weaken the Kiamil Government, or to see him replaced by some pro-German Young Turk. Though anxious to cooperate in keeping the Balkans quiet, he often hesitates to accept plans for fear of their effect in Constantinople. We cannot reckon on English support if energetic coercion of the Porte seems necessary2." This attitude of detachment was quickly modified by the outbreak of hostilities, as BenckendorfT telegraphed with satisfaction in reporting a conversation on October 21st. Even if Turkey won, declared Sir Edward Grey, radical reforms must be secured by direct intervention of the Powers. If necessary, a nominal Turkish sovereignty might be preserved. The territorial status quo was desirable; but, in any case, there should be no Turkish gains. The Prime-Minister spoke for the country when he declared, at the Guildhall on November 9th, that the Powers would recognise accomplished facts, and would not oppose the territorial changes resulting from the victory of the allies. The rapid triumph of the Balkan States raised difficulties for their champions. Sir Edward Grey expressed the hope that the Tchataldja lines would be held, adding that, if the Turks were ejected from their capital, it should be internationalised. His apprehensions, however, were quickly relieved ; for the Bulgarian wave had spent its force. A far graver problem was raised by the victories of Servia and by her resolve to secure an outlet on the Adriatic. These possibilities of explosion threw a special responsibility on Great Britain, of which she showed herself fully conscious throughout the Conference of Ambassadors which sat in London from December onwards. The task of its Chairman, Sir Edward Grey, was to prevent Russia and Austria flying at each other's throats. Russia was compelled to accept the veto of Austria and Italy on Servia's occupation of Durazzo ; and her disappointment was no less keen when the King of Montenegro, 1 Fresh light is thrown on British policy during the Balkan wars by the French Yellow-books, Les Affaires Balkaniques, 1912-1914, 3 vols. 1922. 2 Siebert, Diplomatische Aktenstiicke, pp. 546-50. 472 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE whose forces had entered Scutari after a siege lasting throughout the winter, was commanded to withdraw, since the town was destined for the new State of Albania. All the more tenaciously did she insist on the inclusion of certain Albanian villages within the frontiers of Servia. Throughout these agitating controversies, the British and German Governments worked in perfect accord for the preservation of peace. "Sir Edward," writes Prince Lichnowsky, who had suc- ceeded Marschall von Bieberstein and speedily learned to admire the character of the Foreign Secretary, "from the very beginning took up the position that England had no interest in Albania. He merely wished to mediate between the two groups as an 'honest broker.' He, therefore, by no means took sides with the Entente, and his authori- tative influence contributed in no small measure to agreement. On all questions we took sides with Austria and Italy, while Sir Edward Grey hardly ever backed the French or Russian claims Thus with his assistance it was possible to coax King Nicholas out of Scutari He conducted the negotiations calmly and tactfully. When a question threatened to become involved, he sketched a formula which was always accepted. His personality inspired equal confidence in all the participants1." A slightly different account is given by Jagow, the German Foreign Minister. "The credit of an attitude of mediation should not be denied to him. Certainly, he often advised yielding at Petrograd, as we did at Vienna, and found formulas of agreement; but he represented the Entente, because, like us, he neither could nor would abandon his associates. We, like England, played a mediatory part2." Sir Edward Grey's services to the calming of the waters were publicly acknowledged by the Foreign Minister in the Reichstag on February 7th, 19 13. "We have now seen that we have not only points of contact with England of a sentimental nature. I am not a prophet; but I entertain the hope that on the ground of common interests, which in politics is the most fertile soil, we can continue to work with England, and perhaps to reap the fruits of our labours." Europe, added the Chancellor on April 7th, owed gratitude to the discussions of the Ambassadors for repeatedly dissolving antagonisms. The Kaiser, who also desired a pacific solution, was grateful for the diplomatic lightning-conductor erected in London. It was fortunate for the peace of the world that the Conference 1 My Mission to London, pp. 10-11. • 2 Jagow 's reply to Lichnowsky appeared in Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, March 23rd, 1918. A translation was published in Current History, June, 191 8. THE BALKAN WARS 473 had been established ; for the conflict dragged on beyond all expecta- tion. After a few weeks of war, Turkey had asked for a truce, which was refused by Greece, but granted by her allies. The Representatives of the belligerents met in London in December, and signed a Treaty which was promptly repudiated in Constantinople, where the Govern- ment was overthrown with brutal violence by Enver Bey on January 24th, 1 91 3. During the second stage of the War, Adrianople fell to the combined attack of Bulgarians and Serbs, and Jannina to the Greeks, and in April the diplomats returned to London. But there was now almost open enmity between the victorious allies, Servia demanding a revision of the Partition Treaty of 19 12, and receiving the support of Greece. The Treaty with Turkey was drafted on May 2nd ; but the progress of the negotiations was so slow that, on May 28th, Sir Edward Grey intervened. "Those who are willing to sign the Preliminary Treaty without any alterations should do so imme- diately. Those who are not disposed to sign had better leave London, as it is useless for them to continue to engage in discussions of which the only result is indefinite delay." Two days later, the Treaty was signed by all the Delegates. European Turkey emerged with nothing beyond a foothold in Eastern Thrace ; but her victors proceeded to quarrel over the spoil. On June 29th the Bulgarians treacherously attacked their late allies; but Servia and Greece were reinforced by the advance of a Roumanian army across the Danube, while the dashing Enver reoccupied Adrianople without a blow. The struggle was over so quickly that there was no time for the Powers to take collective action, and Peace was dictated by the victors in August at Bucharest. The ten months of war had left a profound malaise, not only in the Balkans, but also on the broad arena of European politics. The overthrow of Turkey by a League formed under the auspices of the Tsar, and the aggrandisement of his protege Servia, filled the Central Powers with alarm. The German Army was increased, and a capital levy of 50 millions was devoted to strengthening the frontier fortresses, improving the artillery, and augmenting the gold reserve at Spandau. The German military effort inevitably provoked a French response, and the Three Years' Service, which had been abolished in 1905, was restored. Austria, where Conrad von Hotzendorff had been restored to his position as Chief of the Staff after the death of Aehrenthal, was only restrained from action against Servia, when Bulgaria attacked her late allies, by the refusal of her own allies to cooperate. That opinion 474 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE in Russia was no less inflamed than in Germany, Austria and France was proved when, in response to a request from Turkey for a German officer of high rank to reorganise her army, Liman von Sanders was appointed in November, 19 13, to command the First Army Corps1. Sazonoff telegraphed to Benckendorff that a German Commander of an army corps in the Turkish capital was tantamount to a German garrison on the Bosphorus, and suggested that Great Britain and France should make a joint representation at the Porte and ask for compensations. Sir Edward Grey agreed that a German garrison at Constantinople could not be permitted, and proposed to try to per- suade Germany to modify her plan. Meanwhile, he was willing to join France and Russia in asking the Porte if it was really intended to give Liman command of Turkish troops in the capital. Sazonoff, hereupon, asked Sir Edward Grey to approve the following peremptory Note. "The German command would put the whole diplomatic corps in the power of Germany, and the General could take military measures in violation of the Sultan's sovereignty. If Germany obtains such a privileged position, the other Powers would have to consider their own interests." He objected to the threat, and suggested that the three Ambassadors should make a verbal communication to the Porte. "We have heard that a German General has received a very far-reaching command. We assume Turkey will do nothing to jeopardise the independence or security of the Straits and the capital. Other Powers are also interested, and we should be glad of information regarding the contract.' ' A written Note by the Three Powers, he explained, would be a very serious step, while an enquiry was itself a warning. Sazonoff resented the British Foreign Secretary's attempt to pour water into his wine, and complained of his coolness "in a matter of such importance for us"; but he was compelled to adopt the milder course. "If we have changed," he complained to Benckendorff, "it is due to want of confidence in English support. This lack of cohesion and solidarity is a source of lively anxiety; for it constitutes an organic weakness of the Triple Entente, which always damages us in comparison with the solid block of the Triple Alliance." On December 13th, the three Ambassadors accordingly asked the Grand-Vizier for information, and on December 15th the official reply was received. "The General is Chief of the Mission, Member of the War Council, Inspector of Military Schools, 1 See Siebert, Diplomatische Aktenstucke, ch. 17; and Liman von Sanders, Fiinf Jahre Turkei, ch. 1. MISSION OF LIMAN VON SANDERS 475 and Commander of the First Corps. His command is purely technical. The Straits, the forts, and the maintenance of order in Constantinople are not in his jurisdiction." Sazonoff complained that the Turkish reply contained nothing new, and informed Sir Edward that he would now await a British initiative. But the Foreign Secretary, who observed to Lichnowsky that no event had made so profound an impression in Russia since he had been in office, refused to be driven into violent courses; for a conciliatory breeze was blowing from Berlin. A compromise was finally adopted, by which Liman resigned the command of the First Corps and was appointed Inspector-General of the Turkish Army; and at the New Year's reception the Tsar warmly thanked the German Ambassador for complying with his wishes. Great Britain's support of Russia in the Liman incident em- phasised anew the intimacy of their relations. In 19 12 the training of the Turkish fleet had been entrusted to Admiral Limpus; and, in November, 19 13, a contract was signed with the firm of Whitworth and Vickers for thirty years to reorganise the wharves and naval arsenal in the Golden Horn, and to construct a floating dock on the Gulf of Ismid as a naval base. It might well appear strange that the Power which had accepted the task of reforming the Turkish Navy should support Russia's protest against Turkey's invitation to Ger- many to reform her Army. But British policy in the Near East was to follow Russia, wherever possible. When, in 19 13, the Turks had asked for British money and British advisers to reform the adminis- tration in Asia Minor, Sir Edward Grey consulted Russia, and in view of her objections declined the mandate, which was consequently Intrusted to a Dutch and a Norwegian Commissioner. The Liman incident had inspired Sazonoff to submit a Memo- andum to the Tsar " on the necessity of a comprehensive programme f action, in order to assure for us a satisfactory solution of the question of the Straits in the event of being compelled at no distant period to defend our interests in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles1." The Tsar ordered the questions to be discussed by a Crown Council, which met on February 21st, 19 14, and made detailed recommenda- tions relating to transport by land and sea, the construction of new railways in the Caucasus and the strengthening of the Black Sea fleet. Its decisions were unknown to the public ; but the tension was 1 See Laloy, Documents Secrets publics par les Bolsheviks, pp. 74-100; and Das deutsche Weissbuch iiber die Schuld am Kriege, pp. 169-81. 476 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE revealed in a sensational article in the Kolnische Zeitung of March 2nd by its Petrograd Correspondent. "The Russian danger is not immi- nent; but in 1917 the army reforms will be completed and troops are already being massed on her Western frontier Russian arma- ments are enormous, and she will turn her arms against Germany. Such a War would be acclaimed by the whole people." This forecast, which was believed — wrongly, according to Jagow — to have been inspired from Berlin, produced a panic on the Exchanges, and an article in the Bourse Gazette of March 13th, universally attributed to Sukhomlinoff, the War Minister, increased the excitement. " Russia wishes for peace, but is ready for war. The army is not only large, but excellently equipped. Russia has always fought on Russian soil and has always been victorious. Russia is no longer on the defensive. Russia is ready." While the relations between the Dual Alliance and the Central Powers thus grew steadily worse, a welcome detente had occurred between Great Britain and Germany. Though Prince Henry, who was sent on a political Mission in the winter of 191 2, was informed that our relations to France and Russia were as close as ever and that Germany must not reckon on our neutrality in any European War, even the Navy problem seemed for a moment about to enter on a new stage. "Churchill," writes Tirpitz, "who in 1912 still hoped through Haldane to arrange for two keels to one, accepted in 191 3 the 3 : 2 proportion proposed by Lloyd George in 1908. Thus naval agreement was practically achieved, for we had no more Supple- mentary Bills up our sleeve." The problem, however, was too complex to be solved by a formula. "Churchill was annoyed that Tirpitz accepted it," writes Reventlow, "and therefore introduced reserva- tions, such as that the British total was not to include ships far away or indeed in the Mediterranean or the Colonial ships ; and he added that 16 : 10 would not suffice when the pre- Dreadnoughts were with- drawn. His proposal was obviously impracticable and dishonest." Mr Churchill's plan of a naval holiday — that no new ships should be laid down in either country for a year — was put forward in a speech but never brought to the notice of the German Government and never officially supported by the Foreign Secretary. " There are great technical difficulties," observed Bethmann-Hollweg, "and the English Government has not taken it up ; so we must wait. But the fact and the manner of the offer constitute a great advance. It seems to me that the confidence begins to return which has long been lacking, to THE PORTUGUESE COLONIES 477 the detriment of both countries and the world." His optimism was shared by Mr Lloyd George, who, in an interview reported in The Daily Chronicle on January 1st, 19 14, declared that this was the most favourable moment for twenty years to overhaul our expenditure on armaments, since our relations with Germany were infinitely more friendly than they had been for years. Prince Lichnowsky informed his Government that, though Great Britain would indubitably support France if attacked, she would under no circumstances attack or sup- port an attack on Germany. After the settlement of the Morocco crisis, Sir Edward Grey had declared that we had no desire to oppose German expansion in Central Africa, and the possibilities of Colonial cooperation were briefly' discussed by Lord Haldane with Bethmann-Hollweg at Berlin. Negotiations were begun in London after his return1, and the first task was to overhaul the Portuguese Agreement of 1898. When Lichnowsky reached London, he found that the conversations begun by Wolff- Metternich had been carried on by Baron Kiihlmann. "Thanks to the accommodating spirit," he writes, "the new Agree- ment fully accorded with our wishes and interests." Angola, San Thome and Principe, and northern Mozambique were earmarked for Germany, to whom the Agreement was far more favourable than that of 1898. The negotiations were, practically, completed when King George visited Berlin for the marriage of the Kaiser's daughter in May, 1913, and the Agreement was initialled in August. Though the negotiations had proceeded smoothly, a hitch now arose. Sir Edward Grey would only sign if the Agreement of 1898 and the Windsor Treaty were published with it, though Germany might select any time for publication within one year from signature. The Kftlhelmstrasse declined. 1 ' We intended publication , ' ' writes Jagow, ' ' but only at a suitable moment , hen the danger of hostile criticism should be less acute, and if possible ith the simultaneous announcement of the Bagdad Agreement, then near )mpletion. Our hesitation was due to our wish not to stir up fresh trouble. We also had to consider German efforts to acquire economic interests in the Portuguese colonies, which would have been more difficult had the agreement been announced." The real reason for Germany's reluctance was, doubtless, that it would be understood to negative the partition which public opinion 1 See Lichnowsky, My Mission to London-, Jagow's reply to Lichnowsky; Helfferich, Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges ; and "The Bagdad Railway" in The Quarterly Review, October, 191 7. 478 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE regarded as the goal of the negotiations. The delay involved practical difficulties; and, in the spring of 1914, Mr L. Harcourt, the Colonial Secretary, told Lichnowsky that he wished to safeguard German interests, but was in doubt whether he should proceed on the terms of the old or those of the new Treaty. It was urgently desirable to clear up the situation. Lichnowsky 's despatch reporting this con- versation merely brought Instructions to leave matters alone. When, however, the German Ambassador visited Berlin at the end of June, the Chancellor assented to the signature and publication of the Treaty. It still, however, required repeated applications from Lich- nowsky, supported by the Colonial Minister, Dr Solf, before sanction was finally obtained, at the end of July. By that time, however, the War was in sight, and the Treaty was never signed. The discussions relating to Asiatic Turkey were more difficult and far-reaching. On assuming office in January, 1913, Jagow at once took up the question of the Bagdad Railway. After the failure of the Windsor negotiations in 1907, Sir Ernest Cassel and Gwinner, the Director of the Deutsche Bank, vainly attempted to reach an agreement ; but the withdrawal of Russian opposition at the meeting between the Tsar and the Kaiser at Potsdam in November, 19 10, rendered British acceptance of the scheme in some form a mere matter of time. On January 17th, 191 1, Sir Edward Grey observed to Benckendorff that his position as a negotiator had been greatly weakened. Great Britain had no legal title to protest against German control of the proposed line from Bagdad to Khanikin ; but such control would give Germany financial and political influence in Persia. " Germany is strengthened, England weakened. But I make no reproaches. I only ask Russia to keep exclusive control of the line in Persia. A Turkish army under German officers with the use of a railway to Teheran would be a danger. Germany must not have privileges in the Russian sphere which England did not get in 1907." A day or two later, King George urged the Ambassador to draw up the Pact with care. "Russian control of the Persian line would be a security for England, German control a danger." The King strongly favoured a junction of Russian and Indian lines, in which he saw a solution of many difficulties raised by the Bagdad railway. Sir Arthur Nicolson was even more alarmed than his chief or his Sovereign. If Russia allowed German control, he informed Benckendorff, Great Britain would alter her whole policy. " If no way out is found, it is the end of the British policy of the last six years." After these agitating conversations, THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 479 BenckendorfF reported efforts to prevent the Foreign Secretary from resigning. "Our action in the railway question has shattered his conviction that Russia retains complete freedom in her sphere, and he thinks England should have been consulted." "The nervousness of the English is astonishing," replied Sazonoff. "They knew in October that the main theme of the coming negotiations would be the Khanikin-Teheran line. They are still going on, and nothing is settled. We have no idea of giving Germany control." These assur- ances exerted a tranquillising effect; and, when " The Potsdam Agree- ment" was finally reduced to writing on August 19th, 191 1, Sazonoff sent a copy to Sir Edward to show there was no cause for alarm. Like many other projects, however, it was not carried out by 19 14. In the autumn of 1912, the British Government withdrew the demand to share in the Bagdad -Gulf section of the line and agreed to the increase of the Customs on condition: that the interests of Turkey and Great Britain in the Gulf region were defined; that Turkey recognised our right to light, buoy and police the Gulf; that the railway should not be built beyond Basra without our consent; that we reached an agreement in the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab and the control of the port of Basra ; that our rights to navigate the river were confirmed and extended ; that differential treatment on all railways in Asiatic Turkey was forbidden; and that two British representatives should sit on the Bagdad Railway Board. It was on these lines that the final negotiations were conducted , when the Grand- Vizier, Hakki Pasha, visited London for the Peace negotiations after the First Balkan War. On May 21st, 191 3, the Foreign Secretary informed the Russian and French Ambassadors that he could no longer oppose the line, and was about to conclude an agreement with Kurkey and to concede the customs increase. The attempt to inter- itionalise the section south of Bagdad had failed ; but the line would )t be continued beyond Basra without our leave, and two British Directors would watch over the interests of British trade. The negotia- tions proceeded smoothly. Turkey accepted our definition of the status quo in the Gulf, and we recognised the nominal suzerainty of the Sultan over Koweit, though we retained the control over the Sheik's foreign policy and a veto on the alienation of his territory. An International Riverain Commission, with a Turkish facade and British control, was to regulate the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab. The Lynch Company was confirmed in its privileges on the Tigris, and a new Turkish Company was to be formed to take over the 480 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE existing Turkish Company — half the capital to be Turkish and half British, the latter possessing a casting vote. Turkey might alienate 20 per cent, to Germany, in return for her surrender of her navigation rights under the concession of 1903 and her consent to a British share in the construction of the ports at Basra and Bagdad. The German Government was informed of the Anglo-Turkish settlement, and Anglo-German discussions, which began immedi- ately, resulted in a Convention initialled on June 15th, 19 14. In this, Great Britain undertook not to oppose the Bagdad Railway system, and Germany not to oppose British control of river navigation. The terminus was to be at Basra ; two British directors were to sit on the Board ; the construction and exploitation of the ports at Bagdad and Basra to be undertaken by a separate Company, in which British capital was to hold 40 per cent.; while the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab was to be entrusted to a Company in which Great Britain should hold half the capital, Turkey being allowed to hand over 20 per cent, to German capital. Agreements were also concluded in regard to irrigation and oil. As to the former, Germany undertook to avoid competition with the plans of Sir W. Willcocks. In the Oil Company the British share was to be 50 per cent., the German and Dutch 25 per cent. each. The Anatolian Railway Company waived to the Smyrna-Aidin Company its right of objection to certain competing branches. Both parties undertook to prevent discrimination on the railways and rivers of Asiatic Turkey. Germany engaged not to support the establishment of any port or railway terminus on the Gulf without our consent, and recognised our special position on the Shatt-el-Arab. Our promise not to support a railway in direct competition with the Bagdad line did not exclude a line from Egypt to the Gulf or lines needed as feeders for river navigation. On the occasion of the Foreign Office vote, June 29th, the Foreign Secretary announced the settlement. We had signed some Compacts with Turkey, and initialled others with Turkey and Germany, which we could not sign till Germany and Turkey had finished their own negotiations. It was a very complete settlement of many very trouble- some questions. The most important result was that the Railway should not advance beyond Basra except by agreement with us. Equal rights and equal rates were to prevail, and two British directors were to see that the line, over which we had no control and in which we did not participate, was being worked fairly for commerce. Turkey recognised the status quo in the Gulf as. we had understood it for many years — a real understanding, which would prevent either Turkey or ourselves from stirring up trouble. The British negotiators, testifies Helfferich, were stubborn; but the result was satisfactory. GREAT BRITAIN REASSURES FRANCE 481 Sir Edward Grey's most important concession, observes Lichnowsky, was the continuation of the Railway to Basra, the whole of Mesopotamia north of Basra being thus recognised as within the German sphere of influence. Friends of peace on both sides were thankful that the chief cause — except the Navy — of Anglo- German friction had at last been removed. Our negotiations with Germany were watched by our friends with a certain element of suspicion. At the end of 19 12, the French Ambassador was instructed to mention that the press rumours of a rapprochement with Germany were damaging the entente, and that M. Poincare was to answer an interpellation. Sir Edward Grey replied that there was no foundation for the rumours, and that he was only discussing colonial and other subordinate questions in a friendly way. The French Premier accordingly read to the Chamber a reassuring statement which he had submitted to the Foreign Secretary and Mr Asquith. "Since certain doubts have arisen in the public opinion of France as to the present orientation of British policy, Sir Edward Grey has informed the French Ambassador that nothing in British policy is altered, that no new relations with other Powers have been entered into, and that the close Entente with France exists in its full extent1." When M. Poincare, the newly elected President of the Republic, visited London in June, 19 13, he was able to assure himself that all was well. "There is no doubt that the warmth of his reception exceeded that of Loubet and Fallieres," reported BenckendorfF. "Grey tells me he is extremely satisfied with the visit, which has greatly strengthened the Entente2." The feeling of insecurity, how- ever, could not be wholly eradicated. " Goschen asked Cambon his view on a naval holiday," reported the Russian Minister at Berlin in Rbruary, 1914. " Cambon replied that he could not approve, as all savings on the Navy uld go to the Army and be used against France in a future collision. He ks very sadly at the continual rumours of an improvement in Anglo- uerman relations, as it suggests the possibility of a rapprochement. Though I do not wholly share these apprehensions, I cannot wholly forget that Germany and England, when they begin to settle their economic interests in Africa, may go on to more important negotiations which in the long run might lead to a political pact. I can see from here how the German Government is trying to meet the English3." 1 Siebert, Diplomatische Aktenstucke , pp. 802-3. * Ibid. pp. 804-5. 3 Ibid. p. 775. w.&c in 31 482 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE The Liman crisis, in which he deemed Sir Edward Grey in some degree to have left him in the lurch, intensified SazonofT's desire to tighten the bonds of the Triple Entente. On his visit to Balmoral in 19 1 2 he had told him of the new Franco-Russian Naval Convention, and asked if the British Fleet would not render a similar service in the north by drawing off the German Fleet from Russia's coasts. " Recently we have often felt," he wrote to Benckendorff and Izvolsky on February 12th, 1914, "that an instrument is lacking to us which unifies the views and acts of the Powers, like the Ambassadors' Conference in London last year. Correspondence causes delay, which impedes the conduct of affairs Perhaps Grey would not object to the Entente Powers establishing the community of their aims through their Representatives in London; for, while the Powers of the opposing group act, we only take counsel1." The project was well received in London and Paris; but Sazonoff determined to utilise the forthcoming visit of King George and Sir Edward Grey to Paris to secure something more than a mere Stand- ing Committee of Ambassadors. The transformation of the Triple Entente into a new Triple Alliance, he wrote to Izvolsky, seemed to him desirable. "Such an Alliance, while absolutely safeguarding the international position of Russia, France and England, would threaten nobody, as they entertain no thought of conquest, and would be the best security for the maintenance of peace. Certain steps towards cooperation and closer definition of their mutual obligations have been taken between France and England. We must work in the same direction. ... Unfortunately, the domestic situation in Great Britain absorbs the attention of the Govern- ment and public opinion. The soil for international conventions is therefore very unfruitful, and we must proceed very cautiously. I share your view, however, that it would be well if Poincare and Doumergue, taking ad- vantage of the meeting with the King and his Minister, could point out confidentially that a closer relationship between Russia and England would be joyfully welcomed in France and would be equally desirable for all the members of the Entente. The conditions of such a political pact would of course be reserved for direct negotiations between Petrograd and London ; but perhaps the French Government would propose to Grey to inform us of the Anglo-French political compact, which would serve as the foundation for a similar arrangement." The King and Queen arrived in Paris on April 1st, and the importance of the occasion was emphasised by the presence of the Foreign Secretary, who had never left our shores during his long 1 The Russian despatches relating to closer relations with Great Britain and the discussion of a Naval Convention are printed by Siebert, Diplomatische Aktenstiicke, pp. 805-27. KING GEORGE V IN PARIS 483 tenure of office. While enthusiastically welcoming the guests, almost the whole of the French Press urged that the entente cordiale, which had stood the stress of ten years, should be transformed into an Alliance. According to arrangement, Doumergue pleaded for closer relations between Great Britain and Russia, and Izvolsky reported the result to Petrograd. An Alliance was impossible ; but Sir Edward Grey was ready for an arrangement with Russia like that existing with France. A naval convention was possible, and the Anglo-French Agreements might be communicated. "Doumergue and Cambon told me they were astonished at Grey's clear and definite willingness for a close rapprochement." On May 12th, BenckendorfF reported a memorable interview with the Foreign Minister after his return from Paris. cc Sir Edward sent for me to express how profound were the impressions of his journey — impressions which were shared by the King and all who had taken part in the visit. These impressions had far surpassed his expectations, and he could not sufficiently congratulate himself on his reception by Poincare and Doumergue, with whom entire agreement on current issues and the general situation was reached. The reception of Their Majesties, wherever they appeared, was unmistakable. The British Government had drawn the conclusion that the Entente had struck as deep root in France as in England. Grey spoke with a warmth that is not usual with him He went on to say that I was doubtless aware of his conversation on Russia with Doumergue. He could not in that interview give more than his personal assent to the plan that Russia should be informed of all the military arrangements between England and France. He could now tell me that the Prime-Minister had no objection, but that the matter was of course too important to be settled without the assent of the Cabinet. I thanked him for his words, and said he doubtless knew your views on the necessity of a closer connexion between the members of the Entente, which would not exclude an Alliance. Sir Edward replied that an Alliance was impossible and added, 'You see we have even today no Alliance with France.5 " Four days later, the Ambassador reported the favourable result of the Cabinet discussion. Russia would be informed of the Grey- Cambon letters, and negotiations would then take place between the Russian and British Admiralties. The Russian Naval Attache in London might be empowered to negotiate after obtaining his Instruc- tions in Petrograd, whereas the arrival of high Russian officials would certainly become known. BenckendorfT was fully satisfied. " My sojourn in Paris," he wrote to his Chief, " has confirmed my view that an alliance or any public compact is impossible. The reception of the King and Queen was extraordinarily cordial — far more, I was told, than on 31—2 484 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE previous English visits. If, nevertheless, the impossibility of a formal Alliance between England and France was recognised, all the more is that the case between England and Russia. I doubt if a stronger guarantee for common military operations is possible than the spirit of this Entente as it has revealed itself, strengthened by the existing military agreements. Looking back on its different phases, one cannot deny that at critical moments England has never hesitated to take her stand at the side of France. The same is true for Russia, whenever English and Russian interests were simultaneously affected, despite the difficulty of agreement on questions as they arise, and despite the fact that the Entente between Russia and England has not taken such root as that between France and England. A public Alliance would arouse such opposition — not in the Liberal party alone — that it is not worth while, and would add very little to the guarantees which England offers. Even the Englishman who is most deeply convinced that a conflict with Germany is sooner or later inevitable shrinks from binding his country by obligations the results of which he cannot foresee." On May 23rd, the Foreign Secretary gave the Russian Ambassadors the Grey-Cambon letters, adding that there was no objection to a similar agreement with Russia, which would naturally deal with the Navies. The Russian Naval Attache at once returned home for Instructions, and found his Government in high spirits. "Apart from its practical value," wrote Sazonoff to Benckendorff, "we attach special importance to the political aspect. We see in it an important step in associating England more closely with the Franco-Russian Alliance." After full discussion, the Russian Admiralty recommended that Great Britain should hold as large a part of the German Fleet as possible in the North Sea, and thereby render possible a Russian landing in Pomerania ; that for this purpose she might send merchant ships to Russia and the Baltic ports before the beginning of hostilities ; that Russian ships should be allowed to use British harbours in the eastern Mediterranean, as they were already allowed to use French harbours in the Western half; and that information as to signals, ciphers, etc., should be exchanged. Captain Wolkoff returned to London with the Admiralty scheme ; but Benckendorff wisely counselled him not to mention the plan of sending transports to the Baltic. After conversation with Prince Louis of Battenberg, the Naval Attache reported that the British Govern- ment was in no hurry, and that the Prince would visit Russia in August for discussions with the Admiralty. By this time, however, the secret had leaked out. At the end of May, the Berliner Tageblatt, at the instance of the German Government, announced that Great Britain ANGLO-RUSSIAN NAVAL DISCUSSIONS 485 was making a naval convention with Russia1. When, on June nth, Benckendorff informed the Foreign Office that Wolkoff had returned with powers to negotiate, Sir Edward lamented the indiscretions that had occurred, as he would be forced to answer a question in the House; and he sketched the reply which he proposed to make and which would veil the negotiations. Meanwhile, he sought to relieve the apprehensions of the Chancellor, who had instructed Lichnowsky to ask for explanations. On June 24th, Prince Lichnowsky thanked the Foreign Secretary for his declarations, and communicated the Chancellor's belief that trustful cooperation was the key to peace. Sir Edward Grey replied that it was also his object to continue hand in hand with Germany and to remain in close touch in all new questions. He had not the slightest ground to doubt the pacific views of the Russian Government. Benckendorff was no Germanophobe, while the Tsar and Sazonoff always spoke to Sir George Buchanan in a peaceful sense. The French had not the slightest desire for war. There were no unpublished agreements between Great Britain and her friends, and he would never do anything to give the entente a point against Germany; but his relation to the two friends was very intimate and had lost nothing of its strength, and in all important questions they were in continual touch. On receiving Lichnowsky 's report of this interview, Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary, wrote to the Chancellor that the Ambassador was once again talked over by Sir Edward Grey, and suggested that he should be shown the proofs of the negotiations in progress between England and Russia2. On July nth, the Foreign Secretary replied to questions by Mr King and Sir W. Byles whether a naval convention with Russia had been or was being made. "A year ago the Prime-Minister said that, if war broke out between the European Powers, no unpublished agreements existed which could limit the freedom of the Government or Parliament. No negotiations with any *ower have been or are being or are likely to be undertaken which would lake this less true. If any such convention were contemplated which rould modify the Prime-Minister's declaration, it would have to be laid jfore Parliament." 'his ambiguous phraseology was interpreted in different ways; but le inability to meet the question with a direct negative confirmed le suspicious in their fears. 1 From 1909 till the outbreak of war an official in the Russian Embassy in London communicated to the German Government the confidential correspondence between London and Petrograd. See Valentin, Deutschland' s Aussenpolitik, p. 145. 2 Kautzky, Die deutschen Dokumente zum Krtegsausbruch, 1. 6-8. 486 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE The slow progress of the discussions annoyed Sazonoff, who reminded Benckendorff of the necessity for concluding the Convention as soon as possible. "I will do all I can to hasten the negotiations between Captain Wolkoffand the Admiralty," replied the Ambassador on July 2nd; "but I see no reason to believe that the Government has the least objection to carry out the Paris project. If it is not yet finished, it is because Prince Louis is to complete the negotiations in Petrograd. The exact date of this private visit, which is to be kept secret, is not fixed. Another cause of delay is the indiscretions. Perhaps Sir Edward wishes that the disquietude in Berlin should diminish before he goes further. As a matter of fact, he would find it difficult at the same moment to issue dementis and to negotiate — a role he would have to play towards Germany and also towards a large part of his own party and the English Press." Before, however, Sir Edward had time to solve his problem in casuistry, or Prince Louis to sign the Naval Convention in the Russian capital, the whole energies of the British Government were engaged in a desperate effort to maintain the Peace of the World. X. The Outbreak of the War, 19 14 The European atmosphere was already charged with electricity when Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife were murdered by Austrian Serbs at Serajevo on June 28th1. Count Berchtold resolved to seize the opportunity for the final reckoning with Servia for which he had been waiting; and, in answer to an autograph letter from Francis Joseph, William II promised his full support on July 5th. The Chancellor informed the Austrian Ambassador that it was not the German Emperor's business to express an opinion on the questions at issue between Austria and Servia, but that Francis Joseph could rely on his support in accordance with his treaty obligations and his old friendship. No Crown Council was held ; but, before starting on his annual cruise in Northern Waters on July 6th, William II summoned Representatives of the War Office and the Admiralty to Potsdam and warned them of the danger of European complications. The conten- tion that Vienna was the tool of Berlin was as baseless in 19 14 as in 1908; but, by encouraging Austria to take action which was almost certain to plunge Europe into war, the German Government incurred a share in the guilt of the catastrophe scarcely less than that of Austria 1 The most complete collection of official publications is that of J. B. Scott, Diplomatic Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European War, 2 vols., 19 16. PRINCE LICHNOWSKY'S DESPATCHES 487 herself. That William II regarded the Serbs as regicides and savages, and believed that the Tsar would view them in the same light, affords no excuse for the criminal levity with which he urged their prompt and exemplary punishment. While Berchtold was preparing his thunderbolt and assuring himself of German support, Lichnowsky, who had just returned from a visit to Kiel and Berlin, warned Sir Edward Grey, on July 6th, that relations between Vienna and Belgrade were likely to become strained, and suggested that he should persuade Russia to advise Servia to submit to the Austrian demands1. The Foreign Secretary perceived that Austria could hardly refrain from strong measures, promised to remain in touch with Germany, and repeated that he had no evidence of anti-German sentiment in Petrograd. The conversation was resumed on July 9th. Sir Edward Grey was ready to urge Russia to moderation if Austria was compelled to adopt sharper measures against Servia; but much would depend on whether they would inflame Slav feeling to a degree rendering it impossible for Russia to remain passive. The Foreign Secretary, reported the Am- bassador, was in good spirits and remarked that he had no reason for taking a pessimistic view of the situation. The ominous silence of Vienna prompted him to ask Lichnowsky, on July 20th, whether he had any news from that quarter. Austria, replied the Ambassador, would certainly take some steps ; the situation was very uncomfortable, and it would be very desirable if Russia could mediate with Servia. The Foreign Secretary rejoined that Austria would doubtless do nothing till she had disclosed her case, founded presumably on what she discovered at the trial. This would make it easier for other Powers, among them Russia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could keep her demands within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she could produce, the more chance there would be of smoothing over the situation. He hated the idea of a war between any of the Great Powers, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable. In reporting the conversation, Lichnowsky described the Minister as still taking an optimistic view of the crisis. While the British and German Governments were expressing their desire to avoid a world-war, Vienna was preparing to render it virtu- ally inevitable. After receiving the reply of the German Government 1 Lichnowsky's despatches are printed in Kautzky, Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsawbruch, 4 vols., 1919. 488 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE on July 6th, the Ministers of the Dual Monarchy met on July 7th to discuss the situation. Count Berchtold expressed his view that the moment had come to put an end to Servia's intrigues once for all. All present except Tisza, who argued that an attack on Servia involved a world war, agreed that in view of Servia's record a purely diplomatic success would be worthless, and that therefore such stringent demands be presented as to ensure a refusal. In a second Crown Council, held on July 19th, the text of the note to Servia was settled and it was agreed to present it on July 23 rd. Tisza's assent was secured by a resolution that Austria should disclaim annexations. It was understood, however, that the strategic frontiers could be corrected and portions of the country be assigned to other States. On July 22nd, Sir Edward Grey, unwilling to wait longer without information, asked the Austrian Ambassador to see him on the following day; and the Ambassador explained the nature of the ultimatum, which was not to be officially communicated till July 24th. "Count Mensdorff told me he supposed there would be a time-limit. I said I regretted this very much. It might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement. I admitted that, if there was no time-limit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted; but I urged that a time-limit could always be introduced afterwards. If the demands were first made without a time-limit, Russian public opinion might be less excited. After a week it might have cooled down, and, if the Austrian case was very strong, the Russian Government might use their influence in favour of a satisfactory reply from Servia I could not help dwelling on the dreadful consequences involved. It had been represented to me that it would be very desirable that those who had influence in Petrograd should use it on behalf of patience and moderation. I had replied that the amount of influence would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands Count Mensdorff said all would depend on Russia. I re- marked that it required two to keep the peace, and I hoped very much that, if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each other." In reporting the conversation, Count Mensdorff notes that the Foreign Secretary was " as cool and unprejudiced as ever, friendly and not without sympathy for our side, but undoubtedly very anxious as to the possible consequences1." On the following day, July 24th, the Ambassador presented a copy of the ultimatum, which demanded 1 Mensdorff's despatches are printed in the Austrian Red-book, 1920. A translation in three volumes has been published by Allen & Unwin. THE ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA 489 the suppression of anti-Austrian propaganda and the cooperation of Austrian Representatives in this task; and the Foreign Secretary renewed his complaint that a time-limit had been adopted at this stage. He had never known any State address to another a document of so formidable a character. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the concern of the British Government. He would exchange views with other Powers, and must await their views as to what could be done. His first task was to send for the French Ambassador. He told him that he was to see the German Ambassador in the afternoon, and should say that, if Russia took the view of the ultimatum which it seemed to him that any Power inter- ested in Servia would take, he would be quite powerless to exert any moderating influence. The only chance of mediation was that Ger- many, France, Italy and Great Britain, who had no direct interests in Servia, should act jointly and simultaneously in Vienna and Petrograd. M. Cambon replied that nothing could be said in Petrograd till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action ; that, in two days, Austria would march into Servia, since the Servians could not possibly accept the ultimatum; that Russia would be compelled by public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia; and therefore that, so soon as the Austrian attack began, it would be too late for mediation. The Minister rejoined that, if Austria entered Servia and Russia mobilised, it might be possible for the four Powers to urge both to halt, pending mediation; but German participation would be essential to success. M. Cambon reiterated his opinion that, after Austria had moved against Servia, it would be too late, and argued that the best chance lay in gaining time by mediation in Vienna, preferably on the initiative of Germany. In the afternoon, the Foreign Secretary saw the German Ambassa- dor, who brought a Circular Note denouncing the Serb intrigues against the integrity of the Dual Monarchy, approving the Austrian demands, and expressing the opinion that the matter concerned Austria and Servia alone. Sir Edward Grey observed that, if the ultimatum did not lead to trouble with Russia, he had no concern with it. But he was very apprehensive of the view Russia would take, and, in view of the extraordinary character of the Austrian Note and the short time allowed, he felt quite helpless so far as Russia was concerned. The only chance was that the Four other Great Powers should mediate and gain time ; and this was only possible if Germany would propose and participate in such advice at Vienna. In reporting 490 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE the conversation, Lichnowsky added that the Minister was obviously anxious to do everything possible to avoid European complications. The Kaiser, on the other hand, wrote on the margin of the despatch that he would only take part in mediation at Austria's express wish, which was unlikely, "since in vital matters people consult nobody." Having thus proposed mediation to Paris and Berlin, Sir Edward Grey, on the same day, urged Servia to promise the fullest satisfaction if any of her officials should prove to have been accomplices in the Serajevo murder. The efforts of the Foreign Secretary were bravely seconded by the German Ambassador, who, on July 25th, after reading the morning papers, telegraphed that the effect of the ultimatum was overwhelming; that Germany was considered morally responsible, since without her encouragement such a Note could never have been sent ; and that, unless she took part in mediation, British confidence in her love of peace would be finally destroyed. In a second telegram, he urged support of Sir Edward Grey's proposal to postpone hostilities against Servia. A confidential telegram to Jagowadded that the proposal for mediation by the four Powers was the only escape from a world war, and that, if France were drawn in, he did not believe that England could remain indifferent. The Ambassador's reading of the barometer was confirmed by a visit to the Foreign Office, where the Foreign Secretary hinted that Great Britain, though having entered into no binding arrangements, could not be indifferent to European complica- tions. The Government, added Lichnowsky in reporting the con- versation, would remain friendly and so far as possible impartial, so long as it believed in the sincerity of Germany's love of peace and desire to cooperate in preventing an explosion. Refusal of the pro- posal to mediate, or any step suggesting that Germany wished for war with Russia, would probably throw England on the side of France and Russia. On July 26th, Sir Edward Grey telegraphed the proposal for mediation which he had discussed with the Ambassadors to the Governments of Paris, Berlin and Rome. "Would the Minister of Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct the Ambassador here to join with the Representatives of France, Italy, Ger- many and myself to meet in confidence immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? If so, Repre- sentatives at Belgrade, Vienna and Petrograd should request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference." SIR EDWARD GREY PROPOSES MEDIATION 491 trance and Italy promptly accepted the proposal; but Jagow ex- plained to Sir Edward Goschen that such a conference would prac- tically amount to a Court of Arbitration and could only be summoned at the request of Austria and Russia, and that he must therefore decline, desirous though he was to cooperate for the maintenance of peace. He added that he had just heard of the intention of Petrograd to exchange views with Vienna, and that it would be best, before taking any steps, to await the result. Lichnowsky, on the contrary, informed Sir Edward Grey that his Government accepted in principle mediation by the four Powers, and conveyed the Chancellor's request to influence Petrograd to localise the War. The Foreign Secretary rejoined that the Servian reply, which he had just seen and which went further than could have been expected towards meeting the Austrian demands, was obviously due to Russian prompting, and it was therefore at Vienna that moderating influence was now required. If Austria marched into Servia, it would show that she was deter- mined to crush her, regardless of consequences. The reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion, and Germany should urge this course at Vienna. Lichnowsky reported that he found the Minister for the first time in low spirits. "He spoke very gravely and seemed very definitely to expect us to use our influence to settle the question. Everybody here is convinced that the key is in Berlin, and that, if Berlin wishes peace, it will hold back Austria." The Chan- cellor, who was not less anxious for Peace than Sir Edward Grey, telegraphed Lichnowsky's despatch to Vienna, adding that, having already declined the proposal for a Conference, it was impossible to reject the new suggestion. Unfortunately for the Peace of the World, Vienna was resolved on a final reckoning with her troublesome neighbour, who made no secret of her desire to build up a Greater Servia and had been en- couraged by Russia to find her "Promised Land" in the Habsburg dominions. "The integral acceptance of the ultimatum," reported Sir Maurice de Bunsen, "was neither expected nor desired.. . .The country believed it had before it only the alternative of subduing Servia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands." Mensdorff was instructed to inform Sir Edward Grey that Servia had not accepted the demands, that Austria must proceed to force, and that she counted on British sympathy in the struggle. Sir Edward Grey replied that he could not understand this reading of the answer. The Ambassador admitted that it might, on paper, seem satisfactory; but 492 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE the cooperation of Austrian officers and police, which alone would guarantee the cessation of the subversive campaign, had been refused. The Foreign Secretary retorted that in Russia, where the Servian reply was expected to diminish the tension, it had now been in- creased by Austria's decision. The response of Belgrade involved the greatest humiliation he had ever known a country undergo, and it was very disappointing that Austria had treated it as a blank negative. He added that the Fleet, which had assembled for man- oeuvres, was not being dispersed, though there was no menace in the decision. If Austria was determined, at any cost, to have the war with Servia of which she had been baulked in 1913, and which she regarded as essentially defensive, Russia was no less resolved to honour her reiterated promises of support to her protege. In the Bosnian crisis, she had been too weak to draw the sword ; but she had now recovered her breath, and, if she were to allow Servia to become an Austrian vassal, her prestige and authority in the Near East would be gone. Moreover, an influential party looked forward to a conflict of which Constantinople might be the prize. In the Central empires it was hoped, and in some quarters sincerely believed, that she would stand aside while Servia was receiving her chastisement; but there was no ground for such a supposition. After reading the Austrian ultimatum, which by a refinement of duplicity was issued immediately after the French President had concluded his visit to Petrograd and had taken ship, Sazonoff described it to Sir George Buchanan as provocative and immoral, and expressed the hope that the British Government would proclaim its solidarity with Russia and France. The Ambassa- dor replied that he did not expect any unconditional engagement of armed support, since no direct British interests were involved, and a war for Servia would never be sanctioned by British opinion. Sazonoff rejoined that the general European Question was involved; that Great Britain would, sooner or later, be dragged in if war broke out; and that we should render it more probable if we did not from the outset make common cause with France and Russia. Such was the situation when, on July 27th, the Foreign Secretary in a few pregnant sentences informed the House of Commons, whose attention had been focussed on the crisis in Ireland, of the gravity of the situation and of the steps he had taken to meet it. On learning the ultimatum, he had suggested cooperation with France, Germany and Italy to keep the peace. ORDERS TO THE FLEET 493 "The cooperation of all four Powers is essential. In a crisis so grave as this the efforts of one Power alone to preserve the peace must be quite ineffective. The moment the dispute ceases to be between Austria and Servia, it can but end in the greatest catastrophe that has ever befallen Europe at one blow. No one can say what would be the limit of the issues that might be raised by such a conflict, and the consequences would be incalculable." On the same day, the Cabinet for the first time discussed the mo- mentous issues of British interests and obligations in the event of a European War. The Foreign Secretary had uttered no word since the beginning of the crisis to bind himself or his colleagues; but an important decision had been taken on the previous day by the Admiralty on its own responsibility. It had been decided in March that, instead of the usual summer manoeuvres, a test mobilisation would be held in July. On July 16th, accordingly, 460 ships were assembled at Portland, and on July 23rd, at the conclusion of the exercises, Admiral Callaghan announced that he was beginning to disperse the Fleet, and that the process would be complete by July 27th. Desiring to allay anxiety, the Government at first took no steps to arrest the dispersal; but, at 4 o'clock on the afternoon of July 26th, when many minor vessels had already departed, the Admiral was instructed that no ships of the First Fleet were to leave till further orders, and that the ships of the Second Fleet were to remain at their home ports. This order was despatched on the initiative of Prince Louis of Battenberg, the First Sea Lord, with the approval of Mr Churchill. It was an elementary precaution, and, as the Foreign Secretary had explained to the Austrian Ambassador, there was no menace in it. The time had come, declared Sir Edward to his colleagues, to settle whether we should intervene or remain neutral in a European struggle. The Cabinet could naturally choose which it preferred ; but, if it chose neutrality, he was not the man to carry out such a policy. The meeting ended without a decision, and without a clear indication on which side it would ultimately fall. Cabinet discussions and sectional meetings continued throughout the week, Ministers being divided almost equally into interventionists and neutralists, though both sides were equally anxious for the success of the Foreign Secretary's efforts to avert the dread catastrophe. Though they had worked together for over eight crowded and anxious years, during which a European war had on several occasions seemed very near, they had never decided what part we should play in such a struggle. The negotiations which followed Lord Haldane's Mission 494 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE of 191 2 resulted in a significant refusal to tie our hands by a formula of rigid neutrality; but no advance was made, at that time or in the Grey-Cambon correspondence, towards deciding how we ought to employ our liberty. Meanwhile, the conversations between the military and naval experts had continued without interruption, though they remained unknown to Parliament. From the day of his accession to office, the Foreign Secretary had never doubted that it would be our duty and our interest to support France in arms if she were attacked by Germany ; but neither the Cabinet nor the country had reached this definite conclusion, and he was in consequence handicapped, when the storm broke, by his inability to speak in decisive tones. Till August 2nd, when the Government reached its first decision, he replied to all appeals for support that we must keep our hands free. After the ineffective Cabinet discussion on July 27th, he explained his attitude to Benckendorff, who complained that in German and Austrian circles an impression prevailed that, in any event, we should stand aside. This impression, replied Sir Edward Grey, ought to be dispelled by the orders we had given for the First Fleet not to disperse; but that fact must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised. On July 28th, when Sir Maurice de Bunsen expressed the desire of the British Government that the four Powers should work for peace, Berchtold replied, "quietly but firmly," that no discussion could be accepted on the basis of the Servian Note ; that war would be declared that day; that no temporary arrangement with Servia was worth concluding, as she had deceived Austria before; that she was not a civilised nation ; and that the Peace of Europe would not be saved if the Great Powers backed her up. If Austria accepted mediation, Servia would feel encouraged to go on as in the past, and the question of war would quickly crop up again. When the Declara- tion of War was known at Petrograd, mobilisation was ordered in southern Russia, and Sazonoff telegraphed to Benckendorff that it put an end to the idea of direct communications between Petrograd and Vienna. Action by the London Cabinet with a view to sus- pension of military operations was now most urgent ; for, unless they were stopped, mediation would only give Austria time to crush Servia. The Austrian Declaration of War against Servia, though not less deeply resented in Whitehall than had been the ultimatum, wrought no change in British policy. The Foreign Secretary continued to THE WARNING OF JULY 29TH 495 make no promises of support which might inflame the martial ardour of Petrograd, and no promise of neutrality which might encourage hotheads in Vienna and Berlin. On July 29th, he informed M. Cambon that, if Germany and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. "I thought it necessary to say that, because, although we were taking all precautions with the fleet and I was about to warn Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, it would not be fair that M. Cambon should suppose this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise." The Foreign Secretary next appealed to Berlin to suggest any method by which the Four Powers could prevent war. The whole idea of mediation, or mediating influence, was ready to be put into operation by any method Germany could suggest, should his own be unac- ceptable. Mediation, for instance, might be possible if Austria, while insisting that she must hold the occupied territory till she had received satisfaction, stated that she would not advance further pend- ing the effort to mediate between her and Russia. If Germany would recommend this at Vienna, he would secure Russian assent. The conversation with Lichnowsky was continued later in the day, when Sir Edward Grey, after repeating that the Austrian Declaration of War rendered vain the direct conversations between Vienna and Petrograd which the Chancellor had favoured, added what the Ambassador afterwards described as "the famous warning." "This afternoon," he telegraphed to Sir E.Goschen," I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. If Germany became involved and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation into thinking that we should stand aside. He said he quite understood this; but he asked whether I meant that we should under certain circumstances intervene. I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure. . . . But, if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once and the decision would have to be very rapid The Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given to Berlin as his view of the situation." Lichnowsky's despatch, which Jagow confessed to the British Ambassador he read with regret but without surprise, did not reach 496 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE Berlin in time to influence the Crown Council held on the same evening at Potsdam, whither the Kaiser had returned from his northern cruise. No authoritative account of the meeting has been published ; but, on returning from Potsdam, the Chancellor made to Sir Edward Goschen what the latter described as a strong bid for British neutrality. It was clear, he observed, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed ; but that was not Germany's object. If British neutrality were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that Germany aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France, should she prove victorious in a war. When questioned about the French Colonies, he said he could not give a similar undertaking. Germany would respect the integrity and neutrality of Holland, so long as her adversaries did the same. It depended on the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but, when the War was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany. His object had always been to bring about an understanding with England. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement; and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which the present crisis might possibly produce would enable him to look forward to its realisation. Sir Edward Grey promptly replied, with a heat which he had not hitherto displayed, that the Government could not for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal of neutrality on such terms. "Without having further territory taken from her in Europe," he tele- graphed to Sir Edward Goschen, " France could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power ; and it would be a disgrace from which our good name would never recover to make this bargain at her expense. Nor could we bargain away our obligation or interest in the neutrality of Belgium. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances seem to us to require. You should add, most earnestly, that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe. If we succeed in this object, they will be ipso facto improved. If the Peace of Europe can be preserved, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement, to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her Allies by France and Russia and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals; but, if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that GERMANY ATTEMPTS TO RESTRAIN AUSTRIA 497 Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction may make possible some more definite rap- prochement between the Powers." The Kaiser and the Chancellor had rashly encouraged Berchtold to set the stone rolling ; but after the Servian reply they attempted to apply the brake to the Austrian chariot. " The wishes of the Monarchy are in the main fulfilled, " wrote the Kaiser to Jagow. "A capitulation of the most humiliating character is enshrined therein, and every ground for war disappears. But the piece of paper is only of value when it is translated into fact. The Serbs are Orientals, false and procrastinating. In order that these fair promises materialise, a douce violence must be applied. Austria could hold Belgrade as a guarantee. The Austrian Army must have a visible satisfaction d'honneur. That is the condition of my media tion." This proposal was despatched to Vienna on the evening of June 28th, anticipating a similar proposal of Sir Edward Grey. But information received a day later from the Ambassador at Petrograd caused the Chancellor to address a sharp warning to Vienna, which would have been of greater utility at an earlier date. "The refusal to exchange views with Petrograd would be a grave mistake. We are ready to fulfil our duty. As an Ally, we must, however, refuse to be drawn into a world-conflagration through Austria not respecting our advice. Tell Berchtold, with all emphasis and great seriousness." Berchtold at once permitted the renewal of conversations at Petrograd, which he had refused two days previously, and added that neither the infraction of Servia's rights nor the acquisition of territory was contemplated. A Crown Council decided to send a courteous reply to the British offer of mediation, which Austria was willing to consider on condition that the operations in Servia were not inter- rupted thereby, and that Russia instantly ceased mobilisation and dismissed her reserves. The readiness for an eleventh hour com- promise with which Austria has been sometimes credited was thus largely imaginary; for it was of the essence of the Anglo-German proposal that the campaign against Servia should stop, and no one could expect Russia to cease mobilisation and dismiss her reserves while the Austrian army continued to trample the Servians underfoot. When, however, Sir Edward Grey was informed by Lichnowsky that, as a result of German representations, conversations between Russia and Austria had been resumed, he expressed his gratification and instructed the British Ambassador to tell Sazonoff that he earnestly w.&g. in 32 498 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE hoped he would encourage them. He did not, however, see how Russia could suspend military preparations, unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia. To meet the diffi- culty, he now instructed Sir Edward Goschen to sound the German Government as to a fresh proposal. " It has occurred to me that Germany might sound Vienna, and I would sound Petrograd, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory, which she has already declared her willingness to respect. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands impairing Servian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course suspend further military operations or preparations." The Ambassador was ordered to repeat the promise and the warning which the Foreign Secretary had just given to Lichnowsky. " I said that, if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at Petrograd and Paris, and would go the length of saying that, if Russia and France would not accept it, the Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I told the Ambassador that, if France became involved, we should be drawn in." Sir Edward Grey's conversation with Lichnowsky on the morning of July 31st took place, and his Instructions to Berlin were despatched, in ignorance of the fact that Russia, who had mobilised fifty-five divisions on July 29th in answer to Austria's twenty-two, had now mobilised her entire forces. According to Sukhomlinoff, the Russian War Minister, the Tsar signed the order for general mobilisation on the afternoon of July 29th ; but, after a friendly telegram from the Kaiser, he ordered that mobilisation should only take place against Austria1. The War Minister, however, and the Chief of the Staff allowed general mobilisation to continue, while concealing this from the Tsar and denying it to the German Military Attache. Their disobedience was not discovered at the time ; for, in the afternoon of July 30th, Sazonoff, the War Minister and the Minister of Marine, on learning of the bombardment of Belgrade, agreed that general mobilisation was necessary. The Tsar's consent was obtained the same night, and in the early hours of July 31st the capital was 1 The revelations at Sukhomlinoff's trial for embezzlement were summarised in The Manchester Guardian, September 22nd, 19 17. GENERAL MOBILISATION OF RUSSIA 499 placarded with notices. A few hours later Austria also ordered general mobilisation. The provocation involved in Austria's attack on Servia was grievous, and the guilt of the Austrian ultimatum was beyond com- parison greater than that of the Russian mobilisation, because it was first in time and invited the response which it received. The World- war was, nevertheless, precipitated by the action of Russia, at a moment when conversations between Vienna and Petrograd were being resumed, when the Chancellor was at length endeavouring to restrain his ally, and when the Tsar and the Kaiser were in telegraphic com- munication. The proclamation from Berlin of drohende Kriegsgefahr ', followed by an ultimatum demanding the cessation of Russia's general mobilisation within twelve hours, was hailed throughout Germany as the inevitable reply to the dread menace of invasion. While Sir Edward Grey had been gallantly struggling to build a bridge between Vienna and Petrograd, France was convinced that nothing but a public assurance of British support for the Dual Alliance would arrest the avalanche; and, throughout the week, she made repeated but unavailing efforts to secure it. On July 30th, the French Ambassador reminded Sir Edward Grey of the letters of 1912. "He did not ask me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circum- stances arose; for instance, if Germany demanded that France should cease her preparations or demand her neutrality." The Foreign Secretary promised a reply after the Cabinet meeting on the following day; and, meanwhile, the Prime-Minister announced in the House of Commons the postponement of the Irish Amending Bill. "The issues of peace and war are hanging in the balance. It is of vital importance in the interests of the whole world that this country, which has no interests of its own directly at stake, should present a united front and be able to speak and act with the authority of an undivided nation." On the following day The Times, which was still regarded abroad as reflecting the policy of the Foreign Office, began an active campaign for intervention. "The interest of self-preserva- tion," it wrote, "compels us to be ready to strike with all our force for our own safety and that of our friends, the European equilibrium, and the more direct interest of preserving the independence of Belgium and the Channel." This view was shared by almost every Opposition organ, while the Ministerial Press was at this stage equally solid for neutrality. 32 — 2 5oo TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE On July 31st, after the Cabinet, the Foreign Secretary, according to promise, saw the French Ambassador, who referred to a telegram from his brother that it was the uncertainty as to our intervention which encouraged Berlin. "I said it was quite wrong to suppose we had left Germany under the impression we would not intervene. I had refused overtures for neutrality, and this morning I told Lichnowsky we should be drawn in, if France and Germany were involved. That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France. He then asked me for my reply to his question. I said we had come to the conclusion in the Cabinet today that we could not give any pledge at the present time. We could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present we did not feel that any treaties or obligations were involved He repeated his question: whether we would help France if Germany attacked her. I said we could not take any engagement.' * A direct appeal from the President to the King repeated the familiar argument. If Germany were convinced that Great Britain would not intervene, war would seem to be inevitable ; but, if she were convinced that Great Britain would take the field, there was the greatest chance of peace. The King replied, on August 1st, that he was still not without hope, and that he was using his best endeavours with the Emperors of Russia and Germany. " As to the attitude of my country, events are changing so rapidly that it is difficult to forecast future developments; but you may be assured that my Government will continue to discuss freely and frankly any point which might arise of interest to our two nations with M. Cambon." It was a polite, but perfectly definite, refusal to promise assistance, which reflected the mind neither of the King nor the Foreign Office, but represented the makeshift of a divided Cabinet. When the news of the Russian mobilisation and the formal pro- clamation by Germany of drohende Kriegsgefahr reached London on July 31st, Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to the French and German Governments to ask whether they would engage to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and informed Belgium that he assumed she would herself uphold her neutrality to the utmost of her power. France at once gave the desired assurance, while the German Foreign Secretary ominously replied that a response would reveal the plan of campaign. Sir Edward Grey, accordingly, read to the German Am- bassador a warning message unanimously adopted by the Cabinet. " The reply of the German Government is a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If PROMISE OF NAVAL SUPPORT TO FRANCE 501 Germany could see her way to give a positive reply as France has done, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here; while, if there were a violation by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling." At this point, the Ambassador naturally asked whether we would remain neutral if Germany promised not to violate the Belgian frontier. " I replied that I could not say that. Our hands were still free. Our attitude would be largely determined by public opinion, and the neutrality of Belgium would appeal to it very strongly. I did not think we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone." The Ambassador then asked whether the Foreign Secretary could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral, and even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed. "I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free." The Foreign Secretary was to incur sharp criticism when the Report of this conversation was pub- lished in the White-book; and he replied to his critics that the con- ditional offer to guarantee the integrity of France and her Colonies was unofficial and academic. The matter is of no great importance, since the Foreign Secretary was resolved to remain neutral only if the Dual Alliance rejected a reasonable proposal for keeping the peace. King George's indefinite reply to the President, despatched on the morning of August 1st, was supplemented by the Foreign Secre- tary, who informed the French Ambassador after the morning Cabinet that he would propose to his colleagues that the Fleet should oppose the passage of the Straits of Dover or any demonstration on the French coast by the German Fleet, and would ask leave to declare in Parliament that we could not permit the violation of Belgian neutrality. The proposals were made to a Cabinet the same evening, and the discussion was resumed on the following morning, when the Foreign Secretary was empowered to promise conditional naval support. "lam authorised to give the assurance that, if the German Fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British Fleet will give all the pro- tection in its power. This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of the Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding the Government to take any action until the above con- tingency of action by the German Fleet takes place." In handing M. Cambon the Memorandum, the Foreign Secretary 502 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE pointed out that the Government could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany if it broke out between France and Germany to-morrow; but it was essential to the French Government, whose Fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. In taking the momentous decision on August 2nd, to oppose a German naval attack on the French coasts, the Cabinet had before it a letter which was brought to Downing Street during the sitting. ' 'Dear Mr Asquith, Lord Lansdowne and I feel it our duty to inform you that in our opinion, as well as in that of all the colleagues whom we have been able to consult, it would be fatal to the honour and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting France and Russia at the present juncture, and we offer our unhesitating support to the Government in any measures they may consider necessary for that object. Yours very truly, A. Bonar Law1." "This Cabinet Memorandum," writes Lord Loreburn, "fixes the date when we were irrevocably committed to war with Germany; for war between France and Germany was then certain, and was declared next day. It prohibited Germany from using her Fleet against French coasts or shipping, without a corresponding prohibition of the use of the French Fleet against German coasts or shipping." Several Ministers assented with reluctance; and, when the Cabinet met again the same evening Mr Burns, who regarded it as a Declara- tion of War, reiterated his determination to resign. Lord Morley added that he, too, must go; and, though he accepted the Prime- Minister's appeal to defer a final decision till the morrow, he sent in his resignation on the following morning. Two other resignations were received from Cabinet Ministers, but were quickly withdrawn. No fresh decision as to policy was taken on August 3rd ; but, after the Cabinet, orders were issued for the mobilisation of the Army. Belgium had hitherto played a secondary part in the discussions of the British Cabinet; but she now advanced to the centre of the 1 In his article "Retrospect and Reminiscence," in The National Review, August, 1918, Mr Maxse narrates the genesis of this historic letter. Fearing that the Cabinet might not support France, a number of Unionists, among them Mr Maxse himself, Mr Wickham Steed and Sir Henry Wilson, determined on August 1 st to mobilise the Unionist leaders. A meeting was hastily summoned at Lansdowne House, and on the following morning Lord Lansdowne and Mr Chamberlain took a draft letter to Mr Bonar Law. An alternative draft by the latter was accepted, and was taken to Downing Street at midday in Lord Lansdowne's car. THE SPEECH OF AUGUST 3rd 503 stage. A sealed ultimatum, stating that the French had resolved to cross the Belgian frontier and demanding permission for the passage of German troops, had been sent to Brussels on July 29th, and was presented on the evening of August 2nd. The Belgian Cabinet re- fused, and on August 3rd King George received a telegram from the King of the Belgians. " Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic inter- vention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium." Though only diplomatic intervention was requested, the reply despatched on the following morning offered to join France and Russia in resisting the attack which had already commenced1. Sir Edward Grey opened his speech on August 3rd by recognising that the Peace of Europe could not be maintained. He, like the Prime-Minister, had always promised, that, if such a crisis arose, the House would be free to decide, and that they would not spring a secret engagement on Parliament, nor tell it that, because they had entered into such an engagement, there was an obligation of honour on the country. The Triple Entente was a diplomatic group, not an alliance ; the military conversations begun in 1906 in no way restricted the freedom of the Government; and his letter to M. Cambon on November 22nd, 19 12, which he read to the House, recognised that the Government was uncommitted and pledged it to nothing more than discussion if peace were threatened. Thus, the Government was free, and, a fortiori ', the House of Commons was free. We had merely to consider what the situation required of us. For many years we had had a friendship with France. " But, how far that friendship entails obligation, let every man look into his own heart and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obliga- tion for himself. I construe it as I feel it ; but I do not wish to urge upon anyone else more than their feelings dictate. The House, individually and collectively, may judge for itself. The French Fleet is now in the Medi- terranean, and the Northern and Western coasts of France are absolutely undefended because of the feeling of confidence and friendship between the two countries. My own feeling is that, if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which France had not sought, came down the Channel and bombarded 1 The Guarantee of 1839, as Palmerston pointed out, gave a right, but did not impose an obligation, to defend Belgian neutrality. Gladstone's Treaties with France and Russia in 1870 were only necessary because that of 1839 did not auto- matically invoke action. See Sanger and Norton, England's Guarantee to Belgium id Luxemburg. 5o4 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE the undefended coast of France, we could not stand aside. France was entitled to know at once, whether in the event of attack on her unprotected northern and western coasts she could count on British support, and I therefore gave the promise yesterday to the French Ambassador. It was not a Declaration of War." A still more serious consideration was the neutrality of Belgium. He had asked France and Germany whether they would engage to respect her neutrality. France agreed; but the German Foreign Minister said he could not reply before consulting the Emperor and the Chancellor, and he doubted whether they could answer at all. News had just arrived of a German ultimatum to Belgium. " If true, and if she accepted, her independence would be gone, whatever might be offered in return. If her independence goes, that of Holland will follow. If France was beaten, if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, consider what would be at stake from the point of view of British interests. It may be said that we might stand aside, and intervene at the end to adjust things to our own point of view. If in a crisis like this we turn away from those obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian Treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect we should have lost. And if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than if we stand aside. I do not believe for a moment that, even if we stood aside, we should be able to undo what had happened, to prevent the whole of the West of Europe — if that had been the result of the War — falling under the domination of a single Power, and I am quite sure that our moral position would be such as to have lost us all respect. Though the Fleet is mobilised and the Army is mobilising, we have taken no engagement yet to send an Expeditionary Force out of the country ; but if, as seems not improbable, we are forced to take our stand on those issues, then, I believe, when the country realises what is at stake, we shall be supported, not only by the House of Commons, but by the determination, the courage and the endurance of the whole country." Though the decision was in theory left to the House, it was clear that the Foreign Secretary's mind was made up, and his hearers felt that intervention was a matter of hours. Mr Bonar Law promised the support of the Opposition in the event of war; Mr Redmond assured the Government that they might withdraw their troops from Ireland, which would be defended by her armed sons; but Mr Ramsay Macdonald declared for neutrality on the ground that the speech had not persuaded him that the country was in danger. The House adjourned till the evening. When it met again, the Foreign Secretary announced that a German ultimatum had been presented to Belgium on the previous evening demanding passage through the THE ULTIMATUM TO GERMANY 505 country, and added that the Government would take the matter into grave consideration. Early on August 4th, Sir Edward Grey despatched a protest against the ultimatum fy Belgium. " H.M. Government are bound to protest against this violation of a Treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made on Belgium will not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply." Before a reply could be received from Berlin, news arrived from the Belgian Legation that the frontier had been crossed. It was in vain that Jagow instructed Lichnowsky to repeat that under no circumstances would Germany annex Belgian territory, and to impress on Sir Edward Grey that the German army could not be exposed to a French attack across Belgium, "which was planned, according to absolutely unimpeachable information." It was too late for excuses, and German promises were now at a discount. When the Cabinet met on the morning of August 4th, all doubts and hesitations had been swept away. 11 On Saturday, August 1st," declared Mr Lloyd George in an interview in 1915, "a poll of the electors would have shewn 99 per cent, against embroiling their country in hostilities. A poll on the following Tuesday would have resulted in a vote of 99 per cent, in favour of war. The revolu- tion in public sentiment was attributable entirely to an attack by Germany on a small and unprotected country which had done her no wrong; and what Britain was not prepared to do for interests political and commercial she readily risked to help the weak and helpless. I would not have been a party to a Declaration of War had Belgium not been invaded, and I think I can say the same for most if not all of my colleagues1." The ascription of his own views to the great majority of his col- leagues is unwarranted, but the apologia illustrates the changed atmosphere in which the ultimatum to Berlin was drawn up, approved and despatched. "We hear that Germany has addressed a Note to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that the German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indis- pensable. We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmerich. In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat the request and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning be received here by 1 Pearson's Magazine, March, 1915. 506 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE 12 o'clock tonight. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a Treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves." Sir Edward Goschen delivered the ultimatum to the Foreign Minister, who expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and through Great Britain to draw closer to France. The Ambassador then paid a farewell visit to the Chancellor.